

## **Exploiting the Prophet's Authority: How Islamic State Propaganda Uses Hadith Quotation to Assert Legitimacy<sup>1</sup>**

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### **Abstract**

Through its prolific propaganda, the self-declared Islamic State (ISIS) seeks to attract new recruits, motivate existing members, and assert the group's legitimacy. This study addresses the question of how ISIS attempts to legitimize itself through its official rhetoric by exploring its invocation of religious authority via reference to sacred Islamic texts. The study focuses on a specific category of religious scripture: the collected words and actions of the Prophet Muhammad, known as the hadith. The body of hadith has historically served as a bridge of authority from past to present, linking later individuals and groups to the legacy of the Prophet. Related studies have demonstrated that within the Arabic-speaking community in general, citing hadith and Qur'an is an everyday rhetorical strategy for argumentation across all topics, secular and sacred. This article takes an in-depth look at the hadith quotations included in a sample of official ISIS propaganda to compare the relative frequency of specific topics and themes and to

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determine which hadith compilations are preferred by ISIS publicists. The study compares the quotation of hadith across media platforms (videos, newsletters, and magazines), genres (print and video), and languages (Arabic and English). The findings show that ISIS messaging tends to quote hadith from canonical Sunni collections to demonstrate to their target audience that they are authentically Islamic and committed to creating a utopian caliphate on earth. The study highlights important differences between English and Arabic language propaganda, in particular, that English-language propaganda focuses more on apocalyptic prophecies than Arabic-language materials. The article also uses case studies to illustrate how ISIS selectively draws on the vast body of hadith literature as part of the group's strategic framing. By employing familiar Islamic symbolism and discourse, ISIS materials seek to link tradition and innovation. As quoted in ISIS materials, hadith accounts are instruments used both to support specific positions and to lend a sense of religious commitment and legitimacy to ISIS.

Through its prolific propaganda, the self-declared Islamic State (ISIS) seeks to attract new recruits, motivate existing members, and assert the group's legitimacy. This study addresses the question of how ISIS attempts to legitimize itself through its official rhetoric by exploring its invocation of religious authority via reference to sacred Islamic texts. The study focuses on a specific category of religious scripture: the collected words and actions of the Prophet Muhammad, known as the hadith.<sup>1</sup> The body of hadith has historically served as a bridge of authority from past to present, linking later individuals and groups to the legacy of the Prophet.<sup>2</sup> Previous research has shown that quotations from the hadith appear in religious and non-religious circumstances to bolster the authority of the speaker or writer. The corpus of hadiths is vast and encompasses a broad range of topics, in contrast to the more concise Qur'an. How then might such an expansive corpus of diverse content be employed by a violent extremist group like ISIS? Would they choose to focus solely on hadith related to violence rather than on the many hadiths encouraging proper behavior and daily practice of Islam? Which compilers would receive the most attention? In short, how does ISIS employ these texts and to what means?

The application of religious texts by extremist groups must be contextualized within the broader theoretical debate between essentialists who believe that texts themselves can urge violence and instrumentalists who argue instead that religious texts are used selectively to justify violence. This study takes the approach that religious texts are one component of cultural 'tool kit' of symbols, rituals, and traditions from which social actors can draw to form strategies of action.<sup>3</sup> Strategic imperatives shape how individuals or groups choose to use this repertoire of traditions. This study demonstrates how the creators of ISIS recruiting materials use a particular type of

sacred text from the ‘tool kit’ of vast Islamic tradition and apply these texts to further the spread of their ideology, an ideology is often in self-conscious competition with other cultural frameworks that also draw on the same religious texts. Using this approach, the hadith texts quoted in ISIS materials can be seen as one feature of the group’s strategic framing which employs familiar Islamic symbolism and discourse to evoke shared identities to mobilize the target audience.<sup>4</sup> Hadith quotation then provides a striking illustration of how this strategic framing can link tradition and innovation – hadith accounts here are instruments used both to support specific positions and to lend a sense of religious commitment and inherent legitimacy to the propaganda materials produced by ISIS.

This article aims to present both a bird’s eye view of the landscape of hadith quotation in ISIS propaganda, including statistics and trends related to overall usage, and to provide specific case study examples in which hadith were used in representative or even unexpected ways. These case studies demonstrate how ISIS combines tradition and innovation to apply and reframe historical events in a specific contemporary context. This study seeks to identify the scope of hadith quotation in ISIS propaganda material and to answer the following specific research questions: Are extra-canonical hadith collections more prominent than canonical ones? Is the quotation of hadith similar across different media platforms (videos, newsletters, and magazines), genres (print and video), and languages (Arabic and English)? What topics of hadith do ISIS propaganda pieces quote most frequently? Is there significant repetition of particular hadith or is quotation more wide ranging? The findings show that ISIS messaging tends to quote hadith from canonical Sunni collections to demonstrate to their target audience that they are authentically Islamic and committed to creating a utopian caliphate on earth. Hadith quotations

bolster ISIS's legitimacy by infusing their propaganda with a sense of religious seriousness and commitment. The study also reveals important differences between English and Arabic language propaganda, noting in particular a greater focus on apocalyptic themes in English-language materials than in Arabic.

Following a brief review of the volume and nature of ISIS's information operations, this article outlines some of the methodological approaches to analyzing ISIS propaganda that are relevant to the investigation: rhetorical analysis, narrative typologies, and studies of projection of Islamic legitimacy. It then provides brief background on hadith in Sunni Islam. Next, the paper describes the data and methodology. The article then describes the study's findings and identifies key overall trends and provides case studies of hadith quotation in specific contexts.

## **Approaches to ISIS propaganda**

The propaganda efforts of ISIS have generated a great deal of attention among scholars, journalists, and researchers. This literature has noted both the quality (sophistication, high production value, etc.) and sheer volume of the output of the ISIS propaganda machine. Ligon and colleagues highlighted the cyber sophistication of ISIS's media arm as a key capability resulting in a sustained competitive advantage for the group. This media expertise can be seen in the group's range of platforms, use of different languages, and tailored messaging to create a distinct organizational brand.<sup>5</sup> Beyond its quality, the volume of propaganda produced by ISIS is unique among jihadi organizations. Based on a month-long data collection conducted during the summer of 2015, ISIS produced an average of about 38 unique propaganda events per day.<sup>6</sup> A 2016 report by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point suggested that although the

overall media output had dropped from a peak in the summer of 2015 (approximately 700+ products per month), its reduced output as of July 2016 remained near 200 products per month.<sup>7</sup>

Another feature of ISIS's media arm is its dynamicity and flexibility. Zelin's 2015 comprehensive snapshot of one week of ISIS media releases provided a valuable window into the range of materials produced by the group, from radio reports and video messages to photos of agricultural activity and *da'wa* (outreach) materials distributed on the street.<sup>8</sup>

The major goals of ISIS's propaganda effort are twofold and clearly complementary: recruiting new members and legitimizing ISIS as the true caliphate.<sup>9</sup> According to Gartenstein-Ross and colleagues, the chief arguments in ISIS propaganda correspond to three key organizational goals or assertions: 1.) ISIS is the true caliphate and an effective state that implements Islamic law, 2.) ISIS is the only legitimate Islamic organization in the world, 3.) ISIS is growing and strong.<sup>10</sup> Each of the arguments serves both recruiting and legitimizing functions.

## Rhetorical strategies

Scholars have employed a variety of approaches to analyzing the content of ISIS propaganda. Perry and Long applied rhetorical analysis to outline the constitutive (identity-creating), instrumental, and mythic functions of videos featuring accounts of martyrs. Two rhetorical strategies highlighted by Perry and Long that are especially relevant to ISIS's quotation of hadith are the evocation of "sacred time" and the use of transhistorical figures. Through the evocation of "sacred time" – which, for ISIS, is the earliest history of Islam under Muhammad's leadership, – modern-day martyrs are linked to and can participate in a mythic past. Transhistorical figures, such as companions of the Prophet, appear as heroes to be emulated, even to the extent that

contemporary ISIS fighters assume the names of early Muslims.<sup>11</sup> ISIS narratives use sacred time and transhistorical figures to encourage mythical reenactment of events from early Islamic history, even as these events are recast in substantial ways (for example, a modern-day suicide attack becomes a heroic death in a historic battle).

The crucial role of a mythic past in the propaganda of terrorist groups other than ISIS has been described by Rowland and Theye using al-Qaeda as an exemplar of what they term the “symbolic DNA of terrorism.”<sup>12</sup> They argue that messages of terrorist groups consistently draw on mythic symbolism both to persuade and to serve an epistemic function - that is, to provide a new worldview for the audience. According to this pattern, groups believe their core identity to be threatened, reject the identity of the other/enemy, and affirm a new identity for adherents based on a mythical past. Similarly, Long and Wilner detailed how al-Qaeda’s metanarrative blends contemporary events with those of a mythic historical era to foster a new identity for its followers.<sup>13</sup>

## Narratives

Another recurrent approach to analyzing the content of ISIS messaging has been to identify core narratives or themes. Although several different typologies of narratives have been proposed,<sup>14</sup> certain trends have emerged.

