# DIVIDED
CYPRUS

MODERNITY, HISTORY, AND AN ISLAND IN CONFLICT

EDITED BY YIANNIS PAPADAKIS,
NICOS PERISTIANIS, AND GISELA WELZ

Divided Cyprus

NEW ANTHROPOLOGIES OF EUROPE

EDITORS

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Yiannis Papadakis,
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and Gisela Welz

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To Peter Loizos

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INTRODUCTION

Modernity, History, and Conflict in Divided Cyprus

AN OVERVIEW

Yiannis Papadakis, Nicos Peristianis, and Gisela Welz

The volatile recent past of Cyprus has turned this island, often presented in tourist literature as the idyllic "island of Aphrodite, Goddess of Love," into a place renowned for hostile confrontations. During the last forty-five years alone, Cyprus has experienced anticolonial struggles, postcolonial instability, the divisive effects of opposed ethnic nationalisms, internal violence both between the two major ethnic groups on the island and within each one, war, invasion, territorial division, and multiple population displacements, all facets of the notorious Cyprus Problem. The anthropological research agenda on Cyprus has been profoundly influenced by the political quandaries that have affected the island. The primary task of this introduction is to outline these influences and indicate the ways in which such research on Cyprus has productively engaged with the wider anthropological project. It also situates the various contributions in this volume within these domains of discussion.

We shall focus on three overlapping areas. Interesting discussions have taken place regarding the relationships between 1) myth, history, and nationalism; 2) memory, forgetting, and displacement; and 3) modernity, postcoloniality, and transnationalism. Undertaken from a primarily anthropological angle, exploration moves into the darker sides of modernity in its Cypriot modalities. The recent sociohistorical experiences of Cyprus, as interpreted by anthropologists and other social scientists, can provide

insights into the problematic aspects of key institutions of modernity, embodied in projects such as democracy, mass education, the creation of anonymous political publics, and the nation-state. As will subsequently emerge, the geopolitical contingencies of Cyprus—an island divided by a territorial void also known as the "Dead Zone," where there is the complete absence of common ground between the two sides—have often guided anthropologists and other social scientists toward a search for common ground in the realms of theory and politics.

Before entering into the local debates about the past, a brief overview of the island's recent history is necessary in order to outline the various facets of Cyprus's sociohistorical predicaments (and as background to the volume's chapters). The year 1960 marked the end of a period of British colonial rule that began in 1878, when Britain assumed control of Cyprus after three centuries of Ottoman rule. The British colonial period witnessed the rise of Greek and Turkish nationalism in Cyprus (Kitromilides 1979; see also Bryant, this volume). Greek Cypriots strove for *enosis,* the union of Cyprus with Greece, while Turkish Cypriots initially expressed preference for the continuation of British rule and later demanded *taksim,* the partition of the island. From 1955, the Greek Cypriot *enosis* struggle assumed the form of an armed insurrection led by EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), and in 1958, Turkish Cypriots set up their own armed organization, TMT (Turkish Resistance Organization). The opposed aims of the two major ethnic groups and the British policies of exacerbating divisions (e.g., by enrolling Turkish Cypriots as auxiliary policemen against the EOKA insurrection) led to violent interethnic confrontations (Pollis 1979). An independent state, the Republic of Cyprus was created in 1960 as a compromise solution reflecting the opposed interests of the two antagonistic ethnic groups—Greek Cypriots constituted 80 percent and Turkish Cypriots 18 percent of the total population of around 600,000—and of foreign powers that included Turkey, Greece, and Britain. The outcome of independence did not satisfy the aspirations of either of the ethnic groups. Both in fact continued to pursue their respective aims of *enosis* and *taksim* after 1960, leading one observer to describe Cyprus during this period as "the reluctant republic" (Xydis 1973).

Three years after independence, interethnic violence broke out, initially in Nicosia, then spread throughout the island. The violence that began during Christmas 1963 lasted until 1967. During this period, Turkish Cypriots, the weaker party, bore most of the costs in terms of casualties; around one-fifth of their people gradually were displaced in refugee camps (Patrick 1976; Purcell 1969; Volkan 1978). Fearful of Greek Cypriots and urged by their partitionist leadership, they set up enclaves scattered throughout the island.

During 1964, the United Nations came to Cyprus to maintain the peace and has stayed ever since, guarding the "Green Line"—strictly speaking, an area separating the two sides. (The name "Dead Zone," a direct translation of the Greek Cypriot term "*Nekri Zoni*," is used in this volume to signify the empty void in the middle and to suggest the conceptual gap predicated by any binary opposition.)

By 1967, interethnic strife had abated, the two sides had gradually begun negotiations, and the political situation was showing signs of stability. During that year, however, a military junta came to power in Greece by force of arms. The Greek Cypriot leadership began to edge away from the aim of union and toward the goal of reestablishing political stability in Cyprus and safeguarding the island from secessionist Turkish Cypriot demands. Even so, radical Greek Cypriot pro-union factions, with the support of the Greek junta, organized acts of sabotage in the name of the union that they felt had been betrayed. This intraethnic strife among Greek Cypriots culminated in the coup of July 15, 1974, against Archbishop Makarios, then president of the Republic, carried out by pro-union factions calling themselves EOKA B, with the support of the Greek junta. Five days later, Turkey intervened militarily. The Turkish offensive divided the island; Greek Cypriots fled en masse to the south and Turkish Cypriots subsequently moved to the north. This time, Greek Cypriots bore the heavier human cost of these events in terms of people killed, missing, and displaced; the number of displaced people amounted to almost one-third of all Greek Cypriots (Loizos 1981). Throughout the period from the beginning of EOKA to 1974 and beyond, another confrontation was taking place in Cyprus with its own largely unacknowledged record of violence, this time within each ethnic group. This was a clash between the nationalist right, whose actions often promoted ethnic animosity and division, and the left, which for much of this tumultuous period, however hesitantly, still strove to create bridges and provide avenues for cooperation between the two ethnic groups, in the process coming under attack by its own right.

The events of 1974 left Cyprus's conceptual and constitutional status open once again. Greek Cypriots continued to lean toward Greece for political support, despite a strong sense of betrayal by Greece due to the disastrous actions of the Greek junta. Turkish Cypriots initially welcomed the arrival of the Turkish army but gradually began to feel uncomfortable with Turkey's military and political control of their side and the influx of Turkish settlers (see also Navaro-Yashin, this volume). The Greek Cypriot–controlled Republic of Cyprus has remained the only internationally recognized state in Cyprus, while the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, established in 1983, has not gained international recognition. The Greek Cypriot economy recovered and even boomed for a few years after

1974, while the Turkish Cypriot side stagnated and Turkish Cypriots found themselves living in isolation and poverty. Many Turkish Cypriots left the island, while people from Turkey continued to settle in the north.

Since 1974, the largest international effort to solve the Cyprus Problem took place in April 2004, when international mobilization for a federal, bicommunal, bizonal solution culminated in referenda on the two sides for a negotiated UN-brokered constitutional arrangement known as "the Annan Plan." This effort, too, failed when the plan was rejected on the Greek Cypriot side by a strong majority of 76 percent, even though it was accepted on the Turkish Cypriot side (by 66 percent). The pre-referendum period on the Turkish Cypriot side was marked by huge demonstrations in favor of the plan and against the rejectionist Turkish Cypriot stance as personified by the hard-line right-wing leader Rauf Denktash. The demonstrations were led primarily by the Turkish Cypriot left (and allied liberal forces), which emerged as the strongest political force in the north. The entry, a few days after the failed referendum, of the Republic of Cyprus into the European Union (EU) meant that only the Greek Cypriot side effectively became part of the EU, the Turkish Cypriots remaining outside. As a result, the Green Line of Cyprus became the EU's uncertain border in the east. Yet, since April 2003, when in a surprise move the Turkish Cypriot authorities opened the previously uncrossable internal border, people have been able to cross to the "other side." The absence of ethnic violence since the border opening has been noteworthy.

Myth, History, and Nationalism in a Divided State

Seven thousand years ago a lady called Aphrodite landed in Cyprus, and the island has never recovered. The people of Cyprus made a luxury of discontent and always pretend they do not like to be ruled, and yet, like the lady I have mentioned as a prototype, they expect to be ruled, and, in fact, prefer it.[1]

Does this statement belong to the realm of myth or history? The realm of the symbolic or the literal? It was actually uttered in 1939 by the British governor of Cyprus at the time, the autocratic Sir Richard Palmer, in an effort to legitimize British colonial rule in Cyprus. The British, who took over the administration of Cyprus in 1878 from the Ottomans, found themselves in a peculiar situation. They were to rule over a land where they shared the same repertoire of myths with the majority of the natives. These myths were of such high cultural capital that both the British and the local Greeks often treated them as literal history, even if they also recognized them as myths. In fact, the colony was a place where most of its inhabitants could claim ancestral links with those said to have been the very inventors

of history (the English word deriving from the ancient Greek "*istoria*"). This was not a superfluous native claim but one canonically endorsed in the West itself, where it was coupled with an even grander claim, once again emanating from the West's own history of civilization, that ancient Greece was the origin of Western civilization. The natives thus had the audacity to turn the tables, arguing that it was the British themselves who owed their civilization to their Greek ancestors. That this was an island also inhabited by a sizeable (Turkish) Muslim minority who saw themselves as heirs to a glorious Ottoman Empire would lead to a particularly complex and explosive matrix in the decolonizing process.

This, then, was not to be the usual colonial story of the encounter of "Europe" and a "people without history," to use Wolf's (1982) terms. Rather, this was a contest that would take place within a recognizably historical (if also historicist) discourse. The British, like the Greeks of Cyprus, did not hesitate to use myth in a literal way to support historical arguments, ultimately about politics. Westerners, then, were no less prone than natives to use myth, an eventuality that added another challenge to the Levi-Straussian (1966) dualism between "hot" (Western, changing, historical) and "cold" (non-Western, unchanging, myth-bound) societies that has also been criticized on other grounds (Faubion 1993a). If anything, Cyprus has been regarded as a hotspot of ethnic violence; the island has become exemplary of intractable ethnonational conflicts. One of the problems with Cyprus, as evinced by often-quoted works such as Christopher Hitchens's *Hostage to History* (1997), was not the absence of history but rather the overwhelming presence and influence of history. In this respect, the position of Cyprus vis-à-vis the "West" could be more usefully compared to that of the Balkans as Europe's internal Other (Todorova 1997). It has often, and disingenuously, been remarked of the Balkans that their problem is that they produce more history than they can consume. But the anthropological challenge lies in understanding the reasons for such a pronounced emphasis on history, a quest that could reveal as much about Cyprus as about modernity's alleged rejection of the past. This, for example, was the project undertaken by Faubion (1993b) in Greece, a contemporary society known for its appeals to the past as well as for the privileged role it was accorded in the West's story of civilization. Otherwise, one risks sliding into a different kind of allochronism, described by Fabian (1983) as the denial of coevalness: placing other societies in a time other than that of the West. If Victorian evolutionism treated other societies as living in other times (i.e., in the past of the West, hence described as primitive, backward, or undeveloped), an equally worrying current tendency is to treat certain societies as somehow stuck in the past and unable to move on. Our argument in this volume is that this socially specific mode of relationship with

the past should be analyzed not as lying outside modernity but as part of modernity; that is, as an expression of modernity in its Cypriot modality.

The specific issues that concern us here are constructions and uses of the past in nation-states with competing claims to sovereignty and statehood. In such cases, history becomes the major battleground for the legitimation of opposed political claims, often leading to what we call the "fetishism of History." History does not just speak, it commands; History may be injured or raped; History is alive and it is the duty of the living to obey its commands. In short, History emerges as a transcendental moral force that dictates the morally (that is, politically) desirable future, thus being imbued with primary agency that is simultaneously denied to living social actors.

The most obvious distinction between history and myth is that history is taken to refer to verifiable facts, to "dates," as Levi-Strauss put it, and in this sense it is possible only in literate societies with written records, whereas myth, which is usually associated with preliterate societies, cannot—indeed, would not—claim scientific status. This distinction, however, is less useful and more problematic than it may appear, and divided societies such as Cyprus, which present opposed historical claims, make this strikingly obvious. In the island's divided capital, Nicosia, are two museums with the same name, Museum of National Struggle, one on each side. One has the name written in Turkish, the other in Greek. Their historical narratives express the two sides' paradigmatic official constructions of the past, each employing (verifiable and on the whole accurate) historical facts but ending up with totally opposed stories (Papadakis 1994). The Greek Cypriot museum proposes the story of an island that has been Greek from the beginning of history, one conquered by various foreign powers causing suffering to its people, the British being the last conquerors against which the people of Cyprus revolted. *Enosis,* then, was not only legitimate but a historical imperative. The Turkish Cypriot museum narrates the story of a Cyprus that was Turkish from the beginning of history, since history began with the Ottoman conquest of the island, where Turkish Cypriots became victims of Greek Cypriot aggression. In this narrative, history proves that the two peoples of Cyprus could not live together but should live separately: The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was legitimate, and division emerged as the inescapable morally acceptable conclusion of history.

A focus on narrative and historiography offers a useful analytical context for the examination of such opposed historical claims. It can allow for the critical examination of what Anderson succinctly called "the biography of nations" (1991, 204–206), expressed through narrative form. The work of Hayden White (1978, 1987) on historiography offers a useful framework for analysis, and it is interesting to note that the first major use of his work by anthropologists was made by Borneman (1992) in the context of an-

other divided country, Germany (although the German case differed from Cyprus in the existence of kinship links between the two sides and a mutually shared sense of belonging to the same nation). White poses the issue as a rhetorical question: "Does the world really present itself to perception in the form of well-made stories, with central subjects, proper beginnings, middles and ends, and a coherence that permits us to see the end in every beginning?" (1987, 24). This formulation describes the constituent parts of a narrative, and the two official constructions of history outlined above were outcomes of the choices made with regard to the components of the respective narratives (beginning, end, events), while the central subject from whose perspective the whole acquired meaning was the respective nation. The past as a "narrative of national struggles" thus emerged as the paradigmatic form of history shared by the two sides in Cyprus despite their competing political and historical claims (Papadakis 1994).

Narrativity performs three further related functions when it is expressed as the "biography of a nation." First, it establishes historical continuity, hence the existence of an identifiable actor linked to a particular territory which it claims. During the colonial period, the British proposed an alternative view of identity for locals, the "Cyprus mélange," positing the historical presence of an amorphous mixture rather than a well-defined actor and imbuing this with a distinctly local ancestry since antiquity (Given 1997, 1998), primarily in order to counter the demands of Greek Cypriots for union with Greece. In turn, this made Greek Cypriots keener to insist on their purity (as Greeks) and their historical links with Greece. Self-affirmation, however, has often entailed the refusal of the (historical, hence also current) existence of ethnic others. In a manner directly analogous to the arguments used by the British, both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots later presented arguments that cast doubt on the purity and historical existence of the other (Azgin and Papadakis 1998), which in turn produced vehement counterreactions.

The second significant function of narrativity is that in this mode of discourse, "the events seem to tell themselves" (White 1987, 3). This is how it appears that a (disembodied) History speaks by itself. If we grant that through this form History can (appear to) speak, how does it then achieve its moral force; how can it also morally command? This is the third function of narrativity: moralizing. As White (1987, 14) suggests, it is impossible to narrativize without moralizing, and this takes place from the viewpoint of the social actor one identifies with, namely one's own nation. These three functions of narrativity give rise to what we have described as the fetishism of History.

Parallels between history and myth as discussed by anthropologists, such as Malinowski's notion of myth as a charter for the present or Eliade's

view of myth as an explanation of origins, should be clear. Moreover, the (presumed) presence of a transhistorical actor, the nation, said to exist from the beginning of history leads to a suppression of temporality, as Levi-Strauss argued is the case with myth.

