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The Palestinian Popular Resistance and Its Built-In Violence



A Palestinian rioter prepares to throw a Molotov cocktail at IDF forces in Judea and Samaria (Palinfo website, January 6, 2013)

The Main Findings of This Study

1. This study examines the concept of the Palestinian popular resistance (al-muqawama al-sha'abiya) as it was formulated during the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, then adopted by the sixth Fatah conference in August 2009, and **has since been implemented in Judea and Samaria by the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Fatah.** The concept of popular resistance **has become a main component of PA policy,** used to promote PA interests when interacting with Israel and in both the international and internal Palestinian arenas.

2. The main findings:

1) The popular resistance is a strategy implemented on the ground and integrated into **the political, economic, propaganda and judicial campaigns currently being waged by the PA against Israel.** As far as the PA and Fatah are concerned, the popular resistance is used to maintain **constant, controlled tension** in Palestinian relations with Israel. The popular resistance can be used to exert pressure on Israel to the extent and degree suitable to political developments, and is regarded as legitimate by the international community. **Internally, the PA and Fatah have presented the Palestinian public with the popular resistance as an acceptable alternative to Hamas' "armed resistance"** which the PA and Fatah feel is not, at the present time, useful in the Palestinian campaign against Israel.

2) **The popular resistance is not the placid, non-violent protest the PA pretends it is. It makes massive use of violence employing cold weapons, usually but not always involving the frequent use of Molotov cocktails and stones.** In addition, there are sporadic attacks involving **knives and vehicular attacks on Israelis.** In recent years, the use of cold weapons against Israeli security forces and Israeli civilians has increased considerably and **become the main component of anti-Israeli violence in Judea and Samaria,** as opposed to a significant decrease in the use of arms (guns and explosives). **The use of cold weapons has risen even more sharply since the end of Operation Pillar of Defense,** although the popular resistance has not yet turned into a mass uprising (in most instances popular resistance events attract between dozens and hundreds of participants). **Occasionally the popular resistance**

claims casualties (killed and wounded) among Israeli civilians and soldiers, as well as Palestinians.

3) **The PA publicly supports the systematic violence used in popular resistance attacks both directly and indirectly, providing financial and logistic support.** The PA's security forces do not take the same effective steps to prevent the use of cold weapons as they do to prevent the use of arms, although they make an effort to contain and control violent incidents of friction. **In the international arena the PA fully legitimizes the popular resistance, despite its aggressive violence and despite the resulting casualties (an Israeli civilian was recently [April 2013] stabbed to death).** The PA and Fatah represent the violent events "peaceful resistance" or "unarmed resistance" and as such successfully market it to the international community.

4) On the other hand, **the PA does object to the use of arms (guns and explosives), which might turn the popular resistance into an armed military campaign against Israel.** The PA and its security forces **use preventive measures to enforce the position on Hamas and the other terrorist organizations. They also continue security coordination with Israel despite Hamas' harsh criticism.** However, ideologically at least, the PA and Fatah have not ruled out the option of an armed campaign: according to the Fatah political platform of August 2009, **an armed campaign remains a future option, dependent on the political and social conditions in the conflict.** In addition, even during the popular resistance, **the PA and Fatah preserve the legacy and symbols of the armed campaign,** manifested, for example, by **commemorating the "shaheeds"** (of all the terrorist organizations) killed while carrying out terrorist attacks.

5) **While the popular resistance is generally not directed by the Palestinian terrorist organizations, it is not necessarily "popular" or spontaneous, as represented by the PA and its participants.** The original protests were in fact popular, local, spontaneous and authentic, but became institutionalized (especially after the sixth Fatah conference) and have turned into an important PA-Fatah political tool. **Approximately 30 "popular committees"** (a term taken from the first intifada) have been established to protest the security fence and the Israeli settlements; a Popular Struggle Coordination Committee has also been established and sits in Ramallah. **The PA also organized and institutionalized mechanisms to motivate popular**

protests regarding the Palestinian terrorist prisoners, which gained momentum during the past year. Various other elements have been integrated into the popular resistance: **university and college students** in Judea and Samaria, **Palestinian terrorist operatives** (especially from **Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP] and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine [DFLP]**), left-affiliated Palestinian **NGO activists** (especially from Mustafa Barghouti's National Initiative), **pro-Palestinian activists from abroad** (especially from Western countries) organized to arrive in Judea and Samaria for specific periods of time, and **far leftist Israeli activists**.

6) **In 2012 the number of popular resistance attacks rose compared to 2011 and their numbers reached several hundred every month. The numbers have continued to rise throughout the first half of 2013**, to today's high level of violence in Judea and Samaria. Two issues that **inflamed events and increased their severity were Operation Pillar of Defense and the Palestinian terrorist operative prisoners in Israeli jails** (especially after the Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange deal, which was widely publicized). **Stabbings** also increased, from four in 2011 to 11 in 2012. This past year **cold weapons were used to kill two Israeli civilians in Judea and Samaria: one was stabbed to death and the other was the victim of a vehicular attack. In 2012, 35 Israelis were wounded, more than half of them by stones and Molotov cocktails**. However, **the number of terrorist attacks involving the use of arms remained relatively low**, despite attempts by Hamas and the other terrorist organizations to encourage them (only **6.4% of the overall number of violent attacks**).

7) **Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)** and other terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip **still consider an armed military campaign as their chosen method to achieve their overall strategic goal, that is, the destruction of the State of Israel**. Hamas, however, does not reject the popular resistance but regards it as only complementing the **main military-terrorist effort**. Thus Hamas and the other terrorist organizations **do their utmost to establish an armed terrorist infrastructure in Judea and Samaria** (so far without notable success). In our assessment, their failure to successfully export terrorism from the Gaza Strip to Judea and Samaria is primarily the result of **the Israeli security forces' effective counterterrorism activities**. They are supported by the preventive activities of the Palestinian security forces and the

Palestinian public's unwillingness, at least at this point, to pay the high price of a new intifada. **Hamas and other terrorist organization operatives participate in popular resistance events in Judea and Samaria, but they do not play a major role**, and so far have been careful **not to present too much of a challenge to the Palestinian security forces**. The Hamas and PIJ media give extensive coverage to the popular resistance, praise it and encourage it to continue, **while making explicit appeals for a third intifada**.

8) **The PA allows and on occasion even encourages anti-Israeli organizations from around the world (primarily from Western countries) to participate in the popular resistance, some of which play an important role in the campaign to delegitimize Israel**. Most of the foreigners operating in Judea and Samaria belong to NGOs usually **affiliated with the far left in Europe, the United States and Israel** (particularly prominent is the International Solidarity Movement [ISM], rooted in the American radical left, and very active in Judea and Samaria). The most prominent Palestinian terrorist organization involved in the popular resistance and maintaining ongoing contact with far leftist organizations in Europe (especially France and Italy) is the **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine**. For the PA and those motivating the popular resistance, the participation of foreigners **increases its strength and its media presence, and helps them demonize Israel in the international arena** (branding Israel as an "apartheid state"). However, during the past year, the PA has made a point of the **Palestinian role** in popular resistance events, and the PA heads publicly stated they would prefer to see Palestinians dominate the protests and demonstrations. In addition, **Hamas has also made extensive use of far left and extreme Islamic international organizations and activists** to promote projects supporting Hamas in the Gaza Strip, as well as campaigns to send boats and convoys to the Gaza Strip to break the "siege" (a campaign which, in light of a series of failures, has weakened since the Mavi Marmara).

3. **In our assessment, from the PA's perspective, so far the balance of implementing the popular resistance is extremely positive. For the past several years popular resistance events have kept the Israeli security forces in Judea and Samaria busy all the time and helped keep the Palestinian issue in the world media and on the international political agenda. Despite the massive amount of violence involved in the popular resistance and despite the casualties among Israeli civilians and soldiers, the Palestinians have managed to foster the false**

impression that they are waging a peaceful, unarmed resistance campaign against Israel, which is represented as an oppressive occupying power. On the other hand, the popular resistance has not spun out of PA control, it continues holding its events at the traditional friction points and its extent remains limited (although with the potential to deteriorate). In the internal Palestinian arena **the popular resistance has improved the status of the PA and Fatah vis-à-vis Hamas** and at the same time it has not harmed the PA's efforts to restore public order in Judea and Samaria and reduce anarchy on the ground.

4. **Thus senior PA and Fatah figures have repeatedly stated their intention to extend the popular resistance in 2013** and improve its tactics (for example by blocking roads and erecting "outposts"). In our assessment, **the PA assumes it will continue to gain great political benefit from the popular resistance and at the same time be able to control it and prevent it from being exploited by Hamas and the other terrorist organizations.** It seems unlikely that American President Obama's visit to Israel and the PA, and the expectation for a renewal of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations will lead to a decrease in the extent or intensity of the popular resistance and its built-in violence. Rather, **the popular resistance and its attendant violence will probably increase in the coming year**, whether as a way of inciting the peace process or whether as a result of the Palestinians' frustration at not achieving what they expected would be the outcome of the renewal of the peace process.

5. The government of Israel, in its reservations regarding the Road Map, said at the time that the Palestinians had to dismantle the PA's security organizations and reform their structures, cease violence and incitement, and educate for peace (Website of the Israeli Knesset Library, government of the State of Israel decision of May 25, 2003). An analysis of the popular resistance indicates that the conditions were not fully met. While the PA has invested effort in preventing armed military terrorism and has distanced itself from Hamas on that particular issue, **the cold weapon violence built into the popular resistance is not being prevented.** On the contrary, both the PA and Fatah, in word and deed, **encourage and foster it, and accompany the popular resistance with ongoing anti-Israeli propaganda and incitement.** As a result, the extreme terrorism prevalent during the era of Yasser Arafat (especially the second intifada) significantly decreased in recent years, and following that, so did the number

of Israeli casualties in Judea and Samaria. **On the other hand, however, anti-Israeli Palestinian violence did not disappear, it merely changed form, became more sophisticated and more controlled, and the Palestinians feel it is more acceptable and more easily digested by the United States (also as a scenario of the peace process), the international community and even Israel.**

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Section One: The Concept of the popular resistance and Its Built-In Violence

Historical background: The place of the popular resistance in the Palestinian conflict with Israel

1. **The concept of a violent, armed campaign against Israel has been at the center of Palestinian nationalism** since the establishment of the PLO and Fatah in the early 1960s. One of its manifestations was the terrorist and guerilla attacks carried out by Fatah (and other Palestinian terrorist organizations) based in **Judea and Samaria** (during the second half of 1967) and **Jordan** (until 1971), and later in **Lebanon** (until 1982). However, alongside the dominant concept of armed struggle there have occasionally been (fairly weak) sparks **of the concept of the so-called popular resistance, whether to complement the armed campaign or as a temporary alternative to it**, depending on circumstances and conditions making it difficult to carry out the armed campaign.

2. After the Arab defeat in 1967, and more so after Fatah lost its territorial base in Lebanon in 1982, occasional attempts were made in Judea and Samaria to initiate a popular resistance. **Fahd Qawasmeh**, the mayor of Hebron, is credited with saying, in the early 1980s, that "in facing the occupation, **the stones of our children are more powerful than the tanks and cannons of the Arab states.**" While popular resistance became an important tool in the hands of the Judea and Samaria mayors who supported the PLO, **at the time it was not adopted by Fatah, which favored the concept of an armed campaign.** From the Fatah perspective, **the idea of a popular non-violent struggle was contrary to its founding ethic (and that of the other terrorist organizations)**, which relied on Arafat's time-worn formula (inspired by global radicalism) of "the solution will come from the barrel of a gun." **Thus the concept of armed campaign remained the ideological foundation of Fatah's activities**, and Palestinian leaders such as Yasser Arafat and Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) were incapable of internalizing the idea that guns were not necessarily their only weapons, and that there were other effective ways to achieve results.¹

3. **The use of the so-called *soft violence* characterizing popular revolts increased at the beginning of the first intifada** (end of 1987 – beginning of 1988). There was an increase in mass demonstrations and riots in the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria:

¹ See Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Intifada*, Simon and Schuster, 1990.

tires were burned and stones and Molotov cocktails were thrown, presenting significant difficulties for the IDF. However, representing the first intifada as a popular resistance is inexact, **because with encouragement from Fatah, its original spontaneous popular nature slid into armed military uprising**, characterized by shooting attacks and the murder of collaborators. Directed by the PLO and Fatah, whose agenda did not include a popular resistance, **the intifada became more organized**. Hamas established its military-terrorist wing, called the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, which also worked to escalate the intifada.

4. **During the first intifada the concept of non-violent struggle was most clearly expressed by Dr. Mubarak**, a Palestinian psychologist born in Jerusalem in 1942, whose father was killed fighting the Jewish Yishuv (pre-State of Israel Jewish community). He moved to the United States after 1967 and took American citizenship. In 1985 (or 1984, according to other versions) he came to Israel as a tourist and established the **Palestinian Center for the Study of Nonviolence**, known since 1988 as the **Holy Land Trust**. He published many articles before the first intifada and lectured on nonviolent ways to confront the "Israeli occupation."² In 1985 he published an essay dealing with occupied lands in which he preached civil disobedience, which was, he said, the most successful way to struggle against Israel. He participated in organizing nonviolent demonstrations in Judea and Samaria.³ In 1988 he was forced to return to the United States when the Israeli Ministry of the Interior refused to extend his visa.

5. **The second intifada**, which broke out at the end of September 2000, **was characterized by the deadly mass-casualty suicide bombing attacks which became a symbol of the Palestinian terrorist campaign**. The Palestinians regarded the second intifada as an uprising using institutionalized military violence. Hamas, Fatah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other Palestinian terrorist organizations participated in the second intifada, supported by Yasser Arafat's PA. Today Mahmoud Abbas represents the results of the second intifada as a failure whose lessons have to be learned and for which alternative methods found. **The concept of popular resistance is represented as the antithesis of the second intifada, as a response to the current exigencies of the Palestinian national struggle, and as a return to the "popular" roots of the first intifada**. Nostalgia for the first intifada is expressed

² According to Schiff and Ya'ari, *Intifada*, for many years Dr. Mubarak Awad and his ideas were scorned by the PLO as unrealistic and irrelevant for Palestinian life. For further information see Chapter Nine, "The Pendulum of Civil Disobedience."

³ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mubarak_Awad. See also Aryeh Shalev, *Intifada: Causes and Effects*, Tel Aviv University Press, 1990.

by establishing various bodies similar to those operating at the time and by the use of similar terminology (i.e., "popular committees").

The sixth Fatah conference adopts the concept of popular resistance (August 2009)

6. The popular resistance in Judea and Samaria **began as an authentic action whose objective was to change the route of the security fence** built by Israel during the second intifada to protect the country from **deadly mass-casualty suicide bombing attacks**. It began at the height of the second intifada, 2002-2003, but did not receive media coverage or political glory, overshadowed as it was by institutionalized military-terrorist violence. Only later, after the intifada and after the death of Yasser Arafat, **was the concept of popular resistance pushed to the front of the political stage as politically preferable to armed attacks, and formally and publicly adopted by the PA and Fatah.**

7. **The sixth Fatah conference**, beginning in Bethlehem on August 4, 2009, discussed the place of armed violence in the current stage of the Palestinian struggle against Israel. The issue was sensitive and problematic for the PA and Fatah because **ideologically**, the general feeling at the conference was that **the principle of armed campaign**, to which Fatah had adhered since its founding, **had never been and would never be abandoned**. On the other hand, practically speaking, **Mahmoud Abbas** and the heads of Fatah were aware that at that time the social and political conditions in Judea and Samaria and political circumstances in the international arena were unsuitable for implementing an armed campaign.

8. Thus the **concept of popular resistance was adopted, represented as unarmed protest, "the resistance of the masses,"** a term coined by Mahmoud Abbas at the beginning of the conference. In his opening speech he expressed support for continuing negotiations with Israel despite the difficulties, and the adherence of the Palestinian people to the option of peace. However, he said, **the Palestinian people reserved the "right" of "legitimate resistance"** as anchored in international law, **giving the example of the weekly demonstrations in Bila'in**. He explained at length the significance of "legitimate resistance," using the term *muqawama jamahiriyya* ("resistance of the masses").

9. In his speech he said that **"the resistance of the masses of our people against the settlements, the fence and the destruction and confiscation of their houses is an example of our ability to invent different ways of fighting, ways which can the**

penetrate the conscience of the world and receive support from the peoples. I give my blessing and express my admiration for the masses in **Jerusalem, Bila'in, Ni'lin and Al-Ma'sara**,⁴ and wherever they go out, unarmed demonstrators **equipped with nothing but hope**, determination and faith in victory, to demonstrations expressing their resistance to the occupation" (Official website of the sixth Fatah conference, August 4, 2009).

10. Both at the conference and later **Mahmoud Abbas used the term "unarmed 'popular resistance.'" However, the Fatah conference, in the final version of its political platform, stressed that it had not abandoned the concept of armed campaign**, a principle central to Fatah. According to **Article 4** of the platform, entitled "Confrontation with the settlement occupation and the continuation of the campaign for liberation and independence: **"The right to resistance (*muqawama*): Fatah adheres to the right of the Palestinian people to use all legitimate means to resist the occupation, including the right, anchored in international law, to wage an armed struggle**, as long as the occupation, the settlements and the denial of the indisputable rights of the Palestinian people continue" (Fatehconf.ps website).

Article 4 in Arabic (ITIC highlight):

4. الحق في المقاومة: تتمسك حركة فتح بحق الشعب الفلسطيني في مقاومة الاحتلال، بكافة الوسائل المشروعة بما فيها حقه في ممارسة الكفاح المسلح الذي يكفله القانون الدولي، طالما استمر الاحتلال، والاستيطان، وحرمان الشعب الفلسطيني من حقوقه الثابتة.

The popular resistance becomes a main component of PA policy

11. In August 2009 then-Palestinian Prime Minister **Salam Fayyad** made public his two-year plan for constructing the Palestinian state "from the bottom up" (Palestinecabinet.gov.ps website). **He included the popular resistance as part of the overall Palestinian policy, stating it was the duty of the Palestinian government to support the "peaceful resistance of the masses."** They were resisting, he said, steps taken by Israel in Judea and Samaria, **such as appropriating and confiscating lands, founding settlements, building the separation fence and**

⁴ The villages of Bila'in and Ni'lin lie west of Ramallah in proximity to Modi'in Ilit. The village of Al-Ma'sara lies south of Bethlehem.

razing buildings. The resistance would include a boycott of goods manufactured in the settlements.⁵

12. Salam Fayyad has continued his support for the Bila'in model of popular resistance, and participates in popular resistance events. In a speech he gave for Land Day on March 27, 2013, he praised what he called the "peaceful popular resistance" to the occupation and settlements. He said that the popular resistance was **a cornerstone of the PA's vision and Palestinian government's plan**. He also said that the campaign to boycott goods manufactured in the settlements was part of the "peaceful popular resistance" (Wafa News Agency, March 27, 2013).



Salam Fayyad, then Palestinian prime minister (center, light blue shirt) participates in a demonstration in Bila'in for the eighth anniversary of "resistance to the fence." He is accompanied by Laila Ghannam (blue scarf), governor of the Ramallah district (Wafa News Agency, March 1, 2013).

13. In fact, the concept of the popular resistance is **a cornerstone of PA policy and helps promote its interests in several areas:**

- 1) **Against Israel:** The popular resistance allows the PA and Fatah **to challenge Israel, keep the IDF endlessly occupied in Judea and Samaria, provide a response to the burning issues of the Palestinian street** (the Palestinian

⁵ **Mahmoud Abbas** issued a law forbidding the use of such goods and imposed heavy punishment on anyone having commercial dealings with Israeli settlers. To complement the steps taken by the PA, Palestinian NGOs based in Ramallah have extensive connections with organizations around the globe seeking a comprehensive economic boycott of Israel (the BDS campaign), regardless of where the goods were manufactured, in the settlements or within the Green Line, all part of the campaign to delegitimize Israel. In effect, the boycott has only marginal influence on Israel's economy.

prisoners, the activities of the Israeli settlers) and find a vent for their frustrations on holidays, anniversaries and occasions which have become part and parcel of the Israeli-Palestinian Israeli-Arab conflict ("Prisoner Day," "Nakba Day," "Naksa Day," "Land Day," etc.). **However, the PA has a vested interest in containing popular resistance events, and prevents them from becoming a catalyst for the deterioration of the situation with the IDF. Thus the PA maintains its security coordination with Israel and rejects Hamas and PIJ incitement for a third intifada.**

2) **Internationally:** The popular resistance, according to the PA, is a strong card that can be played in political dealings with the UN, the United States and Europe. It is represented as nonviolent and is looked on favorably by the West, which rejects the use of armed military force but is tolerant and sometimes supportive of the popular resistance and its built-in violence. It is also used to enlist **far left anti-Israeli activists (especially in Western Europe and the United States) in anti-Israeli activities in Judea and Samaria and to defame, delegitimize and demonize Israel around the globe** (many of the organizations and activists supporting the popular resistance are also involved in the campaign to delegitimize Israel).

3) **Against Hamas:** The popular resistance enables the PA and Fatah **to present their own alternative to Hamas' concept of "armed resistance."** Thus the PA and Fatah preserve a belligerent image and can fend off Hamas rejection of negotiations with Israel, move the "armed resistance" to Judea and Samaria and end the PA's security coordination with Israel. The PA uses the **popular resistance as a desirable alternative in negotiations for an internal Palestinian reconciliation**, enabling it to continue the peace process and be acceptable to the international community.

4) **In the Arab arena:** The popular resistance is acceptable in the Arab-Muslim world and preferable to an armed campaign in the era of regional upheaval. The popular image of the events in Judea and Samaria can easily be matched with the protests and demonstrations in the Arab world since the regional upheaval began.

14. **At the beginning of 2013 PA and Fatah spokesmen stated that in the coming year the popular resistance would be enlarged and extended (2013 has been named "the year of the popular resistance explosion").** In our assessment, they

assume that the popular resistance and its built-in violence are under the control of the PA and its security forces, and thus it can be expanded **without the PA's being drawn into an overall military confrontation with the IDF** (i.e., a third intifada).

15. Examples of PA statements include: **Adnan al-Dhameri**, spokesman for the PA security forces, called for the popular resistance to be intensified and extended to force the world to exert pressure on Israel and stop its "aggression" (Mawtini Radio, which belongs to the Fatah's information department, January 3, 2013). **Mahmoud al-A'lul**, a member of Fatah's Central Committee, when asked if 2013 would be "the year the popular resistance explodes," answered that "it definitely will" (Mawtini Radio, February 10, 2013). **Abdallah Abu Rahmah**, coordinator for the popular committees to oppose the fence, said that he expected a revolution against Israeli in the West Bank, and that "preparations were complete" (Al-Sharq, Saudi Arabia, February 28, 2013). **Yasser Dudin**, Fatah secretary in southern Hebron, gave a speech for Fatah founding day in which he said, "we promise you, in 2013 **we will work to escalate** the popular resistance...according to the model of Bila'in, Ni'lin and Al-Ma'sara" (Palestinian TV, December 31, 2012).

The place of violence in the concept of popular resistance

16. All those participating in the popular resistance represent it as nonviolent "civil disobedience" and call it "peaceful resistance." However, it is inaccurate to call it nonviolent. **From its roots in the 1980s to the present day it has been accompanied by the use of a variety of cold weapons, among them stones, rocks, Molotov cocktails, knives and cars, sometimes with fatal consequences.** The Palestinian media have praised the use of cold weapons: **Abbas Zaki**, for example, a member of Fatah's Central Committee, told Palestinian television that the popular resistance should be strengthened because it had been shown that Israelis were not afraid of the gun but were afraid of the stone and the knife (Palestinian TV, January 16, 2013).

17. **In recent years the popular resistance violence has increased in volume and now makes up for most of the attacks carried out by the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria** (The Israel Security Agency calls it "**popular-style attacks**," as opposed to the armed attacks carried out by the established terrorist organizations.) **The PA and Fatah have legitimized the use of stones and Molotov cocktails and regard them as integral to the popular resistance.** Moreover, the PA is careful not to

condemn other types of violence (such as the use of knives), which have also become part of the popular resistance (See below).

Throwing stones: the most common form of attack




Young Palestinians prepare a box of stones to throw at the IDF near the Tomb of Rachel during a protest in support of the Palestinian prisoners (Wafa News Agency, February 25, 2013).

Young masked Palestinians confront IDF forces in the Samarian village of Qadom (Wafa News Agency, January 1, 2013).




Palestinians throw stones at Border Policemen during a riot in Bila'in on March 1, 2013 (Facebook page of the International Communities against Israel)



Palestinians throw stones at Border Policemen during a riot in Bila'in on March 1, 2013 (Facebook page of the International Communities against Israel)



A stone ready for throwing at the Friday riot in Bila'in (Facebook page of the International Communities against Israel, March 15, 2013)



Poster illustrating stones as symbols of the popular resistance (Facebook page of the Fatah movement, March 10, 2013)

18. Guns and explosives are far more deadly than cold weapons. However, the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has often shown that **throwing stones, tossing Molotov cocktails, stabbing and using a car to run over Israelis can be dangerous and even deadly to both Israeli civilians and IDF soldiers.** In addition, the need for IDF soldiers to defend themselves and use riot control equipment to disperse rioters leads to the wounding of Palestinians, sometimes even adolescents and children who have been sent to the front line of a violent popular resistance

confrontation. The potential for injuries from cold weapons has been realized both in **Judea and Samaria** (See below for examples of Israeli civilians killed and seriously injured by stones and Molotov cocktails.) and the international arena (the events of the *Mavi Marmara* flotilla⁶).



Cold weapons (including clubs and knives) found aboard the Turkish ship *Mavi Marmara*. They had been prepared in advance for use against IDF soldiers (Picture courtesy of the IDF spokesman, June 1, 2010).

Deadly violence, which became a model for the popular resistance: a mobile model of the *Mavi Marmara* displayed in Bila'in, one of the focal points of the popular resistance in Judea and Samaria (Al-Avam. June 5, 2010).

Is the use of cold weapons terrorism?

"And if he smite him with throwing a stone, wherewith he may die, and he die, he is a murderer: the murderer shall surely be put to death." (Numbers 35:17)

19. How to relate to the popular resistance in general and its violence in particular has been part of the media discourse in both the PA and Israel. Is the use of stones and Molotov cocktails a terrorist attack or rather a Palestinian "right" as part of the

⁶ During the Israeli navy takeover of the Turkish vessel *Mavi Marmara*, operatives of the Islamist organization **IHH** deliberately used previously prepared cold weapons, including knives, axes, wrenches, iron bars, etc. Their use led to a violent confrontation between the Islamist operatives and IDF soldiers which cost the lives of nine Turkish operatives and wounded ten Israeli soldiers and dozens of Turkish operatives.

"resistance" to the Israeli "occupation?"⁷ Can throwing stones and the use of other cold weapons (Molotov cocktails, knives, cars) be considered terrorist attacks? Legally speaking, can it be said that they cause less damage and should not be treated seriously or as attempted murder? The issue from the following perspectives:

The deadly nature of cold weapons

20. The PA and its supporters fully legitimize the use of cold weapons in general and stone throwing in particular, and minimize the level of severity involved. However, past experience has shown that throwing stones and Molotov cocktails (to say nothing of using knives and cars) **are potentially deadly and in certain situations cause death and serious injury. In 2012 one Israeli was killed and 35 were wounded by cold weapons during popular resistance events.**⁸ That represents about 11% of the 309 individuals wounded in 2012, most of them in armed attacks (primarily rocket fire from the Gaza Strip). **Nineteen people were wounded by Molotov cocktails and stones** (18 Israelis and one foreign correspondent). **Twelve Israelis were wounded in stabbing attacks and one was wounded in a vehicular attack** (according to the Israel Security Agency website).⁹ **On April 30, 2013, an Israeli civilian was stabbed to death at the Tapuah junction by a Fatah operative who had served three years in jail in Israel for throwing rocks.**

21. **Stone-throwing is particularly dangerous when the stones are thrown at Israeli cars driving at speed along roads in Judea and Samaria.** They can cause and have caused crashes killing or wounding the people in the car. A recent example was the case of stones thrown at a car driving on the trans-Samaria highway near Ariel on March 14, 2013. Four family members sustained injuries, including a baby girl who

⁷ An example of empathy with Palestinian stone-throwing was provided by Amira Hass in Haaretz (April 3, 2013). Her article, called "The internal syntax of stone throwing," said the following: "Throwing stones is the right and inherent duty of anyone finding himself under foreign occupation. Throwing stones, literally and figurative, is a metaphor for resistance..." (ITIC translation throughout). However, the article later distinguishes between soldiers and civilians, stating that "even if the right and duty are inherent, the rules and limits of stance and resistance have to be learned and developed." As an example the article says, "to distinguish between civilians and those who are armed, between children and men in uniform..." In effect, **no such distinction is made by the PA and those waging popular resistance attacks.**

⁸ According to ISA data there were no fatalities from terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria in 2012. The data do not take into account the Israeli civilian killed in a vehicular attack between the villages of Ornit and Elkana on September 9, 2012.

⁹ The commander of the IDF Central Command was asked by an Israeli correspondent about the decline in the sense of security among residents of Judea and Samaria. He answered that security was determined by results. There was a decrease in the sense of security, he said, because there had been a few more incidents and a great deal more talk about a third intifada. The fact was, he said, that for a long time no one had been killed in Judea and Samaria. It was not to be taken lightly that no one had been killed in 2012 – for the first time in ten years. One could not become complacent, he said, because there could be an attack any minute, and the [security forces] had to be deployed to prevent it (Ma'ariv, March 29, 2013).

was critically injured. On the other hand, the stones thrown at the Israeli security forces deployed at the friction points in Judea and Samaria **have less deadly results** because the soldiers have protective equipment, know how to defend themselves, and are trained in responding to that type of violence.

Is the use of cold weapons terrorism?