An essential ISIS narrative draws on the group’s claim to have reestablished the authentic Islamic caliphate (*al-khilāfa*) and to be actively building a society based on Muslim values. According to Winter’s typology, the most prominent narrative was that of utopia, which was the major theme in over half of the propaganda items coded during his data collection (53%).<sup>15</sup>

Through the utopian narrative, ISIS authors seek to demonstrate to their audience the veracity of ISIS's claim that it is the single legitimate Islamic government in the world. If we view the utopian narrative as conveying a sense of an authentic Islamic society (rather than a society free from problems), this narrative can be seen to incorporate a variety of other sub-themes. As Winter accurately noted, all other narratives support this claim.<sup>16</sup> Themes related to promoting the caliphate and encouraging others to join are also extensions of the utopian narrative,<sup>17</sup> and even the presence of motifs linked to signs of the end times can be viewed as an aspect of this narrative of fulfilling Islam's final destiny.<sup>18</sup>

A second major theme in ISIS propaganda that is described in some form in all the narrative typologies is military success, sometimes described as a "winner's message."<sup>19</sup> In this narrative, ISIS presents itself as militarily strong and seeks to minimize weakness. ISIS is portrayed as constantly expanding and victorious on the battlefield, often in stark contrast to the unbelieving enemies who oppose them.<sup>20</sup> These military and war themes are prevalent throughout ISIS propaganda and generally appear among the most frequent narratives.<sup>21</sup> Other themes identified in the scholarly literature include good governance, commercial interests, brutality and victimhood. Some reports identify more specific narratives than those reviewed thus far, including discrediting the competition (other jihadi groups, particularly al-Qaeda) and jihadi adventure and camaraderie.<sup>22</sup>

Ingram has suggested a different approach to the issue of narratives by arguing that ISIS's messaging has been effective because of its interweaving of pragmatic and perceptual factors into compelling narratives. He argued that ISIS not only attempts to persuade its audience of the political-military success of the group drawing on pragmatic factors, like security and stability,



but also provides the audience a lens through which they can view the world, relying on perceptual factors linked to group identity (e.g., in-group vs. out-group). This approach has emphasized the similarities of some of ISIS's information operations strategies with other guerrilla and terrorist groups and suggests that the pragmatic factors (e.g., military successes) could be viewed as more effective with local audiences, whereas perceptual factors may appeal more to foreign fighters.<sup>23</sup>

## Projecting Islamic legitimacy

As seen in ISIS's appeal to mythic history and transhistorical figures, as well as in the prominence of an utopian Muslim society narrative, Islamic tradition provides a rich source of potential material for ISIS to exploit in order to promote its legitimacy and authority. Yet, the subject of how ISIS constructs its legitimacy as an Islamic state has generated less scholarship than other aspects of its media production. A heated debate erupted over how "Islamic" ISIS should be considered following the publication of Wood's controversial 2015 article in *The Atlantic*.<sup>24</sup> Wood argued it is impossible to understand ISIS without acknowledging the genuine Islamic underpinnings of the organization and draws attention to the commitment to Islamic scriptures and practices espoused by ISIS. Others, such as Dagli have pointed out that merely quoting from texts and evoking religious imagery are not signs of a true religious scholar and should not be mistaken for literal interpretation of a religion.<sup>25</sup> Cottee noted the critical role of Islam, and more specifically of its religious texts, as a legitimizing and constraining force in justifying ISIS's actions.<sup>26</sup>

In response to this controversy, the Brookings Institution launched a six-part series on ISIS's approach to religious scriptures. A consistent theme throughout the articles in the series is that ISIS has demonstrated a commitment to linking their actions to historic beliefs and practices, even in situations where their actions are not supported by the majority opinion of Islamic scholars. Extensive citation of religious sources can be found when this is seen to benefit the group. Interpretation is often, but not always, literal. For example, Siddiqui cited instances of purposive (rather than textual) reasoning when it suited ISIS's goals, as in the case of the execution of the Jordanian pilot, in which the group's religious leaders "adopt a legal methodology which is scripturally-centric and literal, but flexible if literalism alone will circumvent their objectives."<sup>27</sup> In another segment of the series, Revkin discussed how ISIS recycles terminology from financial systems from the Prophet's era to elevate the status of unpopular government functions, such as levying taxes.<sup>28</sup> Another article in the series showed how ISIS has intentionally framed its ruling to mirror historical documents, while making adjustments to suit the modern situation.<sup>29</sup>

Pelletier and colleagues examined how ISIS uses Islamic law as a vehicle to further the group's political and strategic goals. They argued that ISIS's messaging approach differs depending on the degree of overlap between mainstream Islamic law and ISIS's particular interpretation, as well as on the social movements catalysts present which might be more receptive to a reinterpretation of Islamic law. Based on analysis of ISIS speeches, the authors identified several strategies, such as reinforcing ISIS's message via reference to historical precedence, downplaying differences with mainstream interpretations, and presenting radical reinterpretations of Islamic law. Pelletier and colleagues noted that quotations from the Qur'an

and hadith are sometimes used as part of the strategy of reinforcing ISIS's legitimacy by connecting it to the historic Islamic tradition.<sup>30</sup>

In a 2015 report from the Centre on Religion and Geopolitics, El-Badawy, Comerford, and Welby briefly examined religious quotations within the larger context of outlining the shared ideology of ISIS and two other Salafi-jihadi groups through the groups' propaganda. Especially relevant to the current study was the coding of quotations from the Qur'an, hadith, and references to other Islamic scholarship. The authors concluded that religious sources are used extensively, occurring in 87% of the reviewed propaganda. Qur'anic quotations appeared most often (50% of all propaganda, across all groups) and hadith quotations were less frequent (22%). ISIS propaganda was found to be more dense in Islamic quotations than the two other Salafi-jihadi groups included in the study. El-Badawy and colleagues noted that most of the hadith quotations in their data were from canonical collections, suggesting a strategy of emphasizing ISIS's Sunni identity. The authors also pointed out that authoritative religious texts were often cited in response to criticism, noting in particular ISIS's reference to several hadith to rebut claims of the illegitimacy of the group's execution of the Jordanian pilot.<sup>31</sup>

## **Background on hadith**

The current study concentrates exclusively on the use of a specific type of religious scripture in the official messaging of ISIS: quotations from the hadith, the collected sayings and deeds attributed to Muhammad. Related studies have demonstrated that within the Arabic-speaking community in general, citing hadith and Qur'an is an everyday rhetorical strategy for argumentation across all topics, secular and sacred.<sup>32</sup> Therefore, it would be socially unusual for

ISIS not to invoke sacred texts in their propaganda. The current study sought to demonstrate in what ways ISIS hadith usage resembles and diverges from the practices of everyday writers.

The hadith encompasses an expansive body of individual reports that were transmitted orally and in writing by companions of the Prophet and later narrators and are accessible to contemporary Muslims in many different compilations. Unlike the Qur'an, there is no single authoritative version of the hadith. Different sects and schools of law within Islam believe different narrators are reliable and so refer to different hadith collections. Sunni scholarly tradition has developed a meticulous method of hadith criticism to evaluate and categorize hadiths based on a variety of factors, often related to the reliability of the narrators. The number of individual hadith accounts (eliminating repetitive accounts where the main text of the hadith is the same but there are differences in the chain of narrators, *isnād*) is nearly 20,000, and the content of these hadith is wide-ranging and varied, including advice on ethical living and good morals, legal rulings, and theological statements about the nature of God.<sup>33</sup> Given the vast and varied content of hadith, some have suggested a link between extremist views and wide application of hadith.<sup>34</sup>

The hadith literature is highly esteemed by Muslims and regarded as the means through which Muslims can understand the way of the Prophet (*sunna*), which is believed to be the ultimate source of wisdom on moral living. Brown has suggested that the hadith has served two principal functions in Islamic civilization: 1.) providing authoritative documents about the Prophet; and 2.) presenting a link to the Prophet's legacy and a way of connecting later Muslim societies to the authority of the Prophet.<sup>35</sup> Encompassed in the first function is the use of hadith as a source of Islamic law, a tool for interpreting the Qur'an, and a guide for proper behavior. Hadith are quoted frequently in informal speech by Muslims and Arabic speakers, both with and without

explicit identification as being the words of Muhammad. These quotations appear on religious as well as non-religious topics to refer to the information content of a particular hadith and to connect the speaker to the authority of Muhammad.<sup>36</sup> It is the manipulation of the second function of hadith to create authority through evoking the Prophet's legacy that will be particularly important in ISIS propaganda. Because all hadith are, by definition, linked to Muhammad himself, any reference to this material necessarily evokes the sacred time when the Prophet of Islam was living. Muhammad is the single most important transhistorical figure in Islam. By quoting his words, ISIS draws on his authority as a prophet and guide for the Islamic community.

## **Data and methodology**

The data consists of a sample of online propaganda produced by media outlets associated with ISIS, including 87 Arabic-language video messages, 22 issues of an Arabic-language print newsletter (*al-Naba'*) and 15 issues of an English-language print magazine (*Dabiq*).<sup>37</sup> ISIS media outlets produce each of these propaganda types at different rates: during the period included in this study, several videos were released each week, while print publications appeared less frequently, about once a week for the *al-Naba'* newsletter and less than once a month for *Dabiq*. Because of this range of production frequency, the authors decided to examine a comprehensive time slice for each category but to use a longer time slice for media types that were published less frequently. The data reviewed for this study includes three months of videos,<sup>38</sup> six months of Arabic-language newsletters, and two years of English-language magazines. (See table 1 for types of media included in the study and brief descriptions of each.)