These considerations have interesting implications for the anthropological analysis of agency, history, and ritual. History, in the sense described above, appears more like destiny. Anderson remarks that "it is the magic of nationalism to turn chance into destiny" (1991, 19). A view that sees local constructions of history as destiny resembles the local uses of the notion of fate. Rather than being treated as signs of passivity or inaction, both should be regarded as strategies of self-justification. In the case of fate, this may be a way to explain specific failures (Herzfeld 1992), while in the case of nationalism a way to both present current political goals as transcendentally dictated by history and shift blame onto others.

Bloch (1974), drawing from the Weberian concept of "traditional authority," presented a compelling argument about how a disembodied past appears to speak directly through the mouths of the elders as they become possessed by the spirits of the ancestors during the rituals of the Merina in Madagascar. Bloch suggests that the particular format of ritual, its formalized language and the sanction offered by the past, disallows the possibility of disagreement. In Cyprus, while political ritual may serve similar functions, it is undertaken by different actors staging different and mutually contesting rituals in the form of commemorations. Political actors, such as parties on the right and the left of each side, choose to stage commemorations of different events and choose memorials for different "ancestors"—that is, heroes—which express commands and directives that emanate from the past for the living to follow. However, in practice, such commemorations strongly contest state commemorations from divergent viewpoints, as well as those staged by other political parties.

While history may still (appear to) command, its rule is an emerging process that varies depending on the political actor staging the commemoration. This is a view of political ritual closer to that offered by Kertzer (1988), which allows for multiple possible uses rather than the totalizing effects Bloch theorizes. Political ritual in contemporary nation-states assumes the standard form of commemoration that refers to particular (dates of) historical events, an outcome of the asserted historicity of the nation. As Papadakis argued (2003), the discussion on commemorations by anthropologists and others (Gillis 1994; Handelman 1990; Sider and Smith 1997; Spillman 1997) has failed to sufficiently address the narrative aspects of national history. Drawing from his fieldwork in Cyprus, he proposes an alternative analytical framework for the interpretation of ritual in contemporary nation-states, arguing that the interpretation of any

single ritual commemoration in and of itself, as habitually undertaken by anthropologists, cannot disclose its full meaning. Commemorative rituals can reveal their full meaning only if treated as components (events) that build a narrative that articulates a certain story (a history).

But how do stories of the nation, whether constructed by parties or states, achieve their credibility among people? Many theorists of nationalism such as Gellner (1983) and Anderson suggest that nationalist histories are more akin to myths and that these are often imposed "from above." For anthropologists, such formulations beg the question. A more convincing approach considers the interactive processes between "above" and "below" through which (internally contested) constructions of nationalism take shape. Papadakis (1998a) examines how individual Greek Cypriot social actors articulate narratives of the past in ways which blend elements of personal, local, and broader political history. Such an approach can provide an alternative to theories which claim that nationalism's appeal lies in proposing a new kind of imagined community which replaces the local community as it collapses under the dislocating impact of the forces of modernity, as in Spencer's (1990) discussion of nationalism in Sri Lanka. On the other hand, approaches to nationalism phrased in terms of broad cultural ontologies such as Kapferer's (1988) discussion of the differences between the hierarchical Sinhalese case and the egalitarian Australian one, while correctly suggesting that nationalism is not a sui generis phenomenon, encounter difficulties in explaining the presence of more than one model of nationalism within a society and ignore the ways in which nationalism can be internally contested.

This contest in Cyprus primarily emerges between left- and right-wing parties. On both sides, right-wing parties have expressed historical identifications with their respective "motherland," thus proposing Greek-centered or Turkish-centered versions, while the major left-wing parties proposed Cypriot-centered alternatives. The former could be regarded as expressions of what Smith (1991) classifies as ethnic nationalism (based on common descent and ethnicity), the latter as civic nationalism (based on civic identity and shared territory). In this regard, generalized binary distinctions between different types of nationalism are problematic, since both models are present in Cyprus. While these distinctions were noted by anthropologists, Peristianis (this volume) examines the history of the emergence of these two models among Greek Cypriots from a sociological perspective, elaborating their links to social structure in terms of political party formations. By using quantitative data drawn from questionnaires, he analyzes the extent of their appeal among Greek Cypriots in general and among adherents of particular left- and right-wing parties.

While Peristianis shows the internal differences among Greek Cypriots,

Navaro-Yashin focuses on internal differences between Turkish Cypriots and Turks who came to live in northern Cyprus after 1974. Taking issue with political science and other approaches to the Cyprus Problem that habitually define it as an ethnic conflict between Greeks and Turks, she problematizes such dualisms by focusing on the construction and articulation of boundaries within the category of "Turk," highlighting various aspects of the political and social conflict between Turks and Turkish Cypriots on the island, which are often expressed through the idiom of cultural differences. Interestingly, one strategy Turkish Cypriot use "orientalizes" Turks from Turkey as backward, religious, and of a peasant mentality while they present themselves as modern, civilized, and Western. This has critical implications for grand theoretical schemas, such as "Orientalism" (Said 1979) or "the clash of civilizations" (Huntington 1997), whose levels of abstraction and drawing of boundaries do not easily fit with more complex realities on the ground. Anthropology's emphasis on practices instead of discourse reveals how social agents may actually subvert, challenge, or use such schemas for particular ends and thus not accept boundaries as givens but actively manipulate them in order to draw their own distinctions.

Children are a characteristic group whose agency is habitually denied. National education is often regarded as the process of inscribing dominant social injunctions onto docile minds and bodies, thus determining children's outlook on identity and history. The anthropological study of childhood was relatively neglected until groundbreaking studies such as James and Prout (1990) urged the conceptualization of children as social agents and called for ethnographic studies. Spyrou's work on constructions of identity, otherness, and history by Greek Cypriot children operates within this framework. In this respect, it is significant to note a structural ambiguity in the category "Turkish Cypriot" as used by Greek Cypriots. The first part designates them as complete others, as "Turks" who are the archetypal barbaric enemy. The second designates them as part of the self, since children interpret "Cypriot" as meaning Greek Cypriot, leading Spyrou to conclude that "'Turkish Cypriot' is a contradiction in terms" (2001, 177). The need to resolve such social contradictions takes us directly into Levi-Strauss's classic analysis of the primary function of myth, and Spyrou's analysis demonstrates the imaginative work children undertake as they attempt to resolve these contradictions through their own narratives (2001, 2002, this volume). His contribution in this volume examines children's performances of identity and history in two different contexts (one urban and near the Green Line, the other rural) to illustrate how the individual intersects with the local and broader social context to construct a sense of self and others.

One interesting insight Spyrou's detailed contextual analysis yields is

the gap between the official political rhetoric of Greek Cypriots toward Turkish Cypriots, which treats them as compatriots with whom Greek Cypriots peacefully coexisted in the past, and Greek Cypriot educational practices. Anthropological scrutiny sheds doubt on the notion of state policy as some kind of coherent dogma propagated through education. The educational system Spyrou describes contradicts the officially stated policy. This indicates that "the state" itself is not necessarily an efficient monolithic agency that implements policies with a clear political will but may instead itself offer confused and contradictory directives. Better yet, it may be seen as strategically offering different messages to different audiences. The "good Turkish Cypriots" line was persistently repeated in the domain of international politics when Greek Cypriot officials addressed foreign politicians, but inside Cyprus there was no sustained effort to turn this into a part of the educational curriculum. This gap could also be the result of resistance on the part of the Ministry of Education to implementing state policy and resistance on the part of teachers during teaching practices. As Spyrou notes, more often than not, teachers failed to draw any distinctions between "good" Turkish Cypriots and "bad" Turks and as a result, "Turkish Cypriots" were casually subsumed under the negative category of "the Turk." If children are to be conceptualized as social agents, so are teachers, of course, and Spyrou's work points to the crucial role of teachers as active interpreters of official directives.

The limits of agency and responsibility and the dangerous consequences of the narrative forms that nationalist histories assume are explored in an article by Loizos (1988) that seeks to understand the logic of intercommunal killings in Cyprus (see also Herzfeld, this volume). In this article, Loizos delineates the differences between nationalist killings and other forms of political violence that have concerned anthropology, such as feuding. He points out the collectivist, generalizing, and nonspecific (in terms of distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants) principles of intercommunal retaliation as he tries to understand the belligerent actions of a particular (Greek Cypriot) man against Turkish Cypriots. What emerges from this analysis is that nationalism, by predicating the long historical presence of an ethnic self and ethnic others, can easily lead to a logic whereby injuries to a social group centuries ago are perceived as injuries to the ethnic self of today and may thus be regarded as legitimating retaliation where conditions may allow it. One result of nationalist history conceived as a biography of the nation is that this posits the presence of a transhistorical actor or personality. Hence, an injury in the distant past is regarded as an injury to this same (current) actor. Continuity in time is one side of the equation; the other is the unity of the categories of self and other within homogenous imagined communities. This may lead to a logic

whereby an injury to a particular member of one community by certain specific persons belonging to the other may be avenged by another person against anyone else from the other. While Loizos argues that a perpetrator clearly has to be regarded as responsible, he cautiously adds that in a "sociologically fair-minded court" (1988, 651) he could be allowed to enter a plea for diminished responsibility, meaning that he acted within a broader political and ideological context that encouraged this form of action.

Memory, Forgetting, and Displacement

Political conflict and displacement lead to intense preoccupations with issues related to memory, whether of homes that have been lost or events that ought to be remembered. The examination of social memory in Cyprus's divided society (Papadakis 1993a, 1993b) can yield insights regarding the political construction of memory, as it allows for the comparative examination of the dialectic between memory and forgetting among the two ethnic groups that previously lived together and yet have come to remember that period in markedly different ways. In particular, it reveals how silences regarding certain events and periods diachronically—that is, across generations—leads to social forgetting, since the younger generations have no way of knowing what took place. Greek Cypriots, for example, who desired the reunification of Cyprus tended to forget the violent period of the 1960s, as remembering it would also make untenable the view that the past with Turkish Cypriots was one of "peaceful coexistence." Turkish Cypriots, by contrast, officially posited this period as the defining time of their history in order to argue that those events proved that the two people could never live together again. These issues are examined in closer detail in Papadakis's contribution in this volume on ethnic autism: the self-obsessed reiteration of one's own pain and denial of that of others. In his account of ethnographic work among Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, he shows how in everyday life, social actors reproduce but also contest officially proclaimed truths that negate the suffering of others. His contribution traces the interactive process at work in the social construction of political truth-claims regarding violence against others, whether across the ethnic divide or across various levels of the social structure within each ethnic group. He compares different contexts—for example, the city of Nicosia, where Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots were separated by a buffer zone, and the village of Pyla, a mixed community located within this buffer zone—to illustrate the social processes at work that lead either to censorship or to disclosure and acknowledgement.

The two major ethnic groups remember and forget the past in different ways, turning memory too into a means of legitimating their political

claims, one side arguing that the past legitimates division and the other that it legitimates reunification. It turns out that memory, like history, is more concerned with the future than the past, as each version legitimates the political future each community aspires to. Along with memory and history, the experience of suffering in Cyprus has also become officially sharply divided to the point where terms such as "*the* dead," "*the* missing," or "*the* refugees" refer only to those of the speaker's side. Sant Cassia's comparative examination of the emotive issue of the missing on both sides (1998/1999, 2000, 2001) and of the iconography of pain (1998, 1999) in a context where photographs of pain became the staple representation of the Cyprus Problem made apparent that neither side had a monopoly on pain. Such realist photographs were employed by both sides as repositories of memories and documentary proofs of atrocities (perpetrated by others) and martyrdom (as suffering of the social self). His work shifted the discussion toward the understanding of so-called realist photographs as complex symbols that signify different approaches to experience and memory.

Regarding the missing, Sant Cassia's work (1998/1999, 2000, 2001) indicated how Greek Cypriots officially defined the missing as people presumed alive until proven otherwise, in line with their view that the Cyprus Problem was an open issue still requiring proper political closure, while Turkish Cypriots defined them as people lost and presumed dead, corresponding to their official view that the Cyprus Problem was solved and that people should continue to live apart, as they had since 1974. His contribution in this volume focuses on the exhumations conducted at Lakatameia cemetery by the Greek Cypriot authorities in 1999–2000. He first examines the background of the decisions taken by the authorities to conduct the exhumations and explores ethnographically how certain individuals achieved some degree of narrative closure after the exhumations, also suggesting how relatives may have needs that are different from and conflict with the agendas of the nation-state. Taking issue with approaches that treat expressive emotion as resistance, he argues that suffering and emotion may ultimately both subvert and sustain the social order.

The management of memory in Cyprus has become a vital issue in ways that differ both from the management of memory in the former socialist states (e.g., see Watson 1994) and the processes of forgetting encountered in the metropolitan United States in the context of high capitalism. Greek Cypriots who were displaced during 1974 were officially condemned to live in perpetual exile. They could never consider their current residence their home, since only their abandoned home in the north could ever be their true home. Nostalgia thus became a patriotic duty. To have called their new residence home would have been tantamount to an unpatriotic act of abandoning the hope of return. Turkish Cypriots, by contrast, could

not feel nostalgic toward the homes they left behind in 1974, as that could imply that they wished to return or that life there was not always bleak, in contrast to the Turkish Cypriot official rhetoric that the past was all negative and that the north now was their true and only "homeland." Greek Cypriots engaged in what Aciman (2000) would call *nostomania,* whereas Turkish Cypriots engaged in *nostophobia.* Jepson (this volume) evocatively analyzes the practice of gardening in Cyprus, highlighting the unique position gardens occupy in physical and social space and in the internalized, unarticulated, and sensual space of memory. She suggests that the refugees displaced after 1974 have used their gardens as a means of low-key memory work to articulate a connection to their former homes. At the same time, this could be a less risky way of articulating a desire to "put down roots" somewhere else than their "true" home in the north that if openly articulated could lead to accusations of political disloyalty. Jepson contrasts this practice with a growing interest in bourgeois ornamental "modern" gardening, where other kinds of considerations related to taste and class (as discussed by Bourdieu [1984]) predominate.

De Certeau (1984, 91) has made a suggestive distinction regarding the links between place, history, and memory. Contrasting Rome with New York, he argued that the former grows old by playing on all its historical pasts, whereas New York changes by rejecting the past through constant reinvention. Similarly, Klein (1997) discusses Los Angeles as a site defined by high capitalism characterized by the erasure of memory. By contrast, Bahloul's work on Algeria explores a different kind of place where memory is more salient, where "the tale . . . crosses the boundary between the private and the public, between the particular and the universal" (1996, 130). The case of Cyprus fits better with the latter examples, where it is indeed difficult to draw a distinction between private and public or collective stories. Even if the kinds of erasures of memory in the context of capitalism Klein suggests are also present in Cyprus, the political demands emerging from the lack of consolidated states makes the need to infuse the landscape with (ethnic) memories and memorials as a way to provide linkages to the land paramount. While this also entails the erasure of others' memories (by changing place names, destroying statues, etc.), these processes arise from different sociopolitical conditions than those related to capitalism that Klein explores. In Cyprus, displacements occurred along ethnic lines that were the result of ethnonational violence and war.

This argument can be refined by examining Nora's (1996, 1–18) groundbreaking discussion of the links between memory, history, and space in modernity. Nora argues that history and memory in modernity are opposed, giving rise to different kinds of social spaces. Memory is embodied in landscapes and familiar social settings, while history comes to be associated with monuments and heritage sites. The term *milieux de mémoire*

refers to social spaces and landscapes that embody memory as lived experience. History, by contrast, is associated with *lieux de mémoire,* officially monumentalized sites. These exist precisely because there are no longer any *milieux de mémoire*—that is, settings in which memory is a real part of everyday experience—and for this reason the past has to be embodied in sites (monuments, museums, street names, etc.). Nora premises his argument on the idea that we share a sense of history as rapidly accelerating, which means that things now appear to vanish in an irretrievable past and that "something long since begun now feels complete" (1). Using France as his site of investigation, he points out that as the definition of the nation has ceased to be an issue, as peace and prosperity prevail, the notion of society has supplanted the nation (6). One of his major points is that what is nowadays (at least in France) called memory is really history, based on historical records. Nora's analysis of French *lieux de mémoire* and his more general argument provide another useful contrast with the predicament of Cyprus. For in Cyprus, where one side officially proclaims its desire for reunification in a single state and the other for international recognition of its existence as a state, history by no means appears to be complete, especially since the preconditions of peace, if not also prosperity for Turkish Cypriots, are still absent. Instead, history emically appears to be very much "in the making." And the notion of society has not supplanted that of the nation.