22. The use of cold weapons in popular resistance attacks **is sometimes defined as "popular terrorism" by the IDF and the Israel Security Agency (ISA)**. Whether or not their use can be classified as terrorism depends on the definition of terrorism. We use the definition of Dr. Boaz Ganor in his book *The Counterterrorism Puzzle* (ITIC translation): "Terrorism is a kind of violent conflict which makes deliberate use of violence against civilians to achieve political goals (whether national, socio-economic, ideological or religious, etc.)." **Such a definition distinguishes between the deliberate use of violence against civilians** (whether the terrorists use cold weapons or guns) and guerilla activities employing the deliberate use of violence against **military targets**.¹⁰

23. According to that definition, **throwing stones or Molotov cocktails at civilian Israeli vehicles**, as well as stabbing and vehicular attacks, **is considered terrorism**. Thus the IDF and ISA's **use of the term "popular terrorism" is correct** when used to describe popular resistance events directed **against Israeli civilians**. On the other hand, the use of cold weapons **against Israeli security forces** is violence, often potentially deadly violence, but it **cannot be defined as terrorism**. For that reason, for the purposes of this study, all instances of activities carried out within the popular resistance have been designated as **cold weapon violence** (distinguished from **armed violence involving guns and explosives**).

24. **The PA does not distinguish between stones thrown at civilian targets and stones thrown at Israeli security forces, and gives unconditional support to the popular resistance attacks**. The PA represents them to international public opinion and at international forums as "peaceful resistance" to the "Israeli occupation," which according to the Palestinians is the "right" of an occupied population, according to UN decisions. Moreover, **those initiating cold weapon violence sometimes make no distinction between attacking civilians and attacking soldiers**.

¹⁰ Boaz Ganor, *The Counterterrorism Puzzle*, Transaction Books, 2011.

The legal aspect of stone-throwing

25. **Stone-throwing is the most widespread form of popular resistance attack** and its legal aspects are particularly important. There have been differences of opinion among judges in military courts in Judea and Samaria as to **how seriously stone-throwing should be considered in general, and stones thrown at Israeli vehicles on roads in Judea and Samaria in particular**. The judges are aware that **large stones thrown at vehicles driving at high speeds on highways are extremely dangerous** and can cause serious injuries and death, but often the issue was examined **in light of the degree of probability that a thrown stone will have deadly consequences**.

26. For example, the decision handed down in the instances of stones thrown on December 16, 2012 on the trans-Samaria highway determined that the probability was low, and that "unfortunately, hundreds of cases of stones thrown at vehicles come before the military court every year. Infrequently someone is physically harmed and very infrequently the driver or one of the passengers is killed...[ITIC English translation]." Therefore, the court determined in that particular case that **the degree of seriousness of throwing stones varies according to the circumstances**. It can be considered a life-threatening attack or a childish prank without potential damage, carried out by a young person who has barely passed the age of criminal responsibility (from the verdict given at the trial of four Palestinians who threw stones at passing Israeli vehicles on February 2, 2010).

27. A more serious view of stone-throwing in general and stone-throwing at Israeli vehicles on the roads in Judea and Samaria in particular was taken in **the verdict handed down (April 2, 2013) in the case of Wael al-Arja, who was convicted of causing the death of Asher Palmer and his baby son Yonatan** by throwing a stone at their moving car. According to the verdict (April 2, 2013), instances of stones thrown at civilian cars driving along highways **are to be treated with extreme severity**, especially when the methods used are sophisticated and increase the potential for harm. It said [ITIC English translation]:

"In recent years, considerations regarding conviction and punishment may have rested on the fact that incidents of stone-throwing have mostly been spontaneous or unsophisticated. Often stones are thrown at armored military or police vehicles moving slowly through built-up areas, and very often the stones are thrown by minors or adolescents. The conclusion of the court and the conclusion of the

prosecution in asking for a verdict was to relate to such felonies as attacks with little damage and low risk...[However] **the court has to conduct a different examination in cases of stones thrown at civilian vehicles, especially those driving on highways, especially since stones are thrown using technically sophisticated methods which increase the potential for harm, such as throwing stones into a moving vehicle.**"

28. That concept was the foundation for convicting Wael al-Arja of **attempted murder**. He was sentenced to **two terms of life imprisonment and 58 consecutive years** for the killing of Asher and Yonatan Palmer.

Conclusion

29. The popular resistance makes **massive use of cold weapon violence** (stones, Molotov cocktails, knives, cars). **It can be lethal, is genuinely dangerous, and is sometimes premeditated, endangering the lives of the Israeli security forces and Israeli civilians in Judea, Samaria and east Jerusalem. When cold weapons are used to attack civilians,** for example when stones are thrown at Israeli vehicles or Israelis are stabbed, **the attacks can be defined as terrorist attacks in every respect.** The PA supports the use of cold weapons in the popular resistance even when the attacks are carried out against civilians.

Section Two: Organizational and Logistic Aspects

"I salute the brothers who went to Bila'in, Ni'lin and other villages to say 'no' to the fence and the settlements, and to emphasize that we will not agree to the destruction of any building or the expulsion of residents from Jerusalem" (Mahmoud Abbas, chairman of the Palestinian Authority, at a meeting of the Palestinian Legislative Council, January 16, 2010, Wafa News Agency January 17, 2010).

The roots of the "popular committees"

1. The standard bearers of the popular resistance are the local "popular committees against the fence and the settlements." These popular committees, responsible for coordinating popular activities in the various villages, **were established throughout Judea and Samaria during the first intifada**. They led the popular campaign against Israel and defined its nature during the intifada's first stages. Later on the campaign became **an armed military uprising** encouraged and directed by Fatah.
2. The popular campaign against Israel was renewed when Israel began constructing the security fence in response to the deadly Palestinian suicide bombing attacks towards the end of the terrorist campaign known as the second intifada. The campaign was **begun by local residents** to protest the route of the security fence constructed on their land. **Initially, the objectives of the protest were modest** and related to local topographical changes caused by the fence. The figures leading the campaign were not political activists or terrorist operatives but rather local residents who represented an authentic grassroots protest.
3. One of the protest's first locations was the village of **Budrus** (north of Modi'in, not far from Bila'in and Ni'lin) in 2003. According to **Ayed Morrar**, one of its initiators, about 70 representatives from nine villages came to the first meeting. He said invitations had been sent to the local council heads, political figures from the various political parties, youth organization leaders and leaders of local networks. They discussed how to develop an effective method to struggle against the fence and appointed a small committee to represent local residents, calling it a "**popular committee**." **They decided to appoint similar popular committees in each village as well as an umbrella organization to coordinate the activities of the various villages** (Justvision.org website, September 11, 2006).

4. **The local protest in the village of Budrus was a success**, in the eyes of its initiators, and managed to change the route of the security fence. In addition, Ayed Morrar boasted, the villagers forced Israel to "bring hundreds of soldiers [to the village] every day to protect their tractors." Those achievements, he said, helped the villagers overcome the skeptics and critics in their midst, and were used as the base for a model of popular resistance against the "occupation" using non-lethal methods (Ayed Morrar, megafon-news.co.il website, February 9, 2012). **The PA and Fatah adopted the model** as their own and made it central to the concept of popular resistance.

Deployment and activity of the popular committees

5. The success of the local protest in Budrus led to the establishment of popular committees in other villages, especially those involved in land disputes with Israel. **In our assessment, throughout Judea and Samaria today there are an estimated 30 popular committees.** They operate with varying degrees of intensity, and can be found in **Bila'in, Ni'lin, Al-Ma'sara, Beit Jala, Nebi Saleh, Al-Khader, Walja, Umm Salmona, Bayt Umar, Yata, Budrus and Qadoum.** They have also been established in **Nablus, Hebron, east Jerusalem** and other locations in Judea and Samaria (**Note:** The PA and Fatah set up a parallel system for the Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. See below.).

6. Each popular committee usually focuses on its own territorial space. However, neighboring **popular committees cooperate in popular resistance events**, sometimes with institutionalized collaboration.¹¹ **The popular committees also coordinate with the prisoners' clubs, which play an important role in inciting protests in support of the Palestinian prisoners** (See below.). In recent years prominent popular committee activists **have often left their territories** to promote popular resistance events throughout Judea and Samaria.

7. **The popular committees are run by a small nucleus of professional activists.** Over the years the organizers have improved the activists' professional skills by having them attend various courses, such as geographical information systems or the use of camera (See below.).

¹¹ For example, on April 29, 2010, a joint committee for coordinating popular committee events was established in Bethlehem and Hebron. The source of the joint committee's authority was **Maher Ghnem**, former PA minister of fence and settlement affairs (Safa News Agency, April 30, 2010).


The Popular Struggle Coordination Committee

8. To make the popular committees more efficient and send a unified message to the public, a **Popular Struggle Coordination Committee was established, based in Ramallah** (similar to the "united national leadership" of the first intifada). The committee is headed by **Jamal Khalil Hassan Juma'a**, described as "**coordinator of activities for the committees of resistance to the fence and settlements**" (For biographical information, see below.). The **Popular Struggle Coordination Committee**, with PA and Fatah support, **operates a logistical-organizational system** supporting popular resistance in general and local popular committee activity in particular.

9. According to its website, the Coordination Committee was formed by activists in Judea and Samaria to "**lead community resistance**" to the "**Israeli occupation in various forms, such as marches, strikes, demonstrations, direct actions and legal campaigns, as well as supporting boycott, divestment and sanctions**" (the BDS campaign being waged in the West to boycott Israel, its culture and its economy).¹² The Coordination Committee "was formed to facilitate fruitful communication between the different popular committees...The committee aims to provide a base for strategic thinking on a wider scale, while retaining the independence and uniqueness of each popular committee... the Coordination Committee strives to encourage the emergence of new committees and initiatives and support them."¹³

¹² Popular resistance activists call for the boycotting of products manufactured in the Israeli towns and villages in Judea and Samaria but in effect are deeply involved in the campaign waged in the West **to boycott Israel as a country, its goods and culture, and not necessarily those manufactured in Judea and Samaria**. Often there is no difference between boycotting Israel and boycotting the Judea and Samaria industries, or if there is it is vague. The PA is careful not to formally impose a boycott on all goods produced in Israel and limits itself to those manufactured over the Green Line. However, in reality the PA allows the **BNC** (the BDS National Committee) **in Ramallah to direct the global BDS campaign**. One of the founders of the BDS campaign and the moving spirit behind it is **Ramallah-based Omar Barghouti**, who maintains close ties with anti-Israeli activists in the United States and other Western countries.

¹³ <https://popularstruggle.org/content/about>



The Popular Struggle Coordination Committee homepage in English (Popularstruggle.org)

10. The Popular Struggle Coordination Committee, the local popular committees, and other groups participating in the popular resistance coordinate their activities with foreign anti-Israeli organizations and far left Israeli organizations participating in popular resistance events. One of the most prominent Palestinian NGOs, set up at the end of 2002, is **the Ramallah-based Grassroots Palestinian Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign**. It is a collection of local institutions, popular committees and NGOs whose objective is to disrupt the construction of the security fence. The Popular Struggle Coordination Committee and the Grassroots Campaign **overlap to a great extent** (for example, Jamal Juma'a is a central figure in both). **An anti-Israeli organization particularly prominent in the international arena and based in the American far left is the International Solidarity Movement (ISM)**, whose activists are permanent fixtures in anti-security fence demonstrations (See below, Section Seven.).

Prominent figures in the popular committees and in the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee

11. The popular committees are headed by a group of activists, some of whom who operate not only for local events but also for **popular resistance events held throughout Judea and Samaria**. Some of the more important activists are the following:

1) **Jamal Khalil Hassan Juma'a** heads the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee in Ramallah (with the title "coordinator of activities for the committees of resistance to the fence and settlements").¹⁴ He comes from the village of Jayus (east of Qalqiliya) and lives in Ramallah. **He is a veteran of the campaign against the security fence**, and often appears in the Palestinian and Arab media. In December 2012 he called for sanctions on Israel to stop construction in the towns and villages in Judea and Samaria. **In December 2009 he was detained by Israel and released in January 2010. In January 2013 he participated in the erection of the Palestinian Bab al-Shams outpost in area E1** (See below).



Jamal Juma'a: "coordinator of activities for the committees of resistance to the fence and settlements" (Alalam.ir website).

2) **Dr. Mazin Qumsiyeh** teaches and carries out research at Bethlehem and Bir Zeit Universities. He has a PhD from the University of Texas (1986), and has written several studies on the Palestinian cause and the popular resistance. **He heads the popular committee in Beit Sahour** (the town of his birth) but his participation in the popular resistance goes beyond committee activities. He is active throughout Judea and Samaria and **is in constant contact with the international organizations participating in the campaign to delegitimize Israel** (in 2012 he coordinated the "Welcome to Palestine" campaign, whose activists tried unsuccessfully to reach Judea and Samaria by landing at the Ben-Gurion international airport).

¹⁴ **Jamal Juma'a** also represents himself to the English-speaking community as head of the Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign" or as head of the "Stop the Wall Campaign."



Mazin Qumsiyeh displays his book *Popular Resistance in Palestine* (Al-Riwaya blog, March 18, 2013)

3) **Abdallah Mahmoud Muhammad Abu Rahmah** lives in the village of Bila'in. He heads the local popular committee and is considered a leader of the popular resistance. Between the 2009 and 2011 he was imprisoned by Israel a number of times for involvement in organizing riots against the Israeli security forces (See below, Section Four). During the past year he extended his activities beyond the local protest at Bila'in.



Left: Abdallah Abu Rahmah confronts an Israeli Border Police commander at one of the demonstrations protesting the security fence at Bila'in (Al-Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, February 10, 2012). Right: Abdallah Abu Rahmah heads a group of Palestinian activists blocking a main road near the Israeli town of Ofra (Ramallah Land Forum website, December 19, 2012).

4) **Rateb Abu Rahmah** is Abdallah Abu Rahmah's brother and lives in Bila'in. He is in charge of information for the Bila'in popular committee and participates in popular resistance events. He is a psychologist and **teaches psychology at Al-Quds Open University** (Bokra.net website, May 6, 2010).



Rateb Abu Rahmah, in charge of information for the Bila'in popular committee (From a YouTube video posted on June 25, 2011).

5) **Salah al-Khawaja** is a popular committee activist in Bila'in and a prominent popular resistance activist in Judea and Samaria. He is a member of **Mustafa Barghouti's** leftist National Initiative Party, which plays an important role in the popular resistance and the campaign to delegitimize Israel. Al-Khawaja participates in anti-Israeli campaigns such as the BDS campaign and in the Global March to Jerusalem (GMJ) campaign on Land Day. He was a member of the GMJ coordinating committee in both 2012 and 2013.



Salah al-Khawaja (Nukta website, August 1, 2012)

6) **Ayed Morrar** heads **the popular committee in the village of Budrus**. He is a Fatah activist who was imprisoned in Israel for a number of years. He served as the mayor of Budrus. He produced a documentary film called "Budrus" about the village and the story of his life, shown at the Berlin Film Festival in 2010 (Alhouriya.net website, October 13, 2010).



Ayed Morrar (Justvision.org website)

7) **Naji al-Tamimi** lives in the village of Nebi Saleh (west of Ramallah), one of the focal points of the popular resistance, where he heads the local popular

committee. He is often interviewed by the Palestinian media. Al-Tamimi was detained by the Israeli security forces for participating in violence near the village of Ni'lin and released after three months, in July 2012.



Naji al-Tamimi interviewed during a march in support of administrative detainee Hanaa Shalabi (YouTube, March 3, 2012)

8) **Rateb Yussuf Naji al-Jabbur** is a teacher who lives in the town of Yata. **He coordinates the popular committees for the south Hebron-east Yata region.** He was one of the organizers of the attempt to erect the Palestinian outpost Bab al-Qamar in the Yata district, prevented by the Israeli security forces. On January 15, 2013, he led the Palestinian activists from the Bethlehem-Hebron region who used force to open the steel gate in the village of Jaba'a, which lies northwest of Hebron and had been closed by the IDF for 12 years (Ma'an News Agency, January 15, 2013).



Rateb al-Jabbur heads a demonstration in the town of Yata in support of the Palestinian prisoners (Facebook page of the popular committee of east Yata, April 19, 2013).



Left: Rateb al-Jabbur (red arrow) (Website of Radio Bethlehem 2000, April 29, 2013). Right: Rateb al-Jabbur interviewed by the media (Facebook, March 11, 2013).

Student and academic institution involvement in popular resistance activities

12. University and college students in Judea and Samaria play an important role in the popular resistance and participate in activities where cold weapon violence is employed. They participate in the weekly riots at the friction points near the security fence (Bila'in-model demonstrations) and are involved in the protests in support of the prisoners (among them the riots near the Ofer jail).

13. **Some of the more prominent popular resistance activists teach at the universities, especially the Al-Quds Open University and Beir Zeit University in the Ramallah district** (geographically close to the popular resistance focal points of Bila'in, Ni'lin, Nebi Saleh and the village of Bitunya).

14. Student participation in popular resistance events is both spontaneous and deliberately initiated by the student cells of the various Palestinian terrorist organizations. Conspicuous are the **Fatah cells** (the Shabiba movement), the **Hamas cells** (Al-Kutla, the Islamic Block) and to a lesser degree, the cells of the other terrorist organizations (such as the PFLP) and leftist organizations. **Hassan Faraj, secretary general of the Shabiba movement in Judea and Samaria**, is an important field activist who participates in **motivating students to attend popular resistance events**.



Left: Hassan Faraj with a Shabiba delegation in Turkey (Al-Quds, March 24, 2013). Right: Hassan Faraj detained by the police at the illegal Palestinian outpost Bab al-Shams (Alarab.net website, January 13, 2013).

15. In certain instances **close collaboration had developed between academic institutions in Judea and Samaria and the popular committees**, for example, students have been given transport to the traditional friction sites. **A concrete example of the involvement of academic institutions in the popular resistance is the collaboration between Al-Quds Open University in Ramallah and the popular committee of Bila'in**: at the end of January 2013 a course was given to 60 young popular committee activists at the university in **the use of cameras**. Its objective was

to improve their ability to document popular resistance events to serve the media and lawfare campaigns being waged against Israel.

16. On **February 5, 2013**, members of the popular committee in Bila'in headed by **Abdallah Abu Rahmah met with Dr. Younes Amro, president of Al-Quds Open University in Ramallah**, and presented him with a plaque. In thanking them he said, "**The university is a supporter of the peaceful popular resistance in Judea and Samaria**. It is the most suitable way today to struggle against the Israeli occupation and the settlements. Bila'in was one of the first villages to adopt the path of resistance, and we are proud of the example it set." **Abdallah Abu Rahmah** thanked him for his support and for the opportunity given to the students from Bila'in to study at Al-Quds Open University (Dunia Al-Watan, February 5, 2013).



Abdallah Abu Rahmah (third from left), head of the popular committee in Bila'in and a prominent popular resistance activist, presents a plaque to the president of Al-Quds Open University in Ramallah (PNN, February 5, 2013).

17. **Beir Zeit University students are particularly active in supporting the prisoners' protest.** They joined the riots near the Ofer jail in February and the beginning of March 2013. Groups of students from the university and from the village of Bitunya held marches to show solidarity with the prisoners, confronted Israeli security forces and rioted in front of the jail.



Beir Zeit University students throw rocks and Molotov cocktails at the Ofer jail gates (Wafa News Agency, February 12, 2013).



Students participate in the riots at the Ofer jail to support the Palestinian prisoners and their chosen path (Facebook page of the Hamas Islamic Block at Beir Zeit University, April 1, 2013).

Financial and logistic support for the popular resistance

PA support

18. In recent years the spontaneous local character of the popular resistance changed and it **became institutionalized, organized and methodical**. As such, it **needs financial and logistic support for its permanent nucleus of activists, to transport activists to the various confrontation sites** (including foreign activists) and **to provide legal assistance** for activists detained by the Israeli security forces. In our

assessment, **most of its funding comes from the PA**. Secondary sources include **donations from Palestinian companies and public figures and pro-Palestinian organizations and NGOs abroad**.

19. The popular committees in Bila'in, Ni'lin and other villages transfer funds to Palestinians participating in protests to **pay for their participation and various expenses**, such as medical treatment and legal aid. To that end the popular committees in Bila'in, Ni'lin and other villages set up a **logistic system to organize registration, transportation and accommodations with local families in the villages for participants** (Bilin-village.org website, April 10, 2010). **In our assessment the system is financially based on the PA and does not rely on local village resources**.

20. We have no reliable information about the extent of the financial aid received by the popular committees, but according to all indications the PA supports them both directly and indirectly. **Linah Alsaafin**, a British Palestinian blogger and regular participant in the demonstrations at the village of Nebi Saleh, reported a discussion she had with **Muhammad Khatib**, whom she said was one of the founders of the popular resistance's Popular Struggle Coordination Committee.¹⁵ **He told her at the time**, she said, **that since October 2009 they had received 50,000 Israeli shekels** (about \$14,000 at the current rate of exchange) **every month from Salam Fayyad, at that time the PA prime minister**. The money, he said, **paid for the bail of activists detained by Israel, and was also used for logistic and administrative purposes**. He said the sum of 50,000 shekels was not enough because in one month in 2008 Israel had detained 50 activists in Bila'in and that they all needed legal representation (Al-Dustour, Jordan, July 12, 2012). He said that the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee also received donations from NGOs, specifically a Spanish NGO called Nova16 (Linah Alsaafin, Electronic Intifada).

21. **The PA formerly established an ad-hoc ministry called the "ministry for fence and settlement affairs," which was headed by Maher Ghnem** (the son of Abu Maher, the secretary of Fatah's Central Committee and a senior Fatah figure).

¹⁵ **Muhammad Abd al-Karim Mustafa Khatib** lives in Bila'in. He is a prominent popular committee activist in the village, affiliated with Fatah. He was detained by the IDF a number of times and in August 2009 he was indicted on counts of incitement, obstructing a soldier acting in the line of duty, membership in an outlawed association and stone throwing (See Section Four.). He was one of the producers of the movie "Bila'in Habibti" ("Bila'in, My Love") and visited Israel a number of times to participate in its screening. He is employed by the PA youth and sport ministry.

¹⁶ **Nova** is a Spanish NGO based in Barcelona. It was founded in 2010 and calls itself a human rights organization supporting popular nonviolent movements in Israel and the PA. According to its website, **it collaborates with the popular committees of Bila'in and Ni'lin**.

According to its website, the ministry's mission was "to coordinate [the struggle against Israel] with the popular committees and their peaceful intifada against the fence and the settlements; **to provide them with the necessary support and to enlist and organize the national effort**, along with official and civilian institutions..." [ITIC emphasis]. **Maher Ghnem took part in demonstrations**, conferences and media activities related to the popular resistance **in coordination with the committee headed by Jamal Juma'a**.

22. When the new PA government was formed in May 2012 **the ministry was cancelled**. Maher Ghnem was appointed minister of housing and public works, but in effect **he continued leading the government's popular resistance activities**. In our assessment it may have been a deliberate attempt by the PA to make the "resistance" seem more "popular," and not as formally supported by the PA. **However, the PA does continue supporting popular resistance activities, even if it does not do so officially or publicly**.

23. **The prisoners' protest, which is also part of the popular resistance, receives financial support from the PA**, both **directly** from the budget of the ministry of prisoner affairs and **indirectly** from prisoners' clubs and other groups supporting the Palestinian prisoners. **The ministry of prisoner affairs was allotted a budget of 263 million shekels for 2013** (about \$71 million at the current rate of exchange) (See below.). Most often mentioned regarding the aid the PA gives the prisoners is **Mahmoud al-A'lul**, a member of Fatah's Central Committee and responsible for Fatah's recruitment and organization.

Two Figures Noted for Providing Financial Aid to the Popular Resistance



Maher Ghnem, minister of housing and public works (Shasha website, January 24, 2013).



Mahmoud al-A'lul, member of Fatah's Central Committee and responsible for recruitment and organization (Website of Fatah's information commissioner, December 31, 2012).

Support from Palestinian businessmen

24. **Palestinian businessmen and companies are also involved in supporting the popular resistance, although in our assessment they are a secondary source of aid.** For example, documents which fell into the hands of the Israeli security forces give clear indication of the **working relationship between the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee and the Ramallah-based Safad advertising company, owned by Mustafa Barghouti** (also secretary general of the Palestinian National Initiative Party and an important popular resistance activist). The company and the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee signed contracts for a number of propaganda campaigns dealing with the security fence. In addition, the Safad advertising company was asked to deliver maps and posters to the Committee.¹⁷


Foreign support

25. Another source of funding, although in our assessment not central to the popular resistance effort, **are anti-Israeli human rights organizations in the Arab-Muslim world and the West.** For example, according to documents which fell into the hands of the Israeli security forces, on September 26, 2011 the Arab Human Rights Fund informed Jamal Juma'a, general coordinator in Ramallah for the campaign to stop the construction of the security fence, **that it had authorized the transfer of \$25,000 for the organization's campaign. The reason for the donation,** Jamal Juma'a was informed, **was to support the organization** "by reinforcing the capabilities of the youths defending human rights who are active in the matter of stopping the construction of the [security] fence." That was noted in the proposal transmitted to the Arab Human Rights Fund on June 4, 2011. **On November 25, 2011, the sum of \$25,000 was transferred to the Palestinian NGO's bank account in Ramallah from the Arab Human Rights Fund in Beirut, Lebanon.**¹⁸

¹⁷ **Safad** is an advertising agency based in Ramallah, founded in 1996. It produces signs and flyers and deals with Internet graphic design. A subsidiary is **Al-Watan TV**, a news station in Ramallah headed by media person **Muammar Arabi**. The station covers Palestinian and pan-Arab political and economic news. For example, on March 22, 2013, it broadcast a program glorifying Dalal al-Magribi, a Fatah terrorist operative who participated in the Coastal Road slaughter in 1978 (See Section Five).

¹⁸ The **Arab Human Rights Fund** is an NGO that deals with protecting human rights in the Arab world. Its main office is in Beirut. One of its senior figures is **Fateh Azzam**, formerly the director of **Al-Hak**, a **Ramallah-based NGO** active in anti-Israeli lawfare in the campaign to delegitimize Israel (today the campaign is headed by Shawan Jabarin, a Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine activist)


The Arab Human Rights Fund



The front page of the memo sent from the Arab Human Rights Fund to Jamal Juma'a in Ramallah authorizing the transfer of \$25,000 for the campaign to stop the construction of the Israeli security fence (September 2011)

The bank transfer of \$25,000 for the campaign (November 25, 2011)

26. **Jamal Juma'a**, who heads the umbrella organization of the popular committees based in Ramallah, had connections to **pro-Palestinian organizations in Europe and the United States**, and through them raised contributions for the campaign against the security fence. For example, he thanked Gail Drakes, the Grants Administrator of the New York Funding Exchange, for her contribution of \$1,000 to the Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network for the "**Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign**" (May 2004).



The thank you note sent by Jamal Juma'a to Gail Drakes (2004).

Section Three: Applying the concept of popular resistance in Judea and Samaria

General description of popular resistance events

1. **There are many friction points in Judea and Samaria where popular resistance riots and confrontations occur between Palestinian activists and Israeli security forces.** At some there are **regular weekly riots** and at some there are **occasional events** for memorial days or to protest something specific. **Fridays**, especially after the noon prayer in the mosques, are **the most popular times for such events**, as are the anniversaries of national Palestinian events (Land Day, Palestinian Prisoners' Day, Nakba Day, Naksa Day, etc.). Some of the events are organized spontaneously and others are **carefully and thoroughly planned in advance**.

2. In recent years, networks have been institutionalized and established in Judea and Samaria to motivate popular resistance events against the security fence and settlements, and to support the prisoners. **The PA and Fatah** play an important role in them. In addition, Palestinian NGOs and local popular groups (popular committees against the security fence and settlements and prisoners' clubs) are also involved. **The various networks collaborate, so that often demonstrations and riots against the security fence and settlements are integrated into prisoners' protest events.**

3. Generally speaking, each popular resistance event in Judea and Samaria **draws from several dozen to several hundred participants** (in exceptional cases, the number can reach several thousand). Asked it if were the beginning of a third intifada, the commander of the IDF's Central Command replied that as far as he could see, it was not. "An intifada," he said, "is a general awakening in which the public feels it is participating in the events. **What we are seeing in the meantime are localized events that draw 300 people, not 15 thousand.** People live their lives as usual even when there is a riot in front of the Ofer jail. **The principle of separating the general population from terrorism and violence is very important and we are careful to maintain it**" [ITIC emphasis] (Ma'ariv, March 29, 2013).

4. There are a **relatively low number of participants**, in our assessment, because large sections of the Palestinian population are unmotivated and concerned primarily about their daily economic problems. They are also afraid that an increase in anti-IDF and anti-Israeli riots will worsen the situation for the local population in Judea and Samaria and turn the clock back to **the rule of anarchy** during the intifada. **They are**

also afraid that if security deteriorates Israel will impose more severe restrictions, making life difficult for the population (additional roadblocks, more rigorous inspections, a reduction in the number of entrance permits into Israel, etc.).

5. Protest marches and rallies held in the large cities¹⁹ are not always directed against Israel (sometimes they are directed against the PA). In most instances the **Palestinian security forces contain the demonstrations and prevent demonstrators from approaching IDF roadblocks and installations**. Even when they do not, they often limit the number of participants and **keep them from reaching friction points with the IDF**, for example, by permitting only pedestrian traffic and preventing vehicle access. That allows the more militant participants to vent their feelings but prevents serious friction with the IDF. However, in some cases, when it suits the PA, **the Palestinian security forces allow more massive riots to be held while they supervise and monitor them**.

6. The presence of armed operatives is exceptional and contradicts the concept of popular resistance. Their presence is rare, occurring most recently in January 2013 when armed Fatah operatives in Nablus and Jenin held an event in **defiance of the PA**; several operatives were detained the PA security. The governor of Jenin accused them wanting to restore anarchy to the streets and said the only legal weapons were those of the PA security forces (Ma'an News Agency, January 15, 2013).