[Insert table 1 here]

After retrieving the relevant files from the website [jihadology.net](http://jihadology.net), an archive of jihadi propaganda materials designed for researchers, a team of four annotators identified and reviewed the data. Each file was reviewed by two annotators in succession who identified elements as hadith quotations and provided transcription of quotations produced in speech.<sup>39</sup> Researchers located the original hadith in an online or print collection, recorded the full hadith along with its English translation and source information (compiler) in a spreadsheet, then identified and tallied instances of the same quotation in different usage contexts. This method uncovered almost 700 hadith quotations, including many instances of the same hadith cited in different propaganda items. Of these quotations, 472 unique (non-repeated) hadith quotations were identified in the sample. Two researchers independently tagged each hadith for topic and then met together to review and reach consensus on any discrepancies. (See Appendix A for the complete list of topics with descriptions used for assigning topic codes.)

There are several known limitations of this dataset. In addition to being constrained based on the sample size, the identification of hadith quotations may not be comprehensive. While many hadith quotations could be identified relatively easily based on clear cues in the text, other allusions to hadith accounts were embedded in the text with no explicit indications to the reader or viewer, who is assumed to be familiar enough with the hadith literature to appreciate the references because of a shared cultural appreciation for these sacred texts. Annotators captured both fuller quotations and allusions to the greatest extent possible. For example, one of the most frequently cited hadith in the corpus was the following report from Ibn Hanbal's collection: "The Messenger (peace be upon him) said, "I was sent with a sword in my hands before the Hour so

that God alone would be worshipped without a partner. My sustenance was provided in the shade of my spear. Humiliation and disdain were placed on those who oppose my order. He who imitates a people is one of them."<sup>40</sup> Thirteen references to this hadith were identified in the corpus. Sometimes these quotations were similar to the version cited above in that they included explicit attribution to the Prophet and, in some cases, to the companions who passed down the account.<sup>41</sup> In other instances, shorter excerpts from the same hadith appeared in the data in less obvious contexts, such as an article titled "My sustenance was provided for me in the shade of my spear"<sup>42</sup> or a fighter addressing the camera directly in a video message who closed his exhortation with the following statement: "And peace and blessings be upon the one who was sent with a sword and not with a pen."<sup>43</sup> Each of these three references was coded as an allusion to same hadith. In a few instances, the boundary between a hadith allusion and everyday language was difficult to determine. For example, many of the propaganda items reviewed in this study mentioned ISIS's commitment to the "prophetic method" (*al-manhaj al-nabawī*) a reference to a hadith in which Muhammad describes signs of the end times, including a caliphate based on the "prophetic method."<sup>44</sup> This phrase is so pervasive in ISIS materials that we determined not to include this phrase as a hadith allusion.<sup>45</sup>

Another limitation of the current study is that the inclusion of propaganda items produced during different periods of time could have an unintended impact the results. Each propaganda item was produced in a distinct social, political, and military context based on the surrounding events at that time, and therefore the historical circumstances surrounding the publication an issue of *Dabiq* in the summer of 2014 are quite different from those of a video message produced in early spring of 2016. The data used in this study can be seen to represent distinct yet overlapping

sociopolitical and strategic contexts. Future work could randomly sample from more frequently produced media types to ensure more equivalent time samples.

## Overall trends

Hadith quotations appeared in 71% of individual propaganda items. Comparison between the relative density of hadith quotations in each of the three media types was impossible because the full texts of the video messages were not transcribed. However, a comparison can be made of the average number of hadith quotations per unit (written or video document) by media type. The English-language publication *Dabiq* had the highest per unit hadith quotation average of 25 quotations per issue, followed by *al-Naba'* with 13, and finally the videos with only 1 per unit (see table 1). The relatively low number of quotations in the videos may be a result of the spontaneous speech in those materials. Unlike the printed materials which contained edited prose articles, the videos included non-scripted interviews with ISIS fighters, prisoners, and people on the street as well as sections featuring images and video footage accompanied by *nashīds* (hymns).<sup>46</sup> Also, the videos contained far fewer words on average than the other media types. To illustrate the differing lengths and to provide a general sense of the relative number of words contained in the media types included in this study, a representative propaganda item was from each category was selected based on the average length of all items in that category, and a word count was calculated for that representative item. The total words in a typical-length item, by media type, are: English magazines: 26,272 words, Arabic newsletters: 12,617 words, Arabic videos: 536 words.



Another broad trend in the data is that the print sources quoted a wider range of hadith than the videos. In particular, *al-Naba'* quoted a broad range of hadith (221 unique quotations) with relatively little repetition of hadith; no one hadith was quoted more than three times in that media type. In contrast, the videos cited a smaller number of hadith (54 unique quotations) with greater repetition (the top four hadith were cited five times each). Like *al-Naba'*, *Dabiq* quoted a wide range of different hadith (252 total) but with greater repetition than *al-Naba'* (the most frequently quoted hadith in the *Dabiq* sample appeared 10 times). (See table 2).

[Insert table 2]

The wider range of quotations in the print material is unsurprising given the increased opportunity for an individual author to select carefully relevant hadith for an article, in contrast to a fighter praising the caliphate while riding in the bed of a truck on the way to a raid.

## **Hadith compilations**

There is no rigid canon of authoritative hadith in Islam, however, certain compilations have come to enjoy a special status within Sunni Islam. The ninth-century compilers al-Bukhari and Muslim are referred to jointly as *al-ṣaḥīḥayn*, meaning “the two authentic ones.” Sunnis believe these two collections to be the most authentic because all hadith accounts included in these works are backed by strong *isnāds* (chains of narrators). Along with these works, several other compilations have been included in a broader category of authoritative collections, sometimes called “the authentic books” (*al-siḥāḥ*) or “the six books” (*al-kutub al-sitta*).<sup>47</sup> The collections generally included in this category are: *Sahih al-Bukhari*, *Sahih Muslim*, *Sunan Abu Dawud*, *Jami' al-Tirmidhi*, *Sunan al-Sughra* (al-Nasa'i), and either *Sunan Ibn Majah* or *Muwatta Malik*.

These compilations are referred here as ‘canonical,’ but they should not be viewed as exclusively authoritative. Muslim scholars regard many hadith accounts that do not appear in these collections as authentic.<sup>48</sup>

One of the motivating research questions for this study concerned which type of hadith ISIS propaganda tends to cite. More specifically, are the compilations referred to within the well-respected “six books” of the Sunni canon or are they from other collections? Informal feedback from experts had suggested that *Musnad Ahmad*, Ibn Hanbal’s vast extra-canonical compilation, seemed to be a favorite of ISIS adherents. This collection has not been fully translated into English and is not as easily accessible online as many other collections.

To determine relative frequency of different compilations, each hadith quotation was tagged with the collections in which it appeared. Many, though not all, of the extant hadith collections are available in a searchable format online. Annotators relied on online repositories, as well as forums discussing hadith, to locate full Arabic texts and to confirm source information.<sup>49</sup>

Different versions of a particular hadith account may exist in different collections. Although more than one compiler may be listed for each account in the database, these listings are not comprehensive. When the original ISIS document mentioned a specific collection and annotators were able to locate the hadith within that collection, the annotators recorded that collection in the database and did not attempt to find additional compilations where the same or similar hadith might also be found. In cases where no compilation information was provided, annotators located the hadith online, starting with the canonical collections. In cases where the quotation was an excerpt from a longer hadith, annotators used their best judgment in selecting which of the potential hadith accounts was the source, though in some instances several viable possibilities

existed. Annotators also relied on their own judgment in determining which minor wording variations could be considered instances of the same hadith. When an abbreviated quotation appeared in one file and a full quotation appeared elsewhere, both quotations were considered instances of the same hadith account. In some cases, quotations were from different sections of the same hadith so there was little to no overlap in wording (without viewing the complete account). In six instances, no exact match could be located and the compiler was coded as “unknown.”

After tagging each hadith account with one or more compiler, researchers compared relative frequency of quotations from each compilation in the data. In order to view trends in canonical vs. extra-canonical collections, researchers divided the sources into canonical and extra-canonical works. Rather than picking between the two disputed book in the “six books” (*Sunan Ibn Majah* and *Muwatta Mālik*), both works were included within the category of canonical hadith collections.

Results show that most hadith quoted in the sample are from canonical hadith collections. Figure 1 shows all the compilers cited in the dataset. Canonical compilations are represented in shades of blue and extra-canonical are in shades of red.

Over half (54%) of all non-unique hadith quotations in the sample were from the two most authentic hadith collections, al-Bukhari and Muslim (see figure 2).

32% of all non-unique hadith were from other canonical collections (al-Nasa’i, Abu Dawud, al-Tirmidhi, Ibn Majah, and Malik), while the remaining hadith were from a range of extra-canonical collections. Of the extra-canonical sources, Ibn Hanbal’s *Musnad Ahmad* was the most

frequent (9% of the total). The most frequently cited compilation overall was *Sahih Muslim*. The trend to cite canonical hadith compilations was relatively consistent across media types (see figure 3).