One significant reason why social spaces in Cyprus cannot be treated as either *lieux de mémoire* or *milieux de mémoire* but rather as lying somewhere in between is that many people do have living memories of the recent events which led to the current situation (Papadakis 1998b; Scott 2002). Precisely for this reason, a widespread trope through which people commonly discuss history is as witnesses (Sant Cassia 1995) who are still operating in a disputed *milieu de mémoire.* The widespread use of the trope of witnessing indicates that history is regarded more as part of the present than as something past, done and over with, a closed issue. It also suggests the self-reflexive knowledge that history and memory are contested by others' versions; social agents are keen to offer their own testimonies regarding the historical record as if they were appearing in the role of witnesses in a court set to adjudicate how things came to be as they are and apportion blame. This points toward a different ontology regarding the relationship between the present and the past than that suggested by Nora. Modernity in divided Cyprus and the divided modernities of Cyprus have given rise to an alternative social configuration where analytical divisions between *lieux* and *milieux de mémoire,* or between history and memory, which (according to Nora) characterizes Western modernity, are difficult to draw. This suggests an alternative configuration of the relationships between history, memory, and place in societies currently experiencing violent ethnonational conflicts.

Modernity, Postcoloniality, Transnationalism

During the 1960s, southern Europe emerged as a new field for social and cultural anthropology. Modernity, or rather its absence, became pivotal for the anthropological "invention of the Mediterranean" (Goddard, Llobera, and Shore 1994) that contrasted rural Mediterranean regions with northern Europe primarily on the basis of their assumed traditionality. Early Mediterraneanist anthropology located its ethnographic studies in small-scale rural communities, often in marginal areas of the modern states of southern Europe, and was intent on documenting their traditional social order and its underpinnings in kinship, gender ideals, and religion. John Peristiany's 1950s ethnography of a village in the Pitsilia region of colonial Cyprus contributed significantly to the emergence of this area of specialization among British and American anthropologists. In his article "Honour and Shame in a Cypriot Highland Village," Peristiany (1965a) suggested that honor and shame served as value orientations guiding social life not only in Cyprus but in all of the small-scale societies of the circum-Mediterranean countries that had not yet been fully modernized. There, so he proposed, the evaluation of individual actions by village public opinion provided the basis of social integration rather than modern institutions and the nation-state. Peristiany's initial study served as the starting point for a cross-culturally comparative venture during the 1960s and 1970s, engaging anthropologists on all shores of the Mediterranean in compiling evidence of a shared social ethos that united traditional communities in Mediterranean societies (Peristiany 1965b; Peristiany and Pitt-Rivers 1992).[2]

This body of work erected a sharp divide between the cultures of northern and southern Europe by separating modern societies from communities which were of interest precisely because they could be considered premodern. This rigid dichotomy between modernity and tradition was not critiqued until the 1980s (Herzfeld 1987, 1992). Ethnographic studies conducted in Cyprus that focused on the interplay of local legacies with modern influences helped pave the way for this paradigm shift in significant ways. Peter Loizos's study of a village in the Morphou region in the west of the island in the second half of the 1960s (1975) inquired into how modern party politics affected and engaged with traditional social relations in the village; villagers aligned themselves according to emerging divisions of social class and political ideology while striving to attain economic success both as members or heads of families and as a collectivity, competing with other villages in the area. Loizos portrayed the Greek Cypriot inhabitants of the village as social actors who were highly capable of meeting the challenges of a changing society—and indeed profiting from the new opportunities it offered—as well as manipulating its contingencies

to their advantage. In his contribution to this volume, Herzfeld asserts that "Loizos showed how actors invoked seemingly unchanging rules in order to legitimize contingent arrangements—and thereby changed the rules." According to Herzfeld, Loizos's recognition that personal strategies underlie actual structural changes represents a crucial departure from the earlier anthropological literature on Greek rural society. The concern that Loizos showed for the "pragmatics of negotiating a balance between the constraints of formal culture and the necessities of everyday life" (Herzfeld, this volume) prefigured the interest in Mediterranean studies with personhood, identity, and agency.[3]

The title of Loizos's first book, *The Greek Gift,* alluded to the ambiguous benefits of statehood and modern politics for village life. He conducted his research in post-independence Cyprus, a context markedly different from that of Peristiany's research in colonial Cyprus. With Loizos's seminal study, the village community ceased to be a microcosm of the traditional order. Later studies on Cyprus reconceptualized the village as a local arena of social change (Markides, Nikita, and Rangou 1978) and opened up the discussion on the production of boundaries and identities in response to state ideologies, commodification, and capitalist exploitation (Sant Cassia 1982).[4] This impetus also infused a study by Vassos Argyrou with the programmatic title "Tradition and Modernity in the Mediterranean: The Wedding as Symbolic Struggle" (1996). While exploiting a conventional ethnographic concern, the wedding ritual, he abandoned the community-study focus in favor of more free-ranging ethnography that compared both rural and urban sites in the Republic of Cyprus in the early 1990s. Argyrou's study revealed both "modernity" (in the sense of Western attitudes and practices embraced by the Greek Cypriot urban middle class) and the affirmation of "tradition" (as an expression of rural populations and working-class resistance to bourgeois values) to be foils that masked the fact that both modernists and traditionalists merely enacted the symbolic domination of their society by the West. Thus, while Argyrou's title suggested the placement of Cyprus in the Mediterranean, his true aim was to critically examine "Westernization" from a position on the margins of Europe. Argyrou also deconstructed dominant social discourses in Greek Cypriot society. The self-image of Greek Cypriot elites resonates with the concept of modernization that Western sociologists developed after World War II, which viewed their society as "transitional" (Welz 2001) and defined modernity as a goal that Cyprus had yet to achieve. In contrast, Argyrou argued that modernity is "neither a destination to be reached nor an object to be appropriated. It is a historically constituted instrument of division" (1996, 157).

Argyrou's 1996 study made Cyprus into a privileged location for

anthropology's critical inquiry into the meaning of modernity. In many ways, anthropological work on Cyprus is indicative of how the culturally constructed division between tradition and modernity from which anthropology as a discipline emerged and which, according to such work, has become increasingly unstable. In the 1990s, anthropology began challenging conventional assumptions about modernization as a process that progresses in a linear fashion and inexorably replaces tradition. Instead, modernization was increasingly observed to manifest itself as an irregular, disjunctive, and uneven dynamic (Appadurai 1996). Today, modernity is conceived of as "a civilizational complex, spreading globally, affecting the cultures of ever more societies" but "at the same time itself [being] reshaped in those locations" (Hannerz 1996, 48). An increasingly vocal group of anthropologists proposes that societies do not simply adopt a globally standardized modern civilization but rather generate their very own versions of modernity (Ong 2001). In each society, there is a "social and discursive space in which the relationship between modernity and tradition is reconfigured. . . . This reconfiguration is forged in a crucible of cultural beliefs and orientations on the one hand, and politicoeconomic constraints and opportunities on the other" (Knauft 2002, 25). Consequently, many anthropologists reconceptualize modernity in the plural (Kahn 2001). Multiple modernities are "alternative constructions . . . in the sense of moral-political projects that seek to control their own present and future" (Ong 1999, 23) that societies generate.

Anthropologists are thus called upon to historically situate and compare their own versions of modernity across cultures. Joel Kahn asserts that the new anthropology of modernity "compels us towards an ethnographic engagement with modernity in the West" (2001, 663). With its poignant analysis of Western hegemonic exoticism, Argyrou's postscript to this volume provides anthropologists with a vocabulary with which to analyze the past endeavors of anthropological research in Cyprus and to unmask it as emerging from and also constituting unequal relationships between anthropologists and their imperialized others. He considers the impossibility that the anthropological project at large can escape ethnocentrism, as in its effort to unite the world, it ultimately divides it (Argyrou 2002). If an "anthropology of Cyprus" appears as impossible as anthropology sui generis, and if it may be impossible to speak from a position outside of the (Western) hegemonic, the predicament of Cyprus that Argyrou reflects upon is shared by other "non-Western" societies. Against the background of this rather disconcerting analysis, he offers some tentative possibilities for research along two lines: the investigation of the hegemonic "ideas that originate in Western societies and circulate around the world as serious and legitimate statements" and investigation of their impact on and transforma-

tion by the rest of the world: "An anthropology of Cyprus could very well be the anthropological study of the West itself from the perspective of a dominated and marginalized culture" (Argyrou, this volume).

With its focus on modernities emerging outside or on the margins of the geography of the West, research into multiple modernities also explores the possibility of a heterogeneous account of the emergence of colonial modernity. Timothy Mitchell points out that Dipesh Chakrabarty's work (2000) has been particularly evocative of how "colonialism has made European narratives a global heritage that inevitably structures any subsequent account of this modernity" but also how "the hegemony of the modern over what it displaces as 'traditional' is never complete" (Mitchell 2000, xix).

Rebecca Bryant's work in historical anthropology focuses on precisely these issues, pointing toward both transformations and continuities through her examination of the relationships between modernity and nationalism in Cyprus. Her work explores the developments of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot nationalisms in Cyprus throughout the colonial and postcolonial periods as distinct refractions of modernity emerging through the colonial encounter and the influences of the nationalisms of Greece and Turkey. Her work also demonstrates the limits of modernity's liberatory project, highlighting its darker potentialities. Both nationalisms in Cyprus articulated conceptions of a naturalized history that have deeply divided them, as Greek Cypriots employed metaphors of "soul" while Turkish Cypriots invoked metaphors of "blood" to express a kinship between people and land. Drawing from the work of Schneider (1968/1980), who described American kinship as the cultural construction of reproduction as biological fact, she argues that in Cyprus the nationalist conceptions expressing the kinship of people with land were seen not as biological but as historical, with history replacing biology as natural force, even if history is as much culturally constructed as biology is (Bryant 2004, 206). Greek Cypriot versions of history demonstrated purity and continuity, whereas Turkish Cypriot versions emphasized factuality, heterogeneity, and contingency (2004, 212). These two versions correspond to the ideal-type distinction drawn by John Comaroff (1996) between "ethnonationalism" (as more essentialist and primordialist) and "Euronationalism" (as a mode of nationalism acknowledging its own constructedness and the process of homogenization). These differences have also been evident in certain other conflicts such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Israel/Palestine; Serbs, Croats, and Israeli Jews use the former, while Bosnian Muslims use the second (Bryant 2004, 213–214). On these grounds, Bryant also calls for a reevaluation of Delaney's influential thesis (1991, 1995) that nationalisms stemming from the Abrahamic tradition are similar in terms of their gendered notions of conception and family.

Bryant's work demonstrates the pitfalls of the project of liberal democracy by drawing attention to how it can lead to conflict when the polis for which this is to apply is perceived in ethnonational terms (2004, 218–219). When this is the case, as it was in Cyprus, the emergence of an anonymous democratic political space leads to exclusive ideologies of freedom. She argues that an abstract notion of "democratization" has ignored the plural forms of democracy in practice. For example, a comparison with the development of democracy in the United States reveals that the democratic model can appear to be inclusive on the ethnic level only when inequality is cast in terms of class; non-British European immigrants were able to share race but not class with whites, thus losing their ethnic status in the name of a white identity (2004, 222).

Bryant's (2001) research into the historical development of education in Cyprus reveals the kinds of continuities Mitchell alluded to regarding the modern and the traditional. Her historical research allowed her to show how educated persons during the British colonial period could readily become leaders because they were seen as embodying goods already valued since both literacy and education always had implications of a tradition both for Muslims and Orthodox Christians during the previous Ottoman regime. A detailed examination of the workings of education revealed that this was not a process of imposition from above as social theorists often casually assumed and, by extension, that nationalism was not a process of indoctrination through the educational system, as many theorists of nationalism claimed. Both ethnic groups regarded education as a means of becoming more fully what one already was in ethnic terms, assuming that people were already social beings and bearers of social traditions, premises that are markedly different from the modern understanding of education as a process operating on asocial individuals as if on a tabula rasa. The differential positionings of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots within the discourse of modernity led Greek Cypriots to treat education as a process of evocation (i.e., becoming fully Greek was equivalent to becoming fully human since they regarded humanity as corresponding to Hellenism), while Turkish Cypriots saw education as a process of "enlightenment" (whereby the "enlightened"—that is, the intellectuals—would instruct the people about what should count as the communally shared correct version of culture). Bryant argues that nationalist education in Cyprus was successful because it embodied an "'aesthetics of the self' which linked a hierarchy of goods to commonly held understandings of how those goods were to be realized by individuals" (2001, 585–586). Education was a moral project geared toward the creation of better persons who would work to achieve ethnically defined goods or goals. This is a different conception of "goods" from their usual modern conception as individually owned commodities.

Similarly, the goals or ends were ethnically defined and conflicting in contrast to the open-ended perfectibility of indefinite progress stipulated by western European models.

Many strands of Bryant's work are drawn together in her discussion of Cyprus's postcolonial predicaments in this volume. She posits that today there is a failure of Cypriots to engage in debate over their own postcolonial condition and argues that not only did Cypriots actively participate in colonialism as a complex of ideas which they negotiated, rejected, or adapted but that the discourses of nationalism and civilization adopted from the "motherlands" made for a situation that diverged from that of other British colonies: "The case of Cyprus is different at least in the sense that the Greek Orthodox majority in the island claimed not only to possess European ancestry but even that they were the real ancestors of Europe. The Muslim minority, on the other hand, first laid claims to a counterideology rooted in Ottoman imperial rule and later claimed to have participated in a project of national modernization that explicitly aimed at bridging East and West. . . . Both, then, presented themselves as 'civilized' in contrast to the 'Asiatics or Africans,' one by claiming a primordial European identity and the other by claiming an identity constituted by its challenge to Europe" (Bryant, this volume). As Bryant shows in her interpretations of the discourses of both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalist education, it is ultimately this equation of nationalism with civilization as an ideology that makes the conception of the nation one trapped in a unilinear directionality leading toward "the modern" and "the West."

Closely related to these inquiries into the "coloniality of power" (Mignolo 2000), new work on transnational cultural processes has urged anthropology to rethink its assumptions about the state and nationalism and their relation to territory. The term "transnationality" captures those cultural processes that stream across the borders of nation states. The diffusion or dispersal of people, ideas, and artifacts across space generates transnational cultures that extend beyond or cut across state boundaries and make it increasingly difficult to map the concept of anthropological culture onto fixed territories (Hannerz 1998). Ultimately, dichotomies between "the global" and "the local" are called into question (Marcus 1998). In some societies, these changes are especially visible. Cyprus has a long history of translocal connections. Today, the increased mobility and worldwide dispersal of populations, which forms diasporas far from home, also have come to transform anthropological concerns about Cyprus by reconfiguring notions of location, actors, and politics (Welz 2002). Phenomena that were neglected before, such as diasporic groups residing in Cyprus (Pattie 1991, 1995, 1997) and Cypriots forming a worldwide diasporic community (Anthias 1992), have come within the purview of anthropological

studies on Cyprus. During the past two decades, however, many southern European countries, among them Cyprus, have themselves become coveted destinations of migrants and have experienced increased immigration from non-European countries (Anthias and Lazaridis 1999; Lenz 2001; Lenz 2002). This is particularly true for Greek Cypriot society, which has, in its rapid move toward becoming a prospering service economy, become accustomed to taking advantage of cheap immigrant labor, both legal and illegal. Gendered experiences of immigration—of Filipino and Sri Lankan maids working in Greek Cypriot households and Eastern European women hired to work in the entertainment sector and the sex industry—provide focal points of recent ethnographic projects. Forms of contractual labor and restrictive regulations regarding work permits produce a fluctuating workforce that in effect constitutes the new multiethnic underclass of the Republic of Cyprus, a fact that is consistently erased from public awareness or legitimated by prevailing racist stereotypes (Anthias, this volume). Anthias argues that we need to "think through the importance of Cyprus as a translocational space; that is, one where interculturality, movement, and flow have been important aspects of social reality" (Anthias, this volume) and counterposes the presence of immigrants in Cyprus with the experiences of the Greek Cypriot diaspora outside Cyprus; she explores the "narratives of belonging" of diasporic young Cypriots growing up in Great Britain. This ultimately allows for the reformulation of Cyprus as a transnational space in which multiple ethnicities and new forms of European citizenship are both generated and contested.