¹⁹ The locations most frequented are Al-Manara Square, the Muqata'a and in front of UN headquarters in **Ramallah**, the well square on Shuhada'a Street in the center of **Hebron**, in front of the Church of the Nativity in **Bethlehem**, Al-Shuhada'a Square in **Nablus**, the Abu Ali Ayed Square in northwest **Qalqiliya**, the Gamal Abdel Nasser Square in the center of **Tulkarm**, and the Shaheed Yasser Arafat Square in the center of **Jenin**.



Left: Armed Fatah operatives in the Balata refugee camp hold a press conference where they criticize the Palestinian security forces (Ma'an News Agency, January 10, 2013). Right: Armed Fatah operatives walk through the refugee camp streets (Safa News Agency, January 10, 2013).

Focal points of popular resistance activity

7. The main focal points of popular resistance activity are the following:

1) **Palestinian villages near the security fence**, where the protest is generally the result of local complaints about the route of the fence and claims it has encroached on their lands. There are also several villages further away whose residents are involved in land disputes with Israelis. **The two most conspicuous villages near the fence are Bila'in and Ni'lin**, which have become a symbol of the popular resistance. Also often mentioned are **Umm Safa** and **Nebi Saleh** (north of Ramallah), **Al-Ma'sara** and **Umm Salmona** (south of Bethlehem).

2) **Regional roadblocks, crossings, facilities and Jewish religious sites where the Palestinians are in constant friction with the IDF and the local Jewish settlers**: They include the **Qalandia crossing** south of Ramallah, the **Tomb of the Patriarchs** in Bethlehem, the **Tomb of Rachel** (a popular target for stones and Molotov cocktails) and the **Rachel Tomb crossing** in Bethlehem near the Al-A'ida refugee camp, the **Gilboa** (Jalameh) and **Salam crossings** in Samaria near Jenin, and the **Bitunya crossing** facing the **Ofer jail** southwest of Ramallah (near the village of Bitunya, which has become a symbol of the prisoners' protest).

3) **Arab neighborhoods in east Jerusalem inside Israeli territory: A-Tur and the Mount of Olives** (east of the Old City), **Issawiya** (northeast of the Old City), and the neighborhoods of **Ras al-Amud** and **Silwan** (southeast of the Old City) are Arab neighborhoods with small Jewish enclaves. Throughout the decades the local Jewish population has been targeted by Palestinian attacks, including those carried out as part of the popular resistance (from an ISA survey of "Popular Terrorism in Jerusalem," ISA website, July 2012). To the above list the neighborhood of **Sheikh Jarah** (southwest of Mount Scopus and the French Hill) can be added.

Focal points (marked in red) of popular resistance events in east Jerusalem (ISA website)

The Issawiya neighborhood



The A-Tur neighborhood



The Silwan neighborhood




8. **The Temple Mount is a unique friction point** (See below.). It has a powerful tradition of religious-national confrontations, **inflamed by Palestinian incitement and spurious claims that Israel is plotting to destroy the Temple Mount mosques and build Judaism's Third Temple. The Temple Mount is a powder keg of religious sensitivity, and the consequences and influence of its events extend beyond the Palestinian-Israeli arena, reaching the corners of the Arab-Muslim world.**

9. Both Hamas and the northern branch of the Israeli-Arab Islamic Movement (led by sheikh Ra'ed Salah) are involved in provoking violence on the Temple Mount. From time to time **the PA allows** (and sometimes encourages) **controlled demonstrations and violent riots to be held there**, but also works **to contain violent events** and prevent them from spilling over into other friction points in Judea and Samaria.

Issues and occasions inflaming popular resistance events

10. Popular resistance activities are carried out **on the frequent memorial days marking traumatic events in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian** (and Israeli-Arab) conflict, among them Land Day, Nakba Day, Naksa Day, Palestinian Prisoners' Day, the anniversary of Arafat's death, the anniversaries of the establishment of Fatah and Hamas, the anniversary of the Coastal Road slaughter of Israeli civilian bus passengers, etc. **The days are also exploited for anti-Israeli demonstrations around the world**, orchestrated by the organizations waging the campaign to delegitimize Israel. Some of the organizations are in contact with the Palestinian NGOs and activists participating in the popular resistance events and **sometimes collaborate with them.**

11. An issue central to inflaming the events is **the demand for the release of the Palestinian terrorist operatives imprisoned in Israel**, aggravated by prisoner hunger strikes, deaths and the release of some of the prisoners (the Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange deal), as well as the official Palestinian Prisoners Day, which falls on April 17. In addition, popular resistance events are exacerbated by **non-routine Israeli counterterrorist activities in the Gaza Strip** (such as Operation Pillar of Defense), **Palestinian political activity** (such as the upgrade of the PA's status in the UN), **disputes over land** (near security fence locations or conflicts with Israelis residing in villages distanced from the fence), and the **funerals of Palestinians** killed during violent confrontations with the Israeli security forces.



Palestinian activists in the village of Rafat sabotage the security fence near the Ofer jail as part of popular resistance activities (Watan TV, April 17, 2013).

Hamas propaganda event in the Gaza Strip for Palestinian Prisoners Day simulating the detention of Palestinian prisoners surrounded by Israeli guards (Palinfo website, April 17, 2013)

12. Popular resistance events are also held **in response to controversial Israeli actions or as a response to what is considered provocation by Jewish settlers** (such as the so-called "price tag" events). In recent years they have included Israel's project to turn the Tomb of the Patriarchs and the Tomb of Rachel into Israeli heritage sites, and the renovation and rebuilding of the Mugrabi Bridge leading to the Temple Mount. **Sometimes the popular resistance event is not motivated by a genuine act or occurrence, but is rather the result of Palestinian propaganda and a fabrication to create the impression of a false Israeli "threat."** The battle cry (and accompanying incitement) of "Al-Aqsa mosque is in danger" is used to inflame the Palestinians and create friction concerning the issue of the Temple Mount (the northern branch of the Israel-Arab Islamic Movement headed by Raed Salah plays an important role in Temple Mount incitement).

13. **The intensity and extent of events at the various locations changes from time to time according to Israel's actions** (such as Operation Pillar of Defense), **the position taken by the PA** (which uses its security forces to control the flames) and **the general outlook of the Palestinian populace**. For example, this past year **the issue of the Palestinian prisoners has led the protests** while friction regarding the Temple Mount has lessened somewhat; Land Day protests (March 30), which in 2012 extended beyond the boundaries of the PA (because of the campaign to delegitimize

Israel, which called for the Global March to Jerusalem), in 2013 passed almost without exceptional event, following the PA call for quiet protests.

The leading issue during the past year: the prisoners' protest

General description

14. **According to data from the Israel Prison Authority, today there are 4,151 Judea and Samaria Palestinian security prisoners in Israeli jails** (updated end of April 2013). Most of them (2,662) are **terrorist operatives who stood trial and were sentenced** and the rest are detainees (of whom **156 are administrative detainees**).²⁰ **Some of the prisoners were given long prison sentences because of their involvement in murdering Israelis and in other serious terrorist attacks.** Regarding their organizational affiliation, **2,152** belong to Fatah, **758** to Hamas, **373** to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, **234** to the PFLP and **34** to the DFLP; the remaining security prisoners belong to the smaller terrorist organizations. **The affiliation of several hundred prisoners and detainees is unclear.**

15. It is important to remember that the Palestinian terrorist operatives imprisoned in Israel **were tried in court, received fair trials and had legal representation, were found guilty and sentenced to prison terms of various lengths. A considerable number of them confessed to the serious crimes attributed to them and even boasted about them. Thus they are not "freedom fighters," "political prisoners" or "prisoners of war," as the PA and protest activists represent them. They are terrorist operatives, some of whom are serving long prison sentences for having murdered Israeli civilians and whose release would endanger security stability** (See below.).

16. The Palestinian campaign **is meant to secure the release of all the imprisoned terrorists, regardless of organizational affiliation, by every possible means, from making it a political condition for renewing the negotiations with Israel, to exerting pressure on Israel through the popular resistance events or by appealing to international institutions** (the "internationalization" of the issue of the

²⁰ The Palestinians claim that there are **4,700 Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails**, 190 of whom are children and 15 of whom are members of the Palestinian Legislative Council (from a report presented by a Palestinian delegation headed by Salam Fayyad to the AHLC (Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee) when it met in Brussels on March 19, 2013 (Wafa News Agency, March 19, 2013). According to Salam Fayyad, there are **4,900** Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails (Wafa News Agency, April 27, 2013). In our assessment the discrepancy in the numbers may be the result of the Palestinians' including criminal prisoners in the total number of the security prisoners.

prisoners),²¹ to **the massive release of terrorist operatives prisoners through the abduction of Israelis** (according to the precedents set by the Gilad Shalit deal and previous deals). Another of the campaign's objectives is **to end administrative detentions** and improve conditions in the jails. All of the above are accompanied by **defaming and demonizing Israel**, which is falsely represented as treating the Palestinian prisoners with cruelty and as violating international norms regarding the treatment of prisoners.

17. For the past year and a half the issue of **the Palestinian prisoners has been at the center of the popular resistance**. It is a charged, sensitive issue, there is a consensus of opinion regarding it among Palestinians and it has been accepted by all the Palestinian organizations. To inspire the protest for the release of the prisoners, the PA and Fatah devised **a framework devoted exclusively to the issue**, similar to that inspiring the protests against the security fence and the settlements. It is apparently headed by a high follow-up committee for prisoner affairs (a kind of replication of the successful popular committee model). **Two of its prominent members are veteran Fatah activists, both of whom were formerly imprisoned in Israel: Issa Qaraqqa, a resident of the Al-A'ida refugee camp near Bethlehem, who is prisoner affairs minister in the PA, and Qadoura Fares, chairman of the Palestinian prisoners' club.**



Qadoura Fares (left) and Issa Qaraqqa (right) hold a press conference in Ramallah. They falsely claimed that the results of the autopsy of the prisoner showed he was tortured to death (Wafa News Agency, February 24, 2013).

²¹ On April 23-24, 2013, an international conference was held in The Hague to deal with the legal status of the Palestinian prisoners. The day before it began **Issa Qaraqqa**, the PA's minister for prisoner affairs, said that the conference would be attended by representatives from Palestinian human rights organizations. He also said that a legal concept would be formulated to represent the prisoners in the international arena and before human rights institutions.

Significance of the demand to release Palestinian terrorists imprisoned in Israel

18. **During the past year the PA made the release of the prisoners a condition for renewing the peace process with Israel.** Senior PA figures, headed by **Mahmoud Abbas**, repeatedly stated that the **prisoners were at the top of the Palestinian leadership's priority list.** The Palestinians demand that all the prisoners be released, especially those detained **before the Oslo Accords**, as well as those who were sick, women and minors (Wafa News Agency, April 3 and 27, 2013). **The Palestinian media reported that the demand was also made at meetings with high-ranking members of the American administration and the European governments.**

19. **Saeb Erekat**, a member of the PLO's Executive Committee, said that "recently the only topic we have been discussing with the Israelis is the matter of the prisoners. We demand that **107 prisoners from before the Oslo Accords be released, 1000 according to an agreement between Mahmoud Abbas and [Israeli Prime Minister Ehud] Olmert in 2008, and 15 who were released in the Gilad Shalit deal but later re-imprisoned.** We haven't heard anything from the Israelis..." (Interview on Voice of Palestine Radio, April 14, 2013). On another occasion Erekat said that the release of the 107 prisoners in jail since before the end of 1994 **"is the key to renewing the peace process"** (Ma'an News Agency, April 25, 2013).

20. The Palestinian media controlled by the PA and Fatah contribute to raising awareness regarding the prisoners **by keeping the topic at the top of the Palestinian media agenda.** The Palestinian media campaigns relating to the issue of the prisoners are aggressive and inflammatory and often turn into **unrestrained hate propaganda and incitement against the State of Israel**, accusing it of deliberately killing Palestinian prisoners and of ignoring humanitarian and legal norms regarding prisoner treatment. In the Gaza Strip Hamas leads the demand to release the prisoners, **encouraging Palestinians to abduct Israeli soldiers and civilians as bargaining chips.**

21. The release of **terrorist operatives with extensive operational experience**, outside the framework of a political agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, provides a response for the deep, authentic desires of the Palestinian people (as well as the PA and Fatah). At the same time **it helps Hamas and the other terrorist organizations increase their political influence and rebuild their military-terrorist networks in Judea and Samaria.** In fact, **some of the terrorist operatives released in the Gilad Shalit deal have integrated into the terrorist networks in Judea and**

Samaria or handle networks from the Gaza Strip in flagrant violation of the terms of their release mediated by Egypt. Some of them were **re-detained by the Israeli security forces and the security forces of the PA**, and their detention added fuel to the fire of the prisoners' protest (See below regarding the hunger strikes of Hanaa' Shalabi and Iman Sharawna, two terrorist operatives who violated the terms of their release.)

22. The recent involvement of terrorists released in the Gilad Shalit deal was revealed by the exposure of terrorist networks in Judea and Samaria in the first months of 2013. Some of the networks were directed by terrorist operatives who were expelled to the **Gaza Strip** after their release. The following are some examples (based on the ISA website and items in the Palestinian media):

1) **At the end of 2012-beginning of 2013** a Hamas terrorist network was exposed in the Hebron region. It was planning to carry out **shooting and IED attacks**. The network was directed by **Bassel Haimouni**, a Hamas operative expelled to the Gaza Strip after the Gilad Shalit deal.

2) **In March 2013 Amir Barakat** was detained. Barakat was born in 1988 and lives in Nablus, and in February returned from a pilgrimage to Mecca. Interrogated by the ISA, he admitted that while in Saudi Arabia he met with **Amir Dukan, a Hamas operative from Nablus**, who was released in the Gilad Shalit deal and expelled to the Gaza Strip. Dukan suggested Barakat **carry out a shooting attack on the road bypassing Nablus or throw a grenade at the Hawara roadblock, in return for which he would receive \$60,000**. When Barakat returned from Mecca he contacted Dukan and told him he was prepared to carry out an attack, and even tried to obtain a gun.

3) On **March 25, 2013**, the Hamas news website Filastin Al-'Aan reported that **the PA security forces had detained five Hamas operatives from the village of Surif** (north of Hebron) who planned to carry out a variety of terrorist attacks, **abducting Israeli soldiers**. A laboratory for the manufacture of explosives was found in the home of one of the operatives. An operative named **Fadi Abu Daud** was in contact with **Khaled Tahe, one of the terrorist operatives released in the Gilad Shalit deal, who handled him from Saudi Arabia**. He had instructed Abu Daud to carry out a **suicide bombing attack** inside Israeli territory.

4) In **January and February 2013** the Israeli security forces detained a Hamas messenger and his handler who were attempting to smuggle **money from Hamas into Judea and Samaria to finance terrorist networks**. The two were brothers, both residents of the Fara'a refugee camp near Nablus. Among the possessions of the messenger, who was detained at the Allenby crossing, were **€10,000 and \$900, hidden in cigarette packs**. Interrogated by the ISA, one of the brothers confessed that he had been sent to Jordan by his brother **to smuggle money for financing Hamas-initiated terrorist attacks**. He received the money in Jordan from an envoy working for Amir Dukan from Nablus who had been **released in the Gilad Shalit deal** and expelled to the Gaza Strip, where he contacted various terrorist organizations, among them Hamas. The messenger also admitted **he was supposed to receive additional funds from Saleh al-Arouri**, a senior Hamas figure who is based outside Judea and Samaria.²²

23. In addition, prominent terrorist operatives who were released in the Gilad Shalit deal have **publicly declared their readiness and willingness to return to the path of terrorism [the so-called "resistance"] and have openly called for the abduction of more Israeli soldiers**. Their statements are part of the **Hamas media campaign to inculcate the idea of the path of terrorism ["resistance"] as stronger than negotiations to obtain the release of the prisoners and to achieve the overall Palestinian objectives**. Examples follow:

²² **Saleh al-Arouri** is one of the founders of Hamas' military-terrorist wing in Judea and Samaria. He was imprisoned in Israel for 15 years and released in 2007, having served his sentence. He is a member of the Hamas political bureau and holds the prisoners' portfolio. He was reportedly involved in the Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange deal.

Terrorist Operatives Released in the Gilad Shalit Deal Preach Terrorism



Hamas Badran Aatef Ali, head of the Hamas military-terrorist wing in Samaria, was involved in the suicide bombing attack at the Park Hotel in Netanya (30 killed), the Dolphinarium nightclub in Tel Aviv (21 killed) and at the Sbarro restaurant in Jerusalem (15 killed). He held a press conference in Egypt where he stated that he and the other terrorist operatives released in the Gilad Shalit deal had refused to commit themselves before Israel to abandoning the path of terrorism (Ekhbaryat.net website)

Ihlam Tamimi is a Jordanian who lived in Ramallah. She aided the Palestinian terrorist operative who carried out the suicide bombing attack at the Sbarro restaurant in Jerusalem (15 killed) and collected intelligence before the attack. Asked if such an attack was important, she said it was, adding that "I was arrested and underwent hardships, and then I was released, what do I have to regret?" (YouTube).



Wafa Samir Ibrahim Albas, Fatah operative and potential suicide bomber, who tried to blow herself up at the Erez crossing in 2005. During interrogation she said that her mission had been to blow herself up in a hospital in Israel, someplace crowded. After her release she stated she was committed to the path of suicide bombing and that if asked to carry out such an attack again, she would not hesitate. She also called on the Palestinians to "abduct another Gilad Shalit every year" to effect the release of all the Palestinian prisoners (Fatah recruitment and organization website. November 22. 2011).

Yahya Sinwar Ibrahim Hassan, one of the founders of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas' military-terrorist wing, who was involved in the abduction and murder of IDF soldier Nahshon Wachsmann in 1994. Speaking in the Gaza Strip, he said that he preferred to die fighting as a "warrior" and that the warning given by the Israeli prime minister not to return to the "resistance" would not keep the released prisoners from continuing to take action (Palinfo website, October 18, 2011).

Institutions and organizations inspiring the Palestinian prisoners

The PA ministry for prisoner affairs

24. The PA administrative branch dealing with the issue of the prisoners is the **ministry of prisoner affairs**, established in 1998 by Yasser Arafat. The first minister was **Hisham Abd al-Razeq**, a veteran Fatah member from the northern Gaza Strip. He was succeeded by **Issa Qaraqa**, also a veteran Fatah member, who lives in Bethlehem and was imprisoned in Israel for terrorist activities.



Issa Qaraqa, minister of prisoner affairs (Ratan website, April 18, 2013).

25. The ministry of prisoner affairs' head office is in Ramallah. It conducts a variety of operations and its budget for 2013 is **389 million shekels** (almost **\$106 million** at the current rate of exchange) (Ma'an News Agency, March 21, 2013). It supports **all the prisoners** regardless of their organizational affiliation or crime. Its main activities are the following (Freedom.ps website):

- 1) Payment of 13 million shekels (about \$3.5 million) in monthly stipends to Palestinian prisoners, as well as 2.6 million shekels (more than \$700,000) in monthly prison canteen fees (as of 2012).
- 2) Conducting activities to improve the Palestinian prisoners' physical conditions.
- 3) Providing the Palestinian prisoners with legal assistance.

- 4) Providing financial, medical and social support for the prisoners' families.
- 5) Giving \$5,000 to the family of every Palestinian prisoner in an Israeli jail for more than 20 years ("veteran prisoners").
- 6) Paying every released prisoner a monthly stipend of between 1,400 and 2,000 shekels (\$380 to \$543).
- 7) Helping prisoners who have been released to re-integrate into Palestinian society.
- 8) Conducting media activity in the international arena on behalf of the Palestinian prisoners.
- 9) Visiting the Israeli jails (visits conducted by ministry staff members).

The High Follow-Up Committee for Prisoner Affairs

26. The High Follow-Up Committee for Prisoner Affairs supports prisoners and coordinates joint actions in Judea and Samaria. It is headed by **Amin Atalla Muhammad Shuman**. The Shumans are a respected Palestinian clan and very close to PA and Fatah senior figures. In 1984 and 1996 Amin Shuman was involved in throwing stones at Israeli vehicles and detained by the Israeli forces. In 2000 he was active in the PA's preventive security force. In recent years he has chaired the High Follow-Up Committee and often participates in rallies and conferences related to the prisoners.



Amin Shuman participates at the weekly rally held in front of Red Cross Headquarters in Al-Bireh to promote the release of the prisoners (Al-Fajr Al-Jadeed TV, January 22, 2013).

Amin Shuman, High Follow-Up Committee chairman (Al-Alam TV, March 22, 2012).

27. The High Follow-Up Committee organizes protest and support rallies for the Palestinian prisoners. Among them is a weekly rally held in front of Red Cross Headquarters in the city of Al-Bireh. On April 4, 2013, the day the Palestinian terrorist operative Maysara Abu Hamdia died, the Committee organized a protest march from Al-Manara Square in Ramallah through the streets of the city. The PA also holds activities for the children of prisoners and Palestinian shaheeds, including a day of activities for the children of the prisoners (February 2013, in the Tulkarm district) and a summer camp for the children of prisoners and shaheeds (July 2013).

The Palestinian Prisoners Club



The Palestinian Prisoners Club. Left: The club logo

28. **The Palestinian Prisoners Club** is a popular organization founded in 1993 to deal with the issue of the Palestinians imprisoned in Israel. The Club, which has been

registered as an NGO since 1996, **is supported by the PA and Fatah and operates in full collaboration with the ministry of prisoner affairs.** The Club's main offices are in **Ramallah** and it has branches throughout Judea and Samaria (but not in Jerusalem, due to Israeli objections).

29. The organization plays a major role in fomenting popular protests for the Palestinian terrorist operatives imprisoned in Israel and provides the operatives and their families with various types of support, including legal aid and political and media activities. The prisoners clubs throughout Judea and Samaria collaborate with the popular committees in organizing popular resistance events, attempting to duplicate their successes.

30. In February 2006 the Palestinian Prisoners Club elected its current leadership of 13 members, **all terrorist operatives who were imprisoned in Israel and released.** Since 2005 the Club's chairman has been **Qadoura Fares.** He replaced **Issa Qaraqa,** who today is the PA minister of prisoner affairs. The Club operates the **Amwaj radio station, which broadcasts from Ramallah.** The Club collaborates with international organizations, including human rights organizations, **customarily representing the imprisoned terrorists as "freedom fighters," "prisoners of war" or "political prisoners,"** and demands their immediate release.



Mahmoud Abbas (in front of flag) meets with senior members of the Palestinian Prisoners Club. To his right is Issa Qaraqa, minister of prisoner affairs, and to Qaraqa's right is Qadoura Fares, chairman of the Palestinian Prisoners Club (Wafa News Agency, February 26, 2013).

31. **Qadoura Fares**, who heads the Palestinian Prisoners Club, is a Fatah operative and one of the organization's younger generation. He was born in 1961 and lives in the village of Silwad (northeast of Ramallah). He was imprisoned in Israel for seven years and between 2003 and 2005 was minister without portfolio in the Palestinian government. He participated in the Geneva initiative and between 1996 and 2006 was a Fatah representative in the Palestinian Legislative Council. As Palestinian Prisoners Club chairman he has been very active in the media and heads the protest and solidarity activities with the Palestinian prisoners in Judea and Samaria. He often refers to the "**internationalization of the issue of the prisoners**" and has appealed to UN agencies and international organizations to impose sanctions on Israel.



Qadoura Fares (Alresala.net website, July 1, 2012)

32. The Palestinian Prisoners Club's legal department is headed by **Jawad Bulus**, a Christian Israeli-Arab lawyer who lives in the Israeli town of Kafar Yasif in the Western Galilee. He handled the legal battle of Palestinian prisoner **Samer Issawi** against the Israeli legal system and Prison Authority. In Israel he often writes articles for the Arab-Israeli media about the Palestinian prisoners (Facebook page of Jawad Bulus, April 2013).



Jawad Bulus (Facebook page of Jawad Bulus, April 10, 2013)

Institutions active in the Gaza Strip

The ministry of prisoner affairs of the Hamas administration



Atallah Abu Subh (Hamas' Felesteen, April 17, 2013).

The Waad Society



The Waad logo.

35. **The Waad Society** is an NGO operating in the Gaza Strip for the Palestinian prisoners since 2006. **It operates in close collaboration with the de-facto Hamas administration**, a kind of Gazan version of the Palestinian Prisoners Club in Judea and Samaria. It is headed by **Sabar Abu Kirsh**.²³

36. The Waad Society has five branches in the Gaza Strip and is planning to open others in Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem. It conducts media activities for the Palestinian prisoners and maintains contact with their families. It participates in organizing Palestinian Prisoners Day activities in the Gaza Strip.

²³ In addition to the Al-Waad Society there is an organization in the Gaza Strip called "**The Committees of the Prisoners of the National and Islamic Movements in the Gaza Strip**." It deals with heightening awareness, such as activities for Palestinian Prisoners Day.

The dynamic that led turning the prisoners' protests into a focal issue for the popular resistance

Overview


37. During the past year and a half **the demand for the release of the Palestinian prisoners was turned into the most important issue on the Palestinian political and media agenda and the main motivator of popular resistance events in Judea and Samaria**. Hamas used the Gilad Shalit deal to accelerate the protest. The PA joined and encouraged it, along with political activity. The achievements of the campaign to release the prisoners, whether the Gilad Shalit deal, the individual releasing of hunger-striking prisoners or the improvement of the conditions of the terrorists imprisoned in Israel, **fed the protest, helped continue it, increased tension on the ground and put the issue at the top of the PA's political agenda**. Some of the milestones in the prisoners' protest were the following:

The Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange deal (October 2011)

38. In October 2011 the Gilad Shalit deal was arranged, through Egyptian mediation, between Israel and Hamas. **One thousand twenty-seven Palestinian security prisoners** and detainees, close to a quarter of the general prison population of terrorist operatives, were released. The deal greatly increased Hamas' prestige among Palestinians and **the prisoners' protest gained momentum**. Hamas used the deal for a media campaign to inflate the success of terrorism (the so-called "resistance") and **incite Palestinians to abduct more Israelis** to effect the release of additional prisoners.

39. The PA praised the release of the terrorist operatives and Mahmoud Abbas instructed that each of them, whether or not he (or she) was allowed to return to the PA, receive a "presidential grant" of \$5,000. He also instructed the Palestinian medical centers to provide free medical treatment for all the released prisoners (Paltoday website, October 23, 2011). **Receptions were held for the prisoners when they returned to their homes but the PA security forces prevented demonstrations in support of Hamas from being filmed.**²⁴

²⁴ For example, PA security force operatives arrived at the reception held by the PIJ in Jenin for one of the female prisoners who had been released and removed the Hamas flags which were displayed. Other families of released prisoners were also requested to remove the Hamas flags hung on their houses (Ajnad website, October 24, 2011).



Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades poster and logo for the Gilad Shalit deal (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades website, October 21, 2011). The poster and the logo emphasize the message of using military force to achieve the Palestinian goals, including the release of the prisoners.

40. The release of the prisoners was exploited by the PA to foster the narrative of solidarity without mentioning why they had been imprisoned and regardless of their organizational affiliation. The prisoners released to Judea and Samaria went to the Muqata'a in Ramallah where Mahmoud Abbas attended the reception held for them. He was accompanied by two senior Judea and Samaria Hamas activists, **Hassan Yussuf** and **Abd al-Aziz Dweik**. Mahmoud Abbas gave a speech expressing his hope that Palestinians would soon also be able to see **Marwan Barghouti** (Fatah), **Ahmed Saadat** (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), **Ibrahim Hamed** (Hamas) and **Abbas al-Sayyid** (Hamas) at the Muqata'a [all of them terrorist operatives sentenced to long prison sentences for having committed grave terrorist attacks].

41. Another example of fostering the narrative was the support given by the PA to Hamas operative **Abbas al-Sayyid**, the terrorist personally responsible for the suicide bombing attack at the Park Hotel in Netanya (which led Israel to initiate Operation Defensive Shield). Abbas al-Sayyid, whom Israel refused to release in the Gilad Shalit deal, became a leader of the terrorist operatives in Israeli jails and a role model for the Palestinian street. At the end of March 2012 **Issa Qaraqa**, PA minister of prisoner affairs, paid a visit to the al-Sayyid family in Tulkarm and presented them with an award. Media personnel from Palestinian TV also visited the family and interviewed two

female terrorists who had been released in the Gilad Shalit deal, who described al-Sayyid's "deeds" and represented him as a role model for all Palestinians.



PA minister of prisoner affairs Issa Qaraqa presents the family of Hamas terrorist operative Abbas al-Sayyid with an award. Al-Sayyid was responsible for the suicide bombing attack at the Park Hotel during the Passover Seder, March 2002, which killed 30 Israelis (Salam-TV, March 29, 2012).

The hunger strike of Khader Adnan (December 2011 – February 2012)

42. The issue of the terrorist operatives imprisoned and detained in Israeli jails reappeared on the Palestinian agenda several months after the Gilad Shalit deal, the result of the hunger strike of **Khader Adnan, a PIJ terrorist operative** from Arabeh (near Jenin). He was detained on December 17, 2011 and kept in administrative detention, where he began a hunger strike and was transferred to a hospital in Israel on December 31. In February 2012 he appealed to the Israeli Supreme Court to be released.

43. **His hunger strike was accompanied by demonstrations, support rallies and strikes throughout Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip**, attended by thousands of Palestinians. **Issa Qaraqa**, PA minister of prisoner affairs, declared February 23, 2012 (the day the Israeli Supreme Court was supposed to deliberate the appeal) a "day of rage," to be accompanied by hunger strikes in Israeli jails and general strikes throughout Judea and Samaria. **Mahmoud Abbas** and **Ismail Haniya** appealed to the Arab-Muslim world and the international community, requesting their intervention to obtain Adnan's release. **In the end the Israeli Attorney General told the Supreme**

Court that the state would not ask that his imprisonment be extended and that the deliberation was unnecessary.