## Topics and themes

Another approach to studying the categories of hadith quoted in the sample was to compare the relative frequency of distinct topics. To do this, annotators labeled each hadith that occurred in the dataset with the main topics discussed in the hadith itself. The list of topics was developed based on the content of the selected hadith accounts. Many categories are quite broad and reflect general tenets of Islam and the traditional thematic divisions of Sunni hadith compilations.<sup>50</sup>

Other topics are more specific to the context of the data and reflect ISIS's distinctive theological and practical focus. For example, *tawhīd* (monotheism) is an especially important concept for jihadi groups,<sup>51</sup> so the topic was included separately rather than including it within proper belief into a single category. The themes of separation from non-Muslims and the importance of paying *zakat* were hypothesized to be more prominent in the ISIS dataset than might be expected in a different dataset that included hadith quotations and were kept as separate categories. Some categories have been combined to reduce the overall number of labels. (See Appendix A for the complete list of topics with descriptions.)

Overall, the most frequent topic of quoted hadith in the dataset was proper belief and behavior (25%) (see figure 4). This is unsurprising in that many hadith deal with this broad topic. The next most frequent topics were fighting (17%), judgment (11%), and end times (8%). Other subjects that occurred at less than 5% were: attributes of God, Islamic calendar, unity, governance, *tawhīd*

(monotheism), hypocrisy, other religious groups, perseverance, punishments, separation from non-Muslims, sexual morality, allegiance, daily life, forgiveness, *hijra* (immigration), and prophets.

The relatively low occurrence of hadith related to the end times (8% of non-unique hadith in all media types) is an unexpected finding in light of emphasis academic literature has assigned to the message of an impending apocalypse in ISIS's core identity.<sup>52</sup> This will be discussed further below.

An interesting finding is that the topics in quoted hadith differed significantly across media types (see figure 5). This can be explained, in part, by the fact that the materials reviewed often focused on specific topics of interest; for example, a particular video message might focus on praise of snipers while a newsletter article is devoted the importance of fasting during Ramadan. Some variation in topics may be a result of the different subjects highlighted in any particular propaganda item. However, beyond this expected range of topics, certain trends emerged in the data that may suggest targeted recruitment strategies based on audience segmentation by media type. Particular narratives were more prominent in specific media types and the hadith quoted were used to bolster these narratives. ISIS's ability to tailor its messaging to suit distinct audiences has been well documented in the literature.<sup>53</sup> Gartenstein-Ross and colleagues used case studies to describe how the core narratives used in ISIS propaganda are adapted and combined together to suit specific challenges ISIS faces in different physical locations.<sup>54</sup> Similarly, Winter has described the flexibility of the ISIS brand and the fact that different narratives are more or less prominent at any time based on-the-ground realities and specific circumstances.<sup>55</sup>

[Insert figure 5 here]

## In-Depth Analysis of Top Topics

The following section takes a detailed look at three of the most popular topics in this dataset: fighting, proper belief and behavior, and end times. Each sub-section begins with a brief overview of general trends on how the topic appeared across media types in the dataset and how it fit into broader narratives, followed by a descriptive case study outlining a specific context of hadith usage. These case studies demonstrate how ISIS employs hadith as a component of its strategic framing.

### *Fighting (general trends)*

The category ‘Fighting for God’s cause’ combined categories of jihad and warfare.<sup>56</sup> Hadith related to warfare, military accomplishments, and fighting in the cause of God were quoted more frequently in the video messages (30% of all hadith quoted) than in the other media types. This reflects the general content of many of the videos, which often focused on military raids, suicide operations, or martyr praise. The videos in this sample were less likely to address general Islamic doctrines than the newsletters or magazines, which sometimes featured articles on topics like hypocrisy or fasting. Although the overall content of *al-Naba*’ also tended to military-focused, the articles detailing military conquests and victories in the newsletters tended not to contain hadith, while the articles at the end of each issue, which were on general Islamic topics, contained many hadith. Intuitively, this is in keeping with the rhetorical point of quoting from the hadith, which is not simply to document the Prophet’s life and teachings but to apply them to current instructions on right living. The prominence of the topic of fighting in this dataset is

consistent with findings about propaganda and ISIS narratives more broadly. In a sample from 2015, 37% of ISIS propaganda events include the narrative of war, the second most prominent narrative in that dataset.<sup>57</sup> The image of ISIS as militarily victorious and constantly expanding is a crucial component of the ubiquitous “winner’s message” in ISIS propaganda.<sup>58</sup> Winter calls the perception of momentum ISIS’s “most precious symbolic asset.”<sup>59</sup> In this sample, hadith related to fighting, including jihad, martyrdom, or praise for a specific war-related skill, played into the core ISIS narrative of increasing military success and triumphalism. For instance, several of the videos in this sample featured ISIS weapons training and showed fighters practicing their skills and using them to achieve military victories.

#### *Case Study: Snipers as Modern-Day Archers*

In the video *'Inna al-quwwa al-ramī* [Strength is in archery] from January 2016, snipers are singled out for particular praise.<sup>60</sup> This short video is dense with hadith references and eight separate hadiths are quoted during the ten-minute video. The opening voiceover begins by citing four consecutive hadith, including a hadith referencing the Battle of Badr, which is used to emphasize God’s support for those fighting for his cause, and several hadith specifically praising shooting (*ramī*). In the historical context of these hadiths, these references to shooting refer specifically to archery. One hadith quoted in the introduction, which is found in Abu Dawud’s collection, is: “I heard the Messenger of God (peace be upon him) saying, ‘God will admit three people to paradise for each arrow; the maker who has a good motive, the one who shoots it, and the one who hands it up for shooting. So shoot and ride, but I like your archery more than your riding. He who gives up archery after learning it because he loses interest, neglects a blessing.’ Or he said, ‘He is ungrateful’.” The video later features a masked man instructing fighters on

marksmanship and specific related weapons. He cites the Prophet's words "Strength is in archery" in his direct speech to the trainees. Later a voiceover cites the complete hadith in which Muhammad repeats three times, "Strength is in archery." The remainder of the video shows footage of sniper attacks with heroic anthems playing, punctuated by voiceovers reciting hadith praising archery in battles with the Arabic text superimposed on the screen. Through this juxtaposition of sacred texts related to battles in the early days of Islam and contemporary military footage, ISIS attempts to demonstrate to the audience that the modern-day incarnation of an early Muslim archer fighting alongside Muhammad is an ISIS sniper, and the contemporary version of a follower of Muhammad is an ISIS soldier. The hadiths praising archery are explicitly paired with footage of successful sniper attacks and serve to link ISIS fighters to a heroic past. The footage combined with the scriptural references also promote the image of ISIS fighters as competent, skilled, and acting with God's support. The individuals in the video appear to be part of a continual line of God's warriors, giving support to the winners' message narrative and encouraging the viewer to be a part of this ongoing campaign of victory.

### *Proper belief and behavior (general trends)*

This topic was relatively popular across media types, but the Arabic newsletters had the highest concentration of hadith related to this topic (33%) with *Dabiq* (22%) second and videos (17%) third. Hadith in this category covered a wide range of subjects, from more specific (the acceptable length of a mourning period) to more general (reliance on God). Although there does not seem to be any evidence of audience segmentation in this category of hadith, this topic's broad popularity across genres underlies the importance to ISIS of quoting hadiths describing right and wrong behavior and proper doctrine. In a broad sense, hadith detailing



correct implementation of Islam can be viewed as supporting ISIS's core narrative of caliphal utopia. By quoting hadiths on a range of appropriate and inappropriate behaviors and beliefs, ISIS seeks to present itself as an authority on good behavior for all Muslims. Referring to religious texts on these subjects enhances ISIS's claim that it is the true implementer of Islam and gives the appearance of religious authenticity. Even though the group ignores hadith on particular types of prohibited actions that it chooses to encourage, by citing an abundance of hadith on other topics that do not challenge their behavior they distract from their departures from tradition.

*Case Study: Religious Police and ISIS as God's Agent on Earth*

In the *al-Naba'* article titled "Fear of God or fear of the religious police?" citizens of ISIS-controlled territory are exhorted to respect the religious police (*hisba*).<sup>61</sup> The author of the article portrays God as watchful and omniscient and ISIS as the loyal representative of God's interests on earth. The opening paragraph quotes a hadith from *Sahih Muslim* that encourages Muslims to "Fear God as though you can see him, because even though you cannot see him, he sees you." Next, the article mentions several quotations from the Qur'an that emphasize God's omniscience, followed by Qur'an quotations explaining the importance of encouraging good behavior and forbidding bad behavior (*al-'amr bil-ma'rūf wa-l-nahī 'an al-munkar*). The author then cites a hadith from al-Tirmidhi describing God's judgment for those who do not comply: "Either command good and forbid evil or God will soon send you punishment. Then you will call on Him, but He will not answer you" and a well-known hadith from Muslim describing how to respond when encountering evil actions ("Whosoever of you sees an evil action, let him change it with his hand; and if he is not able to do so, then with his tongue; and if he is not able to do so,

then with his heart – and that is the weakest of faith”). The author praises ISIS leadership for prioritizing the establishment of a department for the religious police (*hisba*) among other government departments and argues this demonstrates their commitment to the Islamic concept of enjoining good and forbidding wrong. The fundamental function of the religious police is promoting virtue and preventing vice. The author poses a series of rhetorical questions focusing on the ultimate source of rules (“Who forbade the vices of cigarettes and wine?...Was it not the Lord your God?”) and reminds the readers of the divine rewards and punishments associated with proper behavior. The article closes by imploring readers to abandon forbidden behaviors so that the noble deaths of the *mujāhidūn* will not have been in vain. According to the logic of the article, ISIS and its governmental departments are God’s agents who seek to implement His will on earth. Hadith quotations frame this argument by demonstrating the divine exhortation to encourage appropriate Islamic actions.