Tourism is another phenomenon of transnational mobility that, in the past two decades, has had a strong and irreversible impact on the culture and society of both sides in Cyprus; this makes Cyprus an increasingly productive site for the anthropology of tourism (Scott 1995, 1997; Akiş, Peristianis, and Warner 1996; Welz 1999). Like many other circum-Mediterranean countries, tourism has hastened the destruction of the ecological integrity of coastal areas. Increasing development pressure threatens yet-pristine wilderness areas that are habitats of rare and endangered species, but the implementation of policies of environmental protection often meets with resistance from the local population in Cyprus, who fear that the use of their land is being restricted (Argyrou 1997; Baga 2002). Welz's contribution to this volume elaborates how, within the framework of European integration, environmental protection has in effect become a transnational issue, with the EU exerting considerable pressure on Cyprus and its political actors to comply with its regulations. Anthropological studies in other parts of the world have called attention to the ways in which agencies of global governance both transform and subvert the nation-state and its legal system (Herzfeld 2001a). Cyprus provides an excellent case

in point of the contradictory effects of the process of Europeanization that operates by both enlisting and obviating cultural difference.

One of the dominant tropes through which the history of Cyprus has been emically narrated is that of victimhood, even if each side defines the aggressor(s) differently. Despite the contested narratives, locals often choose to present themselves as almost passive victims. This could be seen as a strategy for self-absolution as a means of shifting blame to others, a road that most anthropologists who have worked on Cyprus have chosen not to travel. As Bryant characteristically comments: "[My analysis] is certain to irritate those who prefer to believe that Cypriots are *only* victims—whether victims of international conspiracies, victims of British colonial policy, victims of the 'mother countries,' or even victims of their own leaders" (2004, 187). Like Bryant, most anthropologists dealing with facets of the Cyprus Problem have addressed the issue of local agency, attributing a share of responsibility to locals for the multiple sufferings of the people of Cyprus without suggesting that outsiders are devoid of their own responsibility (see also Papadakis 2005).

Much of the anthropological research discussed here could provide a useful complement to, and to an extent a critique of, the standard approaches to the Cyprus Problem endorsed by historians, political scientists, and international relations experts. During encounters between anthropologists and other such specialists, the issue of agency often emerged as a strong point of disagreement. Due to anthropology's own theoretical and methodological inclinations—what some would no doubt regard as well-meaning but naive biases—anthropologists tended to treat locals as actors rather than as simply victims. Whatever the limitations or biases of this approach, the assumption of agency would also imply at least a partial acknowledgment of local responsibility for the manifold tragedies of Cyprus. This could entail a necessary step toward the self-critique urgently needed if the painful process of reconciliation is to begin taking place. Asad's (1991) critique of colonial narratives as simple domination-resistance stories and his call for the examination of this opposition in a more historically and socially grounded context may also provide a pertinent frame of analysis for Cyprus. In this view, resistance and colonialism are assumed to have shaped each other. This approach can shed light not only on colonialism but also on other interactions between local systems and external forces.

Overall, the emphasis anthropologists studying Cyprus have placed on politics, understandable though it may have been, resulted in the relative neglect of other areas that have traditionally concerned anthropology elsewhere. While, for example, much anthropological research in Greece and Turkey (societies that face their own ambiguities, given their placement

on the margins of Europe) focused on issues of identity, research in those societies also profitably engaged with a broader set of issues, including gender (e.g., Dubish 1986; Delaney 1991), religion (e.g., Stewart 1991; Shankland 2001), economics (e.g., White 1994), and dance or music (e.g., Cowan 1990; Stokes 1992).

Cyprus has for much of its recent history stood divided by a "Dead Zone" that has entailed the absence of any common ground between the two sides. It has been uncomfortably situated on multiple geopolitical margins, lying between Turkey and Greece, East and West, Asia and Europe, Islam and Christianity, and now, in different respects, both inside and outside the EU. Cyprus has also remained uncomfortably perched between conceptual and theoretical binaries such as modernity and tradition, past and present, history and myth, history and memory, and various typologies of nationalism. Binary oppositions are themselves predicated on the absence of conceptual common ground. Much anthropological writing on Cyprus has criticized such binaries—whether geographical, political, or theoretical—in a search for some common ground, even if it did not shy away from pointing out differences both between the two ethnic groups and within. Despite the failure of the latest peace efforts as of this writing, both sides remain committed to the principle of federalism. The envisaged political solution to the Cyprus Problem in the form of a bizonal, bicommunal federation is a constitutional expression of this quandary, suggesting that unity and division may not necessarily exclude each other but may be constitutionally embedded as principles that can allow for autonomy without leading to dissolution of the state.

Notes

1. Quoted in Given (2002, 423).

2. A closer look at the ways in which meanings were attributed to the concepts of "honor and shame" in various settings around the Mediterranean and how they were translated into social practices revealed more diversity than unity. As a consequence, the idea of the Mediterranean culture area became increasingly disputed and was abandoned (Gilmore 1987; Herzfeld 2001b).

3. Loizos's work had a strong emphasis on visual anthropology, as reflected in his photographic work on Greek Cypriot refugees, *Grace in Exile* (Loizos 2003), and documentaries such as *Life Chances: Four Families in a Changing Cypriot Village* (1974) and *Sophia's People: Eventful Lives* (1985).

4. The study conducted by sociologist Kyriacos Markides and other colleagues in the Mesaoria village of Lysi in the early 1970s argued that modernity was not replacing tradition in the course of a linear transition but instead that economic development, structural differentiation, and modernization allowed the inhabitants of this community to hold on to established cultural values, resulting in dualistic worldviews and social practices (Markides, Nikita, and Rangou 1978). The ethnography by Paul Sant Cassia (1982) on the modernization process in a Paphos community at the western side of the island took its cues from the established interests of social anthropology in marriage strategies and property relations.

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ONE

Transforming Lives

PROCESS AND PERSON IN CYPRIOT MODERNITY

Michael Herzfeld

When I first visited Cyprus in 1972, President Makarios seemed firmly in charge of the island republic, the benign dignity of religious and political leadership embodied in his magnificent defiance of small-minded colonels claiming to represent Hellenism in its purest form. Greek and Turkish Cypriots, living side by side, were still sometimes able to ignore the insistence of politicians that they separate themselves from each other territorially and categorically. Cyprus was a beacon of hope for ethnic co-habitation and for some form of democracy, its anthropology—in an age of relative innocence—the starting point (under John Peristiany's magisterial leadership) for the exploration of allegedly pan-Mediterranean systems of morality and its emergence from the burden of colonialism as an economi-cally robust society a source of pride and confidence. *The Greek Gift* (Loizos 1975b) had not yet brought to the anthropological public the insight that the local conduct of elections could drastically alter our understanding of the relationships among nationalism, the state, and people's everyday lives. And while the lemons were bitter, the orgiastic violence of war had not yet left the hearts of all Cypriots grown equally bitter; for the Greek Cypriot majority, at least, optimism was in the air, although many perhaps already sensed that they were about to reap that bitter harvest already sown.

From that time of innocent hope, we have moved through the peaks and valleys of possibility to a becalmed, sadder, and perhaps—but this

is the tragedy—wiser age. Events have so moved us, and social actors enmeshed in those events have shown us how their adoption of what seemed to be the categorical imperatives of one or another nationalism or "cultural fundamentalism" (Stolcke 1995; see also Herzfeld 1997b, 109) could both create that momentum and be swept aside by it. True, these events restored democratic governance to Greece as well as to Cyprus, but at a terrible cost to Cyprus, one that still carries a persistent surcharge of intransigence and cynicism. It is true, too, that anthropology has refined its sometimes rigidly regional focus and displaced formalistic concerns with structure in favor of recognizing the role of people, as individuals and in groups, in the production of social agency. And it is true, again, that the anthropology of today acknowledges the importance of linking the local with the regional and the national in order to understand the large events in which small communities get caught up. These are important gains, and we owe a significant part of them, in the Cypriot context, to Peter Loizos. But these gains must be appreciated against the backdrop of so much of what Loizos's humanism, anthropological relativism, and endorsement of the values of decency and tolerance have led him, and all of us, to abhor in a world increasingly dominated by new, insidious, and multilayered forms of colonialism. Against those developments, Loizos's own anthropological contributions, although expressed with a modesty that forms part of the poetics of being a late-twentieth-century British liberal, have a significance obscured only by the obscurity of Cyprus itself in the era of the global—for, as Vassos Argyrou (1996, 3) has so ably demonstrated, what might be said of the reasons for the epistemological marginalization of modern Greek culture can be repeated, a fortiori, for a country that some today regard as living under forms of colonial rule imposed by Greece and Turkey, respectively. My goal is to present one view of what Loizos's work might mean for both Cyprus (and Eastern Mediterranean) studies and for anthropology as a theoretical discipline.

Loizos presents himself as a commonsensical English public schoolboy who abhors excess,[1] whether of nationalistic or of epistemological zeal. Since he chose to work in a society where the style of self-presentation often seems to encourage displays of excess, from treating in the coffee house to aggressive defenses of familial virtue, and since he clearly did very well at it, one is tempted not to call into doubt but simply to evaluate as performance and ideology the ways in which his scholarly style seems to announce entrenched antipathy to any kind of theorizing. While his contributions to Cypriot studies are impressively numerous, he apparently neither thinks of himself nor is he usually treated by others as someone whose work generates theoretical controversy or debate. So my task, which reflects many years of warm friendship, is a contradictory one at the very least: to show that, in

Loizos's work, we have an encapsulated moment of theoretical richness that largely owes both its strengths and its limits to the performative modesty and reasonableness with which it is framed.

I want to focus on four works: an essay (Loizos 1975b) on shifting Greek Cypriot residence rules over one century; *The Greek Gift* (1975b), the first serious attempt in the East Mediterranean world to explore the relationship between local interests and electoral mechanisms; *The Heart Grown Bitter,* a work so modestly presented as a "chronicle" that it would be easy to forget its importance, in combination with the film *Sophia's World,* as a major anthropological contribution to refugee studies; and his remarkable *Man* essay on "Inter-Communal Killings in Cyprus" (1988).

Now I certainly do not want to imply that Loizos, like the goddess Athena, sprang in fully formed theoretical splendor from the head of some anthropological Zeus or (for more Byzantine-minded readers) that, like some postmodern St. Nicholas, he could talk the talk and walk the walk three days after he was intellectually born. His education was clearly long, traditional, and painstaking. He has always deeply respected his intellectual ancestors, among whom we must count J. K. Campbell (1964), and he has been particularly attentive to Campbell's recognition that patronage must be taken seriously as a form of vertical political linkage grounded in the local moral universe. That influence in turn leads back to the foundations laid by John Peristiany, whose Nicosia conference in 1970 (later published as *Mediterranean Family Structures* [Peristiany 1976]) was in effect my own entry point at the very bottom end of the profession and my first experience of the warm encouragement of Peristiany, Campbell, and many others, among whom an effervescent Peter Loizos was already working on his study of residential practices in the village of "Kalo" (subsequently unveiled as Argaki).

In that study, Loizos argued that in the hitherto neovirilocal village the demographic pressures of emigration, notably to Britain, had placed increasingly competitive pressure on the parents of unmarried young women to add the provision of a new house to what they were prepared to offer as dowry. Despite criticisms that he did not sufficiently recognize the role of strategy and agency in the management of rules (see, notably, Sant Cassia 1982), this study addressed what are now known as "matrimonial strategies" (on which, see especially Bourdieu 1977, 58–71). It was an important departure from the hitherto rather rigid, structural-functional emphasis on norms that appeared to be fixed in time. Loizos showed how actors invoked seemingly unchanging rules in order to legitimize contingent arrangements—and thereby changed the rules.

This was a crucial recognition of social process: If the force of residence norms appeared to lie in their alleged timelessness, their usefulness lay in-

stead in their malleability. The lability of terms such as "dowry" (*prika*) is itself an indication of this semantic variation,[2] which permits manipulation of what must purport to be a rigid system if its authority is to be useful to those who so manipulate it. Although my data from Crete are not as systematic as those of either Loizos or Sant Cassia, I can say quite confidently, for example, that the inhabitants of the predominantly (one might almost say ferociously) neovirilocal communities of west and central Crete yield to a similar practical exigency when their women are set up in towns such as Rethemnos, Khania, and Iraklio with houses that constitute an important draw for wealthier or better-educated males (see especially Herzfeld 1991, 133–138). The earlier anthropological literature on Greek rural society did recognize this kind of malleability; it was implicit in the descriptions, which unfortunately but necessarily relied on hearsay rather than direct observation, of the negotiations involved in marriage brokerage. Similar conclusions developed out of the initially rather rule-like appearance of naming practices (Kenna 1976; cf. Herzfeld 1982; Sutton 1997; Vernier 1991). But Loizos, in his recognition that personal strategies underlay actual structural changes, was ahead of the pack.

Moreover, as Jepson argues (this volume), ownership of land—especially of homes—is actualized through daily practices that entail the engagement of the human body with the land in its care and through the embrace (or occasional denial) of historically deep associations through inheritance and other materializations of social relatedness. This point becomes important when we consider the choices people make in defending national territory and the ways in which politicians can deploy rhetorics of belonging, home, and boundary maintenance as well as those of memory and forgetting. Theirs is a creative response to formal state logic. In this sense, perhaps, we may say that Loizos reads the idea of residence rules very much in the way that the people he studied might have read the tax code—as a conglomeration of mutually contradictory principles, of which individuals chose those that best suited their needs and interests while representing their choices as consistent with a larger communal morality. And, as Anthias (this volume) demonstrates, the definition of place—including national space—is subject to ceaseless reconfiguration and negotiation. The linkage between these two levels is further evident in David Sutton's astute linkage of local naming practices with concerns over national toponymy, especially with regard to that other hotly contested space of contemporary Greek political interest, Macedonia (Sutton 1997).

Viewed in these terms, Sant Cassia's critique is less a rejection than an amplification of Loizos's argument. Leaving aside the obvious point that they were working in very different communities with distinctive local traditions in each case, we cannot deny that what Loizos has demonstrated

reveals an overall pattern of radical change in perceptions of what the rules "are"—as, again, has clearly happened in west and central Crete. Sant Cassia shows us the observed practices at work, where Loizos had initially pointed to their cumulative effects—although, in his nuanced description of the haggling that occurs among the parties to a marriage negotiation (Loizos 1975a, 514), he pointed with great subtlety to the justifications social actors could make to avoid an unwanted alliance or raise the stakes. Again this is relevant to larger issues of national identity. As I have argued elsewhere, it is the fact that bureaucrats and their clients share a common culture that allows them to engage in mutually supportive excuse-making that, on the surface, looks more like mutual recrimination (Herzfeld 1991, 92–95; 1992, 129–130). For these reasons, it is all the more important to specify the distinction between Loizos's focus on effects and Sant Cassia's on causes. Loizos's concern is above all with the pragmatics of negotiating a balance between the constraints of formal culture and the necessities of everyday life—an area in which his preference for common sense over theory is tempered by the fundamentally anthropological realization that people often have very different ideas about what actually constitutes common sense.

Inevitably, the more macropolitical aspects of Loizos's work are relatively controversial. Cyprus has suffered a hardening of the categorical arteries over the past three decades, echoed in the brutalities of "ethnic cleansing" in the former Yugoslavia. One result has been a growing reluctance to acknowledge the significance of the Cypriot dialect of Greek as a distinct language formation except in the context of ideas about a pan-Hellenic culture. The increasing insistence on "national culture" as a thing that a nation "possesses" (see Handler 1985) represents a triumph of European models forged in the colonial era over the ethnic and religious cohabitation that prevailed, however unevenly, in past centuries. National culture has become an inalienable heritage—in this sense not unlike the residential rules negotiated by the Argaki villagers.