The hunger strike of administrative detainee Hanaa Shalabi (March 2012)

44. Another affair that fanned the flames of the Palestinian prisoners campaign was the administrative detention of **Hanaa Shalabi** from the village of Burqin (in the Jenin district). She was detained in 2009 for her activities in the **PIJ**. Released in the Gilad Shalit deal, she returned to terrorist activities, for which she was detained again. She went on a hunger strike that lasted more than 40 days and was brought before the military court for administrative affairs. On March 4, 2012 the judge ruled that [ITIC translation and emphasis] "the intelligence information concerning the plaintiff is authentic, reliable and well-founded, and indicates unequivocally that **she is determined to carry out a military action**, an action she has already begun by making preparations for it."

45. Shalabi was joined in her hunger strike by several dozen other terrorist operatives in Israeli jails and by **a protest campaign which included popular resistance events in Judea and Samaria**. At the end of March 2012 the decision was reached to release her and expel her to the Gaza Strip for a period of three years, during which would commit herself to refrain from terrorist activity.

The prisoners' hunger strike (April 2012)

46. On **April 17, 2012**, designated as Palestinian Prisoners Day, many protests were held in Judea and Samaria. **Issa Qaraqqa** had announced beforehand that **1,600 Palestinians prisoners in Israeli jails would begin a hunger strike on April 17 to improve their conditions**. According to the Israel media, on April 17 1,200 prisoners went on a hunger strike. According to **Qadoura Fares**, Hamas, the PIJ and other Palestinian organizations had chosen the date, while Fatah prisoners had not agreed to it (Reuters, April 14, 2012).

47. **Senior Hamas operatives** involved in deadly mass-casualty suicide bombing attacks were **prominent among the strike leaders: Abbas al-Sayyid**, who was sentenced to 35 consecutive terms of life imprisonment for planning and orchestrating **the suicide bombing attack of the Park Hotel, Netanya, Passover Seder** (30 Israeli civilians killed, 160 wounded); **Muhanad Shrem**, who was sentenced to 20 consecutive terms of life imprisonment for his involvement in the Park Hotel suicide bombing attack; **Jamal al-Hur**, who was sentenced to five consecutive terms of life

imprisonment for carrying out terrorist attacks and involvement in murder, among them the attack on the Apropro Cafe in Tel Aviv on March 21, 1977 (three young women killed). Another leader was senior PFLP terrorist operative **Wajdi Jawda**, involved in the **suicide bombing attack at the Geha Junction** (east of Tel Aviv) on December 26, 2000 (four Israeli civilians killed and 24 wounded).

48. The prisoners' hunger strike ended after understandings were reached through the intervention of the Egyptian security services and the PA. On May 14, 2012, the leaders of the security prisoners promised in writing, in the name of all the Palestinian security prisoners, that they would unconditionally end their support for terrorism from inside Israeli jails and end the hunger strike. Israel agreed to **a series of measures to ease conditions in the prisons**, among them returning prisoners held separately to the general wings and allowing family visits from Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip (ISA website, May 15, 2012).

Another wave of prisoner protests (February 2013)

49. In the second half of February 2013 there were protest demonstrations and rallies throughout Judea and Samaria, accompanied by stone-throwing and confrontations with IDF soldiers (See pictures below). The protests were prompted by the prolonged hunger strike of four Palestinians prisoners, **two of them who had been released in the Gilad Shalit deal and re-detained after they violated the terms of their release. The demonstrations continued for several days in various locations.** One location was in front of the **Ofer jail** (southwest of Ramallah), which became a magnet for riots and the protests which began in the nearby village of **Bitunya**. Local issues were sometimes integrated into the protests to exploit support for the prisoners.²⁵

50. The confrontations drew more participants after the death of **Arafat Jaradat** in the Megiddo jail on February 23, 2013. They peaked at his funeral, held in the village of Sayeir (north of Hebron) on February 25. The pathology tests conducted by Israel after the autopsy refuted the Palestinian claim that he had been tortured, but could not definitely state the exact cause of death. In any event, **senior Palestinian figures rushed to publicly accuse Israel of murdering Jaradat**, fanning the flames of the Palestinian street. **However, in effect, the PA was careful to contain the events and prevent them from escalating and spinning out of control.**

²⁵ For example, demonstrations in support of the prisoners were held in **Hebron** on February 22, 2013. At the same time hundreds of Palestinians joined the demonstrations to demand the opening of Shuhada'a Street. In **the village of Qassra, south of Nablus**, there were confrontations between Palestinians and local Jewish settlers because of land dispute involving the residents of Qassra and settlers from the nearby village of Esh Kodesh.



The funeral of Palestinian prisoner Arafat Jaradat in the village of Sayeir, north of Hebron (Wafa News Agency, February 25, 2013).

Confrontations between Palestinian rioters and the Israeli security forces during prisoner protests (second half of February 2013)



Palestinian youths confront IDF forces near the Jalameh crossing after the death of Arafat Jaradat (Wafa News Agency, February 24, 2013)



Palestinian youths throw stones at Israeli security force security forces and burn tires near the Hawara roadblock (south of Nablus) after the death of Arafat Jaradat (Wafa News Agency, February 24, 2013).



Palestinians demonstrate to demand Israel open Shuhada'a Street in Hebron as part of a prisoner protest demonstration. After the demonstration there were confrontations with IDF soldiers (Wafa News Agency, February 22, 2013).

Palestinian youths throw stones at IDF soldiers at the entrance to the town of Sayeir, north of Hebron, the home of the prisoner who died in an Israeli jail (Wafa News Agency, February 24, 2013).



Palestinian youths throw stones at IDF forces at the entrance to Sayeir as part of the prisoners' protest (Wafa News Agency, February 24, 2013).



Palestinian youths confront IDF forces at the Jalameh crossing as part of the prisoners' protest (Wafa News Agency, February 22, 2013)



Palestinian youths confront IDF forces at the Hawara roadblock as part of the prisoners' protest (Wafa News Agency, February 22, 2013)

Release of administrative detainee Ayman Sharawna (March 2013)

51. **Ayman Ismail Salameh Sharawna** is a **Hamas operative** from Dura (southwest of Hebron) who was detained in 2002 following **his involvement in an IED terrorist attack in Beersheba in May 2002 which wounded 19 people. He was also involved in an attempt to abduct an IDF soldier and in shooting at IDF soldiers.** He was sentenced to 38 years in prison and released in the Gilad Shalit deal in

October 2011. **Immediately following his release he violated the terms of his release and returned to terrorist activity. He was detained a second time on January 31, 2012, and a request was made by the Israeli legal system to cancel his release and return him to jail to serve the remainder of his sentence.**

52. Returning to prison, Sharawna went on a hunger strike lasting 53 days. During the first half of March he requested to be allowed to leave for the Gaza Strip for ten years instead of returning to prison to serve his sentence. Israeli security and the Israeli legal system agreed and his request was granted. He was released and left for the Gaza Strip where he was warmly received. Interviewed in his hospital bed he said that the only way to release the Palestinian prisoners was to abduct Israeli soldiers (Al-Quds TV, March 18, 2013).



Terrorist operative Ayman Sharawna (Filastin Al-'Aan, March 18, 2013).

Release of prisoner Samer Issawi (April 2013)

53. **Samer Issawi** is a **DFLP** terrorist operative from the village of Issawiya (east of Jerusalem). In 2002 he was sentenced to 26 years for terrorist activity and released in the Gilad Shalit deal. **He was detained again in July 2012 after having violated the terms of his release**, returning to terrorist activities and entering Judea and Samaria.

54. Samer Issawi went on a hunger strike for eight months. The Palestinian media conducted a campaign for his release, finally reporting that an agreement had been reached for his release conditioned on his ending his hunger strike and remaining in prison for an additional eight months (Haaretz, Shihab website and Ma'an News

Agency, April 23, 2013). It was reported that the agreement (reached on April 22) between the military prosecution and Issawi's lawyer, Jawad Bulus, who is also head of the Palestinian Prisoners Club's legal department, would be presented to the military court for approval.

The death of terrorist operative Maysara Abu Hamdia (April 2013)

55. On April 2, 2013, **Maysara Abu Hamdia died of cancer** in an Israeli jail. He was detained by Israel on May 28, 2002 and sentenced to life imprisonment for recruiting the suicide bomber who planned to blow himself up at the Cafit Cafe in Jerusalem (and later changed his mind). According to Israeli prison authority sources, Maysara Abu Hamdia was being monitored by doctors. When his condition deteriorated his doctors diagnosed his cancer as terminal and the Prison Authority appealed to the relevant committee to have him released. Proceedings were begun but he died before they could be completed (Yedioth Aharonoth, April 3, 2013). Fatah and Hamas both embraced Maysara Abu Hamdia, claiming he was one of their operatives.

56. The **PA and Hamas** rushed to accuse Israel of responsibility for his death. **Mahmoud Abbas** accused Israel of having refused the Palestinians' requests for his release, thus causing his death, an event which might lead to the third intifada (Wafa News Agency, April 2, 2013). **Salam Fayyad**, then the Palestinian prime minister, strongly condemned what he called Israel's "policy of medical negligence" and appealed to the international community and human rights organizations to force Israel to act according to international legal principles (Wafa News Agency, April 2, 2013). **Issa Qaraqa**, Palestinian minister of prisoner affairs, called Abu Hamdia's death "a premeditated crime" committed by Israel, and called for an international committee to investigate the conditions in Israeli jails. **Atallah Abu al-Subh**, minister of prisoner affairs in the de-facto Hamas administration, said Israel was responsible for Abu Hamdia's death and called for a third intifada (Safa News Agency, April 2, 2013).

57. The Palestinian media praised Abu Hamdia as a shaheed and spread wildly inflammatory and slanderous propaganda about Israel. The social networks posted notices and pictures praising him. One of them was a picture posted by a Palestinian showing a patient handcuffed to his hospital bed labeled "the prisoner, commander, shaheed Maysara Abu Hamdia." Examination showed **the label was false** and the

picture was of a wounded Syrian in a Jordanian hospital, and had been originally posted on December 8, 2012.²⁶



The original picture of the wounded Syrian in the Jordanian hospital, handcuffed to his bed. It was first posted on December 8, 2012 (Facebook page of Avihai Edri, IDF spokesman's unit, April 4, 2013).

The fake picture, claimed to be the Palestinian terrorist Maysara Abu Hamdia, handcuffed to his bed (Arabi al-Waha forum, April 2, 2013).

58. Following Abu Hamdia's death demonstrations were held in Hebron, Nablus and Ramallah (dozens to hundreds of participants at each demonstration). In Bitunya, Qalandia and Beit Umar there were riots with relatively high levels of violence. On April 4, 2013, Abu Hamdia was buried with full military honors in Hebron (he received the post mortem rank of general). In the **Gaza Strip** Hamas gave him a mock funeral. Riots broke out in the Israeli jails among terrorist operative prisoners and they declared a three-day hunger strike.

59. For the terrorist organizations affiliated with the global jihad the death of Abu Hamdia served as an **excuse to launch rockets and two mortar shells into the western Negev**. A network in the Gaza Strip affiliated the global jihad claimed responsibility for the mortar shell fire, calling it a response to the death of Maysara Abu Hamdia. The Israeli Air Force responded to the rocket fire with attacks on terrorist

²⁶ Spreading false propaganda about Israel's treatment of the Palestinian prisoners is routine. For example, **Rania al-Saqa**, a female Palestinian prisoner who was released, said she had cancer and accused the "Israeli occupation forces" of injecting her viruses into the bodies of Palestinian prisoners when they were released as a way of punishing them (Al-Ghad, Jordan, April 17, 2013). The PA minister for prisoner affairs Issa Qaraqqa said that there was no formal proof that the "occupation" was injecting prisoners with viruses at the time of their release, but, he claimed, there were indications and statements from prisoners who had been released who later became ill and claimed the Israeli prison service had injected them with unknown substances. Qaraqqa added that it was "clear proof" of the medical disregard for the lives of the Palestinian prisoners (Ma'an News Agency, April 19, 2013).

targets in the Gaza Strip, the first time since Operation Pillar of Defense. In addition, on April 17, 2013, two rockets were fired at Israel's southernmost city, Eilat. A network affiliated with the global jihad claimed responsibility for the rocket fire, calling it a protest to the death of Maysara Abu Hamdia.



Palestinian youths throw stones at IDF forces in Hebron after the death of Palestinian terrorist operative Maysara Abu Hamdia (Filastin Al-'Aan, April 2, 2013).



Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades poster mourning the death of operative Maysara Abu Hamdia (Ajnad Facebook page, April 2, 2013).



Fatah poster mourning the death of operative Maysara Abu Hamdia (Fatah al-Yawm, April 2, 2013).

The Temple Mount compound as a powder keg

60. **The Temple Mount compound in Jerusalem is a traditional focal point for popular resistance activities.** From the Mount Muslim worshippers throw stones and Molotov cocktails at Israeli security forces and civilians (including at Jews praying at the Wailing Wall). The issue of the Temple Mount is the subject of inflammatory incitement initiated by the PA, Hamas, Muslim clerics in Judea and Samaria and the Northern Branch of Israeli-Arab Islamic Movement (which turned the slanderous slogan "Al-Aqsa mosque is in danger" into its battle cry). Because of its religious significance and the sentiments its very name engenders, **the Temple Mount compound is a powder keg which may explode and escalate friction throughout Judea and Samaria.**




A stock of potentially deadly projectiles: a wheelbarrow full of cinder blocks and building debris, one of many seized on the Temple Mount. The projectiles were prepared to be thrown at Jews praying at the Wailing Wall and at Israeli security forces (Photo from the Israel Police Force, October 5, 2009). On October 4, 2009, riots broke out on the Temple Mount during which dozens of Muslim worshippers threw stones at the Israeli police who rushed to the scene. Two policemen sustained minor injuries.

61. During the past year **the prisoners' protest took center stage in popular resistance events.** At the beginning of March 2013, when it seemed that solidarity with the prisoners had ebbed somewhat, **the Temple Mount again became the focal point of confrontations between Palestinian rioters and the Israeli security forces, although they did not spin out of control.** On Friday, March 8, 2013, Muslim rioters threw stones and Molotov cocktails at the Mugrabi Gate. Israeli security forces entered the compound and used stun grenades to disperse the rioters. Two Molotov

cocktails were thrown at the police; nine policemen and several Palestinians sustained minor injuries.

62. In March 2013 the Israeli security forces detained a squad of five **Hamas-affiliated terrorist operatives**. During interrogation they confessed that **they had planned the throw Molotov cocktails at policemen on the Temple Mount from inside Al-Aqsa mosque**. They used a minor to bring the Molotov cocktails into the Temple Mount compound on the assumption he would not be examined by the Israeli security forces. The five were indicted (IDF spokesman, April 7, 2013). The incident is additional proof that sometimes stone- and Molotov cocktail-throwing are not spontaneous but rather **well-planned attacks**, which in certain instances are linked to the institutionalized terrorist organizations rather than popular activities.



Riots on the Temple Mount: Palestinians throw Molotov cocktail at police (YouTube, March 8, 2013).

Main types of popular resistance activities


Increased use of cold weapons

63. **Cold weapons are often used in popular resistance events**. The most common occurrence is **throwing stones and Molotov cocktails at Israeli security forces and civilians**. During the past half year (updated May 2013) the level of violence in **Judea and Samaria has been relatively higher than in previous years, although it has not turned into a broad popular uprising**.

64. After the second intifada **the use of cold weapons became the main form of Palestinian anti-Israeli violence.** In ISA publications the use of cold weapons is called "**popular resistance attacks.**" An increase in the attacks began in popular resistance events in 2012, **especially the use of Molotov cocktails.**²⁷ In **Judea and Samaria** in 2012 **578 attacks were carried out, most of them popular resistance attacks** (as opposed to **320** in 2011). In **Jerusalem there were 282 attacks in 2012 (191 in 2011),** all of them classified as "popular resistance attacks." (**Note:** The statistics do not include incidents of stone-throwing, of which there are several hundred every month.)

65. **During the first months of 2013 an increase has been seen in the extent of popular resistance events in Judea and Samaria.** In our assessment, they are mainly the result of solidarity with the Palestinians terrorists in Israeli jails. For example, according to the ISA, in February 2013 **there were 100 popular resistance attacks, as opposed to 56 in January.** Most of them (84) involved Molotov cocktails. In **Jerusalem** there were 38 popular resistance attacks in February (27 in January), 35 involving Molotov cocktails (ISA website, monthly report, February 2013). (**Note:** Stone-throwing was not included in the ISA data above.) The following graph shows the incidence of stone- and Molotov cocktail-throwing and their place in popular resistance events.

Riots' throwing Molotov Cocktails and stones in Judwa and Samaria May 2012 to April 2013



²⁷ The data are based on the ISA study: "The 2012 Annual Report – data and trends concerning terrorism and its prevention."


66. **According to ISA data, there was also a significant increase in attacks involving arms** (shooting attacks, IEDs, hand grenades) **in 2012** (37 attacks as opposed to 26 in 2011). However, the number of armed attacks is still smaller than popular resistance attacks, only 6.4% of the total. No armed attacks were carried out in Jerusalem in 2012, as all the events were popular resistance attacks.

67. An exception was **the attack on a bus in Tel Aviv on November 21, 2012**, at the end of Operation Pillar of Defense, which wounded 29 civilians. It was orchestrated and carried out by a Hamas-PIJ squad from Beit Laqia-Ramallah. The squad was assisted by an Israeli Arab who had received Israeli citizenship through family reunification. He brought the bomb into Tel Aviv (ISA website). During the **first months of 2013 Hamas increased its efforts to carry out terrorist attacks in Jerusalem, including suicide bombing attacks, the abduction of Israeli soldiers and civilians, and mass-casualty attacks. The attacks were prevented by the Israeli security forces.**


68. **Operation Pillar of Defense (November 2012) was the main trigger for the increase in popular resistance events, during which violence increased.** The prisoners' protest triggered the increase in violence during the first months of 2013. Other causes were the **economic difficulties, the frustration at the disappearing political horizon and the "price tag" events carried out by extremist Judea and Samaria Jewish settlers. They all led to a high level of violence in Judea and Samaria during the last half year.** Nevertheless, participation in the events remained relatively low and in most cases there were between several dozen and several hundred Palestinians at each event.

Use of Molotov cocktails

69. The use of Molotov cocktails is notable at popular resistance events. Between several dozen and several hundred are thrown every month. The number increased sharply in 2012, the increase continuing into 2013, as shown by the following graph (ISA website):



Molotov cocktails in Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem, 2012 and 2011



The use of Molotov cocktails in attacks in Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem compared with other forms of attack, November-December 2012. Note: Data on stone-throwing attacks, of which there are several hundred every month, are not included.

Attacks Including Molotov Cocktails



Molotov cocktail thrown at an IDF jeep conducting activities in the village of Ni'lin, December 12, 2012 (YouTube, December 12, 2012).



Palestinian rioters throw stones and Molotov cocktails at an IDF post in the Bethlehem sector (YouTube, March 30, 2012)



Molotov cocktail thrown at an Israeli policeman and Border Police jeep during an activity in the Al-Aroub refugee camp, Hebron region (Jerusalem Brigades website, January 3, 2013)

Molotov cocktails thrown at Israeli security forces in Hebron on March 15, 2013 (Facebook page of the International Communities against Israel, March 15, 2013)



Students from Bir Zeit University throw Molotov cocktails at IDF and Israel Police forces near the Ofer jail during protests in support of the hunger-striking Palestinian terrorists (Wafa News Agency, February 12, 2013).

Molotov cocktails thrown at the Einab roadblock (April 4, 2013)

70. On **April 4, 2013**, Molotov cocktails were thrown at the IDF's Einab roadblock (near Tulkarm). The motive may have been the death of Palestinian terrorist operative Maysara Abu Hamdia. The IDF pursued three of the Palestinians responsible, opened

fire and killed two of them. The initial investigation revealed the attack had been planned by a number of Palestinians who came to the roadblock armed with Molotov cocktails. While in pursuit of the terrorists the IDF force was in danger and opened fire (IDF spokesman, April 7, 2013).

71. The PA accused Israel of killing the two Palestinians and thus supported what they had done. Mahmoud Abbas accused Israel of trying to sow anarchy and cause security to deteriorate in Judea and Samaria. **He claimed the Palestinians had acted within the framework a of "non-violent demonstration."** At a meeting of Fatah's Revolutionary Committee Mahmoud Abbas said that it was unacceptable that a **"non-violent"** demonstration end in the death of two Palestinians. Then-Palestinian Prime Minister **Salam Fayyad** condemned the IDF fire at "peaceful protestors" and called on the international community to intervene and condemn the use the IDF made of live ammunition against Palestinians (Wafa News Agency, April 4, 2013).



Left: Fatah operatives fire into the air during the funeral of the two Palestinians held in Anabta. Right: Obituary posted by Fatah's recruiting office of the death of Amm'er Nassar at the Einab roadblock (Fatah Facebook page, April 3, 2013).

Use of stones and rocks

72. Throwing stones (and on occasion cinder blocks, rocks, pieces of metal and other projectiles) at Israeli security forces deployed at the traditional friction points and at Israeli vehicles driving on the roads in Judea and Samaria **is the most common pattern in popular resistance attacks**. Most of the stones are thrown by Palestinian youths and sometimes by high school students and even children. In some instances

the stone throwers **are masked**. Stone-throwing is easy for the Palestinians to market in the media. The stone throwers are represented as innocent Palestinians and the stones as not dangerous. At the same time Israel is represented as an occupying power suppressing the Palestinian popular resistance. However, as past experience has shown, **stones can be lethal** (See Section Four).

73. We do not have exact data regarding the extent of Palestinian stone-throwing. In 2012 and the first months of 2013 **it was estimated that between 150 and 350 events occurred every month**. The number rises and falls, depending on events and the various memorial days. For example, the number of stone-throwing attacks rose sharply during November 2012 (the month of Operation Pillar of Defense, when there were an estimated 1,000 stone-throwing attacks) and in February-April 2013 (caused by the prisoners' protest).



Stones held by a Palestinian during a Friday protest in the village of Qadoum (Facebook page of The International Communities against Israel, March 15, 2013)



A stone which penetrated an Israeli vehicle in the region of Beit Nabalah on the Modi'in-Jerusalem road. There were no casualties (Photo courtesy of the Israel Police, Judea and Samaria District, March 15, 2013).



A stone thrown at an Israeli truck in the region of Ariel. It caused a collision between the truck and a car. A two year-old baby girl in the car was critically injured; her mother and two sisters were severely injured (Facebook page of Judea and Samaria Rescue, March 14, 2013).



Left: Palestinian youths throw stones at IDF forces during a weekly protest in the village of Qadoun, near Qalqiliya. Right: A masked Palestinian woman holds a rock (Wafa News Agency, April 12, 2013)

74. Sometimes stones are thrown spontaneously, the result of the initiative of local Palestinians motivated by nationalistic feelings and methodical anti-Israeli propaganda and incitement. However, **some of the events, are premeditated and planned in advance.** Groups of Palestinian youths were brought before military courts in Judea and Samaria for organizing to throw stones at passing Israeli vehicles. At traditional Bila'in-model friction sites preparations were made for violent actions, including

throwing stones (See below.). Piles of stones and rocks were found on the Temple Mount, prepared for throwing at Israelis.²⁸

Israeli Security Forces Attacked with Stones and Rocks



Israeli Border Police attacked during a riot in Bila'in, March 1, 2013 (Facebook page of The International Communities against Israel)



Israeli Border Police attacked during a riot in Bila'in, March 1, 2013 (Facebook page of The International Communities against Israel)

²⁸ **Amira Hass**, writing in the Israeli daily newspaper Haaretz in an article entitled "The internal syntax of stone-throwing," said that "in many instances throwing stones is a function of boredom, a surplus of hormones, imitation, boasting, competition. But in the internal syntax of foreign controller-controllee throwing stones is an adjective for the subject of the sentence, "Occupiers, your time has come..." (Haaretz, April 3, 2013, ITIC translation). Hass' biased representation minimizes the significance of the widespread occurrence and methodical and sometimes deadly use of stones. She also ignores the political context of stones thrown as part of popular resistance events, a main component of PA and Fatah strategy.



Palestinians throw stones at IDF forces during a riot in the village of Qadoum, near Qalqiliya (Wafa News Agency, November 9, 2012).



Palestinian rioters throw rocks at an Israel Border Police vehicle near the village of Qadoum (near Qalqiliya) (Filastin Al-'Aan, January 26, 2013).

Confrontation during the erection of a Palestinian outpost by Fatah activists in the region of the village of Anin (Jenin region, near the security fence). The activists mounted the IDF vehicle to throw stones at IDF soldiers (Wafa News Agency, January 26, 2013).

Stabbing attacks


75. **Attacks involving the use of knives** (or other sharp instruments, such as axes), which is a fairly common pattern, are **particularly dangerous**. They occur sporadically far less commonly than attacks involving stones or Molotov cocktails. Between 2000

and 2009 **152 stabbing attacks** were carried out at varying frequencies from year to year. Between 2001 and 2006 there were an average of **19 such attacks** a year, in 2007 **seven** attacks and in 2008 and 2009 **ten and 12 attacks**, respectively. **Seventeen Israelis were killed**, most of them in 2001 (four deaths) and 2003 (three deaths) (ISA website, "Analysis of terrorist attacks in the last decade, October 29, 2000 to December 31, 2009"). Many stabbing attacks were prevented when knife-carrying Palestinians were detained at the roadblocks in Judea and Samaria.

76. **Stabbing attacks are easy for lone operatives** to carry out. That is because knives and other sharp instruments are easy to obtain and no preparations are necessary. **Jerusalem is the largest area of Jewish-Palestinian friction, making it easy for Palestinians to carry out stabbings.** They are also carried out at **the friction points in Judea and Samaria** (the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron and the Tapuah junction in Samaria are two prominent sites). The interrogation of several knife-wielding Palestinians revealed that their basic objective was to kill Jews (soldiers, ultra-Orthodox, settlers).

77. **There were 11 stabbing attacks in 2012** (as opposed for four in 2011). **Five of them were carried out in the Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem and two in Judea and Samaria. Two others were carried out inside Israeli territory (Kfar Saba and Beersheba) by Palestinians from Judea and Samaria.** Between January and April 2013 there were **three stabbing attacks in Jerusalem and Samaria**, as follows:

1) On **April 30, 2013, an Israeli civilian was stabbed to death** at the bus stop at the **Tapuah junction** in Samaria. The terrorist operative arrived at the junction by car, approached a group of civilians standing at the bus stop and stabbed one of them in the chest. The victim was Eviatar Borovsky, 32, married and father of five. The terrorist operative was from the Fatah rank and file and **had been released from an Israeli jail in March 2013 after having served a three-year sentence for throwing stones.** The **Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades**, Fatah's military wing, formally claimed responsibility for the attack, representing it as revenge for the deaths of two prisoners in an Israeli jail. According to the announcement, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades had "received a green light to initiate a series of showcase actions against the occupation."



The scene of the attack at the Tapuah junction (Judea and Samaria Rescue spokesman, April 30 2013)



The Al-Qsa Martyrs Brigades, Fatah's military-terrorist wing, claims responsibility for the attack (Watan, April 30, 2013)

2) On **February 4, 2013**, a stabbing attack was carried out on Sultan Suleiman Street in east Jerusalem in which an Israeli civilian sustained minor wounds. The operative, **Sa'mer Ahmed Mahmoud Matar**, from the village of Edna (northwest of Hebron) was detained the same day. Interrogated by the ISA, he confessed to

the crime, saying he had begun planning to murder an ultra-Orthodox Jew or settler three months previously. He also confessed that he **planned to carry out other attacks**, including placing a **homemade IED on a bus carrying ultra-Orthodox Jews**. Matar is a Hamas operative who was held in administrative detention between 2009 and 2011. He confessed that he continued his Hamas activities while he was planning to place the IED and carry out the stabbing (IDF spokesman's website, April 9, 2013).

3) On **January 29, 2013**, an Israeli youth was stabbed **near the Tapuah junction** while waiting for a ride. He was seriously wounded and evacuated to a hospital. An IDF soldier who happened to arrive on the scene chased the attacker and alerted Border Police forces, who detained the attacker (IDF spokesman, January 29, 2013). He was **Mustafa 'Adel Mustafa Barghouti**, from the village of Beit Rima (northwest of Ramallah). He confessed to the stabbing. Barghouti, **a student at Al-Najah University in Nablus**, confessed that initially he planned to **murder an Israeli soldier**, having decided to carry out the attack that morning. He looked for a soldier and when he could not find one, decided instead to kill one of the civilians waiting for a ride at the Tapuah junction (IDF spokesman's website, April 9, 2013).



Israeli security forces treat the youth who was attacked (Judea and Samaria Rescue, January 29, 2013).

4) On **November 22, 2012**, a Border Policeman was stabbed and sustained minor injuries. The attack was carried out at the entrance to a police station in east Jerusalem. After the attack dozens of Palestinian youths gathered at the station and the police used force to disperse them when they refused to leave.

5) On **November 2, 2012**, a young Jewish man was stabbed in the back by two Palestinians in the Ras al-Amud neighborhood of east Jerusalem. His wounds were classified as minor to serious.

6) On **June 4, 2012**, a Palestinian went to the Cave of the Patriarchs, approached a policeman securing the entrance, took out a sharp instrument and stabbed the policeman in the head, causing minor injuries. Another policeman shot the attacker, inflicting serious wounds.

7) On **April 24, 2012**, an Israeli civilian was critically wounded in the central Israeli city of Kfar Saba by a knife-wielding Hamas terrorist from Ramallah. According to the initial investigation, the attacker got into the taxi in Tel Aviv and asked to be driven to Kfar Saba. When they arrived the Palestinian took out a knife and stabbed the taxi driver (Wallah! website, April 24, 2012).