This narrative of ISIS as the authentic implementer of Islam on earth is a core theme in much of ISIS propaganda. Although descriptions of the religious police and their punishments might not seem to not fit into a category called ‘utopia’ it is indeed viewed as an aspect of religious authenticity to many of ISIS’s target audience. The author of this article attempts to paint a picture of ISIS officials sincerely committed to enforcing divine rules rooted in Islamic scripture. At the same time that the article portrays ISIS as an authentic religious authority encouraging individuals to act in accordance with religious strictures based on personal piety and not temporal consequences, it also shows ISIS to be the legitimate government wielding authority on a possibly wayward population.

This article also provides an excellent example of the range of sources of authority ISIS writers use to support their arguments. In addition to the hadith quotations mentioned above, the author quotes from two categories of Islamic sources: Qur'an and classical scholarship - in this case, two medieval Hanbali scholars: Ibn Qayyim, a student of Ibn Taymiyya, and Ibn Jawzi. The current study does not attempt comprehensive discourse analysis of any one document; however, more inclusive analyses of all of these classical sources could provide a fuller understanding of the rhetorical strategies used by individual authors and with specific audiences in mind.

### End times (general trends)

Perhaps the most striking difference in topics across media types can be seen in the relative focus on hadith related to the apocalypse and signs of the coming end times. 13% of all hadith quoted in *Dabiq* were related to the signs of the apocalypse, while only 4% of hadith quotations in the newsletters and videos were on this topic. The higher percentage in *Dabiq* may imply that ISIS publicists believe that a narrative of impending end times will resonate more for an English-speaking audience than for an Arabic-speaking audience. McKants has suggested that the lure of the apocalypse is especially strong for foreign fighters,<sup>62</sup> and a more intense focus on end times across English- vs. Arabic-language propaganda provides additional evidence supporting this claim. The precise link between foreign fighters and a strategy of apocalyptic messaging is complicated, however, by the fact that many foreign fighters are from Arabic-speaking countries, such as Tunisia and Saudi Arabia.<sup>63</sup> Although Arabic-speaking foreign fighters may not be a main target audience of *Dabiq*, as ISIS's major English-only publication the magazine is clearly designed to appeal to a global audience<sup>64</sup> and the urgent message of a rapidly approaching apocalypse is a prominent theme in ISIS's strategic communications designed for this

international environment. Another factor that complicates the analysis of relative focus on end times hadith in *Dabiq* relative to other media types is the differing time ranges included for each media types in the current study. Because the English-language materials included in this study cover the longest time range, the apparent greater focus on the apocalypse in this media type could, in fact, reflect the prominence of this theme in the group's earliest propaganda.

In addition to more frequent references to hadith related to the apocalypse in English-language propaganda, the relative scarcity of hadith on this topic across genres (8% overall) is conspicuous given that scholars of ISIS have identified the apocalypse as playing a major role in the group's identity. Some have argued the group is genuinely motivated by their eschatological beliefs, while other suggest it is a manipulative recruitment tactic aimed at Muslims less knowledgeable of their religion.<sup>65</sup> Others have noted the evolution and muting of ISIS's apocalyptic vision and the group's willingness to sell pragmatic decisions as ideologically motivated when it benefits them.<sup>66</sup> The relative lack of prominence of hadith discussing the end times is even more surprising because the primary source of prophecies on the signs of the coming Day of Resurrection (*yawm al-qiyāma*) is the hadith literature. Although the Qur'an provides a consistent message of God's final judgment and the afterlife, it does not provide a great deal of specificity regarding the Day of Resurrection or the signs leading to it. Major classical Sunni sources on eschatology consist of compilations of hadiths on relevant topics, with some contextual or exegetical information.<sup>67</sup> Key figures in modern-day Sunni apocalyptic literature, such as the anti-Christ (*al-dajjāl*) do not appear in the Qur'an but only in the hadith and subsequent apocalyptic literature. Several possible interpretations could explain the overall lack of focus on end times throughout this dataset. As mentioned above, the prominence of the

apocalyptic narrative may have declined over time. Another possibility is that while the apocalyptic narrative is a distinctive feature of ISIS recruiting as compared to other similar groups, ISIS's strategic communications use the imagery and symbols associated with the end times as a single aspect of a multifaceted strategic messaging campaign.

## *Case Study: Prophecies of a looming apocalypse and ISIS as part of Islamic destiny*

In an article series in an issue of *Dabiq*, the authors make extensive use of hadith quotations as a part of a call for readers to make *hijra* in the context of the end times.<sup>68</sup> The authors connect references in these texts to aspects of ISIS to argue that ISIS will play a key role in ushering in the apocalypse. The author opens with a description the unique status of ISIS based on the global immigration to ISIS-controlled territory that has fueled the group's growth, a phenomenon which the author contends is to achieve the ultimate goal of paving the way for the apocalypse. The following section quotes Muhammad saying "Verily Islam began as something strange, and it will return to being something strange as it first began, so glad tidings to the strangers." When asked who he meant by the strangers, Muhammad responded "Those who break off from their tribes." A variety of evidence, including quotations from Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi and classical Islamic scholars al-Baghawi, al-Kalabadhi, and Ibn al-Qayyim, are presented to further explain that the strangers described in the hadith refer to those who leave their tribes for the sake of Islam and to explain the claim that Islam was strange in its early days. The author cites a hadith from Ibn Hanbal's compilation lauding those who follow Islam after the death of Muhammad: "The wondrous people in faith are a people who come after me and believe in me without having seen me, and they attest to my truthfulness without having seen me. So they are my brothers."

In the following section “Sham is the land of malahim” [the term *malāḥim* refers to battles leading up to the apocalypse], the author makes an unambiguous connection between the immigration of the modern-day strangers to the Levant and the pivotal role this region plays in the end times prophecies of Muhammad. The text cites three hadith that specifically mention Greater Syria (al-Sham) in the context of apocalyptic battles or other end times imagery. This intentional placement of ISIS into the context of a mytho-historic trajectory toward the fulfillment of Islamic eschatology is common in these articles, especially in *Dabiq*. Like many other propaganda items, the author reserves particular praise for *muhājirūn* (immigrants) who leave their families and homes to participate in the ushering in of end times. This prominence of the image of a courageous immigrant is unsurprising in a publication targeted at those outside of the Arabic-speaking world who would have to travel to join the ranks of ISIS. The hadith cited in this article serve to legitimize ISIS in the context of an imminent apocalypse – specifically, by connecting precise locations in ISIS-controlled territory to end times prophecies and praising those who break off from their familiar environment. These quotations also reinforce related messages that tap into a desire of wanting to be on the winning side of a historic conflict and desiring to be a part of something momentous. The concluding section of the series quotes five additional hadith detailing prophecies related to the apocalypse and describing the battles that will rage during this period. The author closes by reemphasizing that those described in the texts as the true Muslims who left their tribes are, in the modern period, the followers of ISIS. The list of what these “best” of the believers are fighting against expands here from not only entities mentioned in the previously quoted texts themselves but also “the cross worshipers, the apostates, their crosses, their borders, and their ballot-boxes.”<sup>69</sup> This example demonstrates the

application of hadith through numerous direct quotations to a modern context to provide justification supporting ISIS's goals.

## **What Hadith are Omitted?**

In addition to enabling actions and behaviors, another function of sacred texts is to constrain behaviors by outlining inappropriate and forbidden practices. Many hadiths reject practices regularly employed by ISIS, such as killing Muslims and use of suicide attacks, and these hadiths are often cited by Muslims who oppose ISIS. To explore if this sample included these hadiths, we selected a representative text composed in opposition to ISIS (Letter to al-Baghdadi), identified all the hadiths quoted in it, and searched for these hadith in the database.

The open letter to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was written and signed by a coalition of Muslim scholars and leaders to refute ISIS's practices.<sup>70</sup> The document makes frequent reference to the Qur'an and the hadith, both to frame their approach in sending the letter ('religion is advice' – Muslim) and to refute specific ISIS claims and practices. A fundamental criticism presented in the letter is that ISIS selectively applies religious texts without taking the whole of Qur'an and hadith into account. In the opening section, the authors dissect the following phrase from a speech given by former ISIS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-'Adnani: "God bless Prophet Muhammad who was sent with the sword as a mercy to all the worlds." They argue that this statement inappropriately combines a reference to a hadith from Ibn Hanbal's *Musnad* describing Muhammad as being sent with a sword with a Qur'anic reference to Muhammad's being sent as a mercy, and consequently confuses a statement that is general and unconditional with something specific to certain historical context. The authors also note that this hadith is frequently cited by

ISIS followers in spite of its weak *isnād*. This study's findings support the prominence of the referenced hadith, which was the second most frequently cited hadith in the dataset and appeared in all media types.