Indeed, as Sutton (1997) has so elegantly shown, local understandings of property transmission provide models through which people make sense of events of "national" significance that are removed from their immediate inspection and that they know primarily through media representation. In his analysis, the linkage between home and name affected villagers' adherence to the more general Greek refusal to allow the Republic of Macedonia to use that name. Similarly, in attacking "cultural fundamentalism" (Herzfeld 1997b; see also Stolcke 1995), I argued that the model for the pattern of rape and infanticide reported from Bosnia and Kosovo might be explained, at least partially, in terms of the agnatic structuring of social relations there—the translation of lineage into *ethnos.*

Certainly the link between kin group, home, and territory is fundamental to the Greek understanding of Cyprus. When I was on Rhodes during the earlier phases of the Turkish invasion of 1974, I heard the invasion likened to an unrelated man's entering one's house and raping the women. Thus, Loizos's analyses of the significance of houses in Cypriot village social relations may help us to understand also how Cypriots conceive the relationships among their own national state, the Greek and Turkish nation-states, and ideas of selfhood. Here his examination of intercommunal killing is especially revealing. Let us recall, first of all, that the claim—which is historically verifiable, at least in part—that many Turkish Cypriots are descended from apostate Christians both reproduces the logic of agnatic descent and, concomitantly, serves the argument of those who say that no Turkish interest in Cyprus is justified. This is an argument that appeals to race and blood. It is reproduced, as Loizos emphasizes, in the schoolbooks on which generations of Greek Cypriot children have been raised. These books are the instruments of a transformation—not that of the peasant into a model citizen (the colonialist civic model on which Rebecca Bryant's work [2001] sheds much interesting light) but of the citizen of a plural empire into the subject of a high-modernist project of taxonomic control. Indeed, Bryant is absolutely right to argue both that the issue is not one of "shaping individuals" so much as producing persons who "fit into *orders* defined by religion, political hierarchy, and long intellectual traditions" (Bryant 2001, 606, my emphasis) and thus into a relatively immutable aesthetic of selfhood, as she appropriately calls it in contrast to my own coinage of "social poetics" for the *deformations in social practice* of that aesthetic (2001, 607n5). In this project of solidification, it becomes increasingly difficult to perform identities that fail to conform to ever more intransigently static models; as Bryant shows (this volume), the educational process sets in motion the production of constraining bodies of culturally appropriate knowledge, to the exacting standards of which its creators and inculcators can then be held by even the most inept of their pupils.

In this process, leaders yoke metaphors of intimacy (kinship and family) to moral claims of universal truth. As I have argued elsewhere (Herzfeld 1997a, 85–88), the metaphor of blood is the medium through which political leaders reconfigure kinship as ethnicity and then as national identity. In the process, they also suppress the local forms of contingency in favor of a sense of permanence. This amplifies what I. M. Lewis (1961), in a very different context, called "structural amnesia," if we are willing to concede that the state (as Loizos and others have long insisted) is not as antithetical to lineage politics as, in its expropriation of kinship jargon, it must pretend to be. Blood—to adapt Stefan Beck's (2001) useful formulation about genetics, which often replaces blood in popular discourse—both

unifies the body politic and provides the common ground for expressing the most profound internecine mistrust. As Greek villagers sometimes say, between brothers the blood boils—sometimes with love, sometimes in raging hatred. Such metaphors, especially when (as now) couched in the language of a modernist science, also provide a crucial two-way link between popular idioms of belonging and the scientific language of the media and the schools.

Loizos pinpointed the role of schooling in the production of the intensification of a patriarchal idiom of belligerence in relatively small children; his work nicely dovetails with that of Greek feminist linguist Anna Frangoudaki (e.g., 1978) in this regard but, like Bryant (this volume), adds to Frangoudaki's textual analysis the crucial factor of the teachers' and children's own agency (see also Spyrou, this volume). Education, an intellectual process (but one that may also entail a good deal of regimented inculcation as well), legitimates the racial argument of blood—the type of reasoning that Loizos (1975b, 284), with a fine eye for irony, identifies as the syllogisms that underlie political allegiances.

Loizos is not particularly concerned with the discursive aspects of such assertions, but his argument nonetheless necessarily rests on an unspoken appreciation of their importance. Indeed, although he has never analyzed political rhetoric in linguistic terms, he was perhaps the first anthropologist of the Greek-speaking world to acknowledge that rhetoric could make a difference and that it could also—in the form of these "syllogisms"—provide a culturally acceptable framework for the legitimation of political and ethnic division. What is especially important about his article on intercommunal killing is that he shows us precisely how the actions of individuals derive their force from a social consensus, one that is grounded in the schoolbooks and reproduced in social interaction.

This is anticipated in his work on changing residence rules, in which he explicitly sets out "to relate a particular type of social change to the decisions of individuals within a framework of cultural and economic constraints" (Loizos 1975a, 503). In that article he generously, and with characteristic respect for his intellectual antecedents, attributes his methodology to Firth and Barth, although (perhaps in keeping with the limits of these exemplars' own visions) he does not develop a model of the performative force of rhetoric as such. But in both *The Greek Gift* and in the intercommunal killing article he also demonstrates both the power of rhetorical formulae to provide cover for morally questionable actions and the scope that individuals enjoy to question such logics.

What he documents is a convergence between local models and the intrusive refashionings brought about by hard-line nationalisms. Individuals have choices, but they also face enormous pressures from outside forces

and the increasingly conformist force of local opinion. As he remarks of one of the key characters in the violence against Turkish Cypriots, "It was possible to think of him as a 'psychopath,' but it was also too easy. During wartime society treats as heroic the very qualities which in peacetime it regards as anti-social." A whole society found its values oriented to a program of mutual hatred grounded in arguments that drew on both traditional forms of violence and the rhetoric of nationalism. Loizos would have allowed the "psychopath" to plead diminished responsibility in a "sociologically fair-minded court"—although, ever faithful to his British brand of liberalism, he might also have recommended *some* punishment as a way of displacing the call for revenge to the civil authorities—for, as Borneman (1997) has recently argued, fairness is relative and a complete failure to punish is likely to leave smoldering resentments ever ready to burst into flame once more.

Loizos has thus identified the social practices that occur in the interstitial space between nationalist discourse and local imperatives that we would recognize, in an anthropological sense, as legal. The point of state legislation is that it removes the right of revenge from the feuding parties, thereby increasing the chances of reaching some sort of conclusion: The potentially infinite exchange of violence is replaced by the real possibility of termination. Even the American notion of "victims' rights," vindictive though it is, is directed at something called "closure." We know that feuding societies *also* possess devices for creating resolution: the *sulha* among Palestinian Arabs (Lang 2002), the *sasmós* on Crete (Herzfeld 1985), the *küvend* among the Albanians (Hasluck 1954), and so on. Such societies possess a sense of the temporality of events (see, e.g., Dresch 1986) and prefer resolution to infinite mayhem, older anthropological caricatures to the contrary. It is, to the contrary, in the context of *state* systems, when the nationalist rhetoric of eternity gets combined with ideas about racial purity, that resolution seems impossible except through the total annihilation of those who have been classified as "the other side." Leach (1965) long ago pointed out the taxonomic properties of warfare, and the complexities of nomenclature, which are intended to create permanent facts, ironically underscore instead their highly contingent character (see Navaro-Yashin, this volume, and Herzfeld 1992). Loizos allows us to see how the larger society is prepared to bless violent actions pursued for personal ends because it can categorize them as attacks on "the other side" and thus as a defense of "our side." In that setting, the exponents of state nationalism effectively abdicate all responsibility for what they should instead be attempting to control. Thus, Loizos does not argue that we should understand the defendants in their sociological court as innocent but that we should see them as guilty of crimes in which they have been encouraged by more powerful others, who

should consequently themselves also be indicted for their responsibilities in the matter. The defendants' guilt can thus best be understood in the context of realizing that the violence in which they engaged had not always been ethnic in nature (see Papadakis and Navaro-Yashin, this volume). In other words, if we may bring the liberalism of Loizos into conjunction with the theories of agency to which his work has been sympathetic, in substance if not in name, the defendants always had some choices, but these were constrained by the powerful ideological transformations on which those choices would also turn out to have some effect.

In my view, there is another level of responsibility that must also receive attention. Specifically, some measure of the responsibility should *also* be borne in a historical sense by the Western powers. Had the West not virtually required the Greeks to see themselves as the heroic defenders of Europe against the evils of Oriental despotism, the Greeks might have preserved much of what today they nostalgically recall as their traditional culture instead of banishing it as "Turkish" or "Slavic." By the same token, they might be able to contemplate with equanimity the cultural independence and fluidity of both Cypriot and Macedonian identities. Greeks are understandably bitter toward Great Power machinations. As Loizos himself (1981, 142) shows, Greek Cypriots say, "Why, we lived with the Turks very well before. It was only the British and that lunatic Grivas who made a little trouble between us. . . . The Western Powers have carefully *manipulated* our differences." Such nostalgic reconstructions can certainly be self-serving, as we can see clearly from the analyses by Anthias, Papadakis, and Navaro-Yashin (this volume). But they also reflect historical experience; responsibility is multiple here. It is all too easy for observers from powerful countries to blame the violence on "atavistic hatreds," as happened during the break-up of Yugoslavia. These collective sentiments, however, have in part grown from the interference of those same European powers, some of whose representatives have taken refuge in the ironic delusion that the tradition of liberal democracy—the very ideology that, as Loizos justly perceives, rejects utterly such extremes of intolerance as ethnic cleansing—absolves them of all historic responsibility. Indeed, it is this reliance on the abstractions of ideology that secures their complicity, allowing them to overlook the extent to which foreign interference has transformed local feuds into nationalist wars. The point is not that local leaders are blameless—which is palpably untrue—but that others have played an equally transformative role, making these local leaders the agents of their perceived special interests.

"The move from kin-group and clan to nation and ethnic group," Loizos argues, "is not a simple enlargement nor an arithmetical addition of units. It involves *scale changes* in which many of the givens transform" (Loizos 1988, 649). While scale is probably not the whole story—which

includes both massed military power and the considerable cultural author-ity vested locally in an educated elite (see Bryant, this volume)—Loizos correctly emphasizes that we must understand such phenomena in terms of both local-level value systems and the much larger context of nationalist discourse and international relations. Social anthropologists are perhaps uniquely qualified to do this since they can observe political, discursive, economic, and many other links between the local and the national or su-pranational; simply reading and discussing the news in the village *kafenío* provides a wonderful way to trace the penetration of everyday conscious-ness through the interpenetration of journalistic and everyday language. And Cyprus, as Loizos has so amply demonstrated, has the tragic honor of hosting in a small space a very large and seemingly intractable conflict. As we read today of well-intentioned Israeli and Palestinian citizens drawn into a hateful conflict by extremists on both sides, a situation in which ap-parently senseless killing is conducted to "radicalize" more peaceful souls, we should recall the self-adulatory agency not only of Kajis (the killer-hero of Loizos's nationalist nightmare) but also of those who knowingly pointed him in a direction that could only intensify the cycle of violence.

Loizos is hesitant to point an accusing finger at the next higher level of agency—that of international policymakers. Whether as a British liberal who still espouses ideals of democratic decency and is reluctant to see "the West" tainted with the blood of proxy killing or as a Greek Cypriot who sees the dignity of the country and the sheer tragedy of the refugees' plight soiled by the failures of the "ethnic" leadership, he has always been cautious about pointing an international finger—although nothing in his ethnographic analyses precludes such a move. It takes an act of faith to write, as he does, that after the Turkish invasion "official Cyprus began to sort things out; [this was because] the civil servants were British in their professionalism and the national emergency brought out the best in them" (Loizos 1981, 115), especially as he also provides, throughout his work, plentiful evidence that the traditional excuse and patronage structures that characterize Greek bureaucracy were also well developed in Cyprus. Long before he attempted a local political career in London, Loizos clearly felt himself committed to the liberal tradition of British politics, itself part of the ideological range that informs the early emergence in British social anthropology of distinctive modes of political and social analysis (see Kuklick 1984). This orientation also informs Loizos's understanding of Cypriot politics; moreover, it entails a view of Cypriot cultural sophistica-tion that we often encounter among members of the Cypriot elite, which, as Argyrou (1996, 51) nicely demonstrates, persistently deploys its British heritage as part of a Eurocentric condescension toward both the Greek nation-state and their own less-well-educated compatriots. Loizos's no-

nonsense approach allows him to take a moral position that both accords with his liberalism and takes the elite's claims to a British-derived model of transparency at face value.

That position is also consistent with his principled refusal to claim knowledge of the key actors' underlying motivations; he focuses instead on the relationship between acts and deeds. He reminds us that political convictions are ultimately unknowable (Loizos 1975b, 122, 138n5). He thus prefers to speak of "alignments" and to describe the play of power among visible social actors. It may be that his reluctance to discuss his own political convictions springs either from a sense that they would always remain a representation, forever suspect (as Greek villagers would also insist) of political partiality, and are therefore a mere distraction from the greater issue of how politics actually works in the community he has studied or from a distaste for some of the more flamboyant expressions of anthropological self-display—he has been reluctant to confront, except as the more or less traditional (and thus quite unreflexive) chronicler of his own kinship with the villagers of Argaki, the question of how his personal concerns might affect the content of his analysis. I disagree with those who would treat a display of modesty as *merely* a colonialist affectation (see, e.g., Rosaldo 1986, 93), but I do worry that the faith in British "professionalism" can serve as a Trojan horse for less-savory interpretations by less obviously benign commentators on the Greek Cypriot scene—outsiders who might use this description to "prove" that the only thing that saved Cyprus from total ruin and its people from their natural weaknesses was its colonial legacy and those elite members who continue to invoke the British administrative heritage as the basis of claims to exclusive moral and political entitlement.

It is against precisely this kind of generalization that Loizos's work is especially, and paradoxically, valuable. It allows us to rebut both the crass cost accounting of policymaking and the equally crass determinism of academic cultural fundamentalists (e.g., Huntington 1996). Loizos pays unremitting attention to what people actually say and do. By avoiding both the psychologism of attributing personal motives and the assumption that people are forever locked in their cultural values, he undercuts both of these world-hegemonic perspectives. The British were masters of Cyprus for quite a long time, and they did train the local civil service, so the country's ability to rise to the occasion *might* have arisen in some degree from this historical circumstance. Such an outcome is a demonstration, if not exactly of the superiority of British civic morality, then at least that people can and do learn from models that are conceptually opposed to what everyone, themselves included, views as "typically" local behavior and attitudes.

Many observers have noted that Greeks, including Greek Cypriots,

tend to speak of political relations in highly personal terms. To some extent, this observation is accurate and reflects the relatively small scale on which such relations are conducted in Greece and Cyprus. But what kind of personal relationship is involved? Here I want to return for a moment to *The Greek Gift* and to Loizos's analysis of the concept of "friendship" (*filía*). In a brief but telling discussion, Loizos (1975b, 89–92) shows how the analysis of Greek Cypriot village friendship is not just a matter of choosing between ideal types of "disinterested" versus "instrumental" friendship—a dichotomy that simply makes no sense in the ethnographic context. His view of the matter is not simply a rejection of a false opposition, though it is that as well. It is also a recognition that understandings of motive are the products of *attribution*—indeed, as we have seen, Loizos (see also 1975b, 301n2) extends Needham's (1972) critique of the concept of "belief" in anthropology to questions of political conviction, which are inextricably entwined with both sentimental and instrumental aspects of friendship in his altogether persuasive analysis. Decisions as to whether a person's friendship should be viewed as instrumental or sentimental, or as some mixture of the two, are entirely a matter of context and depend on the speaker's relations with the "friend" in question (Loizos 1975b, 92). The anthropologist, far from engaging in the villagers' favorite guessing game, recognizes it as a play of strategic interests in which affect is certainly one highly important component in determining what kinds of attitude get attributed to whom. Thus, too, the fact that Greeks often speak about international relations in terms of personal ties among the principal actors reflects the local experience of politics and the clear fact that personalities do indeed make a difference; but it is, ultimately, a *collective representation,* much as the often-discussed concept of *eghoismos* (see Campbell 1964, 306–310) is a *social* phenomenon even though it purports to address *individual* attitudes. It is, in fact, a representation of others rather than of the speaker's own sense of self—and of generalized others, at that.