8) On **April 19, 2012**, an Israel civilian was seriously wounded when he was stabbed in the stomach and leg as he left the tomb of Shimon the Righteous in **the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood of east Jerusalem**. On April 22, 2012 the Israeli security forces detained two residents of the Old City, who confessed during interrogation that they had carried out the attack. The investigation revealed that in preparation for the attack the two had armed themselves with knives and gloves, and positioned themselves at a spot which overlooked the route leading to the tomb of Shimon the Righteous. They claimed their motive for the attack had been the detention of a Hamas-affiliated network calling itself **Shabab Al-Aqsa**, whose operatives were involved in violent activity and riots on the Temple Mount (ISA website).²⁹

9) On **April 2, 2012**, an ultra-Orthodox Israeli civilian was attacked with an axe **near the Nablus Gate in the Old City as he was on his way to pray at the Wailing Wall**. The attacker followed him, attacked him in the middle of the street and fled the scene (ISA website).

²⁹ One of the Shabab Al-Aqsa operatives placed a bomb at a bus stop near the International Convention Center in Jerusalem in March 2011. The explosion killed a British woman tourist and wounded 47 Israelis.

10) On **March 15, 2012**, a female soldier was attacked **while riding the light railway in Jerusalem**. The terrorist took out a knife, stabbed her several times and fled the scene. He was a high school student from Beit Hanina, detained a short time afterwards. During interrogation he admitted that his motives were nationalistic and religious, claimed that he had a religious duty to act against the Israeli "occupation" (ISA website).

11) On **March 6, 2012**, the Palestinian police detained a female Palestinian from **the village of Habla** (south of Qalqiliya) who had approached the security fence of the Israeli town of Immanuel in Samaria. She had a large knife in her possession and said she was planning to stab a Jew (Ynet, March 6, 2012).

12) On **January 21, 2012**, a Palestinian youth stabbed an Israeli Border Policeman at a roadblock **near the Shuafat refugee camp** (northeast of Jerusalem). He sustained minor wounds; the attacker fled the scene (Ynet, January 21, 2012).

Vehicular attacks

78. **There are fewer vehicular attacks than stabbings, but they are more deadly.** Between 2000 and 2008 there were 15 such attacks in which **15 people were killed**. Three were carried out in Jerusalem, two of them by means of front loaders, during the second half of 2008. All of the above attacks killed three Israelis and wounded an estimated 100 (ISA website, "Analysis of terrorist attacks in the last decade").

79. During **2012** there were a number of vehicular attacks in the Jerusalem region and in Judea and Samaria. In one of them **an Israeli civilian was killed** and in several attacks Israeli security force personnel were injured. In two attacks the Palestinians who carried out the attacks were killed. The major attacks of the past year were the following:

1) On **February 14, 2013**, a Palestinian broke through the Karnei Shomron roadblock and attempted to run over an Israeli policeman. The policeman shot the tire of the car but the Palestinian continued driving forward. The policeman then shot at the vehicle itself. The driver was wounded and evacuated to a hospital (Ynet, February 14, 2013).

2) On **December 23, 2012**, a Palestinian driving a taxi hit a Border Policeman at **the entrance to the police station in Jabel Mukaber in east Jerusalem**, inflicting minor wounds. The Palestinian had driven his taxi to the station, and

when he was not allowed to enter the parking lot he deliberately rammed into a car that was leaving. A Border Policeman attempted to talk to him, but the driver put the car in gear and drove into him (Ynet, December 23, 2012).

3) At the end of **November 2012** a Palestinian from a village in the Tulkarm district rammed into an Israeli jeep engaged in security activities in the region of **Nablus**. The jeep overturned and its passengers sustained minor injuries. The Palestinian then rushed at them with an axe yelling "Allahu akbar" and wounded two of them. One of the passengers shot and killed him. Five security force personnel were injured in the attack (IDF spokesman, November 29, 2013).

4) On **October 2, 2012**, four IDF soldiers were wounded (one seriously and three sustaining minor injuries) by a Palestinian taxi near **the village of Neve Daniel in the Etzion Block**. A group of soldiers was standing near their jeep, which had stalled, when a passing Palestinian taxi rammed into it and into the soldiers and fled the scene. The taxi driver's exact motivation was unclear.



The scene of the vehicular attack in which IDF soldiers were injured (Spokesman for the Judea and Samaria District of the Israel Police, October 2, 2012).

5) On **September 9, 2012**, the security officer of the Judean town of **Sha'arei Tikva (west of Ariel)** was killed in a vehicular attack on the road between **Ornit and Elkana**. He was stopping and documenting **Palestinian vehicles, looking for vehicles carrying illegal Palestinian workers to places of employment in Israel**. Even though he stood in the middle of the road a vehicle continued straight at him and hit him, killing him. The driver, a resident of the

Israeli village Kfar Qassem, fled the scene and was later detained. According to the indictment, he deliberately accelerated the vehicle, drove directly at the officer, hit him and fled (NRG website, September 27, 2012).

6) On the night of **July 29, 2012**, a Palestinian vehicle tried to **break through the Al-Zayim roadblock (east of Jerusalem, near Ma'ale Adumim)**. **The driver was killed in the attempt and an Israeli policeman sustained minor injuries.** According to policemen present at the time the driver tried to break through the roadblock and run over the policemen located there. The office of the PA chairman issued an announcement condemning the death of a Palestinian civilian which, allegedly, had been premeditated and carried out in cold blood (Wafa News Agency, July 30, 2012).

The transition from popular resistance to armed attacks

80. In most instances **there is a distinction** between Palestinians who carry out popular resistance attacks with using cold weapons and terrorist operatives who carry out armed attacks. However, **sometimes the line separating the two is vague**: the exposure of several terrorist networks has shown that in some instances popular resistance **activists also participate in armed attacks or try to upgrade their activities to armed attacks**. In other instances armed attacks have been integrated into attacks using cold weapons.

81. In 2012 and 2013 the Israeli security forces exposed **a number of popular resistance networks in Judea and Samaria, leading to the detention of dozens of operatives. Some of the detainees confessed during interrogation that they had also been involved in armed attacks. Some of them had also planned to "graduate" from the use of cold weapons to the use of arms.** For example:

1) On **March 28, 2013**, the Israeli security forces detained a **Fatah-Tanzim terrorist squad in the village of Beit Fajar** (in the Bethlehem region). The squad carried out **terrorist attacks in the Gush Etzion region, including firing improvised and standard guns at the Jewish village of Migdal Oz and at a bus on one of the local roads**, as well as placing a mock IED at the entrance to a village. **The operatives also engaged in throwing Molotov cocktails** (IDF spokesman, March 28, 2013).

2) On **February 4, 2013**, a Palestinian from the village of Edna (west of Hebron) was detained **who had stabbed an Israeli civilian in east Jerusalem**. During interrogation he confessed that three months previously **he had begun making plans to kill an ultra-Orthodox Jew or Jewish settler**. He also considered the option of placing a homemade IED on a bus used by ultra-Orthodox Jews in the central Israeli city of Beit Shemesh. **During interrogation he also confessed to continuing his activities in Hamas** (between 2009 and 2011 he was held in administrative detention because of his Hamas activities) (IDF spokesman's website, April 9, 2013).

3) On the night of **January 26, 2013**, IDF forces detained two Palestinians who had **thrown Molotov cocktails** at an army post near Hawara (south of Nablus). In their possession were three improvised hand grenades and three Molotov cocktails ready for throwing. They were also carrying a letter stating that the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades had to carry out an attack in the settlement of Alon Moreh.

4) In **January 2013** a terrorist squad from the village of Bayta (in the Nablus region) was detained. **Some of its operatives were involved in shooting attacks using improvised weapons**. They were also involved in **throwing stones at moving Israeli vehicles** (IDF spokesman, January 9, 2013).

5) **At the end of 2012** the Israeli security forces exposed a number of Palestinians who belonged to a PFLP squad. During interrogation two of them confessed that they had planned **to abduct Israeli soldiers as bargaining chips**. They planned **to shoot at an IDF force to distract them and then to abduct soldiers**. They also planned **to abduct a civilian in Samaria**. **In addition, the squad operatives participated in riots and popular resistance events against the Israeli security forces** (ISA website).

6) In **November 2012** a terrorist squad was exposed in the village of Sinjil (in the Ramallah region). **The squad had carried out a number of attacks as part of the popular resistance** during Operation Pillar of Defense, including throwing stones and Molotov cocktails at moving Israeli vehicles. On November 19, 2012, they threw a Molotov cocktail at a vehicle in the region of Ma'aleh Levona, setting it on fire. The passengers managed to escape from the vehicle without being harmed; the vehicle was completely destroyed (IDF spokesman, January 17, 2012). The squad operatives, who did not belong to a terrorist organization,

confessed **that they had weapons in their possession, and surrendered two rifles**. One of the squad operatives confessed that **he had agreed to participate in placing an IED** (IDF spokesman, January 17, 2012).

7) In **May 2012** the Israeli security forces detained three Hamas operatives, residents of Hebron. The squad was headed by **Muataz Suleiman Muhammad Qawasmeh, who had been imprisoned in Israel a number of times**. He had assisted his brother Muayed, who led a terrorist cell and who was **involved in a suicide bombing attack in the southern Israeli city of Dimona** in February 2008.³⁰ **During interrogation the three confessed that they had prepared improvised IEDs and detonated them near the security fence around the city of Kiryat Arba to see how the IDF would react**. The use of the IEDs was part of their preparations to infiltrate Kiryat Arba **to abduct or kill a local resident**. On numerous occasions **the three also threw Molotov cocktails at the Jewish town of Givat Hakharsina** (ISA website).

8) During **May 2012** the ISA brought six Palestinian operatives in for questioning, most of them residents of Silwan in east Jerusalem, a focal point for the popular resistance. The six admitted to **throwing Molotov cocktails and an improvised IED**, and to attempting to stab or otherwise attack an IDF soldier and steal his weapon. One of them admitted to having attempted to make an IED that could be detonated with a cellular phone and to trying to market the squad's methods to Israeli Arabs (ISA website: "Popular terrorism" in Jerusalem, July 2012).

9) On **April 19, 2012**, an **IED was detonated in an attack on an Israeli vehicle near the town of Yata** (southern Mt. Hebron). It was a complex attack involving the simultaneous use of a number of IEDs which were supposed to be detonated with cellular phones. There were no casualties and no damage was reported. The investigation of the attack led to the detention of two young Palestinians from Yata who had prepared the IEDs. The two also confessed that they had constructed a large number of IEDs and had even detonated one in 2007. **They also confessed to throwing stones on a number of occasions** (ISA website).

³⁰ The attack was carried out by two suicide bombers in the center of Dimona on February 4, 2008. One Israeli woman was killed and 38 people were killed. Muayed was released in the Gilad Shalit deal and expelled to the Gaza Strip.



One of the IEDs detonated by the two Palestinians from the town of Yata, who threw stones (ISA website).

10) On **December 24, 2011**, two Palestinians, aged 16 and 17, were detained after having **shot at an Israeli vehicle** near the village of Azun. During interrogation they confessed to having carried out the attack and to other shooting attacks against IDF soldiers. They **confessed to carrying out another attack against an Israeli vehicle, and to having thrown a large number of stones and Molotov cocktails** at Israeli vehicles and the Israeli security forces in the region of Azun (IDF spokesman, January 14, 2012).

Section Four: Models of the popular resistance in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip

Overview

1. The popular resistance and its built-in violence have several models. They differ from one another in frequency, objectives, level of violence and amount of media exposure.

2. The following are some of the major models of the popular resistance in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip:


- 1) Bila'in-Ni'lin model
- 2) Attacks on Israeli vehicles driving on roads in Judea and Samaria
- 3) Erecting outposts
- 4) Other models in Judea and Samaria
- 5) Propaganda events in the Gaza Strip

The Bila'in-Ni'lin model

3. The main sites of the popular resistance are **Bila'in** and **Ni'lin**, two villages near the security fence (northeast of the city of Modi'in). For eight years they have been the scene of **regular, ongoing, organized protests involving violence against the Israeli security forces** (throwing stones and Molotov cocktails, sabotaging the security fence and physically confronting Israeli security personnel). The protests began with local residents' complaints about the route of the security fence. The **PA and Fatah later turned Bila'in and Ni'lin into a symbol of the popular resistance, with some local activists playing a major role in popular resistance events in Judea and Samaria:**

- 1) **Bila'in** has a population of approximately 4,000 and has constantly been the site of demonstrations against the security fence since it was built in its present form in 2005. Initially they took place daily; it later became established practice to

hold them on **Fridays**. The number of participants in the demonstrations usually ranges from several dozen to several hundred.



Panoramic view of Bila'in; the inset marks the site of the weekly clashes between the demonstrators and IDF forces (plus.google.com/photos, February 3, 2012)

2) **Ni'lin** has a population of approximately 1,500 and has been the site of demonstrations against the security fence since Israel began its construction in May 2008 (the fence route in Ni'lin was approved by the Israeli Supreme Court before the actual construction began). As in Bila'in, the demonstrations in Ni'lin initially took place daily, but eventually they were held on Fridays (except in special circumstances). The number of participants in the demonstrations ranges from about 100 to over 200.



The villages of Bila'in and Ni'lin, symbols of the popular resistance

4. Initially the PA distanced itself from the local struggle in Ni'lin. It later supported the demonstrations, provided material assistance to their organizers and turned them into a symbol of the popular resistance. In Bila'in, however, the struggle had the support of the PA from the start. After the sixth Fatah convention in August 2009, the PA turned the events at Bila'in and Ni'lin into a symbol of the popular resistance and a device for attracting international aid for the Palestinian cause. PA and Fatah leaders (including former Prime Minister Salam Fayyad) often take part in the demonstrations. The PA also encourages the presence of international media and pro-Palestinian activists from around the globe.

5. On Friday, March 1, 2013, a demonstration was held in Bila'in to mark the eighth anniversary of the "popular resistance against the fence." It was attended by former PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, Ramallah governor Laila Ghannam and other top PA officials. Salam Fayyad hailed the demonstrations in Bila'in as a model of the so-called "non-violent popular resistance," saying it should be applied to other locations. The demonstrators threw stones at Israeli security forces and injured an estimated 25 soldiers, according to Palestinian reports. Salam Fayyad himself was rushed from the scene when the Israeli security forces fired tear gas to disperse the stone-throwing demonstrators (Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda, March 1, 2013).



Salam Fayyad with the governor of Ramallah at the demonstration in Bila'in (Wafa News Agency, March 1, 2013)



Stones thrown at Israeli border guards during a demonstration in Bila'in on March 1, 2013, attended by former PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad (International Communities Against Israel Facebook page)

The involvement of left-wing Palestinian organizations

6. In addition to PA and Fatah officials, other notable participants in the Bila'in-model protests are members of **Palestinian left-wing organizations** which also use the popular resistance as their major method of operation. The most prominent popular left-wing resistance organization is the **Palestinian National Initiative (PNI)**, headed by **Mustafa Barghouti**. PNI members take an active part in the demonstrations in Bila'in and other popular resistance sites; its leader has often been filmed confronting the Israeli security forces. Another left-wing organization participating in the events is

the **Popular Struggle Front**, founded by **Samir Ghawshah** (died 2009). The organization's current secretary general is **Ahmed Majdalani**, who is also the **PA minister of labor**.



Salam Fayyad at a Friday demonstration in Bila'in (International Communities Against Israel Facebook page, March 1, 2013). The demonstrators standing nearby carry flags of the Popular Struggle Front (left) and Palestine, as well as the orange flag of the Palestinian National Initiative (orange).



The logo of the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front



The logo of the Palestinian National Initiative Organization



PNI activists with orange flags sabotage the security fence in Bila'in and confront Israeli security forces (Palestinian National Initiative website)

Mustafa Barghouti (right) confronts IDF soldiers at a demonstration against the fence in Bila'in (Palestinian National Initiative website)

Demonstrations in Bila'in and Ni'lin



Foreigners at a Friday demonstration in Bila'in (International Communities Against Israel Facebook page, March 1, 2013)



Left: A Palestinian throws a stone at an Israeli border patrol vehicle in Bila'in (Al-Raya, March 1, 2013). Right: Demonstrators in Bila'in march towards the point of friction with the Israeli security forces (Plus.google.com/photos website, February 3, 2012).




Palestinian activists at the weekly demonstration in Bila'in carry a large ladder to climb the fence and confront the Israeli security forces (Bokra.net website, October 26, 2012)



Left: Masked demonstrators throw stones at Israeli security forces (Plus.google.com/photos website, June 10, 2012). Right: A Palestinian throws a stone at a border guard officer in Bila'in, March 1, 2013 (Bila'in Facebook site, March 6, 2013; International Community Against Israel).



School children throw stones at Israeli security forces in Bila'in (Plus.google.com/photos website, February 3, 2012).



Young Palestinians throw stones at a police vehicle during a demonstration in Bila'in (Panet.co.il, website March 2, 2013)

The use of cold weapons in Bila'in and Ni'lin

7. During the demonstrations and riots in Bila'in and Ni'lin the demonstrators use organized violence against the Israeli security forces. The acts of violence include throwing stones by hand or with slingshots, throwing sharpened bits of metal with slingshots and throwing Molotov cocktails. The demonstrators also make a systematic effort to sabotage the security fence³¹ and sometimes masked demonstrators deliberately engage in physical confrontations with the Israeli security forces, trespassing on a closed military zone and breaking Israeli law. The PA considers the violence part of the "resistance against the occupation." It has supported the violence over the years and in fact has given it legitimacy (even though it still claims that the popular resistance is non-violent).

8. Charges filed in the past against rioters detained by the Israeli security forces include several acts of violence:

- 1) Abdallah Mahmoud Muhammad Abu Rahmah, from Bila'in, is head of the village popular committee. He has often led marches to the security fence to riot and throw stones at the Israeli security forces. With his colleagues in the local committee he has incited the participants to attack the Israeli security forces (shouting 'Push them back,' "Throw [things] at them," "Don't let them shoot,"

³¹ The cost of the damage caused to the security fence in Bila'in and Ni'lin in 2009 was estimated at NIS 300,000 (about \$82,000 at the current rate of exchange).

etc.). Abdallah Abu Rahmah and other committee members **would divide the demonstrators into two groups**: one to throw stones, the other to cut the security fence. **They instructed the village youths to throw stones at the security forces (by hand and with slingshots) as soon as the adults left the demonstration site.** Abdallah Abu Rahmah himself **threw stones** and prepared bottles and balloons filled with chicken droppings which the demonstrators threw at the security forces (Prosecution case no. 3813/09).



Abdallah Abu Rahmah confronts an Israeli soldier (Safa News Agency)



Rateb Abu Rahmah, chief of information for the Bila'in popular committee and Abdallah Abu Rahmah's brother, briefs a member of a Russian delegation that visited Bila'in (Bokra.net website. November 2012)

2) **Zidoun Sa'id Muhammad Srour**, from Ni'lin, is a former member of the Ni'lin popular committee, and was detained on January 12, 2010. He and other committee members were accused of organizing gatherings and marches, **dividing their participants into groups by area and inciting them to throw stones at the Israeli security forces. The committee members also paid the demonstrators to participate and throw stones**, including in cases where their actions resulted in **various expenses (such as medical expenses and legal fees for the trials of stone-throwers)**.³² Zidoun Srour himself served as a lookout and even personally threw stones at the Israeli security forces (Prosecution case no. 1210/10).

³² **Information about payments** for participating and reimbursement of expenses for throwing stones can be found in other indictments, for instance the indictment against **Hassan Mustafa Rashid Moussa**, member of the Ni'lin Popular Committee, and the indictment against **Ibrahim Mustafa Rashid Amira** (Abu Sa'idat), also a member of the Ni'lin Popular Committee.

3) **Muhammad Abd al-Karim Mustafa Khatib, from Bila'in, is a member of the local popular committee** and was detained by the Israeli security forces on August 3, 2009. According to the charges against him, on Fridays the committee members gathered the villagers **near a mosque** and gave them with shirts and pieces of metal to throw at the tear gas canisters fired by the IDF to disperse the demonstrations. **The committee members led mass gatherings to the fence for the purpose of rioting and throwing stones at the security forces.** The committee members incited the demonstrators to harm Israeli security forces and coaxed the village youths to throw stones at the security forces as the older men left the site (Prosecution case no. 2781/09).



Demonstrators gather near the central mosque in Bila'in before going to the weekly demonstration. The yellow flags are Fatah's (February 3, 2012)

4) **Adib Ahmed Abu Rahmah, from Bila'in, is member of the local popular committee** and was detained on July 10, 2009. The committee members gathered the villagers near a mosque and gave them **Palestinian flags**. Adib Abu Rahmah led mass gatherings to hold riots and throw stones at the security forces. **They divided the demonstrators into two groups: one to throw stones, the other to cut the fences put up by the security forces.** Adib Abu Rahmah called on the demonstrators to "Join us, attack them, throw [things] at them, move forward." He was holding a photograph of a Bila'in man who had been killed during a demonstration and a 7-foot sheet of iron to stop the security forces from hosing him down (Prosecution case no. 2636/09).



A young Palestinian throws stones during a demonstration in Bila'in extensively covered by the media (IDF Spokesman)

IDF soldier injured in Bila'in (IDF Spokesman)



International Communities Against Israel Facebook page, March 15, 2013

9. The charges clearly indicate that Israeli security forces operating in Bila'in and Ni'lin have often had to deal with violent demonstrations and riots where the local popular committee used organized violence. In responding to the demonstrators' provocations Israel generally showed restraint. The mission of the Israeli security forces operating in Bila'in and Ni'lin was to prevent the destruction of

the security fence and to deal with the demonstrators and violence, minimizing casualties to IDF forces and demonstrators alike.³³




Palestinian youths sabotage the security fence in Bila'in (Plus.google.com/photos website, June 10, 2010)

10. **The violence used by the Palestinians during the events in Bila'in and Ni'lin caused many injuries to the Israeli security forces and the demonstrators.** For example, between August 2008 and December 2009, 135 Israeli security personnel sustained minor injuries and three were seriously injured. During the same period, seven Palestinians were killed in the clashes, 134 sustained minor injuries, ten were seriously injured and eight were critically injured. According to data from the IDF Spokesman, eleven Palestinians and five Israeli security personnel sustained minor injuries in the first four months of 2010.


11. The local committees rallying the demonstrators in Bila'in and Ni'lin **are usually affiliated with the PA and Fatah**, and are directed and aided by the PA. However, some of the demonstrators are operatives belonging to **Hamas, the PFLP, the DFLP and other terrorist organizations**. In some cases they can be identified by the flags and posters they carry, as shown below.

³³ **Dr. Rateb Abu Rahmah**, a psychologist and psychology lecturer at the Al-Quds Open University, is head of information for the Bila'in popular committee. Asked by an Israeli reporter about the stone-throwing incidents that injure IDF soldiers and border guards, he replied, "We are against throwing stones. **It is true that some people throw stones, but these are youngsters who often don't listen to us.** We are against the use of force or violence of any kind" (Avi Issacharoff, Haaretz supplement, January 8, 2010). However, the charges clearly demonstrate that **these young people are told what to do by the local committees, and that the stone throwing was not a spontaneous occurrence but rather a well-organized method of operation.**

Terrorist Operatives Participate in the Bila'in and Ni'lin Demonstrations



Hamas flags and posters at a demonstration in Ni'lin in memory of Hamas operative Aqel Sadeq Srour, killed in one of the demonstrations in Ni'lin (June 5, 2006). At the bottom of the poster is a quote often seen on Hamas posters: "Jihad to victory or martyrdom."



Left: Red PFLP flags carried by demonstrators in Bila'in on March 1, 2013 (Panet, March 2, 2013). Right: A red DFLP flag and a PFLP flag (used as a scarf) at a demonstration in Bila'in on March 1, 2013. The PFLP is a notorious terrorist organization with ties to far-left organizations in Europe, some of which support the Palestinian popular resistance. The flags clearly indicate that these are not local "popular" demonstrations but rather well-organized events, some of whose participants are Palestinian terrorist organization operatives.

Attacks on Israeli vehicles driving on roads in Judea and Samaria

Overview

12. Another method used by the popular resistance, **aimed mostly against Israeli civilians, is throwing stones and Molotov cocktails at Israeli vehicles driving on roads in Judea and Samaria.** In some cases the events are spontaneous, in others the stone-throwers **make advance preparations** to attack Israeli vehicles. **The targets** are vehicles chosen randomly as they drive along the road. In most cases the stone-throwers stand on the side of the road, but there have been cases where stones were thrown from moving Palestinian vehicles. **The purpose of the attacks** is to harm Israeli civilians, disrupt the lives of the Israeli settlers in Judea and Samaria and undermine their sense of security.

13. **Stone-throwing attacks, which also occur on main roads in Judea and Samaria, became more widespread in early 2013, with as many as several dozen incidents taking place every day.** The attacks have **a severe impact on the Israeli settlers' sense of security and have made travel to several towns dangerous.** One incident illustrating the potential dangers of the attacks occurred in March 2013, when an Israeli family was injured by stones thrown at their car near Ariel. A baby was critically wounded in the attack (See below.). Other incidents in March 2013 ended without casualties: throwing stones at a vehicle driving on Road 443 between Modi'in and Jerusalem (March 15, 2013), throwing Molotov cocktails at Israeli vehicles near the Nitzanei Shalom crossing near Tulkarm (March 14, 2013), and throwing stones and Molotov cocktails from the Al-Fawwar refugee camp (Hebron) at the main road. The Israeli government provides financing to make car windshields stone proof, which reduces the number of casualties but does not make the residents feel less threatened.

14. In a verdict handed down against a squad of four Palestinians who threw stones at Israeli vehicles on the trans-Samaria road on December 26, 2012, the military court discussed the fact that in many cases **the stone-throwing and Molotov cocktail attacks were not spontaneous but rather pre-meditated attacks.** The following are excerpts from the verdict in [Samaria] Cases No. 1975/11, 1976/11, 1974/11 and 2023/11:

"In Cases No. 1785/11, 1786/11, 2279/11 and 2672/11, the court was made aware of situations in which stones were thrown with great frequency **and in a sophisticated manner which included lookouts, alerts and group activity**. In all of the cases the stones hit the vehicle, penetrated the windshield **and caused physical injuries (some of them serious) to the occupants or driver of the car**. In other, more extreme cases, the targeted vehicle overturned as a result of the stone's impact, causing serious injuries."

"Case No. 4842/10 involves a defendant who threw stones and Molotov cocktails at a civilian vehicle **after blocking the road in a planned ambush: it was established that one of these was done with premeditated intent to cause death**. The court accepted the plea bargain brought before it; however, the prosecution changed the charges in the plea bargain and in the end the defendant was not charged with attempted murder."

"It is my impression that **there has in fact been an increase in the number of gangs that gather to carry out sophisticated stone-throwing attacks**, whether from a moving vehicle or by other means **that turn stones into an accurate, deadly weapons**"³⁴ (ITIC translations from the Hebrew).

15. **As far as the attackers are concerned, throwing stones at vehicles driving in Judea and Samaria has many advantages**, as follows (based, among other things, on the verdict handed down against Wael al-Arja, who was convicted of killing of Asher and Yonatan Palmer by throwing a stone, and the verdict in the legal proceedings against a group of four Palestinians who threw stones at vehicles driving on the trans-Samaria road on December 26, 2012):

- 1) **High probability of hitting the target**: The chances of hitting a moving vehicle with a stone are high, and higher still when throwing stones from another vehicle. The evidence in Wael al-Arja's trial indicated that the combined force generated when a stone is thrown from an oncoming vehicle driving in the

³⁴ **On September 2, 2010**, the group threw stones at a Renault driving from Ariel to the Tapuach junction. One stone went through the front windshield and hit a 12-year-old girl sitting in the passenger seat. She was taken to a hospital where she underwent surgery for a skull fracture. Nevertheless, the defendants were acquitted of attempted murder and charged with the lesser offence of throwing objects at a moving vehicle. The court reasoned that even though hundreds of similar cases were brought before the military court each year, it was rare for a person to suffer physical injuries and even rarer for a passenger to die. Accordingly, it could not be argued that the natural result of throwing stones at a passing vehicle was the death of the driver or the passengers, barring extraordinary and special circumstances that increase the probability (for instance, when a large stone is thrown from one vehicle at another traveling in the opposite direction, resulting in an extremely powerful impact). Ultimately, the judge sentenced the defendants to four years on probation and a fine. On the other hand, the ruling dated April 2, 2013 in the matter of Wael al-Arja took a more serious view of the stone-throwing attacks, as noted below.

opposite direction is much greater than when throwing a stone by hand, particularly on a highway.

2) **Lethality (potential threat) of varying levels of severity:** A stone thrown with force at a vehicle driving on a highway may cause an accident, possibly leading to severe injuries and death. In contrast, throwing stones at an armored military vehicle or in urban territory is not as lethal as throwing stones at a civilian vehicle, and throwing stones at visible forces is more severe than throwing them at forces behind cover.

3) **Difficulties in prevention:** A stone is a readily available weapon that can be acquired and thrown with no difficulty. Possession of a stone is not a crime, so attackers can easily go through roadblocks and do not have to conceal the stones or face the consequences of being found in possession of illegal weapons.

4) **Difficulties in identification:** Due to the high speeds involved and the force of the impact, the victim is usually unable to identify the attacker. It is also difficult to identify groups of masked attackers who throw stones at security forces.


5) **Quick and easy escape:** Stone-throwers who stand by the side of the road or throw stones at the security forces can easily blend into the local population. An attacker who throws a stone at an oncoming vehicle driving in the opposite direction can easily escape without being caught.

16. The Israeli government pays to stone proof windshields, which reduces the number of casualties but does not make the residents feel less threatened.