In addition to the above hadith from Ibn Hanbal, which was cited specifically to comment on its application by ISIS, the open letter cites thirty-seven additional hadiths. Of these, eleven appeared in the ISIS dataset. The hadiths included in the letter but not in the ISIS dataset covered a range of topics, many related to prohibition of specific behaviors, including the killing of innocents, children, women, and retreating forces. Other hadiths quoted in the letter but not the ISIS dataset include those in which Muhammad advocates behavior that contradicts ISIS's approach, such as praise for mercy and gentleness and encouraging followers to avoid severity. Unsurprisingly, none of these twenty-six hadith were quoted in the ISIS dataset.

Of the hadith quoted both in the ISIS propaganda reviewed and in the open letter, several dealt with the proper practice of jihad. In the ISIS materials, these quotations appeared in contexts praising and justifying the group's violent actions, while the letter used the same hadiths to clarify the goals of jihad and the intention behind it. The hadith related to jihad were also cited in the open letter to highlight relevant historical circumstances surrounding the events described.

Other overlapping hadith were applied to very different contexts. For example, the very popular "actions are judged by intentions" hadith was used in the letter as part of a detailed rejection of ISIS's overuse of the practice of *takfir*, declaring other Muslims to be unbelievers, to demonstrate the importance of knowing the intentions of the person accused on unbelief. In a very different setting, the same hadith appeared in a *Dabiq* article encouraging ISIS soldiers to



keep their intentions sincere while fighting for the cause of ISIS.<sup>71</sup> In other cases, different aspects of the same hadith were emphasized to justify different behaviors. For instance, a hadith describing Muhammad's decision to forbid the killing of certain hypocrites "so that people do not say the Muhammad killed his companions" was cited by ISIS in reference to the definition of hypocrisy with no reference to the text as evidence of Muhammad's mercy.

Given the vast corpus of hadiths, it would be impossible to examine all the hadith omitted from ISIS's materials but this short analysis demonstrates that ISIS selectively cites hadiths that can be interpreted as supporting their actions while overlooking hadith that present potential condemnation of their actions. Hadiths with multiple interpretations are applied in ways that support and add legitimacy to the group's goals.

## **Discussion**

Hadith quotations serve to bolster ISIS's legitimacy in two key ways. First, the simple quotation of hadith in ISIS propaganda conveys to the reader a feeling of religious seriousness and commitment. Quoting from the hadith demonstrates ISIS's desire to be viewed as authentically Islamic and as the true implementer of Islam on earth. These quotations play into the group's core narrative of creating an Islamic utopia and add credence to their caliphal claims. The technique of back-to-back direct quotations from the hadith that is especially prominent in ISIS's print propaganda gives readers the feeling that ISIS's message is intrinsically legitimate.<sup>72</sup> At this level, the substance of a quotation may be less important than the fact of quotation. At the same time, the information content of specific hadith quotations is often used to support other

narratives employed by ISIS propagandists to recruit new members and to assert the group's legitimacy.

The link between hadith quotation and intentional promotion of ISIS's Sunni Islamic legitimacy is reinforced by the fact that over half of the hadiths quoted in this sample were from the two most authentic Sunni hadith collections, al-Bukhari and Muslim. The strong canonical focus of ISIS hadith quotation, alongside the frequent references to the Qur'an and other classical religious sources, bolsters the group's religious credentials and contributes to the general sense that they are part of Islamic history and within the Islamic tradition. In particular, quotations related to Islamic eschatology support ISIS's claim that it will usher in the end times and play a role in Islamic destiny. By referring back to the experience and words of the Prophet, the group attempts to place itself in a position of unassailable authority.

Claiming that hadith quotation is part of ISIS's strategy of self-legitimization is not to suggest that this strategy is sufficient to earn legitimacy. Although ISIS has attracted many recruits, it remains reviled by most Muslim groups. This may make ISIS's choice to continue with its strategy puzzling or it may suggest a complicated interaction of factors at play. Because reference to sacred texts is best viewed as one prong of a multifaceted approach to recruiting, it is difficult to tease apart which strategies are effective and with which segments of the target audience. Future studies could attempt to compare the perceived efficacy of various strategies based on change over time in reference to specific events.

Beyond demonstrating that quotation of hadith is part of a strategy to bolster ISIS's legitimacy and religious authority, the current study suggests that the specifics of hadith quotation can shed

light on some trends in ISIS messaging. In the studied sample, the attention to end times prophecies was not consistent across media platforms and notably less prominent than other themes. ISIS clearly targets different messages and narratives to the perceived interests of a particular groups and use of end times hadith quotations seem to play into this trend by emphasizing an apocalyptic theme in propaganda designed for non-Arabic speakers.

This final point highlights a critical finding of this study: ISIS's sophisticated information operations machinery distinguishes between English-speaking and Arabic-speaking audiences. It would be a dangerous mistake to rely solely on English-language publications because of their glossy format and ease of access.<sup>73</sup> As shown in Milton's 2016 study which included propaganda from 28 languages, the overwhelming majority (97%) of all media releases in their data were in Arabic.<sup>74</sup>

Another notable trend in this study's data is that hadith quotations do not appear in isolation, but are included alongside other sacred texts and material from the Islamic intellectual tradition. This supports the view that these texts are simply one instrument from an array of resources selected from the expansive Islamic historical tradition. These quotations tend to appear in a consistent order reflecting a general hierarchy of authority: Qur'an, followed by hadith, followed by other scholarship.<sup>75</sup> Although ISIS claims to reject some medieval Islamic scholarship as inappropriate religious innovation (*bid'a*), they are willing to draw on this material when it suits their purposes.<sup>76</sup> This paradoxical relationship with Islamic scholarly tradition in which ISIS wants to show itself to be a part of the Islamic tradition but does not want to accept the interpretive tradition as a whole merits further research. Like fundamentalist practice across religious, ISIS at times shows disregard for evidence that seeks to contextualize or classify sacred texts in favor of

rigid interpretation. As shown in previous research, ISIS, and its precursor al-Qaeda in Iraq, is willing to select interpretative methods over strict constructivist interpretation when needed to justify their practices.<sup>77</sup> It is beyond the scope of this study to examine non-hadith quotations in detail, but it is vital to remember that ISIS quotes from the hadith as part of the broader Islamic tradition, of which it considers itself a part and draws from to support its goals.

Future work on this topic could attempt a comprehensive analysis of sources of authority in ISIS propaganda, covering a broader range of intellectual and religious materials cited by the group than were included in the current study. Sources of authority might be religious scriptures like the Qur'an or references to other religious authorities, or authority in the form of logical or allegorical argumentation. Beyond exploring forms of authority, this type of discourse analysis could provide a rough hierarchy of intellectual and religious sources. The contours of ISIS's inconsistent relationship with the expansive Islamic intellectual tradition deserves to be explored in greater depth. Based on this study of official propaganda, ISIS seems to want to draw authority from the tradition when needed without fully engaging the nuances and conclusions of historical interpretation. A fuller understanding of the corpus of literature from which ISIS selectively cites could provide valuable insight for counter-messaging efforts by showing how the group builds an identity using these sources and how they draw on these texts to appeal to new members by connecting to a broader Sunni Muslim identity. Another avenue for future research could be delving into the evolution of the apocalypse as a strategy in ISIS propaganda, looking specifically at references to the prophecies as theme over time.

# ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

## APPENDIX A

### HADITH TOPIC CATEGORIES FOR ANNOTATORS

**Fighting** (includes praise of fighting skills, like archery; narratives of historic battles; military tactics, discussion of *ribāṭ* (voluntary defense of Islam); division of spoils of war; martyrdom. Also includes discussion of jihad.

**Judgement** and rewards (including divine rewards or punishments in paradise and hell and Judgement Day)

**End times** (mention of the events leading up to, but not including, Judgement Day, including the anti-Christ, signs of the times, apocalypse, etc.)

**Daily life** (clothing, hygiene, etc.)

**Punishments**, including legal/human punishments in this life, including those for apostasy. Does not include references to hell.