One might take this position as an illustration of a Durkheimian sociocentrism that also appears in Loizos's refusal to accept psychological solutions to the question of intercommunal violence. In both cases, however, something much more interesting is at stake—something that is not necessarily at odds with a sociocentric position. This is a recognition that social actors are strategic actors and that they will use a wide range of rhetoric (including the rhetoric of "alignment" disguised as "political conviction") in order to achieve personal ends in ways that are socially comprehensible. That recognition is already present in the analysis of residence rules, where the cumulative effect of a socially shared perception of optimal strategies is inferred from a diachronic process of palpable consistency. Doubtless, as Sant Cassia observes, one might ferret out other kinds of calculation

than the single factor identified by Loizos, and perhaps here we might also follow de Certeau (1984) in shifting from strategy—which has its own normativity—to the notion of *tactics.* But Loizos, while attentive to the tactics of individuals, is in fact interested in the strategies through which a collectivity manages sets of rules that would otherwise be unmanageable—not a Gluckmanesque equilibrium so much as a calibration of social form to practical exigency. This sense of strategy (in de Certeau's more specific sense of the term) is absolutely essential to understanding how the contingent fact of an apparently willing killer such as Kajis can be adapted to a scenario of which such a man has little direct understanding but within which he is able to achieve an alarming degree of respectable agency. This he can do because others' strategies—specifically the creation of a climate of reciprocal fear—are the enabling grounds for the realization of his presumed desires. In the same way, while Loizos—whether as a sociocentric skeptic or in thinking like any Greek observer—would never presume to "know" what lay behind a gesture of friendship or precisely what calculus motivated the decision to build a town house for a rural daughter, he can document on the ground the conditions under which an accumulation of cases leads to an intensification of probability and so also to a redirection of prevailing norms. And this, precisely, is the strategy of political leaders trying to commit reluctant followers to war by reducing the chances of conciliation that existing social institutions might have offered—institutions, be it noted, that are shared by Greek and Turkish Cypriots. This is how those who wield power can change the rules on the ground: Like bureaucrats reinterpreting opaque rules (Herzfeld 1992) or like nationalists everywhere who must interpret as benign an ideology of violence by redeploying key symbols (Kapferer 1988), they invest their contingent interests and interpretations with the force of eternal truth by treating ambiguity as absolute clarity. While we should not necessarily see this in pseudo-evolutionary terms as the converse of what Norbert Elias (1978) calls the "civilizing process"—what others have called "barbarization" (e.g., Bax 2000, 188)—this ethnographically grounded view of the relevant processes offers extraordinary insight into one of the great mysteries of our age: Why do people take nationalism seriously?

Certainly, after reading *The Heart Grown Bitter,* one might well wonder why anyone continued to support a nationalist ideology that had contributed to so much misery. Many of the refugees were themselves confused and unsure about how to answer such questions, and Loizos is careful to recognize the widely divergent views possible among a politically already heterogeneous population beset by a violent enlargement of its horizons and a plethora of ideological disappointments—a population, moreover, that was accustomed to thinking for itself, as Loizos also documents. After

the invasion, few practical alternatives to facing the likelihood of an en-
during refugee identity were available; the refugees had to make a difficult
adjustment in a society that, much like metropolitan Greece facing the
influx of Asia Minor refugees before them (Hirschon 1989), although cer-
tainly with a greater sense of shared experience and culture, was not always
as welcoming in fact and deed as it was in its leaders' rhetoric. But if the
metropolitan society was not really the refugees' home and if they did not
experience it as such, what goal did all that suffering serve?

Loizos is certainly no theologian, and he has not tried to fathom the
theodicy that might provide an answer to that question. Among the suf-
ferers and perpetrators, to be sure, various sorts of theodicy must assuredly
have been at work—from the secular theodicy that legitimates brutality as
a necessary evil or the product of an inevitably flawed human world to the
religious opiates that enjoin resignation rather than rebellion and so serve
the convenient accommodation between religious leadership and secular
authority.

What Loizos does not allow us to forget is that in all these terrible
moments of human depravity dressed up as noble causes, there are in-
dividuals capable of remarkable self-sacrifice as well as efficiency in the
face of calamity and that the choices they make, no less than those of the
apparent pychopaths-turned-national heroes, spring from a history rooted
in the land and the people. Before the invasion of 1974, acting the role
of the kinship-fixated traditional ethnographer, Loizos analyzes residence
patterns and their transformations and points out that it is because it is a
"homely" analysis that it allows him to join up individual actions with what
he rather drily calls "aggregate data" (Loizos 1975a, 504). He is—unwit-
tingly, we may suppose—preparing the ground on which, a few short but
violent years later, he will show, in the destruction of people's houses and
the desecration of their intimate spaces (Loizos 1981), the meaning of the
expression that a people has lost its very roots—land that expressed and
nurtured their sense of collective being. Identities and traditions are *not*
eternal; they change. But they change because individual actors work with
what is already there. When that existential comfort is snatched away sud-
denly and brutally through the interventions of outsiders uninterested in
local consequences, lives are reshaped and transformed, selves embittered
or ennobled. Yet still they long to return to an age of innocence that, with
the passing of the years, becomes ever more improbable as a representation
of the past and ever more unattainable as a vindication of the the future.
The official Turkish side, it seems, has a very different view of what will
happen next, as Yiannis Papadakis (1998) has shown: They are building
for permanence. Whoever said that fatalism was an Oriental privilege? It is
the lot of people everywhere who have no more reason to hope, attributed

to them as the symbol and instrument of their subjugation by competing regimes of intrusive domination. What Turkish *Cypriots* think of all this is less clear.

Loizos has salvaged from the tragic tales of all those involved what may be the most durable account of the realities that were and are their lives. He has not given us a sugar-coated account of heroes and saints, nor has he drawn a bestiary. While he celebrates his kinship with the people of Argaki, he has paid them the ultimate compliment of not taking sides with *any* of those whose adventurism has oppressed them. Instead, he has told us about lives as they are lived; he has talked about his people and made them our people—the exact opposite of that vitriolic rejection that we call ethnonationalism (see Tambiah 1989). With humane modesty and sometimes flamboyant passion together, he has made it possible, for those who might one day listen and learn, to understand how political and cultural transformations of selfhood do not determine the choices all the time or for all those concerned. Some, those celebrated in his work, are able to see beyond an official aesthetics of single-blooded heroism. Theirs is a personal poetics, one that few of them asked to have calibrated to nationalist causes. This poetics—while it may be full of the interest-seeking that marks all our human lives—is, in its fundamental sociability, creative, civil, and, yes, humane.

Notes

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1. I speak with the authority of knowing that we were both educated at Dulwich College!

2. See my analysis of the relevant terminology on Rhodes (Herzfeld 1980).

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TWO

On the Condition of Postcoloniality in Cyprus

Rebecca Bryant

Frantz Fanon observed almost half a century ago that the appeal of nationalism in the anticolonial struggle could not hold up under the corruption and disillusionment that seemed invariably to ensue after independence. The transition between coloniality and postcoloniality was bridged by nationalism; nationalism, in turn, was not superseded but tempered (Fanon 1986). In the vast majority of formerly colonized countries, the nation-state now is not a given but a problem. Throughout Africa, the nation-state is challenged on the basis of its arbitrariness, especially with respect to borders. In Arab countries, the political foundation of the state has been problematic and is now met with an Islamist challenge. In South Asia, especially India, there is a constant tension between plurality and the nation-state's demands for homogeneity. The condition of postcoloniality has led to a rethinking of colonial histories and the ways in which power was written not only into the structures but also, and more deeply, into the discourses and categories of colonial rule.

I undertake here an anthropological rereading of nationalisms under colonial rule in Cyprus with the intention of problematizing the condition of postcoloniality in the island. I ask, in other words, how we can describe the effects of colonial rule on how Cypriots live and what Cypriots have become. One focus of my interest is the failure of Cypriots to engage in debate over their own postcolonial condition. I will suggest that this failure is due to two related reasons. First, the experience of colonial rule in Cyprus was

genuinely different from elsewhere, less because of British rule itself than because of Cypriots' responses to that rule. Cypriots co-opted many of the ideologies and dichotomies that underpinned colonial power, a process that Vassos Argyrou usefully calls "symbolic domination"; that is, the manner in which something called "the West" maintains hegemony not only because of its own efforts but, more importantly, because of others' recognition of its dominance (Argyrou 2002; see also Argyrou, this volume).

But unlike the strategies of co-optation elsewhere, the strategies Cypriots used were also inherently tied to the nationalisms of Greece and Turkey—countries that were never Western colonies, even if both suffered forms of what Michael Herzfeld has called "crypto-colonialism" (Herzfeld 2002). Moreover, the discourses of nationalism and civilization adopted from the "motherlands" were adapted to a situation in which two groups found themselves in a situation of structural inequality. In other words, the nationalist discourses of civilization reproduced certain experiences on the ground in Cyprus.

The unusual character of British colonial rule in Cyprus led, in turn, to what I take to be the second reason for the failure of postcoloniality, which is that to discuss seriously what Ashis Nandy calls the "colonization of mind" that resulted from colonial rule is to admit defeat in the game of symbolic domination (Nandy 1989). If we discuss British rule only as realpolitik, only as a game of strategy in which everyone tries to play their advantages, then British rule in Cyprus is not really like British rule in Egypt or India or Africa but is more like the diplomatic games that the British were always trying to play with the Russians and the Ottomans. Especially in the context of European Union integration, it doesn't pay to discuss one's possible subalternity.

However, the case of Cyprus, while different, may still be usefully understood within the context of that "colonization of mind" of which Nandy writes. Clearly, the case of Cyprus is different at least in the sense that the Greek Orthodox majority in the island claimed not only to possess European ancestry but even that they were the real ancestors of Europe. The Muslim minority, on the other hand, first laid claims to a counterideology rooted in Ottoman imperial rule and later claimed to have participated in a project of national modernization that explicitly aimed at bridging East and West. So one often found expressions such as this one in the newspaper *Alitheia* in 1889:

> The Cypriots, being most Hellenic in their ideas, could not of course bear that the English, who have occupied their Island as saviours and profess to render its administration a model for the rest of the provinces of the Ottoman Empire, should govern them as a conquered country inhabited by Asiatics or Africans.[1]

Muslim Cypriots, on the other hand, consistently emphasized differ-ence. For instance, in 1902 the newspaper *Mir'at-ı Zaman* protested the government's attempt to bring an English schoolmistress to the Muslim girls' school, saying,

> We are not going to make our girls (serve as) English schoolmistresses, or Interpreters in the Government Departments, or let them dance a waltz at a public ball. If the intention of the Government is to drag us into English Civilization, such things can never be admitted by Moslem Civilization.[2]

Both, then, presented themselves as "civilized" in contrast to the "Asiatics or Africans," one by claiming a primordial European identity and the other by claiming an identity constituted by its challenge to Europe.

Where, in this, to find the locus of Cypriots' postcolonial condition? One indeed finds it here, in the emerging equation of nationalism with civilization. In other words, it appeared to Cypriots that nationalisms were not just ideologies of liberation but were ideologically liberating, extracting them from the realm of primitive "Asiatics or Africans." In order to dem-onstrate this, I take up a challenge presented by Argyrou and attempt an alternative reading of the very symbolic domination he analyzes. In particu-lar, I argue that when change is popularly conceptualized in a discourse of progress, popular notions of "civilization" acquire a liberating quality that is also a struggle for overcoming. It was possible for this particular form of dominance to occur because of the wedding of local notions of "the civi-lized" with nineteenth-century sociological theories of moral progress. The demand in Cyprus and elsewhere (see, e.g., Shakry 1998) for a "progress both moral and material" arose from widely diffused "scientific" notions of the evolutionary progress of societies.

The language of social evolution, and its incorporation into a civilizing of the citizen, made the very conception of the nation one that is forever trapped in a unilinear directionality leading toward "the modern," "the West." I will briefly outline this argument by examining the ways in which a civilizing of the citizen was undertaken through nationalist education. Along the way, I also show the very particular discourses of civilization that undergirded this triumph and how those discourses of civilization were defined by civilization's Other—in the Greek case, a barbarous Other at the gates, and in the Turkish case, a backward Other within the communal self. These discourses were clearly appropriated from the "motherlands" (e.g., Kitromilides 1979, 1990)—the centers of civilization—but took particular forms in Cyprus both because of colonial rule and because of the manner in which colonial rule incorporated the two communities into a situation of structural inequality.

That There Will be Progress
Both Moral and Material

Thin, thoughtful, and mustachioed Georgios Loukas died in 1925 after a lifetime devoted to village education and the nationalist endeavor. While still studying in Athens for his certificate in elementary education, he had returned to Cyprus to collect and publish *laografika*—folklore materials that link the customs, myths, and mores of the modern Greeks with the ancients. He published his thesis in 1874 under the title *Philological Excursus into Ancient Monuments in the Lives of the Modern Cypriots* and then returned once more to his native island, where he would continue his studies of the dialect and teach in the elementary schools. By his own recollection, he taught in at least fourteen village schools during the thirty-eight years of his teaching career, many of them in very small villages. He was learned and eloquent—a Cypriot plant cultivated in Greek soil, to adopt metaphors that Loukas himself might have used.

Yet Loukas devoted the majority of his life to elementary education and to articulately expounding the true goals thereof. In a speech given for the 1885 graduation from the elementary schools of Ktima, Loukas extolled the spiritual virtues of a Greek education:

> And once again we gather in this spiritual nursery to pick the flowers yielded by your cultivation. . . . The soul, gentlemen, as the philosophical presence of the spirit in man . . . is in the image and likeness of the Spirit. . . . The only beneficial inheritance from our parents to their children is the exercise of education and learning in their spirit and mind, and a good upbringing possessed of virtue. (Loukas 1874/1974, xi)

For Loukas and others of his time, a particularly Greek education could produce those virtues, and he introduces his *Philological Excursus* as a primer in the undying glories of the ancients, whose virtues have been transformed by the Church:

> Yes! the indomitable Greece of Pericles lives! Child, grow old cloaked in its illumination, for it is protected by the benefaction of the Christian church, and view its noble body in the shade of centuries but living and breathing! Hunger strongly in the church and view ancient Greece filled and crowned with the indomitability of Pericles! Go, child, and visit her under the banner of Constantine, welcomed in faith! In faith truly! Because is it possible to resist Time triumphantly for so many ages? . . . In the discovery of this, can one not intend to fight, and the heart be persuaded to soothe balm on the wounds caused by the ravages of time? (ibid., ιγ')

Simply learning of those undying glories should inspire the heroic virtues

that would ultimately rejuvenate and restore the crippled body of the ancient realm.

In contrast to Loukas's rather high-flown rhetoric, British assessments of the ideological bent of their Greek Cypriot subjects instance a very interesting—even postcolonial—historicization of the inequalities that appeared to produce difference. Agitation in Cyprus in favor of *enosis,* or union with Greece, dramatically increased toward the turn of the twentieth century, as the economic policies of the British proved disastrous and educated Cypriots continued to be excluded from higher posts in the administration. A former chief secretary, C. W. J. Orr, observed some time after his return to England that

> it is difficult for anyone who has lived in Cyprus and mixed freely with the people to resist the conclusion that the clamor for "Union with Greece" on the part of the Greek-speaking community arises less from an ambition to exchange British domination for that of Greece than from a desire that the administration should be conducted in their own language by officials for the most part sharing their ways of thought and used to the same social standards.[3]

This evidences the sort of structural inequalities that Comaroff (1987) claims are productive of ethnic difference. Comaroff argues that unequal access to both symbolic and material resources produces the sense of difference that we commonly call "ethnic."