The deadly potential of stones: The Biton family (March 2013)

17. **A recent example of the deadly potential of stones was the case of the Biton family** from the village of Yakir: **on March 14, 2013**, they were driving on the trans-Samaria highway. Near the city of Ariel, the truck in front of them suddenly braked **after it being barraged with stones**. The Biton family car rammed into the truck from behind and was crushed. **A two-year-old girl sustained critical injuries**. Her mother and two sisters, aged four and five, sustained serious injuries. The truck driver sustained minor injuries. A passing bus also came under a hail of stones, injuring the driver and three passengers. **On the night of March 14 IDF forces detained five**

teenagers aged 16 to 17 from the village of Hares in Samaria for allegedly throwing the stones causing the accident.



The Biton family car (Magen David Adom, March 14, 2013)

The scene of the attack (Google Maps)



Left: One of the stones thrown at the Israeli vehicles near Ariel, where the Biton family was injured.
 Right: Rescuers evacuate the wounded from the scene of the attack (Judea and Samaria Rescue Services, March 14, 2013).

The deadly potential of stones: The Palmer family (September 2011)

18. **On September 23, 2011**, a cinder block was thrown at a moving Israeli vehicle on Road 60 in Mount Hebron. The vehicle overturned into a ditch, **killing Asher and his young son Yonatan**. According to the police investigation and autopsy, **the car turned over into the ditch when a large stone hit the front**.



Asher and Yonatan Palmer (Walla! website, January 25, 2011)

The vehicle in which Asher and Yonatan Palmer were killed (Judea and Samaria Rescue website. September 25, 2011)

19. **On April 2, 2013**, two Palestinians from Halhul were convicted of membership in a squad planning to carry out attacks against Jews. Formed in early September 2011, **the squad customarily threw stones from a moving vehicle at Israeli vehicles**. The verdict of the military court in Judea (Case No. 5348/11, April 2, 2013) relates to the modus operandi of throwing stones at Israeli vehicles driving on the roads of Judea and Samaria.

20. **The military court unanimously convicted Wael Salman Muhammad al-Arja from Halhul of the murder of Asher Palmer and his son Yonatan:**

1) **Background:** Wael Salman Muhammad al-Arja, from Halhul, served in the PA security apparatuses beginning in 2001. He was a uniformed soldier for eight years and later became an intelligence agent. During his service, he bought a

taxi and worked as a taxi driver. **He used the cab for throwing the stones** that hit Asher Palmer's car.



Wael al-Arja as a prisoner (Pal Life website, April 3, 2013)

2) **Throwing stones as a method:** Wael al-Arja belonged to a five-man Palestinian squad that would take a car, gather stones (including large stones), drive along a road used by both Arab and Jewish vehicles, identify a Jewish civilian vehicle, throw a stone from their car at its front windshield and drive away. In most cases, they would throw stones as many as three times during a single ride.

3) **The killing of Asher and Yonatan Palmer:**

A. On September 23, 2011, Wael al-Arja met with fellow squad member Ali Abd al-Hadi Ismail from Halhul. They drove in Arja's taxi cab. On their way they stopped near the Halhul junction to pick up three large stones.

B. After taking Road 60 (the main Hebron-Jerusalem road), they threw stones at an Israeli vehicle and then at an Israeli bus.³⁵ They then noticed a Subaru driving in the opposite direction. Inside were Asher Palmer and his eight month-old son.

³⁵ Yaniv Azulai, the driver of the bus, was injured in the attack which took place before Asher Palmer's car was hit. He testified that he had been hit by a large stone thrown from an oncoming vehicle. It hit the driver's side of the bus and shattered the windshield.

C. When they came within a few feet Palmer's car, **Al-Arja and Abd al-Hadi threw the third projectile** they had prepared (a 6" by 7" by 2" block of concrete), hitting the front windshield. Asher Palmer was hit and lost control of the car, which swerved off the road, crashed into the safety railing and turned over into a ditch. As it rolled rocks fell on the roof of the car and crushed it. Both passengers were killed.

D. When the two attackers saw the car swerve off the road and hit the safety railing, Wael al-Arja told his partner something like, "A man who murders a Jew will not see the fires of Hell."

E. Al-Arja and Abd al-Hadi sped towards Halhul to the house of Ali (Arja's partner). They went up onto the roof of the house to watch the scene of the attack from a distance.

4) Intent (referred to in the verdict as evidence of a state of mind of intent):

The prosecution sought to establish intent, arguing that **Asher and Yonatan's death was the natural result of the method used by Al-Arja and Abd al-Hadi**. That was despite the fact that the incident was exceptional in the way the attacks were carried out, their frequency and their horrific results. Testifying on January 24, 2013, Wael al-Arja was asked to describe the danger of stones thrown from one vehicle to another. He replied, "**The car may roll over, and people can get killed. Anything can happen.**" Ali Sa'ada, another of Wael al-Arja's partners, told the ISA that **Wael had wanted to hit the front windshield of oncoming vehicles**. Thus, the stone they threw at Asher and Yonatan's car was thrown at the front windshield and shattered it. After throwing the stone, Wael told Ali that "If someone murders a Jew, he will not see the flames of Hell" [meaning he would go to paradise].

5) Post mortem: Prof. Yehuda Hiss, chief pathologist at Israel's Abu Kabir Institute of Forensic Medicine, performed the post mortem. His report stated he had found contusions on the right side of the head and a fractured cervical vertebra. The findings were consistent with the circumstances of the attack (the concrete block hit Asher Palmer on the right side of his head) and suggested that he might have been critically injured at that point. His injuries were consistent with immediate loss of consciousness. No skid marks were found, suggesting that the victim lost control of the vehicle at the moment of impact.

21. Based on the evidence, Wael al-Arja was convicted of 26 counts, the most serious of which was **murder**. The military court sentenced him to **two terms life imprisonment and consecutive terms of 58 years in prison**.

Other examples of the lethal capabilities of stones and Molotov cocktails

22. The following incidents, which took place during the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, illustrate the lethal capabilities of stones and Molotov cocktails:

1) **On December 27, 2009**, a Molotov cocktail was thrown at a bus in southern Mount Hebron, near the village of Negohot. **A young Israeli woman suffered serious injuries** and second-degree burns over her the lower part of her body.

2) **On June 4, 2001**, a stone was thrown at a car near the village of Al-Lubban al-Sharqia, south of Nablus. The stone went through the front window of the vehicle and hit a baby sitting in the back of the car. **The five-month-old baby, Yehuda Chaim Shoham, died of his injuries six days later**.



The place where the stone hit the front part of the car (Shilo.org website)



Yehuda Chaim Shoham, the baby who was killed in the attack (Shilo.org website)

3) **On October 30, 1988**, Palestinians lying in ambush threw a Molotov cocktail at a bus driving from Tiberias to Jerusalem via Jericho. **As a result, Rachel Weiss from Jerusalem and her three children burned to death**. An IDF soldier who attempted to rescue them suffered severe injuries **and died some time later**.

4) **On April 11, 1987**, the Mozes family went Passover shopping with one of the children's friends. Near the village of Habla (south of Qalqilya) a Molotov cocktail was thrown inside the vehicle, which went up in flames. The injured father was able to pull his three children and the other child out of the car. All of them suffered severe burns. **Ofra Mozes could not escape and burned to death in the vehicle. Three months later, her five-year-old son Tal died in hospital of his injuries.**

5) **On January 29, 1983**, Palestinian children threw a stone at a vehicle driving on Road 60. A young woman in the vehicle, **Esther Ohana from the city of Beit Shean**, was severely injured and **died of her injuries two weeks later**, on February 12.

Erecting outposts

Overview

23. **The concept of establishing facts on the ground by quickly constructing new buildings and erecting outposts is not new.** One of the points in Salam Fayyad's "bottom-up" program to establish a Palestinian state mentions **a plan to seize as much territory in Area C as possible.** In 2012 a substantial number of outposts were erected in Judea and Samaria, each with several makeshift buildings, a mobile water tank and a generator with the PA emblem. Many such outposts were built on weekends or days when the civil administration inspectors were on vacation. The activity did not receive much media attention, a fact apparently internalized by those behind erecting the outposts.

24. **In early 2013 the Palestinians erected a series of outposts in several locations throughout Judea and Samaria, intending to establish facts on the ground and provoke Israel.** The outposts were created across a large area through quick organization, and gained media coverage.

The Bab el-Shams (Gate of the Sun) outpost

25. **The first outpost was named Bab el-Shams** (after a book by Lebanese author Elias Khoury, which follows the lives of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon). **It was erected in Area E1** (between Jerusalem and Ma'ale Adumim) **after Israel's Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu announced his decision to construct housing in**

the area. After the UN General Assembly voted the PA observer status, **Jamal Juma'a, Mahmoud al-Khatib, and Abdallah Abu Rahmah**, popular committee activists from the Ramallah region, organized the preparations for erecting the outpost. Also involved in the erection of the outpost was the **Popular Struggle Coordination Committee, based in Ramallah**, which directs the activity of the popular committees.

26. The outpost was erected on January 11, 2013, by several dozen activists from Judea and Samaria. **Foreigners and Israeli Arab activists** also participated, with as many as 100 to 200 people present at the height of the event. Most activists gathered in front of the Red Crescent offices in Ramallah on Friday morning **and were transferred by bus to the site of the outpost.** The activists created a tent camp of about 25 tents. They said in an announcement that they had decided to erect the outposts after Israel announced its intention to build 4,000 housing units in Area E1. They also said that it was an expression of the popular resistance (Ma'an News Agency, January 11, 2013).

27. **Mahmoud Abbas and the PA leaders expressed their support for the erection of the outpost.** The ministry of municipal affairs granted **Bab el-Shams rural authority status and opened a bank account for donations from the public.** Many senior Palestinian figures attempted to reach the site to show support for the activists but were prevented by the IDF, which declared the area a closed military zone. The senior figures included **Saeb Erekat**, member of the PLO Executive Committee and chief Palestinian negotiator; **Hanan Ashrawi**, a member of the PLO Executive Committee; **Ahmed Majdalani**, the PA minister of labor; and **Majida al-Masri**, the minister of welfare (Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda, January 13, 2013).

28. **After the outpost had been erected Israel ordered the demonstrators to leave or be removed by force.** The demonstrators announced that if the Israeli security forces tried to remove them they would not confront them but rather **use passive resistance** (Ynet, January 11, 2013). On the night of January 12 Israeli security forces evacuated the outpost. However, popular resistance activists and senior PA figures continued visiting the site even after the evacuation (for instance, on Land Day, March 30, 2013, the PA prime minister at the time, Salam Fayyad, attended a tree-planting ceremony there).



The Bab el-Shams outpost (Flickr.com website)



The Bab el-Shams outpost is erected (Occupiedpalestine.wordpress.com website)

29. The Bab el-Shams outpost was widely covered by the media and enhanced the image of the popular committees involved in building it. Israel, the Palestinians believed, had been caught off guard, unprepared for this type of activity. Therefore, inspired by Bab el-Shams, other attempts were made to erect outposts. **They stopped only after a several attempts were prevented by Israel and their partial successes did not generate much interest.**

The Bab el-Karama (Gate of Honor) outpost

30. **On January 18, 2013**, about a week after the Bab el-Shams outpost was erected, another was erected in the village of **Beit Iksa** (northwest of Jerusalem). The activists built it **in an area where the route of the security fence is disputed by the villagers**. A number of tents were put up at the site and work began on a brick structure to be used as a mosque. The Palestinians announced that they would not let Israel destroy the outpost, as it had destroyed Bab el-Shams (Wafa News Agency, January 18, 2013). However, the outpost was evacuated on January 21 without exceptional incident. A number of attempts to return to the outpost were unsuccessful.



The Bab el-Karama outpost in the village of Beit Iksa (Shihab, January 19, 2013)



Left: Attempts to build a brick mosque (Shihab, January 19, 2013). Right: A Palestinian at the Bab el-Karama outpost holds a sign reading, “Oh, fascist occupation, we will stay in the village of Beit Iksa and will not evacuate. In the end, your settlers will evacuate, because such is the law of history. The popular resistance committees in Jerusalem” (Wafa News Agency, January 18, 2013).

The Al-Manatir (Guardian) Quarter or Bab al-Hurriyya (Gate of Freedom)

31. After the two previous outposts were evacuated, approximately 200 Palestinians erected a third outpost named the **Al-Manatir Quarter** or **Bab al-Hurriyya**. The outpost was built in **Burin**, south of Nablus (Area B). The activists put up seven tents and frames for several buildings. Clashes broke out as IDF forces were evacuating the outpost. Israeli settlers who came from the villages of Har Brakha and Yizhar threw

stones at the Palestinians. According to Palestinian sources, over twenty Palestinians were injured by the IDF's riot control measures. An Israeli soldier sustained minor injuries.

32. According to the organizers, the goal in building the outpost was to protest the destruction of the one built previously and make sure that no Israeli settlements were built in the area (Ma'an News Agency, February 2, 2013). **As in previous cases, the outpost was built by activists belonging to the popular committees, most notably Salah al-Khawaja.** They brought the equipment to the site in coordination with **Mustafa Barghouti's PNI. Mahmoud al-A'lul**, a prominent popular resistance figure, member of the Fatah central committee and head of the recruitment and organization office, was present as well and called on residents to come to the site. He said that the goal of the popular resistance was to intensify the struggle and build one new outpost every day (Sawt Felesteen radio, February 2, 2013).



Left: Confrontations between Palestinians and Israeli security forces after the outpost was erected (Shihab website, February 2, 2013). Right: The Bab al-Hurriyya outpost is erected in the Burin region, near Nablus (Fatah al-Yawm, February 3, 2013).

The Canaan Village outpost (Bab el-Qamar, Gate of the Moon)

33. **On February 9, 2013**, Palestinian activists and foreigners erected an outpost named Canaan Village³⁶ **east of the town of Yata** (south of Hebron). According to Palestinian media, preparations for the outpost had been completed one week earlier.

³⁶ According to the activists, the name "Canaan" was chosen because of its thousand-year history and because it represents Arabism and dignity. In our assessment the name was chosen to emphasize the Palestinians' alleged connection with the Land of Israel, which, they claim, goes back to the Canaanite period (**Note:** The Palestinian claim has no basis in fact whatsoever).

The initial plan was to build the outpost in the Huwwara region near Nablus, however, the plan was changed due to the massive Israeli security force presence there.

34. The Israeli security forces were able to stop most of the activists from reaching the site of the outpost. Several who did arrive began erecting the main tent, which was immediately dismantled by the Israeli security forces, and the site was declared a closed military zone. The Palestinian media reported that ten activists (including four foreigners) had been detained arrested during the evacuation.



The main tent of the Canaan Village outpost (www.qassam.ps, February 11, 2013)



Activists put up the main tent of Canaan Village in Yata. Two of the foreigners shown in the photograph were detained (Palsolidarity.org website, February 10, 2013)

The Ahfad Younis (Descendants of Younis) outpost³⁷


35. **On March 20, 2013** (during President Obama's visit to the Middle East), dozens of Palestinians and foreigners erected a new outpost called the **Ahfad Younis Neighborhood**. Consisting of 15 tents and a tall flagpole flying the flag of Palestine, it was built in **Al-Azariya, in the vicinity of Ma'ale Adumim (in Area E1)**. According to the organizers, its objective was to emphasize the "Palestinians' right to return to their lands and villages" and expand popular resistance activities. Furthermore, exploiting the fact that the outpost was erected on the day of President Obama's visit to Israel and the PA territories, **the activists protested American policy which, they claimed,**

³⁷ Younis is the hero of Elias Khoury's novel *Gate of the Sun*, which follows the lives of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

hurt the Palestinians, supported Israel and provided it with annual military aid (ISM website, March 21, 2013).

36. **The event** was attended by **top Fatah officials, including Mahmoud al-A'lul**, member of the Fatah Central Committee and in charge of the Fatah recruitment and organization office. **Mustafa Barghouti**, **PNI** secretary general, also took part in constructing the outpost. He said it was a message to President Obama not to ignore the Israeli settlements (Ma'an News Agency, March 20, 2013). **Mazen Qumsiyeh**, a prominent popular resistance activist who represented himself as spokesman for the outpost, said that it had been built to support the residents of Yata, whose lands had been expropriated. He also said that more outposts would be built in other locations (Palestinian TV, March 21, 2013).

37. On **March 24, 2013**, the site was evacuated by Israeli security forces. Some of the activists present were detained, including Mustafa Barghouti.



The Ahfad Younis outpost (ISM website, March 21, 2013)



Anti-American posters and slogans at the Ahfad Younis outpost (Wafa News Agency, March 20, 2013)



Senior Fatah figures Mahmoud al-A'lul and Mustafa Barghouti in the outpost (Wafa News Agency, March 20, 2013)

Blocking main roads

38. In the past six months some attempts have been made to block main routes in Judea and Samaria to give the popular resistance more power, disrupt the daily lives of Israelis driving on the roads and draw the attention of the media:

39. On October 16, 2012, Palestinians from the village of Ur al-Tahta, in collaboration with foreign anti-Israeli activists, blocked Road 443 (the main route connecting Tel Aviv

and Jerusalem) to protest the actions of Jewish settlers during the olive harvest (Wafa News Agency, October 16, 2012).



Palestinians from the village of Ur al-Tahta and anti-Israeli activists block Road 443 (Tel Aviv – Jerusalem) (Wafa News Agency, October 16, 2012)

40. **On October 19, 2012, Palestinians working with foreign anti-Israeli activists** blocked a lane in a road close to the village of Ma'sara in the Bethlehem region. The event occurred during the weekly demonstration against the security fence (Wafa News Agency, October 19, 2012).



Palestinian and foreign anti-Israeli activists close the road (Wafa News Agency, October 19, 2012)

41. **On October 14, 2012**, main junctions and traffic arteries in Judea and Samaria were blocked to mark the 24th anniversary of the Palestinian declaration of independence. Several thousand Palestinians and foreigners were involved and there were confrontations with the Israeli security forces. **The activists gathered on the following roads and blocked them with iron chains:** Road 60, the Tunnel Road Route (connecting Gush Etzion and Jerusalem), Ofarim junction in Binyamin, Road 446 close to the entrance to the village of Ni'lin, Road 446 between Ofarim and Nili.



Palestinian activists block main traffic arteries in Judea and Samaria to mark the 24th anniversary of the Palestinian declaration of independence (Yabous, November 14, 2012)



Mustafa Barghouti, PNI secretary general, and Abdallah Abu Rahmah, coordinator of the popular committee in Bila'in, and Palestinians and foreign activists block a road in Judea and Samaria (Dunia al-Watan, November 14, 2012)

Abdallah Abu Rahmah, coordinator of the popular committee in Bila'in (right, wearing a light blue shirt), Palestinians and foreigners block the passage of Israeli vehicles on Road 446 to mark the 24th anniversary of the Palestinian declaration of independence (Shasha, November 14, 2012)

42. Palestinian demonstrators blocked Road 60 between **Gush Etzion and south Jerusalem** as part of the protests in solidarity with hunger-striking Palestinian prisoners (February 2013).



Palestinian demonstrators block Road 60, which crosses Judea and Samaria, in the section connecting Gush Etzion and south Jerusalem, to show solidarity with four hunger-striking prisoners (Wafa News Agency, February 18, 2012)

Other Models

Demonstration at a supermarket in Shaar Binyamin

43. **On October 24, 2012**, dozens of Palestinian activists belonging to the popular committees demonstrated at a supermarket in Shaar Binyamin. The supermarket belonged to the Israeli Rami Levi, chain known for its low prices. Foreign and leftist Israeli activists also participated in the event. They carried Palestinian flags and confronted the Israeli security forces. Prior to that, **the demonstrators had blocked major traffic arteries in the region**. According to one of the organizers, the aim of the event was “to protest the sale of products made in the settlements and Israel’s activity in general” (Al-Quds TV, October 24, 2012).




Palestinian, foreign and leftist Israeli activists demonstrate at a supermarket in Shaar Binyamin (From a Facebook page dedicated to young people's protest against the high cost of living in Judea and Samaria, October 24, 2012)

The demonstration at the supermarket in Shaar Binyamin (Mptinpalestine.blogspot.com website)

Protest on a bus

44. On November 15, 2011, six anti-Israeli Palestinian activists accompanied by journalists got on an Israeli bus en route to Jerusalem. Among them were **Mazen Qumsiyeh** and **Huwaida Arraf**, two prominent activists who participate in the popular resistance and in the campaign to delegitimize Israel. According to the Palestinian passengers, they got on the bus to protest the travel restrictions imposed on Palestinian residents. When the bus reached the **Hizma roadblock** north of Jerusalem (near the neighborhood of Pisgat Ze'ev), the Palestinian passengers got off the bus and confronted Israeli security forces. The event ended shortly afterwards.



The bus protest: Sitting in the front is Huwaida Arraf, one of the leaders of the ISM and a prominent figure in the campaign to delegitimize Israel. Mazen Qumsiyeh can be seen in the left photograph (ISM website, November 16, 2011)

Bicycle rides in the Jordan Valley and Mount Hebron

45. On April 14, 2012, a group of about 250 Palestinians and dozens of pro-Palestinian left-wing activists from Europe rode their bikes along the Jordan Valley road. The ride was organized by ISM activists to protest IDF roadblocks and the lack of water in the Jordan Valley. The ride began near Jericho and was supposed to end in the Jiftlik region. Several IDF soldiers stopped the participants at a junction near the village of Al-Awja and a clash ensued.

46. A video circulated online showed the deputy commander of the Jordan Valley brigade hitting a leftist Danish activist with the butt of his M-16. The IDF Spokesman stressed that it was a serious incident that violated IDF norms and that there had been no justification for violence. The spokesman noted, however, that the footage did not show the entire incident, since behind the twenty anarchist activists were 200 Palestinians who were trying to block the main Jordan Valley road (Interview with the IDF Spokesman on Israeli radio, April 16, 2012).³⁸

³⁸ The deputy commander of the Jordan Valley brigade was immediately suspended pending the results of a "thorough and in-depth investigation" of the incident. In addition, the chief military prosecutor ordered a military police investigation whose findings would determine whether there were grounds to file charges against the officer (IDF Spokesman's website, April 26, 2012). Israel's political and military leaders, including the prime minister, the defense minister and the chief of staff, strongly condemned the officer's

47. **On December 9, 2012**, another bicycle ride was held on Mount Hebron to protest the IDF designation of areas as firing ranges and closing them. The ride was organized by the **ISM**. About one hundred bikers participated and the ride, which went through several villages in southern Mount Hebron, passed without exceptional incident (ISM website, December 9, 2012).



Bike trip on Mount Hebron (ISM website, December 9, 2012)

Propaganda events in the Gaza Strip

Overview

48. Following Operation Pillar of Defense Palestinian farmers were allowed to enter the security perimeter near the security fence (about 300 yards from the fence). Palestinian youths took advantage of the situation to **approach the border fence, provoke IDF soldiers** and even attempt to sabotage the fence and cross the border. In some cases their actions became a security threat and forced the IDF to open fire. In our assessment Hamas does not initiate provocations **and its security forces work to contain** such events. However, **they do not prevent them.**

behavior. They stressed that such behavior contradicted IDF values and was not characteristic of IDF soldiers and commanders.



Hamas forces deploy near the security fence, with IDF forces behind the fence (Al-Ayam, November 25, 2012)

49. According to the Arab and Palestinian media, **four people were killed and 75 were injured** in propaganda events and provocations (as of early 2013), most of them in the northern Gaza Strip. A similar number was reported by **Ashraf al-Qudra**, a spokesman for the ministry of health of the de-facto Hamas administration. He said that the Palestinians injured while attempting to approach the fence were **young people in their 20s** (Al-Raya, January 26, 2013). The Palestinian media, particularly those controlled by Hamas, represented the victims as innocent farmers who approached the fence to cultivate their lands. In our assessment, however, **most of the participants were not innocent local farmers but rather youths attempting to defy and sometimes provoke the IDF and Israel.**

The first event

50. The propaganda events began after **the ceasefire that ended Operation Pillar of Defense** (November 21, 2011). **The first and most notable event took place on November 23, 2011**, when 300 Palestinians approached the security fence in the southern Gaza Strip. They **rioted, damaged the security fence and tried to enter Israeli territory.** IDF forces attempted to distance them from the fence, and when the rioters refused to obey, the IDF forces opened fire. The Palestinian media reported that one person was killed and 19 injured. According to the Palestinian media, the IDF forces fired at Palestinian farmers who had come to work their own lands. Following the incident, Hamas' security services deployed near the border to impose order.




Palestinian youths approach IDF forces in the northern Gaza Strip, cursing and trying to provoke them (YouTube, November 24, 2011)

Additional incidents

51. Since the end of Operation Pillar of Defense, a number of propaganda events have taken place near the border fence and at sea:

- 1) **On March 30, 2013**, a demonstration was held in the northern Gaza Strip as part of the Land Day events. After the demonstration the participants planted trees and some of them took the opportunity to approach the security fence and provoke IDF forces.



Palestinian demonstrators in the Gaza Strip take advantage of Land Day to approach the Israeli border in the northern Gaza Strip (Palestine Info, March 30, 2013)

2) **On March 3, 2013**, activists belonging to foreign anti-Israeli NGOs held a demonstration at sea. About twenty fishing boats set sail from the Gaza port to protest Israel's so-called attacks on fishermen and the naval blockade of the Gaza Strip. The event was organized by the International Action for Palestine network, the Gaza Strip union of agriculturists and Palestinian fishermen. It ended without exceptional incident.³⁹

³⁹ ISM activists operating in the Gaza Strip are planning to dispatch a ship loaded with goods produced in the Gaza Strip to a European port to draw the attention of the international community to the so-called Israeli "siege" of the Gaza Strip. The ship is being built using the frame of an old ship and parts of abandoned fishing boats.



The fishermen's demonstration (Facebook page of the International Action for Palestine, March 3, 2013)

3) **On March 1, 2013**, Gazans approached the security fence in the northern Gaza Strip and threw stones and Molotov cocktails at IDF forces, and also fired a gun at an IDF force. No casualties were reported. The Palestinian media reported three residents were seriously injured by IDF fire east of Jabaliya.

4) **On February 1, 2013**, it was reported that Palestinian youths approached the security fence in the northern Gaza Strip. According to the Palestinian media, two of them were seriously injured by IDF fire.



Palestinian youths approach the border fence in the northern Gaza Strip (Felesteen, February 1, 2013)

5) **On January 25, 2013**, Palestinian youths approached the security fence in the northern Gaza Strip. The Palestinian media reported that six Palestinians in their twenties were injured by IDF fire in two separate incidents.



Palestinians approach the border fence in the Gaza Strip, with IDF forces in front of them (Arabs of '48 website, January 25, 2013)


6) **On January 18, 2013**, dozens of Palestinians gathered near the border fence and tried to sabotage it. An IDF force opened fire. The Palestinian media reported that two Palestinians were injured by IDF fire near Beit Lahiya.

7) **On January 14, 2013**, an IDF force opened fire at a group of Palestinians near the security fence in the northern Gaza Strip near Beit Lahiya. The Palestinian media reported that a Gaza Strip resident, Mustafa Abu Jarrad, was killed in an agricultural area in northern Beit Lahiya. Photographs taken during his funeral show **his body wrapped** in the Hamas flag and mourners carrying green Hamas flags.⁴⁰

8) **On January 11, 2013**, dozens of Palestinians gathered near the security fence in a close military zone in the northern Gaza Strip. Soldiers who arrived on the scene told the demonstrators to leave. When they did not comply the soldiers fired warning shots. The Palestinian media reported that one Palestinian was killed and another was injured by IDF fire, and argued that they were farmers working nearby.

⁴⁰ His brother, Luway Abu Jarrad, was a Hamas operative who according to reports was killed in an IDF air strike against a squad of Hamas rocket launchers in the northern Gaza Strip (Alresalah.net website, January 14, 2013).

9) **On December 21, 2012**, Palestinians who were not farmers gathered near the security fence in the northern Gaza Strip. An IDF force tried to disperse them using riot control measures, but without success. The IDF force then fired at the demonstrators' legs. The Palestinian media reported that one person was killed and five were seriously injured by IDF fire. The Palestinian killed, Anwar Muhammad al-Mamlouk, was an activist for **Fatah's** Shabiba student movement in Al-Azhar University. Fatah formally issued condolences. Top Hamas and PIJ officials accused Israel of violating the understandings that led to the end of Operation Pillar of Defense; however, Mahmoud al-Zahar, a Hamas leader, defused the event by saying there was no need to react to "insignificant violations" by either party.



Left: The official condolences of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Fatah's military-terrorist wing, for Anwar Muhammad al-Mamlouk (Al-Quds forum, January 13, 2013). Right: Anwar al-Mamlouk's funeral in Gaza. His body was wrapped in the Fatah flag (Al-Quds News Agency, January 12, 2013).

Protests for prisoners near the Erez crossing

52. On February 5, 2013, the PIJ erected a protest tent near the Erez crossing in solidarity with hunger-striking Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, also part of the popular resistance in the Gaza Strip. High-ranking PIJ member **Ahmed al-Medallal** said that Israeli soldiers should be abducted and exchanged for Palestinian prisoners held in Israel (Maan, February 5, 2013).



Photograph taken at the protest tent. Right: Ahmed al-Medallal, a PIJ senior figure, gives a speech calling for the abduction of Israeli soldiers, to be exchanged for Palestinian prisoners (Maan, February 5, 2013).

53. There were also propaganda events near the Erez crossing to demonstrate solidarity with the terrorists imprisoned in Israel during the second half of February 2013. They included Hamas's having kindergarten children demonstrate near the crossing (Palinfo website, February 16, 2013).



Kindergarten children protest near the Erez crossing in a Hamas-organized demonstration (Palinfo website, February 16, 2013).