**Zakat** (alms)

**Forgiveness** and mercy (including seeking forgiveness and repentance)

**Islamic calendar**, including fasting and holy months (Rajab)

**Sexual morality**, including proper behavior for women

**Allegiance** (*bay'a*)

**Separation** from non-believers

**Attributes of God** (mercy, power, etc.)

# ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

**Proper belief and behavior** of Muslims: including right and wrong belief (faith, piety, good intentions, etc.) and right and wrong behavior of Muslims (prayer, charity, going to the mosque, lying, dishonesty). Do not apply when a more specific category has already been given (e.g., zakat, jihad)

**Other religious groups** (Jew, Christians)

**Unity** of Muslims (treatment of other Muslims, importance of avoiding *fitna*/factions, etc.)

**Hijra** (immigration)

**Hypocrisy** and hypocrites

**Tawḥīd** (worship God alone without partners)

**Perseverance** in the face of trials

**Governance/leaders**

**Prophets** (attributes of the prophets, including prophetic intercession and revelation)

<b>Media Type</b>	<b>Media Description</b>	<b>Total Number Reviewed</b>	<b>Average Hadith per Unit</b>
Arabic newsletters	<i>al-Naba'</i> is an Arabic-language print newsletter distributed online, ranging in length from 12 to 16 pages. All issues published between December 2015 and May 2016 were reviewed.	22	12
English magazines	<i>Dabiq</i> is an English-language magazine distributed online, ranging in length from 26 to 83 pages. All issues published between July 2014 and July 2016 were reviewed.	15	23

Arabic videos	The videos reviewed ranged in length from about five minutes to 25 minutes. The videos generally include Arabic voice-overs, interviews, footage of ISIS raids or daily life in ISIS-controlled territory. The reviewed videos were released between January and March 2016.	87	1
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Table 1: Media types reviewed and average hadith quotations per unit

Media Type	Total Number of Unique Hadith	Highest Number of Repetitions
Arabic newsletters	221	3
English magazines	252	10
Arabic videos	61	6

Table 2: Total unique hadith quotations and highest number of repetitions




Figure 1: Frequency of hadith compilations quoted (all compilers)




Figure 2: Frequency of hadith compilations quoted (al-Bukhari and Muslim combined)




Figure 3: Frequency of hadith compilations quoted, by media type






Figure 4: Most frequent topics of quoted hadith




Figure 5: Most frequent topics of quoted hadith, by media type

<sup>1</sup> The term hadith is both a collective noun, referring to the broad prophetic tradition, and a singular, countable noun, referring to individual hadith reports.

<sup>2</sup> Jonathan A. C. Brown, *Hadith: Muhammad's Legacy in the Medieval and Modern World* (London: Oneworld, 2009).

<sup>3</sup> Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies" *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 2 (1986): 273-286.

<sup>4</sup> Mohammed Hafez and Creighton Mullins, "The Radicalization Puzzle: A Theoretical Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism" *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 38 (2015): 958-975.

<sup>5</sup> Gina S. Ligon, Mackenzie Harms, John Crowe, Leif Lundmark, and Pete Simi, "The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant: Branding, Leadership Culture and Lethal Attraction" (report prepared for the Department of Homeland Science and Technology's Directorate's Office of University Programs, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, College Park, MD, 2014).

<sup>6</sup> Charlie Winter, "Documenting the Virtual 'Caliphate'," *Quilliam* (2015). The definition of a propaganda event in Winter's comprehensive study includes all Arabic-language propaganda output, including photographic reports, audio reports, statements, *da'wa* (outreach) materials, and *nashīds* (hymns). The corpus in this study is limited to videos and two specific categories of written propaganda, Arabic newsletters and the English magazine *Dabiq*.

<sup>7</sup> Daniel Milton, "Communication Breakdown: Unraveling the Islamic State's Media Efforts," *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point* (October 2016). The data for Milton's report includes official visual media releases, such as videos, picture reports, and tweets with an image or video file.

<sup>8</sup> Aaron Zelin, "Picture or It Didn't Happen: A Snapshot of the Islamic State's Official Media Output," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 9, no. 4 (August 2015): 85-97.

<sup>9</sup> Others have included instilling fear among enemies as a main goal of the ISIS propaganda machine. See, for example, Lauren Williams, "Islamic State Propaganda and the Mainstream Media," *Lowy Institute for International Policy*, (February 2016).

<sup>10</sup> Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Nathaniel Barr, and Bridget Moreng, "The Islamic State's Global Propaganda Strategy" *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague* (March 2016): 15.

<sup>11</sup> Samuel P. Perry and Jerry Mark Long, "Why Would Anyone Sell Paradise?": The Islamic State in Iraq and the Making of a Martyr," *Southern Communication Journal* 81, no. 1 (2016): 1-17. Similar appropriation of historical terminology, such as replacing names of modern nation-states with historical designations and other in-group terminology, is described by Long and Wilner in the context of al-Qaeda's metanarrative. Jerry Mark Long and Alex S. Wilner, "Delegitimizing al-Qaeda: Defeating an 'Army Whose Men Love Death'," *International Security* 39, no. 1 (Summer 2014): 126-164.

<sup>12</sup> Robert C. Rowland and Kirsten Theye, "The Symbolic DNA of Terrorism," *Communication Monographs* 75, no. 1, (2008): 52-85.

<sup>13</sup> Long and Wilner, "Delegitimizing al-Qaeda."

<sup>14</sup> See Charlie Winter, "The Virtual 'Caliphate': Understanding Islamic State's Propaganda Strategy," *Quilliam* (2015); Winter, "Documenting the Virtual 'Caliphate';" Gartenstein-Ross, Barr, and Moreng, "The Islamic State's Global Propaganda Strategy"; and Milton, "Communication Breakdown."

<sup>15</sup> Winter, "Virtual 'Caliphate';" and Winter, "Documenting the Virtual 'Caliphate'."

<sup>16</sup> Winter, "Virtual 'Caliphate';" 28. One of the strengths of the definition of the utopian narrative in Winter's report is that it encompasses sub-narratives, such as justice, social life, economic activity, and religion, while other typologies divided some of these sub-narratives, such as governance and religion, into separate themes, resulting in an apparent greater overall focus on military or war themes.

<sup>17</sup> Zelin, "Picture or It Didn't Happen"; Gartenstein-Ross, Barr, and Moreng, "The Islamic State's Global Propaganda Strategy."

<sup>18</sup> Some have even referred to this narrative as "apocalyptic utopianism." Winter, "Virtual 'Caliphate';" 28.

<sup>19</sup> Gartenstein-Ross, Barr, and Moreng, "The Islamic State's Global Propaganda Strategy."

<sup>20</sup> Zelin, "Picture or It Didn't Happen."

- <sup>21</sup> In Milton's typology, the war theme appears as the most common (48%) and in Winter's it is second, after the utopian narrative. Milton, "Communication Breakdown," and Winter, "Documenting the Virtual 'Caliphate'."
- <sup>22</sup> Gartenstein-Ross, Barr, and Moreng, "The Islamic State's Global Propaganda Strategy."
- <sup>23</sup> Haroro J. Ingram, "The Strategic Logic of Islamic State Information Operations," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 69, no. 6 (2015): 729-752.
- <sup>24</sup> Graeme Wood, "What ISIS Really Wants," *The Atlantic*, March 2015.  
<https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/>.
- <sup>25</sup> Caner K. Dagli, "The Phony Islam of ISIS," *The Atlantic*, February 2015.  
<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/02/what-muslims-really-want-isis-atlantic/386156/>.
- <sup>26</sup> Simon Cottee, "'What ISIS Really Wants' Revisited: Religion Matters in Jihadist Violence, But How?" *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 40, no. 6 (2017): 439-454.
- <sup>27</sup> William McCants and Sohaira Siddiqui, "Experts Weigh In (Part 2): How Does ISIS Approach Islamic Scripture?" *Brookings Institution*, March 26, 2015 <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/03/26/experts-weigh-in-part-2-how-does-isis-approach-islamic-scripture/>.
- <sup>28</sup> William McCants and Mara Revkin, "Experts Weigh In (Part 5): How Does ISIS Approach Islamic Scripture?" *Brookings Institution*; May 13, 2015 <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/05/13/experts-weigh-in-part-5-how-does-isis-approach-islamic-scripture/>.
- <sup>29</sup> William McCants and Andrew March, "Experts Weigh In (Part 3): How Does ISIS Approach Islamic Scripture?" *Brookings Institution*; May 5, 2015; <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/05/07/experts-weigh-in-part-4-how-does-isis-approach-islamic-scripture/>.
- <sup>30</sup> Ian R. Pelletier, Leif Lundmark, Rachel Gardner, Gina Scott Ligon, and Ramazon Kilinc, "Why ISIS's Message Resonates: Leveraging Islam, Scoiopolitical Catalysts, and Adaptive Messaging," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 39, no. 10 (2016): 1-66.
- <sup>31</sup> Emman El-Badawy, Milo Comerford, and Peter Welby, "Inside the Jihadi Mind: Understanding Ideology and Propaganda," *Centre on Religion & Geopolitics* (October 2015).
- <sup>32</sup> Jennifer Boutz, Claudia Brugman, and Alia Lancaster, "Quoting the Prophet Online: Communicative Functions of Hadith Quotation in Web-based Arabic Discourse" *Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research* 10, no. 1 (2017): 3-23, and references cited therein.
- <sup>33</sup> For a brief introduction to the content of Sunni hadith, see Scott C. Lucas, "Major Topics of the Hadith" *Religious Compass* 2, 2(2008): 226-239. See also Brown, *Hadith*; and Brown, *Misquoting Muhammad: The Challenge and Choices of Interpreting the Prophet's Legacy*, (London: Oneworld, 2014).
- <sup>34</sup> John Alden Williams, *The Word of Islam*, (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1994), 36.
- <sup>35</sup> Brown, *Hadith*.
- <sup>36</sup> Boutz, Brugman, and Lancaster, "Quoting the Prophet Online."
- <sup>37</sup> ISIS has now replaced *Dabiq* with a different English-language magazine *Rumiyah*. This study's data collection ended in May 2016 prior to the publication of *Rumiyah*.
- <sup>38</sup> This sample includes videos produced by the governorates (*wilayāt*) of al-Anbar, Diyala, Falluja, al-Janub, al-Jazira, al-Ninawa, Salah al-Din, [provinces in Iraq], Barakah, Dimashq, Halab, Homs, al-Khayr, al-Raqqa, [provinces in Syria], Tarabulus, [Libya], al-Jaza'ir [Algeria], Sayna [Sinai], al-Furat [parts of Syria and Iraq], and Khurasan [parts of Afghanistan and Iran.] These names reflect ISIS's naming conventions at the time of each video's release. The number of videos reviewed for this study is slightly lower than the total number of videos released during the three-month time period. Two of the videos had been removed from the host website and two were collected but did not contain sufficient Arabic content to review (the majority of content of these videos was in French and Russian.)
- <sup>39</sup> It was necessary to include at least two annotator passes for each item because of the potential for missing hadith quotations that were difficult to recognize as being hadith because they were embedded in the text without explicit introduction as being the words of the Prophet or because they were quoted in an abbreviated form.
- <sup>40</sup> For this hadith from Ibn Hanbal's *Musnad Ahmad* in Arabic with commentary, see <http://www.ahlalhdeth.com/vb/showthread.php?t=129319>. Many of the other hadith compilations are easily available in print and on websites like Sunnah.com, however *Musnad Ahmad* is more difficult to search in its entirety. Unless otherwise noted, translations of hadith accounts are the authors'.