So while Loukas saw Greek history as part of the spiritual inheritance of his pupils, British administrators saw agitation for union with Greece as an expression of a desire for cultural and political equality. Along with this difference, as I have noted elsewhere (Bryant 2001), Cypriot educators and British administrators conflicted over the type of persons who were produced and should be produced by the schools. British administrators, for instance, saw the overt efforts of schoolteachers to "inflame the minds of the pupils against other races resident in the Island" as a directly political attempt to disturb the status quo. The inspector of schools observed in 1911 that he had found

> some rather strong expressions in certain schoolbooks, but the majority of village children do not reach to that point (i.e., the higher classes) or they are too young to understand it. I think there is little or no anti-Turkish or anti-English teaching in the Elementary schools—what there is is in the secondary schools to pupils who are of an age to take it in—and this does not depend on set lessons or books but on what the teacher says on the thousand occasions when he can introduce his sentiments into any lesson, without any check.[4]

Greek Cypriot spokesmen recognized the British fears of nationalist agi-

tation and often asked, when various educational schemes were offered, "Will the Government attempt to control the teaching of 'Greek national history' in the schools? If so, it were better to repudiate government assistance altogether."[5]

Moreover, Greek Cypriots agreed that education was explicitly political and believed that it should be. I would argue, in fact, that only in arenas in which one attempts to maintain the illusion of nonpolitical objectivity in education is the political seen as propaganda. The molding of personhood in the schools of both communities in Cyprus already presupposed that Cypriots were essentially social beings rather than individuals (Bryant 2001). Cypriot education did not begin from the assumption of the political individualism of liberal philosophy but rather from a type of Aristotelianism that was a part of the inheritance of that education. The assumption is that humans are born political and their task on earth is to cultivate the talents and opportunities given to them as specific members of specific communities. Hence, while a nationalist education might be seen as propaganda by British rulers, for Greek Cypriot educators it was simply a matter of cultivating an innate "Greekness" that needed to be brought to fruition.

Students of the Pancyprian Gymnasium were told, for instance, that they were being prepared to take up their political duties:

> We have had and always have the idea that the Pancyprian Gymnasium excellently fulfilled its purpose, that it not only transmits the light of education throughout the island, but it also prepares young, vibrant youths. . . . It educates men of wisdom and full of self-denial, true defenders of Faith and Fatherland. . . . To you, noble adolescents of today, tomorrow the fatherland will entrust her future. You will govern her fate, you will be the laborers who will guide her reestablishment, the apostles of the Great Idea.[6]

For Greek Cypriots, then, education was indeed a discipline not unlike that known by their British rulers. The significant difference was in the type of citizen produced.

It would seem, in fact, that Greek Cypriot education turned on a rather different "political axis of individualization" (Foucault 1977, 192). Foucault has amply demonstrated how the processes of individualization and atomization created a new kind of polity by creating new techniques of power.[7] Foucault writes of the "great book of Man-the-Machine," the modernist project begun by Descartes and finished by those faceless functionaries of the new sort of governmentality which regulated the body (Foucault 1977, 36). The disciplined body of the modern soldier demonstrates in its comportment the ideal regulation of that controllable, manipulable, and perfectable machine. In a strangely similar way, the Greek Cypriot image

of "man the ethnic subject" demanded a discipline that could be accomplished only through regulating education while simultaneously denying the *necessity* of that education for the creation of ethnic subjects. In other words, philosophers of the French Enlightenment would have said that man is, by his nature, mechanical, but that education was required to achieve his telos. Similarly, Greek Cypriots would have said that humans are, by nature, ethnic subjects, members of their race, but that education is required to achieve their higher end.

In fact, much as repetitive military drills train the soldier to respond without thought to commands, so the rote memorization of passages in ancient Greek or the distance from Athens to Sparta was intended to domesticate and control an identity that was seen as already ethnic. Indeed, articles about education made it abundantly clear that the primary goal was to create ethnic subjects trained in a moral discipline that could best be learned by becoming literate. One 1912 article claimed, for example, that

> education and the school are foundations and institutions Greek for ages, because first and foremost our nation, in the cultivation of a spiritual and moral man, marks out as special and indispensable the attributes and signs of civilization, of freedom, and of good-citizenship.[8]

Education had begun only within the writer's lifetime to mean more than reading, writing, and basic arithmetic, so the writer could have had few illusions regarding any kind of "higher" education. Moreover, folktales regarding the "secret schools" that supposedly kept Hellenism alive through the ages never suggest that those schools did more than teach children the basics of their language. Rather, they suggest that the mere fact of linguistic continuity symbolizes a racial continuity.

In Henri-Irenée Marrou's examination of the centrality of rhetoric in the education of antiquity, he makes an important remark about the value of rhetoric that could just as well be applied to Greek Cypriot assessments of their own education:

> Learning to speak properly meant learning to think properly, and even to live properly: in the eyes of the Ancients eloquence had a truly human value transcending any practical applications that might develop as a result of historical circumstances; it was the one means for handing on everything that made man man, the whole cultural heritage that distinguished civilized men from barbarians. (Marrou 1956, 196)

The ideal man was eloquent, but eloquence was also inseparable from ethnicity. In a similar way, to receive a proper education was to become a true Greek, a truly civilized human.

Indeed, it is abundantly clear in discussions of education that the realization of ethnic identity through education was the realization of an unquestionable good, the realization of one's full humanity. This is so much a part of Greek Cypriot discourse that I can pick an example almost at random. It is certainly well expressed in the words of Leontios, Bishop of Pafos during the 1930s, who defended the need for a purely Greek education thus:

> Here, however, it is a question of an historically Greek island, having a history of five thousand years, a history of a glorious civilization, occupied during these times by a population purely Greek, noble, and Christian. . . . For this reason the official and systematic attempt to anglicize the Greek Cypriots is reprehensible. . . . [Greek education] consists in its teaching not only of the Greek language, but also of Greek history, the history of the ethnos, about which the wise men of all nations have not ceased, and will not cease, their praise. . . . It is a truth scientifically proven that the Greeks—the ancestors—became the first creators of education, and in this way they became the educated people of humanity. . . . The Greek spirit approaches the universal meaning of "human," and Greek education [morfosis] means human education.[9]

To deny Greek Cypriots a Greek education was not just to deprive them of their rights but to deny them full humanity, since humanity directly corresponds to Hellenism.

I would like to draw some conclusions from this. First, many Greek Cypriots believed that nationalist pedagogy and what might be seen by others as nationalist propaganda were directly successful. However, they were successful because the work of education was a somewhat Platonic evocation of a Greek spirit, a Greek potential, already present in the child. As early as 1916, this was expressed in a eulogy addressed to the first contingent of Boy Scouts in the island:

> These youths, by being taught under the liberal status quo of Cyprus their duties towards their motherland, will, when the moment will come that they should be called up to the colors and that they should continue the interrupted work, be the most enthusiastic and most disciplined soldiers of [Christ]. Likewise, when, directly, they will be swearing by this sacred flag of the fatherland, the scouts' oath, a thrill of emotion will run through their bodies, and the whole long and glorious history of the great race to which they belong will, in that moment, pass through their mind, and they will remember, yes, they will remember the sacred oath which, thousands of years ago, the Athenian youths used to swear at the same age, the oath, that is, that they would defend the fatherland both when found by themselves and when found in company with others, that they would not abandon the sacred arms and that they would not hand back the country smaller. They will remember that those

who, about a century ago, fell at the Dragatrani as the heroic victims of the Hellenic liberty were, like them, still in their youthful age, in their very boyhood. They will remember all that and how much more will they not remember! The whole history of the race will pass before them as an immaterial power and will strengthen them and will dictate to their souls the creed "I believe in a great Hellas," and, in a frenzied emotion, they will, with the hand upon this sacred flag and with the soul knelt down, give all of us here the assurance that it will not be they who will disgrace the history of their fatherland, but they will be those who, either as citizens or as soldiers or either here or anywhere else shall be nothing else than the observers of the historical traditions of the nation, and the continuators of a history a more glorious of which no race can show.[10]

The "immaterial power" that is the history of their race would be evoked as an orgasmic thrill, an organic shudder, that would leave them spiritually prostrate before the glory contained in the Greek flag. "They will remember all that and how much more will they not remember!" exclaimed the speaker, arousing in his audience all the Ideas of ethnic history already imprinted in the mind.

Second, Greek Cypriots described their own history as the inevitable and inescapable history of humanity, in which their own role was already largely predetermined. Their duty was to be, either as citizens or soldiers, "nothing else than the observers of the historical traditions of the nation." Hence, the ultimate human goal accords with the ultimate national goal. And because Hellenism directly corresponds to humanity, the threat to *politismos,* or a civilization corresponding to Hellenism, is directly defined as barbarism. In the inevitable movement of Greek history, the only impediment to its complete fulfillment are barbarians at the gates. And in Greek Cypriot rhetoric, as I note at length elsewhere (Bryant 2004), the historical barbarians at the gates are the Turks, who purportedly suppressed for centuries the full and necessary realization of Greek history. Furthermore, as Herzfeld notes for Greece (Herzfeld 1982, 1987, 1997), lingering Turkish elements in Greek culture threaten to pollute and corrupt it from within.

And third, education was cultivation precisely because it evoked the inheritance that could be shaped to true humanity. Put simply, the dream of "progress" through education, of a "better future" that demanded the molding of young minds and bodies, was, for Greek Cypriots, the fulfillment of an ethnic fantasy. Humans are, prior to cultivation, ethnic subjects, but only through cultivation could they blossom to achieve the aesthetic paradigm that the colonizers saw as propaganda. "Progress," then, was the fulfillment of an immanent potentiality. Progress becomes predestination, and education becomes evocation.

But the fulfillment of that potentiality was a progress that was also simultaneously oriented toward a future in which Greeks would reclaim their full rights and status as ancestors of the West. As Michael Herzfeld has demonstrated in detail for Greece, "the West" is not simply a foil against which Greek history unfolds but is an essential element in the construction of Greek nationalist history and identity (ibid.). The argument appears to be circular: Ancient Greeks were ancestors of the West, so in order to prove their own "Westernness" (against the threat of a polluting Turkishness), Greeks had to attempt to revive the glories of the ancient ancestors. As we see in the Cypriot case, however, the circularity embedded in Greek nationalist thought also appears to be resolved through a notion of a civilizing progress. In other words, if Greek civilization also corresponds to true humanity, and if progress is the cultivation and realization of that immanent potentiality, then the cultivation of Greekness is also progressive. The realization of an ethnic future thus becomes the realization of a "real" progress that must necessarily be either the same as or better than "Western" understandings of the same concept.

Backwardness and Progress

In contrast to a progress that cultivates ethnic potentiality, Turkish Cypriot notions of progress were clearly modernist, even before the establishment of the Turkish Republic. They reflected a sense of a weakness in the social body that had to be corrected, leading both to a greater acceptance of colonial mandates and to an understanding of "civilization" that was quite different from that of their Greek compatriots.

This sense of a weakness in the social body is reflected in a discussion I had one day with Fahri Bey, today a high-level bureaucrat in the government of northern Cyprus. He described to me discussions that he had had with his father about his family's history. His father told him that his family had all been criminals of the worst sort, which was why they were sent to Cyprus, long a place of exile under the Ottomans. He claims that even into the 1960s one could see Turkish Cypriot men carrying knives attached to the breast by a chain. The British rooted out such violent habits and customs, he claims, giving them education and civilization (*medeniyet*). "The English brought refinement and education," he remarks. There was no crime in the island, he claims, until the post-1974 arrival of the Turkish settlers. He singles out for condemnation the settlers' treatment of foreigners, especially women (see Navaro-Yashin, this volume).

What is interesting about Fahri Bey's remarks is that they demonstrate a continuity of thought about the state of Turkish Cypriot society. Until the Atatürk period, there was a clear ambivalence about the British, reflected in

various forms of resistance: protests in the late nineteenth century against copies of the Qur'an being placed in the hands of the British director of education; protests at the turn of the century against British control of the *evkaf,* or religious foundations; and protests in the 1950s against a British director of the Turkish lycee. But at the same time, there was also a clear sense of backwardness and a demand for development (*kalkınma*) that laid the groundwork for an appropriation of Kemalist Westernization (for elaboration of this point, see Bryant 2004).

Certainly, Turkish Cypriots as a minority have been at a distinct disadvantage with regard to their Greek neighbors. What is interesting, though, is the way in which this weakness has been interpreted. It has not been interpreted as oppression by the majority but rather as a weakness of the self, a weakness internal to the society, something in need of remaking. This concern with a weakness in the social body may clearly be seen as a sketch in miniature of Ottoman concerns. In contrast to the Greek *politismos,* in which what threatened civilization was barbarism, the threat to *medeniyet* was backwardness.

In one study of the history of Turkish Cypriot education, the author quotes the remarks of a medical doctor who was educated in the last decades of Ottoman rule, became a member of the Young Turk movement in Istanbul, and escaped exile by fleeing to his native Cyprus, by then under British rule. He also taught French for some years at the *idadî,* published the newspaper *İslâm,* and opened his own industrial training school until forced by Nicosia elites to close it. In this teacher's memoirs he explains

> that because in the villages there were fewer Turks than Greeks; because they spoke Greek, and because without schools, or imams, or mosques, or teachers they were in a pitiable situation, under the influence of clever priests a portion of them were Grecified. He says that in the Ottoman period because not only in the villages but even in the towns not even a speck of importance was given to education, the future of up to forty villages was dark. (Nesim 1987, 65)

However, a teacher educated in a medrese in Istanbul "[founded] a large medrese in Paphos, and [preached] sermons in the mosques and villages to warn and awaken the people, and thanks to the students that he distributed to the villages, he saved the villager from becoming Greek."[11] The "darkness" of custom and ignorance—represented here by the "Grecified" Muslim villager—was overcome by the "enlightenment" of civilization, represented by the traditionally educated intellectual who, despite his religious education, was able to "warn and awaken the people." This, indeed, was one of the primary responsibilities of those known as the *aydınlar,* a word that literally means "lights" or "enlightened ones" but which refers to

all those who have "knowledge." In this vision, intellectuals would preserve "the people" from the calamities to which they would otherwise be led by custom and ignorance.

In Cyprus, Muslims' own backwardness was clear in comparison with their Greek neighbors, who appeared to succeed at their expense. Moreover, this self-criticism extended even to the heart of the society, namely to its dealings with women. One Turkish Cypriot teacher whom I interviewed was born in 1919 in a small village in the Pafos area of Cyprus. Both his father and elder brother were teachers, so his family's association with education reaches back into the early Hamidian period. When discussing his own family, he noted that "although my father was a teacher, he didn't send the girls to school. He said they could go to primary school, but he only sent one sister. My elder brother, oooh, he finished primary school, he finished *rüştiye,* he became a teacher. My elder brother. But my father didn't send my sisters who came after him, not even to elementary school." While this was no doubt a common practice, in actual fact Muslim schools in the island for many decades compared favorably with Greek schools with regard to primary education for girls. One reason for this is indicated in observations regarding girls' education by the first British inspector of schools, Josiah Spencer, who wrote in 1881 that

> the condition of the Masters of the Christian village schools has generally been hitherto such as to prevent parents from sending their girls, except a few very small ones, to School. The Moslem village Masters being generally older men, and religious Teachers, there is not the same difficulty, and their Schools are usually more mixed than the Christian village schools.[12]

In a report on the state of Cypriot education as late as 1913, Muslim girls constituted 37 percent of the total 5,692 children enrolled in elementary classes, while girls in the Christian schools made up only 30 percent of the total of 25,854 (Talbot and Cape 1913, 14).