Propaganda events in the northern Gaza Strip prior to Operation Pillar of Defense

54. The Erez crossing, used by journalists, UN officials, humanitarian activists and other international figures, **was a favorite site for propaganda events** even prior to Operation Pillar of Defense. The most prominent example occurred on **March 30, 2012, during the Land Day events** (which were accompanied by propaganda activities in the countries bordering Israel).

55. **On March 30, 2012**, several thousand Palestinians demonstrated in Beit Hanoun (northern Gaza Strip) and near the Erez crossing. Participants included a 25-member Egyptian parliamentary delegation and anti-Israeli activists from around the globe (Ireland, Indonesia, Turkey). The de-facto Hamas administration announced its support for the demonstration. In practice, however, **the Hamas security services worked to contain the events**. The Palestinian media reported clashes between security personnel and Palestinian youths who were trying to approach the Erez crossing. When the protesters approached, IDF forces used riot control measures to distance them from the fence. One Palestinian was killed and an estimated 35 were injured. A friend of the Palestinian killed said that he had tried to break into the crossing, take down the Israeli flag and replace it with a Palestinian flag (Safa, March 31, 2012).



The Land Day demonstration in the northern Gaza Strip (Al-Jazeera, March 30, 2012)



Hamas policemen prevent Palestinian demonstrators from reaching the Erez crossing (YouTube, March 30, 2012)

Involvement of foreigners

56. Foreigners take an active, conspicuous role in popular resistance activities in Judea and Samaria (even though it is not always in the Palestinians' best interests to emphasize their presence). In recent months **foreigners have been visibly involved in propaganda events near the fence under the pretext of "protecting the Palestinian farmers."**

57. For example, dozens of foreigners (and Palestinians) participated in a propaganda event conducted by Palestinians near the security fence in the northern Gaza Strip on February 10, 2013. The Ma'an website released footage of the event, which had been initiated by the Union of Agricultural Work Committees Association (UAWCA).⁴¹ The participant acted as though their intention was to help the Palestinian farmers, but the signs they carried (in Arabic and English) quoted the slogans from the BDS campaign to delegitimize Israel.

⁴¹ According to unconfirmed information, the association is affiliated with the PFLP. The PFLP is a notorious terrorist organization which maintains close relations with anti-Israeli activists abroad and has been integrated into the campaign to delegitimize Israel.



Activists with BDS signs (Ma'an News Agency, January 10, 2013)



Foreign and Palestinian activists take part in the demonstration in the northern Gaza Strip (Ma'an News Agency, January 10, 2013)

58. In addition:

- 1) The website of the **ISM, an anti-Israeli organization with roots in the American far left** and deeply involved in popular resistance events in Judea and Samaria, posted a report about a group of international volunteers working in the Gaza Strip to support the local farmers and fishermen.⁴² It was also reported that **the group members accompanied the Palestinians into closed military**

⁴² For further information about the ISM and its anti-Israeli activity in Judea and Samaria, see the December 12, 2010 bulletin "The International Solidarity Movement (ISM) is a network founded by extreme American leftists and part of the campaign to delegitimize Israel."

zones near the security fence and the Gaza Strip waters, and documented the IDF's activity against them (ISM website, February 7, 2013).

2) **Michael Coleman**, a leading activist for the Australian Gaza Freedom Flotilla, reported that he had visited the Gaza Strip in the second half of February 2013 and met with members of Palestinian NGOs, including the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committee (PARC), an organization allegedly working to “protect Palestinian land from confiscation by the Israeli occupation” and involved in international campaigns to boycott Israel. He said he **went to a zone where Palestinians were not allowed to enter and participated in a protest** during the so-called international action day to boycott Israeli agricultural products (**Note**: The event took place on February 9, 2013) (Michael Coleman's post on the Gaza's Ark website, February 13, 2013).

Section Five: PA Position on Popular Resistance

Encouragement and containment of popular resistance

1. Since the 2009 Fatah convention the PA has worked **to turn the popular resistance from popular, spontaneous events into well-established activities directed from above**. As far as the PA is concerned, the objectives **are not limited** to demands for solutions to the local land problems of the villages in the vicinity of the security fence. Rather, **the popular resistance is perceived as an integral part of the struggle to promote the PA's overall policies**. Emphasis is placed on a **sweeping protest of the very existence of the security fence** (completely ignoring the reasons for its construction), **the Israeli settlements in Judea and Samaria**, Israeli actions such as the announcement of building new housing units in Area E1, and what is represented as **Israel's efforts to “Judaize” Jerusalem**. **Another objective is to release Palestinian terrorists held in Israel**.

2. The institutionalization of the popular resistance and its PA sponsorship have taken various forms: **the integration of the popular resistance into PA's political struggle** against Israel; **the participation of PA and Fatah leaders (including former PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad) in popular resistance events**; **providing the events with organizational, financial and logistic assistance**; and **using popular**

resistance events for propaganda, both on the internal Palestinian scene and vis-à-vis the Western target audience.

The participation of PA and Fatah leaders in popular resistance events



Mahmoud al-A'lul, member of the Fatah Central Committee, and Ahmed Assaf, Fatah spokesman in Judea and Samaria, take part in a support rally for Palestinian prisoners in front of the Ofer prison (Mahmoud al-A'lul's Facebook page, February 21, 2013)



Tawfiq Tirawi, high-ranking Fatah member and former chief of General Intelligence, confronts IDF soldiers in Deir Nidham, northwest of Ramallah (Al-Ayam, January 15, 2010)



Maher Ghnem, former PA minister of fence and settlement affairs, and Khaled al-Qawasmeh, former PA minister of municipal affairs, take part in a march in Hebron's old town, in which they called to open the Al-Shuhadaa street (PA website, July 25, 2010)



Abbas Zaki, member of the Fatah Central Committee, takes part in a march from the town of Dura to the Al-Fawwar junction on the anniversary of the Palestinian declaration of independence. The participants dismantled an IDF roadblock in the region and confronted IDF forces (Al-Wasat al-Yawm, November 14, 2012).



Sultan Abu al-Einein, member of the Fatah Central Committee, takes part in a weekly demonstration against the fence in Bila'in marking the 6th anniversary of Yasser Arafat's death (Alarab.net website, November 12, 2010)


Maher Ghnem, former minister of fence and settlement affairs, takes part in a march in Beit Jala, with IDF forces standing before him (PA website, May 8, 2012)



Former PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad plants an olive tree in the Bab el-Shams outpost on Land Day (Wafa News Agency, March 30, 2013)

3. One expression of support for the popular resistance is **the glorification of terrorists who carried out attacks using cold weapons**, including attacks in which Israeli civilians were killed or injured. A recent example **was posted on Fatah**

websites praising the terrorist **Salam As'ad Zaghel** for **stabbing an Israeli civilian to death** at the Tapuach junction (April 30, 2013).⁴³ Other examples are:



“Rise up and rebel against the oppression. End your silence. Salam Zaghel is waiting for martyrdom...the one who carried out the stabbing attack against the settler at the Tapuach junction on April 30, 2013 is now detained in one of the enemy’s hospitals” (Facebook page of Al-Shiraa TV in Tulkarm, April 30, 2013)

“Peace be upon you the day you were born, the day you were imprisoned, and the day you will be freed” (Fatah Facebook page, May 30, 2013)

⁴³ Fatah’s official reaction was more cautious. **Jamal Mohsen**, member of the Fatah Central Committee, said that the attack at the Tapuach junction was “a natural reaction to the violations of the occupation and the settlers.” He added, however, that the terrorist attack did not represent the overall policy of the PA and Fatah, which follow the path of the popular resistance against the occupation (Quds Press, Pal Press, April 30, 2013). Mohsen’s statement was criticized by other Fatah members and Palestinian journalists, who described Zaghel as a hero who had restored Fatah’s dignity (For further information see MEMRI report of May 2, 2012, “Criticism of Fatah Official Who Expressed Reservations Regarding Tapuach Junction Terrorism Attack”).



A paean of praise written by Sultan Hamid, a Fatah member from Gaza and a regular columnist for Fatah al-Yawm, considered Fatah's official website (Fatah al-Yawm website, April 30, 2013). The poem says that the terrorist attack has lifted heads high, awakened the yearning for revolution, and visited an earthquake on the settlers (Fatah al-Yawm, April 30, 2013).

4. To market the popular resistance to Western countries, PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas, former Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and Palestinian spokesmen often portray the PA's policy as "non-violent resistance" or "peaceful resistance." Palestinian spokesmen have compared the popular resistance to the path taken by Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King. In practice, however, the PA encourages the considerable violence that has systematically been built into the popular resistance.

5. At the same time, the PA uses the Palestinian security forces to contain popular resistance activities and channel them into a few specific friction points. So far the PA has not encouraged the spread of the events and does not want the popular resistance to become an all-out, ongoing popular uprising in Judea and Samaria (particularly not in hotspots of anti-Israeli terrorism during the second intifada, such as Nablus and Jenin). To date, the number of participants in popular resistance events has not exceeded several dozen to several hundred at each site.

6. Apparently in the past year the PA loosened the reins and now allows activities and initiatives with a greater potential for friction with the IDF. That began prior to Operation Pillar of Defense, gained momentum during the operation and continued during the prisoners' protest. However, the PA still keeps a tight rein on the situation since it understands, in our assessment, that events should not be

allowed to spiral out of control and that the security coordination with Israel needs to be maintained. It is also our assessment that the Palestinian public, with the memory of the second intifada still fresh in their minds, is more inclined to support (at least for now) a limited-scale popular resistance rather than all-out activity that may potentially lead to an escalation. **However, the fundamental factors in Judea and Samaria, mainly the uneasy economic situation, the considerable solidarity with terrorists held in Israeli jails, the frustration of the young people and the lack of political perspectives all create a potential for the expansion of popular resistance activities.**

Preventing military-terrorist activity

7. **Contrary to the PA's support of the violence built into the popular resistance, it is opposed to the organized military activity conducted by Hamas (or other terrorist organizations) similar to the second intifada (suicide bombings, shootings, firing rockets and using IEDs).** That is reflected in public statements and the PA security services' **ongoing preventive activities against Hamas and the other terrorist organizations, such as the PIJ, and its coordination with the Israeli security forces.**

8. In recent years, the activity of the PA (and Israeli) security services **has helped damage the Hamas military and operative infrastructure in Judea and Samaria** and weaken its civilian institutions (mosques, the education system and charitable societies). **One aspect of this policy is the PA's reinforcement of its support for popular resistance and its built-in violence.**

Providing Islamic religious approval

9. In its struggle against Hamas, **the PA has mobilized its religious establishment to support the concept of popular resistance.** An example of coordinating Islamic motifs with PA policy was the sermons delivered by **Mahmoud al-Habbash**, the PA minister of religious endowments, in February and March 2010. He justified the concept of non-violent popular resistance **and gave it religious authorization** using an interpretation of the prophet Muhammad's actions in his first thirteen years of activity. The following is a summary of his Friday sermons (broadcast on February 12 and 19 and March 5 and 19, 2010):

1) The Palestinian leadership believes that for the present, non-violent popular resistance is **the most useful form of "resistance."** Their position does not stem from fear but rather **from prudence and the interests of the Palestinian people,** which make necessary.

2) The **prophet Muhammad used non-violent resistance in Mecca for thirteen years.** He was not a coward but was divinely inspired to understand the real situation **and that at the time, it was the most effective way** to spread his message, that is, to spread Islam.

3) In Mecca, **Muhammad did not carry arms and prohibited others from carrying them.** To prove his point, Mahmoud al-Habbash said that when **Sa'd Ibn Waqqas** asked Muhammad to commit murder, Muhammad forbade it, claiming **prudence required specific methods for specific times and situations**⁴⁴ (Note: We were unable to find any confirmation in Islamic sources for the claim).

4) Accordingly, al-Habbash called for **"non-violent popular resistance against the occupation, the fence and the settlements, non-violent civil resistance... that leads to achievements and prevents losses."**

10. The sermons **sent clear overt and covert messages** reflecting the **PA's utilitarian view** of popular resistance:

1) **On the one hand,** the sermons were intended to fortify the PA's position on unarmed popular resistance **among Islamic audiences in Judea and Samaria, while providing an answer to Hamas' calls for armed resistance against Israel in Judea and Samaria** and rejecting the accusations made by Hamas against the PA regarding its security collaboration with Israel. The examples taken from the prophet Muhammad's life and the use of Islamic terminology (although based on what is clearly a contemporary interpretation with political undertones) are better received by Muslim Palestinians than any mention of Mahatma Gandhi or Martin Luther King.

⁴⁴ **Sa'd Ibn Abu Waqqas** was one of the prophet Muhammad's comrades from the Quraysh tribe (the prophet's own tribe), and among the first to convert to Islam. Considered the first warlord to fight a holy war for Islam, he took part in the wars of the early Islamic period. During Caliph Umar Ibn al-Khattab's reign, Sa'd Ibn Abu Waqqas fought against the Persians in the Battle of Qadisiyyah (636 A.D.), in which the Persians were defeated. He was the governor of the Iraqi city of Kufa. Sunni Muslims regard him as one of the ten senior Muslims to whom paradise was promised while still alive.

2) **On the other hand**, the PA's reference to the prophet Muhammad contains a covert message. It suggests that the objection to the use of armed attacks **is not a matter of principle or strategy, but rather a temporary tactic dictated by a clear-sighted view of the needs of the current phase in the Palestinian struggle against Israel**. The example used by al-Habbash refers to a well-defined (although long) period of time **after which the Prophet enforced his path and his religion on his opponents by armed force and violence** (i.e., jihad, the Muslim holy war against the infidels).

Preserving the belligerent legacy of the armed campaign


11. In addition to implementing the concept of the "popular struggle," the PA and Fatah continue **preserving the legacy and symbols of the armed struggle**. One example is the **perpetuating of the memory of shaheeds killed in terrorist attacks against Israel**, including those that killed many Israeli civilians. **Children and adolescents studying in PA schools are also inculcated with the legacy of the terrorist shaheeds**. In addition, Fatah and the PA **spread propaganda against Israel and demonize it**. They also do not prepare Palestinian public opinion for peace with Israel and **consistently deny the existence of a Jewish nationality** with ties to the Land of Israel.

Belligerent motifs in Fatah posters posted online



A gun, a knife, a Quran and a map of Palestine (Fatah al-Yawm website, March 7, 2013)

Fatah's Ramadan greetings to the Palestinian people (Halhul forum website, September 3, 2009)



A poster commemorating the 48th anniversary of Fatah's founding, symbolizing 48 years of "armed struggle" (Fatah's Facebook page, December 11, 2012)

A poster commemorating the 48th anniversary of Fatah's founding (Website of the Fatah's foreign relations office, January 18, 2013)

12. **Mahmoud Abbas also fosters the legacy of the shaheeds**, not only those belonging to Fatah but also to the terrorist organizations that carried out deadly terrorist attacks against Israel. For example, speaking at a rally in the Gaza Strip on the anniversary of Fatah's founding (January 4, 2013), Mahmoud Abbas named many Palestinian shaheeds who had died in the course of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They included **Sheik Izz al-Din al-Qassam**⁴⁵ and **Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husseini**, as well as **senior figures from various organizations, including Fatah, Hamas, the PIJ, the PFLP and other Palestinian terrorist organizations**. He also mentioned Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), former head of the Fatah military wing; Ahmed Yassin, the founder of Hamas; Abd al-Aziz Rantisi, one of the founders of Hamas; Fathi al-Shqaqi, the founder of the PIJ; George Habash, the founder and leader of the PFLP; and Abu Ali Mustafa, also a founder of the PFLP.

⁴⁵ **Sheik Izz al-Din al-Qassam**, originally from Syria, studied in Egypt's Al-Azhar University and adopted the ideology of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna. He called on the Palestinians to return to religion and take up arms against the British and the Zionists, and designated jihad as a personal duty. He headed an underground network that carried out terrorist attacks and was killed in battle with the British police in November 1935. **Hamas embraced him as a role model and gave his name to the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades**, its military-terrorist wing.



A speech given by Mahmoud Abbas, shown at a Fatah rally in the Gaza Strip, on the occasion of the 48th anniversary of the founding of Fatah. In it he mentioned many shaheeds who died in the course of the conflict with Israel (Al-Fajr al-Jadeed TV, January 4, 2013).

Glorifying terrorist shaheeds

13. The policy of preserving the legacy of the armed struggle is expressed by glorifying and commemorating terrorist shaheeds in cities, towns and villages throughout Judea and Samaria. They usually **belonged to Fatah**; however, **shaheeds from other terrorist organizations** are commemorated as well, including **Hamas, the PIJ and the PFLP**. Particularly prominent among them is **Dalal al-Magribi**, a female Fatah terrorist who participated in the 1978 Coastal Road massacre and **was turned into a role model**. Another with many memorials named after him, including a street in Ramallah, is **Yahya Ayyash (“the Engineer”)**, a top Hamas military-terrorist operative responsible for numerous mass-casualty suicide bombing attacks in Israeli cities.



A street in Ramallah named after Yahya Ayyash (courtesy of Israel TV Channel 10, April 7, 2010). Yahya Ayyash was a top Hamas terrorist operative responsible for a series of deadly suicide bombing attacks. Yahya Ayyash Street houses the PA presidential building.

Dalal al-Maghribi: A Case Study

14. Glorifying terrorists in PA-administered territories is particularly glaring in the case of **Fatah terrorist Dalal al-Maghribi, who was turned into a role model and a source of inspiration**. She was member of the Fatah squad **which carried out the Coastal Road massacre (March 11, 1978)**. The terrorist squad left Lebanon by sea in inflatable boats, landed on the coast of Israel and took over a passenger bus. Near the Glilot Junction, north of Tel-Aviv, a firefight developed between the terrorists and police forces, during which the terrorists blew up the bus with the passengers inside. **Thirty-five Israelis were killed in the attack (13 of them children) and 71 were injured**. In response, Israel launched Operation Litani against Palestinian terrorist infrastructures in south Lebanon.




The bus blown up in the Coastal Road massacre, currently an exhibit in the Egged Museum in Holon

15. Glorifying Dalal al-Magribi and turning her into a national heroine **began under Yasser Arafat and continued under Mahmoud Abbas**. There are squares, streets, schools and summer camps named after her. The PA allowed the inauguration ceremony of the Dalal al-Magribi square in Al-Bireh to be held close to American Vice President Joe Biden's visit to the PA. Even though the PA claimed that the ceremony was "unofficial," a senior Fatah figure was in attendance.⁴⁶

Praise for Dalal al-Magribi, who “shook the [Zionist] entity” and went to the “gardens of eternity [Paradise] with the prophets, the righteous and the [other] shaheeds” (Fatah's main forum, March 13, 2013).

⁴⁶ For further information see the March 21, 2010 bulletin “Turning Shaheeds into Role Models: Fatah unofficially inaugurated the Dalal al-Magribi Square in Al-Bireh, named after a Fatah terrorist who participated in the mass-murder attack on Israel's Coastal Road (1978).




A forum participant uses Dalal al-Magribi's photograph as his online avatar. His nickname is "The Moon of Yasser [Arafat]" (Fatah's main forum, January 6, 2009).



The inauguration ceremony of the Dalal al-Magribi square in Al-Bireh. At the center, dressed in a light-colored suit, is Tawfiq Tirawi, a senior Fatah figure (Al-Quds, March 12, 2010).

16. On March 11, 2013, the Palestinians marked the anniversary of Dalal al-Magribi's death. Photographs and posters were posted on Fatah websites to glorify and commemorate her. The Fatah al-Yawm website, used by Fatah's recruitment and organization office, designed a special poster for the event, entitled "The bride of Palestine, shaheed Dalal al-Magribi" (Fatah al-Yawm, March 18, 2013). The Fatah

office in Denmark released a poster her in military uniform (Fatah Denmark, March 18, 2013).



A poster where Dalal al-Magribi is referred to as the “Bride of Palestine” (Fatah al-Yawm, March 18, 2013)

A poster marking the death anniversary of terrorist Dalal al-Magribi (Fatah’s Denmark office, March 18, 2013)

17. In addition, **Watan**, a Palestinian TV and news channel, produced a documentary about her. One of the people interviewed for the film was **Brigadier General Rashida al-Mughrabi**, Dalal’s sister, who is currently a military intelligence officer in Ramallah.⁴⁷ A link to the film appeared on several Palestinian websites affiliated with Fatah, including the Pal Press website.

⁴⁷ **Rashida al-Magribi**, Dalal’s sister, is a veteran Fatah member from Lebanon. She came to the PA-administered territories in 2009 for a conference of the Fatah General Assembly in Bethlehem. For several years had been denied entry into Judea and Samaria by Israel due to her terrorist past. She served in a key position in the Political Guidance Administration of the PA national security forces and currently serves in the military intelligence service in Ramallah.



A scene from the documentary produced by the Palestinian Watan channel about the terrorist Dalal al-Magribi (Watan, March 11, 2013)

Other examples of glorifying terrorist shaheeds

Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad): the head of the Fatah military wing

18. In April 2013 the PA and Fatah marked the 25th anniversary of the death of terrorist operative Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) in a targeted killing. Abu Jihad, a top Fatah leader, was the head of the organization's military-terrorist wing and responsible for many terrorist attacks against Israel. On the anniversary of his death, PA and Fatah websites posted material glorifying him and praising his role in the armed struggle against Israel.



One of the posters issued in memory of Khalil al-Wazir. It reads, "Prince of the shaheeds, Khalil al-Wazir, Abu Jihad. The first bullet...the first stone... April 16, 1988" (Fatah's Facebook page, April 14, 2013).

Hanadi Jaradat: the female suicide bomber who blew herself up in the Maxim restaurant

19. One striking example of glorifying terrorists and turning them into role models was the arrival of a delegation of four lawyers from the Cairo-based Arab Lawyers Union in Jenin to present a framed plaque to the family of **Hanadi Jaradat, the terrorist who carried out a suicide bombing in the Maxim restaurant in Haifa**, killing 21 Israeli civilians and wounding an estimated 50, including two families and four children. At the ceremony, which took place on October 13, 2012, the delegation expressed its pride and appreciation for Jaradat's "deeds" and presented a plaque to her family.



A member of the Arab Lawyers Union presents a plaque to the family of suicide bomber Hanadi Jaradat (Hamas forum website, October 13, 2012)

The plaque presented to Hanadi Jaradat's family by the Arab Lawyers Union. It reads, "Presented by the Arab Lawyers Union/Palestine Committee to the family of the suicide bomber [terrorist], the lawyer Hanadi Jaradat, to commemorate the day she carried out the suicide bombing attack. [Signed] Sayyed Abd al-Ghani, Lawyer, head of the [Palestine] Committee" (Hamas forum, October 13, 2012).

Abu Ali Mustafa, leader of the PFLP



Majida al-Masri, the PA minister of welfare, at the opening ceremony of an exhibition to commemorate shaheeds in Ramallah, organized by a local student board. The shaheeds included Abu Ali Mustafa (PFLP), Dalal al-Magribi (Fatah) and Ahmed Yassin (Hamas) (Al-Ayam, January 20, 2010).

Photograph of Yasser Arafat with Abu Ali Mustafa on a poster entitled "The award ceremony of the Shaheed Abu Mustafa Tournament heroes and the 2009-2010 cup tournament" (Palestinian TV, April 13, 2010). Abu Ali Mustafa, head of the PFLP, was responsible for many terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians. He died in a targeted killing in 2001.

Section Six: Hamas and the popular resistance

Hamas' position on the popular resistance

1. Hamas considers the use of armed resistance with its clearly military nature (artillery fire, suicide bombing attacks, abductions and murders) **a central means of achieving its strategic objectives in the conflict with Israel**, namely the obliteration of the State of Israel and the establishment of a radical Islamic Palestinian state on all the territory of "Palestine." At the same time, in implementing the strategy Hamas is driven by **pragmatic considerations**, most important of which is guaranteeing ability of the movement and its leaders to survive and maintaining its political rule of the Gaza Strip. **Thus since Operation Pillar of Defense Hamas has adopted a restrained policy of terrorist attacks in the Gaza Strip** that it imposes on local rogue terrorist organizations, which do not have the same political constraints as Hamas. At the same time, **Hamas operatives in the Gaza Strip, including Fathi Hamad, minister of the interior, continue their efforts to build military-terrorist networks in Judea and Samaria and carry out military-like terrorist attacks (suicide bombings and other**

attacks, abductions of Israeli soldiers and civilians). During the past year their efforts have been frustrated by the Israeli security services.⁴⁸

2. **In our assessment, the concept of popular resistance poses a dilemma for Hamas, which supports armed military struggle as the main strategic means to “liberate Palestine.”** That is because the popular resistance presents an ideological alternative for the character of the “resistance,” and provides a kind of legitimacy for the PA’s political conduct in the conflict with Israel (to which Hamas is strongly opposed). On the other hand, Hamas, which portrays itself as being deeply rooted in the Palestinian public, **finds it difficult to deny “popular” Palestinian activity of any kind, including Bila’in-model popular resistance.** The dilemma facing Hamas is even more significant, considering that its policy of terrorist attacks is **influenced by both ideological and pragmatic considerations, particularly the challenge of governance in the Gaza Strip, the main reason Hamas has imposed the lull in the Gaza Strip since Operation Pillar of Defense.**

3. Consequently, **Hamas does not, in principle, reject the strategy of the popular resistance.** However, Hamas spokesmen have stressed that **it has to be accompanied by armed resistance, which, as far as Hamas is concerned, is preferable.** In addition, it is Hamas’ view that **the use of more violence in the popular resistance should not be avoided,** even if the result is escalation and a so-called third intifada in Judea and Samaria.

4. That approach was evident in an interview with **Izzat al-Rishq, a member of the Hamas Political Bureau, originally from Hebron but currently living in the Gaza Strip.** Izzat al-Rishq was asked to comment on remarks made by Mahmoud Abbas, who during meetings with Khaled Mashaal had mentioned the concept of “non-violent popular resistance.” Izzat al-Rishq replied that **“We agreed on popular resistance, not non-violent popular resistance,** since non-violent resistance means that we cannot even throw stones, **and that is not the intention.” He further added: “We in Hamas do not consider promoting the popular resistance an alternative to armed resistance. The gun will still be held high”** (Al-Asfoura news website, February 12, 2013). Thus, **Hamas is opposed to the PA’s efforts to contain “popular**

⁴⁸ The ISA exposed a Hamas terrorist squad from Ras Karkar (west of Ramallah) and Silwad (northeast of Ramallah). Its operatives, who took orders from the Gaza Strip, were planning terrorist attacks including laying IEDs and abducting soldiers and civilians. The ISA investigation showed that some of the terrorist attack plans were developed by **Fathi Hamad,** the minister of interior in the de-facto Hamas administration, and some of his close associates (ISA website).

resistance” events and rules out any kind of security collaboration between the PA security services and the Israeli security forces.⁴⁹




“No to security collaboration:” a poster on the Ajnad Facebook page of Hamas in Judea and Samaria calling to stop the security coordination between Fatah and the “Zionist enemy” (Ajnad Facebook page, February 25, 2013)

Hamas’ involvement in popular resistance events

5. In May 2010 senior Hamas operatives in Judea and Samaria began taking part in popular resistance events in villages near the security fence, even though the relative number of their of participants **has been secondary**. Their activity was covered by PA media and by Hamas websites. According to a Hamas-affiliated website in the Gaza Strip, the operatives took part in the **weekly marches in Bila’in, Ni’lin, Al-Ma'sara and other locations** (Albian.ps website, May 24, 2010). **On May 14, 2010, Dr. Abdul Aziz Dweik**, chairman of the Hamas Legislative Council, **attended a protest tent erected in Ni’lin to mark the 62nd anniversary of the Nakba and delivered his Friday sermon there** (Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda, May 14, 2010; Hamas media). **On May 12, 2010, Abdul Aziz Dweik and Hamas members of the Legislative Council took part in a procession in the village of Al-Ma'sara in the Bethlehem district.**

⁴⁹ In practice, the security collaboration between the Israeli and Palestinian security forces has not stopped, even when the PA has been engaged in a bitter political struggle against Israel. When IDF Central Command Chief Nitzan Alon was asked whether the security collaboration with the Palestinians proceeded normally, he replied, “It hasn’t been frozen for one second. They make arrests based on their own interests. They don’t work for us. They have legitimacy limitations, they are negotiating reconciliation with Hamas, so they are more careful...” (Ma’ariv, March 29, 2013).

6. Hamas operatives resumed participating in popular resistance events **in late 2012**, first noticed when the media reported that **after a long absence, Hamas flags and emblems could be seen in the weekly demonstrations in Bila'in** (Ynet, December 14, 2012). **In February 2013** activists carrying Hamas flags and wrapped in green Hamas flags participated in prisoners' protests held in Israel (while senior figures from Hamas and other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip called for a third intifada).



Palestinians wrapped in Hamas flags and wearing green Hamas headbands throw stones at IDF forces in Judea and Samaria (Shihab website, February 24, 2013)



Abdul Aziz Dweik, chairman of the Hamas Legislative Council, participates in a rally in the village of Al-Ma'sara on May 21, 2010 (Hamas forum)

Abdul Aziz Dweik participates in a rally in the village of Al-Ma'sara on May 21, 2010 (Hamas forum)

7. Another indication of Hamas operative participation in “popular resistance” events, and perhaps their attempts to foment the violence often built into the popular resistance events, were incidents that took place in late February and early March 2013 in two locations:

1) **In late February 2013** clashes between Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli security forces took place in the **village of Aboud**, northwest of Ramallah, as part of the prisoners’ protest events. About two weeks later, **Samih Asfour**, 22, died from a head wound from a rubber bullet. **Hamas announced that he had been a Hamas operative**. His funeral was attended by Hamas operatives and his casket was wrapped in the Hamas flag.



Muhammad Asfour’s funeral in the village of Aboud. The participants carry green Hamas flags (Paltoday, March 8, 2013).