<sup>41</sup> For one example like this, see *al-Naba'* 25 (2016): 12. Available at <http://jihadology.net/2016/04/05/new-issue-of-the-islamic-states-newsletter-al-naba-25/>. The example includes an abbreviated quotation from the hadith and translates as follows: “And He (peace and blessings be upon him) said: ‘I was sent with a sword in my hands just before the hour so that God alone would be worshipped.’ An authentic hadith narrated by Ahmad [Ibn Hanbal] and others.” Although in this quotation Muhammad is not identified by name, use of the distinctive phrase “peace and blessings be upon him” indicates clearly to the audience that the quoted speaker is Muhammad.

<sup>42</sup> Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali, “My Provision was Place For Me in the Shade of My Spear, *Dabiq*, 4, (2014): 10-11. Available at <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/the-islamic-state-e2809cdc481biq-magazine-422.pdf>.

<sup>43</sup> ISIS Video Message, *Ilaykum yā banī qawmī risāla* [O my people, I send you a message], January 20, 2016. Available at <http://jihadology.net/2016/01/20/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-oh-my-people-to-you-i-send-a-message-wilayat-%E1%B8%A5im%E1%B9%A3/>.

<sup>44</sup> For the full hadith in translation, see McKants, *ISIS Apocalypse*, 163-164. For more on the widespread reference to the “prophetic method,” see McKants, “Islamic State Invokes Prophecy to Justify its Claims to Caliphate,” *Markaz*, Brookings Institution, November 5, 2014. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2014/11/05/islamic-state-invokes-prophecy-to-justify-its-claim-to-caliphate/>.

<sup>45</sup> Titles of ISIS propaganda often contain references to sacred texts. Video message titles tend to refer to Qur’anic verses, and even the magazine title *Dabiq* refers to the name of a Syrian town mentioned in a hadith describing the end times. As in the case of references to the “prophetic method,” the term “Dabiq” was not coded as a hadith quotation.

<sup>46</sup> This study did not include the text of the *nashīds* in its analysis; however allusions to hadith do appear in the poetic lyrics of these hymns. For examples of this, see Henrik Gråtrud, “Islamic State *Nasheeds* As Messaging Tools,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 39, no. 12 (2016): 1050-1070.

<sup>47</sup> For a detailed explanation of the fluid boundaries of the Sunni hadith canon, see Brown, *Hadith*, 38-40.

<sup>48</sup> Brown, *Hadith*, 40

<sup>49</sup> The online repository the annotators used most frequently was [www.sunnah.com](http://www.sunnah.com) which contains Arabic texts and aligned English translations of the canonical Sunni compilations as well as several other anthology-type collections.

<sup>50</sup> Lucas, “Major Topics of the Hadith.”

<sup>51</sup> El-Badawy, Comerford, and Welby “Inside the Jihadi Mind.”

<sup>52</sup> Jeremy Shapiro, William McKants, Martin S. Indyk, and Shadi Hamid, “ISIS and the Unbearable Stateness of Being,” Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, September 25, 2015, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/09/25/isis-and-the-unbearable-stateness-of-being/>; J.M. Berger, “The Metronome of Apocalyptic Time: Social Media as Carrier Wave for Millenarian Contagion,” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 9: 4, 2015; Jessica Stern, “ISIS’s Apocalyptic Vision,” (*Defining Ideas*, The Hoover Institute, February 25, 2015).

<sup>53</sup> Winter, “Virtual ‘Caliphate’;” and Winter, “Documenting the Virtual ‘Caliphate’.”

<sup>54</sup> Gartenstein-Ross, Barr, and Moreng, “The Islamic State’s Global Propaganda Strategy.”

<sup>55</sup> Winter, “Documenting the Virtual ‘Caliphate’.”

<sup>56</sup> The decision to include jihad within the fighting label is based on ISIS’s, and other jihadi groups’, interpretation of the concept of jihad as focusing exclusively on violent acts (See El-Badawy, Comerford, and Welby, “Inside the Jihadi Mind). In a different context, these hadith could be categorized differently.

<sup>57</sup> Winter, “Documenting the Virtual ‘Caliphate’.”

<sup>58</sup> Gartenstein-Ross, Barr, and Moreng, “The Islamic State’s Global Propaganda Strategy.”

<sup>59</sup> Winter, “Documenting the Virtual ‘Caliphate’,” 36

<sup>60</sup> ISIS Video Message, “Inna al-quwwa al-ramī,” (January 10, 2016). Available at <http://jihadology.net/2016/01/10/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-indeed-the-firing-force-wilayat-al-janub/>

<sup>61</sup> *al-Naba'*, Issue 28, Available at <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2016/04/the-islamic-state-e2809cal-nabacc84-newsletter-28e2809d.pdf>.

<sup>62</sup> McKants, *ISIS Apocalypse*, 147

<sup>63</sup> According to a 2015 report from the Soufan Group, the top two countries contributing foreign fighters to the conflict in Syria were Arabic-speaking: Tunisia and Saudi Arabia. See the Soufan Group (2015). *Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq*. New York: The Soufan Group.

<sup>64</sup> Colas has suggested a range of audiences for *Dabiq* that goes beyond English-speaking Muslims and Western policymakers to include current ISIS members who are struggling to accept life in the caliphate. Brandon Colas, “What Does *Dabiq* Do? ISIS Hermeneutics and Organizational Fractures within *Dabiq* Magazine,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 40, no. 3 (2017): 173-190.

<sup>65</sup> McKants, *ISIS Apocalypse*; and the opinions quoted in *The Economist*, “Apocalypse Postponed,” October 29, 2016, 44. <https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21709203-defeat-jihadist-group-may-revive-realism-among-sunnis-islamic>

<sup>66</sup> Shapiro, McKants, Indyk, and Hamid, “ISIS and the Unbearable Stateness of Being” (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, September 25, 2015) <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/09/25/isis-and-the-unbearable-stateness-of-being/>

<sup>67</sup> See Jane Idleman Smith and Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, *The Islamic Understanding of Death and Resurrection*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); and David Cook, *Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic Literature* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2005).

<sup>68</sup> *Dabiq*, 3, (2014): 5-11. Available at <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/the-islamic-state-e2809cdc481biq-magazine-422.pdf>.

<sup>69</sup> *Dabiq*, 3, (2014): 11.

<sup>70</sup> “Open Letter to Dr. Ibrahim Awwad al-Badri Alias ‘Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,’” (September 19, 2014), 1 Available at <http://www.lettertobaghdadi.com/>.

<sup>71</sup> *Dabiq*, 6 (2015): 6.

<sup>72</sup> Ingram notes this feature of *Dabiq* in Haroro Ingram, “An Analysis of Islamic State’s *Dabiq* Magazine,” *Australian Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 3 (2016): 472.

<sup>73</sup> Others have also noted the potential pitfalls of disproportionate coverage in Western media sources on *Dabiq*. See Zelin, “Picture or It Didn’t Happen.”

<sup>74</sup> Milton, “Communication Breakdown,” 48-49.

<sup>75</sup> The most frequent source of quotation is the Qur’an and, to a lesser degree, quotations from other companions of the Prophet, such as ‘Umar, Abu Bakr, and ‘Ali, and from the biography of the Prophet (Ibn Hisham’s *Sira*). Other classical Islamic scholars that were quoted in this dataset include Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Kathir, al-Tabari, and al-Waqidi.

<sup>76</sup> See El-Badawy, Comerford, and Welby, “Inside the Jihadi Mind,” 50-52.

<sup>77</sup> For a discussion of ISIS rejecting literal interpretations in certain cases, see McCants and Siddiqui, “How Does ISIS Approach Islamic Scripture?” <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/03/26/experts-weigh-in-part-2-how-does-isis-approach-islamic-scripture/>. Also see Mohammed M. Hafez, “*Takfir* and violence against Muslims,” in *Fault Lines in Global Jihad: Organizational, Strategic, and Ideological Fissures*, ed. Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman (London: Routledge, 2011), 25-46.