2) **On March 12, 2013**, clashes occurred between Palestinians and IDF forces in the **Al-Fawwar refugee camp** in south Hebron. The clashes began after stones and Molotov cocktails were thrown from the camp at the main road (Road 60). During the clashes, one Palestinian was killed and nine were injured by IDF fire. According to Palestinian (including Hamas) media, the Palestinian killed was **Mahmoud Adel Fares al-Titi**, 22, a **released prisoner and Hamas member who had taken an active part in protests for Palestinian prisoners**. Hamas’ Al-Aqsa TV reported that the organization was sad to learn about the death of its operative. The PIJ also released a statement saying that Al-Titi was one of its operatives. Thousands of people attended his funeral on March 13, 2013, and **carried Fatah, Hamas and PFLP flags**. During the

funeral there were clashes between the Israeli security forces and the Palestinians in several locations in Hebron.



Mahmoud al-Titi's body wrapped in a green Hamas flag (Ajnad Facebook page, March 13, 2013)



Hamas' official obituary for Mahmoud al-Titi (Ajnad Facebook page, March 13, 2013)



Mahmoud al-Titi's funeral in the Al-Fawwar refugee camp on March 13, 2013. The participants carry Fatah, Hamas, PFLP and DFLP flags. Al-Titi's body was wrapped in the Palestinian rather than that of Hamas to make the funeral into a national event crossing organizational boundaries (Filastin Al-'Aan, date, 2013).

The PA-Hamas Media Discourse about the Popular Resistance

8. The PA and Hamas have been conducting a discourse in the media about the popular resistance vs. the armed resistance. The PA reiterates its adherence to the

popular resistance which it [falsely] represents as nonviolent. Hamas, on the other hand, supports "every form of resistance," but **gives priority to armed "resistance"** [i.e., armed terrorism] (while on the ground Hamas is careful to preserve the lull in the fighting in the Gaza Strip and its operatives have participated, although not taking main roles, in popular resistance events).

9. One aspect of the media discourse was Hamas' response to Mahmoud Abbas' declaration **that circumstances dictated the PA adhere, in principle, to the nonviolent popular resistance.** According to Mahmoud Abbas, Hamas shared the PA's position (Al-Mayadeen TV, Lebanon, January 25, 2013). Hamas issued a response stating that **all forms of "resistance" to Israel** (i.e., the "Zionist occupation") **had to be implemented**, that is, **armed resistance as well as popular resistance.** Hamas added that "armed resistance" had proven itself as the only way "to defeat the enemy, to take our rights by force and establish our independent state on all of our occupied land, with Jerusalem as its capital" (Hamasinfor.net website, January 27, 2013).

10. Following Mahmoud Abbas' statement, a televised debate was held between **Ghazi Hamed**, deputy foreign minister in the de-facto Hamas administration, and **Saeb Erekat**, of the PLO's Executive Committee. The following were its main points (Al-Mayadeen TV, Lebanon, January 28, 2013):

1) **Ghazi Hamed** was asked if he thought Hamas and Fatah had similar opinions regarding the "armed resistance." He said that to end the [so-called Israeli] "occupation" **the Palestinians had to take an integrated approach: "Political action is necessary. [Armed] resistance [i.e., terrorism] is necessary, popular resistance is necessary. We must not ignore any option."** Such an approach, he said, was the basis for the planned internal Palestinian reconciliation.

2) **Saeb Erekat** responded that the political objective had to be the establishment of a Palestinian state with the 1967 borders and east Jerusalem as its capital. The "resistance," he said, was the Palestinians' "right" as part of its struggle to achieve the goal and negotiations were also "a tool to achieve objectives." He said **the "right to resist" [i.e., armed resistance] did not have to be exercised in every situation, and that was, in fact, Hamas' position:** "We are working for a lull in Gaza, it is a question of the lives of our people and we have to preserve them." He added that **"if the option of nonviolent resistance is**

called a lull [by Hamas], then we will call it a lull. Why should we give Israel an opportunity to fire missiles? There is a lull agreement [in place], it was authorized by Egypt, the Arab League and Hamas, and it has to be preserved."

3) During the program, part of an interview with Mahmoud Abbas was broadcast in which he said that Hamas and Fatah agreed on four points: a state with the 1967 borders, i.e., the two state solution; negotiations [with Israel]; nonviolent resistance and Palestinian Legislative Council elections. Asked if Hamas did in fact agree to all four points, Ghazi Hamed said that **Hamas' position was clear: none of the leaders had spoken about a two-state solution, although Hamas did agree to a Palestinian state with the 1967 borders but without recognizing Israel. In addition, he said that Hamas agreed to nonviolent resistance but did not rule out armed resistance to the [Israeli] occupation.**

11. Interviewed in March and April 2013, senior PA and Hamas figures repeatedly stated their positions on the popular resistance:

1) **Mahmoud Abbas**, interviewed by **Russia Today TV** on March 15, 2013, **repeated the claim that Hamas had adopted the concept of popular resistance.** As to the internal Palestinian reconciliation, he claimed that both sides had agreed that **"the Palestinian people would base their actions on a peaceful 'popular resistance'"** and then they could negotiate. He added that the ceasefire agreement signed at the end of Operation Pillar of Defense under American and Egyptian aegis, under whose terms the use of arms was forbidden, represented Hamas' official position. Therefore, he said, **there was no difference between the policies of the PA and Hamas, they both rejected an armed struggle** [and so, according to Mahmoud Abbas, the European Union did not have to include Hamas on its list of terrorist organizations]. Asked if the Palestinian people would return to an armed struggle and begin another intifada, he said that **it would not benefit the Palestinians:** "The Palestinian people have another weapon," he said. "They can rebel with peaceful popular demonstrations and appeal to international forums, as was the case with the UN..."⁵⁰

⁵⁰ In reality, senior Hamas figures **continue emphasizing their commitment to the concept of armed struggle.** For example, Ismail Haniya, head of the de-facto Hamas administration, told students in the Gaza Strip that **Hamas was committed to "not laying down its rifles."** He boasted of Hamas' capability to develop rockets and strike Tel Aviv and Jerusalem (Al-Jazeera, March 17, 2013).

2) In an interview senior Hamas figure **Musa Abu Marzouq** said that **"the resistance in all its forms, armed and popular, is the way to struggle against Israel and stop it"** (Al-Sabil, Jordan, April 23, 2013). He added that an armed resistance operative needed a supportive infrastructure, and the popular resistance was his support. He said that Hamas had agreed with Mahmoud Abbas to promote the popular resistance in the West Bank but it opposed the idea of abandoning other forms of resistance, i.e., "armed resistance."

12. The essential difference between the PA and Hamas was made clear during the extensive prisoners' protest in Judea and Samaria (second half of February 2013). While the PA supported the protest but contained the events and prevented the situation from deteriorating, **senior Hamas and PIJ leaders called for a third intifada**. The PIJ said **it objected to attempts to turn the confrontations in Judea and Samaria into nonviolent demonstrations** (Filastin al-Yawm, February 27, 2013). Senior PIJ figure **Khaled al-Batash** warned the PA security services not to prevent the intifada which was about to break out (Alresala.net website, February 26, 2013).



Hamas fliersheet distributed in Judea and Samaria: "The prisoners' intifada...our third intifada" (Ajnad Facebook page, February 26, 2013).

13. However, **the PA and Fatah refused to be dragged into an escalation of the popular resistance, not even during the prisoners' protest**. **Nabil Shaath**, a member of the PLO's Central Committee, said that "It is our opinion that Palestinian activity has to be nonviolent and organized..." He added that activities had to be accompanied by PA activities in the international arena and a reconciliation with

Hamas (Ma'an News Agency, February 24, 2013). A similar statement was made on Voice of Palestine Radio by **General Adnan al-Dhameri**, spokesman for the Palestinian security forces in Judea and Samaria, on February 26, 2013. **He accused Hamas of fomenting anarchy in Judea and Samaria** and opposing the position of the Palestinian leadership, which **was striving to avoid an armed confrontation with Israel**. He said **Hamas was clearly inciting "[armed] resistance" in Judea and Samaria**, as opposed to its policy in the Gaza Strip. He asked if there was someone who wanted "to lead the Palestinians to committing suicide?"..."**Is there anyone who wants Israeli tanks to enter the Palestinian territories tomorrow and destroy everything the Palestinian people rebuilt?**"

Section Seven: The popular resistance and the International Community

International involvement in popular resistance events

1. Popular resistance events, especially those of the Bila'in model, have as participants international activists belonging to pro-Palestinian NGOs hostile to Israel. **Some belong to the far, some are anarchists from various countries, including Israel.** Their activities include participation in Bila'in-model demonstrations, building illegal outposts with the Palestinians, confronting Israeli security forces and participating in various propaganda events in Judea and Samaria.
2. One of the most prominent of the international NGOs operating in Judea and Samaria is the **International Solidarity Movement (ISM)**. The **Anarchists against the Wall** is a prominent Israeli organization. In most instances **international activists are sent to Judea and Samaria for specific periods of time**. Attempts have also been made to send large groups of foreign activists to Ben-Gurion international airport, which were prevented by the Israeli security forces.
3. **The activities of the foreigners at the various friction points are coordinated with the local popular committees, with the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee in Ramallah and with Palestinian NGOs, especially those belonging to the Palestinian left.** The foreigners bring cameras to **document the demonstrations** at the friction points in Judea and Samaria for purposes of **propaganda** and **lawfare**. The fact of their presence sometimes provokes and aggravates the events, encourages the demonstrators, increases tension and encourages riots, creating difficulties for the Israeli security forces. Most of the time the foreign activists do not directly participate in acts of violence (throwing stones and Molotov cocktails), but sometimes confront IDF soldiers, break Israeli laws, are detained by the Israeli security forces and are deported.

Foreign Activist Participation in popular resistance Events



Palestinian and foreign activists (the activist in the jeep is holding a French flag) break through the security forces and confront Israeli security forces in Bila'in (YouTube, April 22, 2011).



Foreign activists document local activities. (Left: Plus.google.com/photos website, February 3, 2012; Right: Bila'in Facebook page, February 22, 2013)



Foreign activists participate in the weekly demonstration in Bila'in (ISM website, November 9, 2012).



Palestinian and foreign activists demonstrate for the reopening of Shuhada'a Street in Hebron (Palestinesoldarityproject.org website, March 1, 2013).



Foreigners participate in weekly demonstration in Bila'in (ISM website, November 9, 2012).



Foreigners participate in a demonstration in Nebi Saleh to boycott the Jerusalem marathon (Nabisalehsolidarity.wordpress.com website, March 4, 2013).



A foreigner confronts an IDF soldier
(Twitter.com/PalestinePSP, July 4, 2012).



Demonstrators in the village of Qadoun
burn the British flag (PALQA Facebook
page, November 2, 2012).

The International Solidarity Movement (ISM): the most prominent foreign organization in popular resistance activities⁵¹

INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT

4. The **ISM** is the most prominent foreign NGO participating in the popular resistance events in Judea and Samaria. Established in 2001 and rooted in the American far left, it is a global network of anti-Israeli activists joined by Western European anti-Israeli organizations and activists affiliated with the far left, radical Islam (the Muslim Brotherhood), human rights organizations and trade unions. They are also joined by far left and anarchist pro-Palestinian activists in Israel (See below.). This heterogenic coalition, which plays a central role in the campaign to delegitimize Israel, has as its common denominator **a fundamental hostility toward Israel, a denial of its right to exist as the nation state for the Jewish people, and sweeping support for the Palestinian extremists and their demands** (and it sometimes supports Palestinian violence and terrorism).

⁵¹ For further information about the ISM, see the December 7, 2010 bulletin "The International Solidarity Movement (ISM) is a network founded by extreme American leftists and part of the campaign to delegitimize Israel."

5. **Huwaida Arraf leads and inspires the ISM**, and also has an important position in the **Free Gaza Movement (FGM)** (a pro-Hamas network based in the United States specializing in sending flotillas to the Gaza Strip). She was born in Detroit to an Arab Israeli father (from the Galilee) and Christian Palestinian mother from Beit Sahour (east of Bethlehem), a town which is one of the focal points of the popular resistance. Arraf is married to **Adam Shapiro**, an American Jew, a senior FGM member and one of the founders of the ISM. She has a PhD in jurisprudence from the American University in Washington, DC, and has lectured on human rights and humanitarian law at Al-Quds University in Jerusalem. **In various forums during the second intifada the leaders of the ISM publicly declared their support for the armed Palestinian campaign and their understanding for the motives of the suicide bombers.**



Huwaida Arraf and Adam Shapiro, two of the ISM's founders
(Archive.frontpagemag.com website)

6. **Between 2001 and 2005, the years of the Palestinian terrorist campaign against Israel known as the second intifada, the ISM, using volunteers enlisted for specific periods of time, conducted intensive activities in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip.** The volunteers, who began arriving in December 2001, did not content themselves with supporting the Palestinian population, **they made a point of breaking Israeli law and disrupting IDF operational activities.** Their activities included participation in Palestinian demonstrations and protests, serving as human shields for Palestinian terrorist operatives, providing the Palestinians (including terrorist operatives and their families) with financial, logistic and moral support, disrupting the razing and sealing of the houses of terrorists who had carried out suicide bombing attacks, and

holding marches along the security fence from various areas in Judea and Samaria to Jerusalem.

7. When the second intifada ended, Huwaida Arraf and other senior ISM and FGM figures **focused their activities on the flotilla project**. The project, which reached its tragic peak with the *Mavi Marmara* flotilla, was intended to cripple the IDF's operational activities ("to break the [Israeli] siege" of the Gaza Strip), to prop up the de-facto Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip and intensify the delegitimization of Israel around the globe.⁵² **However, at the same time the ISM continued sending volunteers to Judea and Samaria to participate in the protests at the friction points, calling their participation "nonviolent resistance in Palestine"** (although it was often in fact violent).

8. Initially the ISM and other international organizations made do with participating in the traditional Friday demonstrations near the route of the security fence using the Bila'in model. However, **their activities spread to other models, such as erecting illegal Palestinian outposts, aiding the Palestinians at various friction points with the Jewish settlers and participating in various propaganda events** (such as blocking roads).

9. In summing up 2012, according to its website the ISM helped Palestinians in Judea and Samaria to combat the expansion of the Jewish settlements and the aggression of the Jewish settlers. That was achieved through the presence of international activists in high-risk areas where there was friction between Palestinians on the one hand and the IDF and the settlers on the other. For example, protecting the Daraghmah family near the settlement of Ma'ale Levona, demonstrating presence in the villages of Burin and Asira al-Qibliya near the settlements of Itamar, Yizhar and Har Brakha, and participating in events in southern Mt. Hebron. In addition **ISM activists continued participating in Friday demonstrations organized by the Palestinian committee in the villages of Bila'in, Qadoum, Nebi Saleh and Ni'lin** (ISM website, March 2013). Regarding plans for 2013, according to the organization's website, they will face new

⁵² **Huwaida Arraf** and other senior ISM and FGM figures claimed, during the flotilla project, that they were committed to "**civil disobedience**" and "**non-violent resistance**." In reality, activists from the ISM and similar networks made extensive use of **passive resistance tactics**, what they called "**direct action**." The tactics were used aboard the boats which the networks tried to send to the Gaza Strip, and included having passengers barricade themselves in the wheelhouses, passive resistance to evacuation from the ships, throwing various objects at IDF ships, physical confrontation with IDF soldiers, erecting barbed wire fences and other obstacles aboard the ships and the use of verbal violence directed at the IDF soldiers and the State of Israel. The Islamist Turkish organization IHH, which collaborated with the FGM, made extensive use of cold weapon violence aboard the *Mavi Marmara*, which led to a violent confrontation with IDF soldiers.

challenges and hope to expand their activities in the West Bank (ISM website, March 2013).

10. In several instances the Israeli police detained activists from the ISM and other foreign organizations who had broken the law during popular resistance events in Judea and Samaria. For example, on July 13, 2012, the police detained **five women activists from Britain, Italy and Sweden in Nebi Saleh** for disturbing public order (PNN, July 15, 2012). On February 10, 2013, two ISM activists were detained at the Canaan outpost near the town of Yata during a preemptive Israeli security force activity (ISM website, February 10, 2013). On September 21, 2012, three British subjects and one American citizen were detained during a demonstration in the village of Qadoun (Palsolidarity.org website, September 21, 2012).

The involvement of an Israeli group called "Anarchists Against the Wall"



The home page of Anarchists Against the Wall, an Israeli network participating in popular resistance events (Awalls.org/Hebrew website).

11. In Israel a **network calling itself "Anarchists Against the Wall"** organized and joined the Bila'in-model protests against the security fence. Originally they called themselves the Coalition against the Wall, and later adopted the term "anarchists," given them by the media. The network apparently has several dozen members, most of them young. In accordance with their ideology they do not have a hierarchical structure, official membership, offices or a headquarters. They participate in demonstrations, marches and protests (including the prisoners' protest) as part of popular resistance activities, coordinating with international organizations centering around the ISM.

12. They began their activities on the ground in April 2003 during the second intifada. Initially they focused on protests against the security fence in the village of Mas'ha near the village of Elkana. They set up a protest tent which was manned for four months. In 2004 members of the group joined the protests in the village of **Budrus**. Beginning in 2005 they focused their activity on participating at the weekly protests in the village of **Bila'in**.



Anarchists Against the Wall at a demonstration in Bila'in marking eight years of demonstrations. The sign reads "Military zone, danger, cross or damage the fence at your own risk." (Facebook page of the Anarchists Against the Wall, March 1, 2013).

13. In addition, the network preaches **disobeying IDF soldiers** and participates in the Palestinian prisoners' protest. In March 2013 members organized a demonstration in Jaffa for the release of hunger-striking terrorist operative **Ayman Sharawna**, who was sentenced to 38 years in prison for his involvement in placing an IED in Beersheba, an attempt to abduct an IDF soldier and shooting at IDF soldiers.⁵³ During Operation Pillar of Defense group members demonstrated in Tel Aviv to protest the IDF operation (November 17, 2012). In December 2012 Anarchists Against the Wall received honorary awards from the municipality Nebi Saleh, one of the hotspots of the Bila'in-model popular resistance.

⁵³ On March 17, 2013, Sharawna was released after a long hunger strike and expelled to the Gaza Strip for ten years. Arriving in the Gaza Strip, he called for the abduction of Israeli soldiers, calling it the only way to release the terrorists imprisoned in Israeli jails.



Anarchists demonstrate against Operation Pillar of Defense in Tel Aviv on November 17, 2012 (Facebook page of Anarchist member Haim Schwarzenberg)



The Anarchists and their Nebi Saleh awards (Facebook page of Anarchists Against the Wall, December, 2013).



Demonstration against Operation Pillar of Defense in Tel Aviv on November 17, 2012 (Facebook page of Anarchist network member Haim Schwarzenberg)



Demonstration against the administrative detention of terrorist Ayman Sharawna in Jaffa on March 9, 2013 (Facebook page of Anarchist network member Haim Schwarzenberg)

The PA position on international involvement

14. The PA and the popular committees encourage international involvement, although during the past year they have minimized the participation of foreign activists and emphasized the character of the popular resistance as authentically

Palestinian. The PA regards international involvement as strengthening the legitimacy of popular resistance activities, heightening their media effect, making it difficult for Israeli security forces to respond and increasing the number of participants. **The participation of foreigners accompanied by foreign correspondents has sometimes inflamed the demonstrations in Bila'in and other popular resistance sites** and helped brand the "Bila'in phenomenon" as anti-Israeli in the international arena. Hamas also makes intensive use of international organizations to promote its political agenda, especially "breaking the siege" of the Gaza Strip.

15. The PA allows the Palestinian NGOs participating in the popular resistance to **direct the BDS campaign from Ramallah**. It does so although formally it has not imposed a general boycott on products manufactured in Israel, but rather focuses on goods produced in the Israeli cities, towns and villages in Judea and Samaria. **The international activities of the BDS campaign are directed by the national committee, based in Ramallah** (BNC, the BDS National Committee). One of the prominent BDS activists in Ramallah is **Omar Barghouti, who maintains constant contact with activists in Western countries waging the campaign to delegitimize Israel** (his energetic activity to boycott Israel, including in the international academic world, did not keep him from studying philosophy at Tel Aviv University).

International conferences in support of the popular resistance

The annual conferences in Bila'in

16. An example of international involvement in the Bila'in-model popular resistance and the PA effort to harness NGOs and celebrities to the struggle is **the annual Bila'in international conferences**. For example, on April 21 to 23, 2010, **the Fifth Annual Bila'in Conference for Palestinian Popular Resistance** met in the Bila'in elementary school. It was attended by representatives from the PA and abroad, including diplomats from various countries. Among the attendees were Salam Fayyad, senior Fatah and PLO figures, representatives of the various political parties, Arab and foreign ambassadors and consuls, UN Secretary General representative Robert Serry, former vice president of the European Parliament and Nobel Peace Prize recipient Luisa Morgantini, members of the European Parliament and European and Israeli representatives (Ma'an News Agency, April 24, 2010).

17. Salam Fayyad spoke at the conference about the popular resistance, as did **Abdallah Abu Rahmah**, head of the Bila'in popular committee, who at the time was imprisoned in Israel, and who spoke in the name of the Palestinian prisoners from his cell in the Ofer jail. He called for a **"third popular intifada"** with the aid of foreigners and Israelis. Among the speakers were representatives from **Spain, Ireland and France. Letters from Desmond, Tutu, Jimmy Carter and the European Parliament were read** (Bila'in website). Workshops were held on the second day to discuss the **boycott** of Israeli products, the **divestment of foreign interests** in Israel and the **imposition of international sanctions** on Israel for its so-called "violations" of international law [i.e., BDS]. **The conference participants voted to use an overall strategy of international boycott of Israeli products, a cultural boycott which would include Israeli universities, the use of international law against companies profiting from the "occupation" and the establishment of an international network to support the popular resistance** (Ma'an News Agency, April 24, 2010).



Salam Fayyad speaks at the Fifth Annual Bila'in Conference (Al-Ayam, April 22, 2010)

18. Another example of international involvement in the popular resistance was the **Seventh Annual Bila'in Conference, held on April 10 to 13, 2012**. It was opened in Bila'in by Salam Fayyad, then-PA prime minister, and attended by senior Palestinian figures, Israeli and foreign leftists (among them former European Parliament vice president Luisa Morgantini). The second day of the conference was held in **the Old City of Hebron**, and the third day in **the Silwan quarter of east Jerusalem** (Palestinian TV, April 14, 2012).

19. On the final day the conference voted to **encourage the popular resistance, tighten the coordination between the popular committees, tighten the**

coordination between the PA institutions and legal bodies in the United States and Europe, increase the use of the media to support the popular resistance, and increase support for Palestinian activity in Area C, especially at the focal points of friction with Israel (Ma'an News Agency, April 13, 2012).



Foreigners wave EU and French flags during the Seventh Bila'in Conference (Arabs of '48 website, April 11, 2013).




Salam Fayyad, PA prime minister, speaks at the opening ceremony of the Seventh Annual Bila'in Conference (Palestinian TV, April 14, 2012).



Luisa Morgantini, European Parliament member and former Parliament vice president, and Nobel Peace Prize recipient, participates in the Seventh Annual Bila'in Conference (Silvanic.net website, April 12, 2012).

International involvement in the prisoners' protest

20. **The prisoners' protest has also won international involvement, encouraged by the PA, which hopes to internationalize the prisoners' cause. Particular attention is devoted to the campaign for the release of senior Fatah figure Marwan Barghouti.** On April 27, 2013, the eleventh anniversary of his imprisonment, a conference was held in Ramallah in support of the Palestinian prisoners. It was attended by Salam Fayyad, senior Fatah figures, Fadwa Barghouti (Marwan Barghouti's wife), **a delegation from the European Parliament and other public figures from abroad.** The conference ended with a call to promote an international campaign for the release of Marwan Barghouti and to continue the effort "to force Israel to honor international laws concerning the Palestinian prisoners" (Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda, April 29, 2013).



Left: Salam Fayyad speaks at the conference in Ramallah in support of the Palestinian prisoners (Wafa News Agency, April 27, 2013). Right: Fadwa Barghouti, wife of Marwan Barghouti, speaks at the conference (Wafa News Agency, April 27, 2013).

Marketing the popular resistance to the West

Overview

21. **The concept of the popular resistance is marketed to Western public opinion as a legitimate, nonviolent path of action such as those taken by Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King.** It involves members of their families in marketing its biased. **Rajmohan Gandhi**, Mahatma Gandhi's grandson, visited Bila'in in April 2010. He praised the local popular committee and the villages' "nonviolent resistance" (Ma'an

News Agency, April 6, 2013). **Martin Luther King the third**, Martin Luther's son, met with Salam Fayyad in Ramallah on April 14, 2010. Salam Fayyad expressed support for the popular resistance and said that its program was based on three elements: resistance to the fence and the settlements, constructing the institutions of a state and the PLO's political activities (Palestinian TV and the Wafa News Agency, April 15, 2010).



Rajmohan Gandhi and his wife in Bila'in (Al-Quds, April 6, 2010).

Martin Luther King the third and Salam Fayyad (From Salam Fayyad's website, April 15, 2010)

22. **The message has trickled into into Western consciousness and been accepted: the popular resistance is perceived in the international arena as legitimate**, especially since peace activists from Western countries (hostile to Israel) participate in it. Tony Blair, former British prime minister, writing in Time Magazine for the issue on the one hundred most influential people in the world, said of Salam Fayyad that he had "...a clear vision of unequivocal nonviolent path to statehood and peace with Israel."⁵⁴

⁵⁴ http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1984685_1984864_1984897,00.html



Third from left: Martin Luther King's son visits Bila'in where he is updated about activities in the village (Wafa News Agency, April 14, 2010).

23. However, **comparing the Palestinian popular resistance with the campaigns waged by Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King is baseless, for two main reasons:**

1) **In essence, the Palestinian popular resistance does not genuinely reject the use of violence to promote its political goals, while both Gandhi and King absolutely opposed all forms of violence.** As far as the Palestinians are concerned, the popular resistance is not a permanent, long-term strategy which in principle rejects the "armed struggle," but rather **a convenient alternative for the current phase of the Palestinian national struggle** which, considering the state of the Arab world, can be used to advance Palestinian interests.

2) **The Palestinian popular resistance is not completely free of violence, rather it makes use of cold weapons, that is, stones and Molotov cocktails, or stabbing and vehicular attacks, which are regarded as legitimate** (although past experience has shown that cold weapons can be lethal). **The popular resistance is thus an important tool in the Palestinians' national campaign but it is not the only one and it does not negate the concept of "armed resistance."**

Examples of marketing the popular resistance

24. The popular resistance has been marketed to the West in the following ways:

1) The documentary "**5 Broken Cameras**"⁵⁵ recounts the struggle of the residents of Bila'in against the security fence as it was filmed by Emad Burnat, a Bila'in resident. **It is completely one-sided** and focuses entirely on the Palestinian version of the dynamics behind the popular resistance: the IDF is an oppressive, occupying army whose actions are taken arbitrarily against the Palestinian population, harassing innocent, peace-loving local residents. The Palestinians, according to the film, are waging a just, popular struggle devoid of violence. **Almost no riots are held by Palestinians, no stones or Molotov cocktails are thrown**, no IDF soldiers are injured in any way by Bila'in's violence. The security fence, according to the film, was built by Israel to steal Palestinian lands and trees. No mention of the real reason for its construction, i.e., the mass-casualty suicide bombing attacks of the second intifada, is made. Operation Pillar of Defense is represented as "an overall Israeli attack on the Gaza Strip," with no mention of the Palestinian terrorist organizations and the rockets targeting the Israeli civilian population.



The residents of Bila'in congratulate Emad Burnat on being nominated for an Oscar (Facebook page of the village of Bila'in, March 3, 2013).

⁵⁵ "**5 Broken Cameras**" was directed by **Guy Davidi and Emad Burnat** and released in 2011. It was nominated for the Best Documentary Film at the 2012 Oscar Awards. The film is based on photographs taken by Emad Burnat, a Palestinian from Bila'in, between 2005 and 2010.

2) **Interviewed by Haaretz journalist Akiva Eldar, Salam Fayyad defended the Bila'in-model protests.** "The oppressed of the world," he said, "will raise their heads against oppression." "It is unreasonable to expect Palestinians to restrain themselves in the face of the injustice of the occupation. It's like water: keep it from flowing in one place, it will find someplace else. It is the right of an oppressed people to say 'enough.' You cannot expect people to support injustice, and you certainly can't expect it of the Palestinians, who have been occupied for decades. **We are doing what Gandhi and Martin Luther King did**" (Haaretz, April 2, 2010). Interviewed by Israel Channel 2 TV, Mahmoud Abbas was told by Ehud Ya'ari that "Recently there has been talk in Israel and even formal meetings about the popular resistance. We know that the demonstrations begin with slogans, move on to stones and end in violence, wounded and unfortunately, deaths. That's the gamble [you take]." Mahmoud Abbas answered that "Yes, it is, it's true. But I tell [the demonstrators] not to draw us into a trap that will force us to use a stone or a gun. **I do not want anyone to hold a demonstration involving a violent incident with the Israelis**" (Israel Channel 2 TV, April 27, 2010; ITIC translation).

3) **Eitan Bronner, the New York Times correspondent in Israel, wrote an article on April 6, 2010, after a visit to Ramallah, entitled "Palestinians Try a Less Violent Path to Resistance."** According to the article, Palestinian leaders who formerly commanded "militias" are now joining "unarmed protest marches" against Israel, for which they are being arrested. The PA, it says, is "**trying to forge a third way**" by rousing "**popular passions while avoiding violence**...The idea...is to build a virtual state and body politic through acts of popular resistance..." The article also noted that Rajmohan Gandhi, Mahatma Gandhi's grandson, had visited Bila'in, and that Martin Luther King the third, was scheduled to speak in Bila'in at "a conference on nonviolence"⁵⁶

⁵⁶ http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/07/world/middleeast/07westbank.html?_r=0