Despite this, however, the same teacher clearly believed that the opposite was the case, and he made a direct association between the perceived backwardness of Muslim education and the lack of education for girls. In our interview, I had noted that beginning in the early Hamidian period and continuing until Cyprus's independence in 1960, complaints had been lodged with the British administration about the deficient nature of Muslim/Turkish education, especially in contrast to that of their Greek neighbors. When I asked this retired teacher about the problem, he remarked:

> This was true. Theirs was much better. And in any case they gave much more importance to education than we did. They definitely sent their Greek children to

school. It should also be good for the girls. Because with us, boys and girls couldn't ever be together, that is. At twelve years old they [the girls] were completely covering themselves (*çarşaf örtüsünü giyerlerdi*). The Greeks weren't like that. The Greeks were always in love, always going to the church together, our girls didn't go to the mosque, the women. Of course there were those who went, but they had a separate place. But not like the Greeks, the Greeks on Sunday all went to the church, all together, there was mingling (*kaynaşma vardı*), girl, girl-boy mingling happened. That's why, if a girl goes to school, if a Turkish girl goes to school, and if she learns reading and writing, she writes a letter to her lover. That's why families didn't send them! Greeks weren't like that, the Greeks were different. And they gave much more importance to education, that was the reality.

While my question had concerned the perception of a backwardness in comparison to Greek education, his answer focused very clearly on the relationship between that backwardness and traditional practices and perceptions with regard to girls.

I draw several conclusions from this. The first is that there were common cultural understandings of what was *medeni,* or civilized. This most clearly crystallized around the theme of women precisely because women represented the "inside," the "essence" of the society and hence also represented its backwardness. The second is that this backwardness was perceived to be a danger within the society, something to be fought, altered, or repressed. It was a danger because it was a weight on the society, something holding up its progress. And finally, there was clearly a perception of the possibility of change and self-remaking.

Among Turkish Cypriots, the latter possibility was one that became particularly clear by comparison with their Greek neighbors. This, one former teacher said, is why Turkish Cypriots immediately adopted the Turkish republican reforms, even before they were adopted in Turkey itself:

> They didn't want Ataturk's reforms, they didn't want them, the Greeks. But the Turks accepted them immediately. Thanks to those reforms our identity became clear. During the English administration life changed a lot, standards changed, they changed a lot. If you compare the Turks with the Greeks, their standard of living was much better. We tried to be like them by looking at them. And so we immediately adopted the reforms, we immediately accepted them.

While the Greek vision of the civilized represented Turks as the barbarians at the gate, the Ottoman/Turkish vision of the civilized represented its other as backwardness within Turkish society.

For Greek Cypriots of the period, civilization was defined by Greekness, especially in contrast to the barbarous. For Turkish Cypriots, civilization was defined in contrast to the backward, something that becomes especially

clear in narratives of the treatment of women. Hence, in the Greek case civilization was something to be evoked from the past, revived, protected, and prevented from contamination by the barbarous. In the Turkish case, on the other hand, civilization was something to be achieved, a limitless goal. Backwardness implies a self-critique and a need to move forward, a need for a progress "both moral and material."

Politismos, Medeniyet, and Progress

The idea of a progress both moral and material was a central part of the ideological framework that supported European imperial projects and explained the hegemony of European civilizations. It was, more generally, a significant part of the *episteme* of the period, much as its successor, modernization theory, has been an important underpinning of the *episteme* of the twentieth century. Confounded by Darwinian evolutionism but unwilling to give up God, nineteenth-century social theorists used the growing knowledge of "primitive" peoples to argue for social, especially racial, progress. Just as natural evolution presumably demonstrated a more and more perfect adaptation to one's surroundings, so social evolution should demonstrate moral progress.[13]

But inherent in this idea are two entirely opposite tendencies that were often at odds with each other and that many thinkers of the period were at pains to reconcile. On the one hand, it appeared to the famous evolutionist E. B. Tylor, for example, that "morality was largely a matter of conforming to the customs of the society a person belonged to, and if anything, savages were more custom-bound than civilized men" (Stocking 1987, 224). On the other hand, most thinkers of the period expected progress to lead to absolute improvement and ultimately to perfection. This opposition between relative and absolute progress was resolved by Herbert Spencer, for example, who argued that some repugnant customs might represent a more perfect adaptation to their environment but that it was still possible to judge such customs absolutely, especially at a time when most societies were undergoing conscious development (ibid.).

This dichotomy was in some sense derived from the long-standing tension in European thought between relative and absolute standards for civilization. The positivism prevalent in the period forcefully argued for the absolute improvement of civilization and therefore of morality, both of which reflected the absolute progress of knowledge through science. But what has often been called a German tendency in European thought argued equally forcefully for cultural limitations on human knowledge and for a heuristic split between spiritual culture and uniformly progressive material civilization (see Elias 1994; Stocking 1987). The fact that such definitions

of civilization and the moral progress linked to it were contradictory did not prevent them from claiming a powerful role in the explanation of European hegemony; indeed, it may have been their very contradictory nature that made that ideological hegemony all the more powerful.

Despite this contradiction, what had clearly developed in Enlightenment thought was a vision of morality as law-bound, something that regulated relations between right-bearing individuals in a society usually perceived as based on a social contract between those individuals.[14] Moreover, it was widely believed that goodness was a faculty, something inherent in humans—an idea that would be modified but not lost in the post-Darwinian period. Kant had remarked, for instance, that "man must develop his tendency towards *the good.* Providence has not placed goodness ready formed in him, but merely as a tendency and without the distinction of moral law" (Kant 1960, 11). This was very clearly not the concept of morality at work in the Cypriot context.

Rather, in Cyprus, the idea of moral progress and social betterment was linked to culturally specific understanding of the "civilizing process." A "progress both moral and material" meant both an improvement in one's economic conditions and further "civilization." Colonialism clearly represented "progress" and "the modern," as we especially see in Cypriot expressions of their disappointments with Britain's failure to realize the anticipated progress and modernization (on this point, see Bryant 2004). But "progress" and "modernity" are concepts open to local interpretation. Both imply a linear history and movement toward a goal—in this case, the goal of achieving a certain level of "civilization." But equally important, these concepts imply a present fallenness or backwardness in relationship to that goal. In other words, one must explain to oneself why that goal has not yet been reached.

Two ready-to-hand explanations are that one has been prevented from reaching the goal by some external force or that one has been corrupted and weakened from within. While Greek Cypriots adopted the former explanation, their Muslim/Turkish compatriots adopted the latter. For Greek Cypriots, the ideals of civilization were always already defined as Greekness, but a Greekness that had been prevented from its full flourishing by the forces of barbarism. Because those forces external to Greek civilization had also penetrated daily life and threatened that civilization from within, bringing that innate potentiality to full flourishing also by necessity implied purification.

In contrast, beginning in the late Ottoman period and continuing into the period of the Turkish Republic, Turkish Cypriots discussed their own backwardness as a type of disease of the social self, something that needed to be treated and remedied. Hence, the extreme "modernization"

and remaking inspired by Atatürk was not simply an imposition of Western mores but was also a consequence of this rethinking of the problems in the social self. Like the ideals of Greek civilization that circulated throughout the Greek-speaking world of the period, educated Turkish Cypriots also participated in an *episteme* in which their own backwardness was something to be cured, if necessary through radical surgery on the social body.

Conclusion

In Cyprus, a favorite explanation for the triumph of Greek and Turkish nationalisms on the island remains Britain's notorious divide-and-rule strategy, which supposedly pitted Christian and Muslim Cypriots against each other. But a more complex way in which one might view the effects of colonialism and its role in the rupture between the communities would see British colonialism not only as a method of force but, more important, as a complex of ideas in which Cypriots participated and which they negotiated with, rejected, or adapted to. Timothy Mitchell argues that the study of modernity should be concerned not simply "with a new stage of history but with how history itself is staged" (Mitchell 2000, 1). What I have suggested here is that the specter of the West that haunts colonial narratives may also be linked to the figure of the modern through culturally specific notions of what a civilizing progress might mean.

In the Cypriot case, these were narratives of the self that were adapted from the narratives of the "motherlands" and which became prevalent in the island through the rise of media and the spread of education (Bryant 2004). However, these narratives were appropriated in a situation of structural inequality and adapted to a situation in which Turkish and Greek Cypriots lived side by side. Hence, while Greek Cypriot narratives of civilization always opposed themselves to the Turkish barbarians—or to elements of the "barbaric" within the self (Herzfeld 1982)—this produced a confusion about the attitude to take toward the Turks in one's midst. And while Turkish Cypriot narratives of civilization consistently opposed it to the backward and hence oriented civilization toward a modernist progress, this happened within a situation of structural inequality in which Turkish Cypriots were at a disadvantage (Bryant 2001). So while adopting narratives from the "motherlands," Cypriots adapted these to a situation that produced schism, rupture, and differentiation.

It is precisely here that one can locate the failure of postcoloniality in Cyprus: The West becomes both the goal of history and the ground upon which history is staged. Narratives of the self as "always already" Western or as "really," radically Western are not just claims to modernity but are, perhaps even more important, claims that that self is participating in the

playing field of the "civilized"—that is, Western—world. So when, in his April 2004 speech before the Greek community, President Tassos Papadopoulos claimed that a "no" vote on the Annan Plan referendum would not have disastrous consequences for Greek Cypriots, he explained his position by claiming that northern Cyprus could not ever be recognized by countries that "really count." Claims to legitimacy on that playing field are made precisely through claims of "civilization" that are tied to different, even contradictory strands of European thought regarding what the West is "really" about. While those contradictory strands may coexist in Europe itself, Cyprus becomes the ground where those contradictions are played out.

Notes

1. Extract from *Alithia,* August 31, 1889, State Archive of the Republic of Cyprus (hereafter SA1) 2236/1889.

2. SA1/C685/1902.

3. Orr further expresses the hope that "as soon as the time comes, as come it must, when Cypriots are admitted to important posts under Government, the barrier which now exists between them and the English community will begin to disappear. But so long as it remains, 'ENOSIS' will continue to be the gospel of the educated Cypriot, preached to the peasant, encouraged in the schools, and given daily prominence in all the Greek newspapers" (Orr 1918, 171).

4. Confidential letter from Canon Newham to chief secretary, July 18, 1912, SA1/1074/1911.

5. Ibid.

6. "Evge Neotis!" *I Foni tis Kiprou,* March 2, 1901. The Great Idea (Megali Idea) was both an irredentist ideology and sometime policy of the Greek state until the end of World War I. It envisioned reuniting all Greek-speakers in what were seen as historically Greek lands.

7. "The moment that saw the transition from historico-ritual mechanisms for the formation of individuality to the scientifico-disciplinary mechanisms, when the normal took over from the ancestral, and measurement from status, thus substituting for the individuality of the memorable man that of the calculable man, that moment when the sciences of man became possible is the moment when a new technology of power and a new political anatomy of the body were implemented" (Foucault 1977, 193).

8. The author continues by noting that "the ethnic school for these reasons forms the national crucible in which are smelted and opened wide and forged the great and high characters in those advanced persons who accomplish great things." *Kypriakos Fylax,* September 29, 1912.

9. Leontios, Bishop of Pafos, to Governor Palmer, November 18, 1935, Archive of the Archishopric of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus, document 500.

10. Extract from *Neon Ethnos,* SA1/646/1916/1.

11. Ibid.

12. Josiah Spencer to Chief Secretary, July 25 1881, SA1/1314/1881.

13. The most exhaustive study of these ideas is contained in Stocking 1987.

14. MacIntyre puts it thus: "In that period [roughly 1630 to 1850] 'morality' became

the name for that particular sphere in which rules of conduct which are neither theological nor legal nor aesthetic are allowed a cultural space of their own. It is only in the later seventeenth century and the eighteenth century, when this distinguishing of the moral from the theological, the legal and the aesthetic has become a received doctrine[,] that the project of an independent rational justification of morality becomes not merely the concern of individual thinkers, but central to Northern European culture" (MacIntyre 1984, 39).

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Disclosure and Censorship in Divided Cyprus

TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF ETHNIC AUTISM

Yiannis Papadakis

All nationalists have the power of not seeing resemblances between similar sets of facts. . . . The nationalist not only does not disapprove of atrocities committed by his own side, but he has a remarkable capacity of not even hearing about them. . . . In nationalist thought there are facts which are both true and untrue, known and unknown.

> —Orwell (2000, 307–308)

A Dead Zone In Between: Divided Views

Propaganda, defined as that branch of the art of lying which consists in very nearly deceiving your friends without deceiving your enemies.

> —Cornford (1922/1993, xv)

For years on end, on weekdays at 8:00 P.M., faithful to his rendezvous with his (possibly nonexistent) audience, a serious, middle-aged Turkish Cypriot man appeared on BRT 2, an official Turkish Cypriot television channel. He addressed Greek Cypriots either in Greek or in English, reading from a text which he often abandoned as he got carried away, overwhelmed with enthusiasm for his own argument. He then began to improvise on the day's topic, chosen with care among the (apparently plentiful) evils of Greek Cypriot society. Topics varied daily from rampant corruption and nepotism on the Greek Cypriot side to the inhuman

treatment of foreign migrants to wasted arms expenditures paid by the duped Greek Cypriot taxpayers. Despite the seriousness of his intentions and those who commissioned the program, if Greek Cypriots watched it at all—extremely few did, in fact—they only did so to laugh. The Greek Cypriot official television channel, in turn, produced its own programs in Turkish addressed to Turkish Cypriots. These often showed a previously mixed village in the south where Turkish and Greek Cypriots lived "happily together" before 1974. The camera never failed to focus on the (newly restored) mosque in pristine condition as a local woman emotively called to a past Turkish Cypriot neighbor using her first name, saying that she missed her and expected her to return in order to live in warm neighborly communion as in the past. This program was treated with as much mirth and skepticism by Turkish Cypriots as its Turkish Cypriot counterpart was by Greek Cypriots.

Even if such programs would strike many outsiders—as well Turkish Cypriots when faced with official Greek Cypriot official publications or programs, and vice versa—as stark propaganda, they were produced for years on end as potentially strong persuasive arguments. It could be argued that, caught in the webs of their own limited political horizons, the creators of such programs were unable to perceive how unpersuasive they may have appeared to others or how they may have had the opposite of their intended effects. But what is of real interest here is not so much the effects of such programs on others but what they revealed about their creators. Despite the laughter they provoked among those seeing them from the other side, they were no laughing matter but had serious and, I would argue, insidious implications. What they starkly revealed was the chasm separating the two sides, one so deep that even when they were trying to persuade the others, the creators of such material remained so deeply enmeshed in their own perspectives and so utterly convinced of their own self-evident truths that they appeared unable to question its efficacy. For eventually, and herein lies their insidiousness, they did have real effects by causing laughter, often mixed with a sense of incredulity and indignation, to those watching them on the other side. What appeared amazing and laughable, what caused indignation, was how unreasonable *the others* were, how *they* seemed to buy into their own propaganda, how blindfolded, how brainwashed *they* were—how so different, in other words, from *us*. The well-known verdict shared by both sides was verified and reinforced: "our" truth, "their" propaganda. This all too easily led to a tendency of rejecting in toto *any* argument or evidence presented by the other side as yet another instance of propaganda.

In his discussion of nationalism, Gellner (1983, 2) makes a brief allusion to what the Italians under Mussolini called the *sacro egoismo* of nationalism. This formulation aptly captures two key elements of nationalism:

first, the self-centered, or ethnocentric, perspective upon which it is based; and second, how in demanding reverence to what Karakasidou (1994) has aptly termed "sacred truths of national history," it denigrates any critique of an act of sacrilege. This raises the issue of censorship, one that, as many analysts have shown (e.g., Chomsky 1989; Cohen 2001; Herman and Chomsky 1988/1994), is paramount in any discussion of the official and social construction of truth. In a social context such as Cyprus, where on both sides "obsessive ethnic nationalism" (Loizos 1998, 40) has prevailed for decades, traitor-hunting has become the equivalent of what in other social contexts was treated under the theme of "witch-hunting."[1] In a number of articles, Loizos (1988, 1995, 1998) has suggested a number of factors hindering reconciliation, limiting understanding, and justifying atrocities against others. Key among them were the following: abstraction and generalization leading to the presentation of the other side as homogeneous and giving rise to the view that all the others are equally responsible (including women and children) and bellicose; obsessive ethnic nationalism; one-sided constructions of history focusing solely on periods or incidents of conflict; and the inability to see certain commonalities even in certain key metaphors through which the two ethnic groups comprehend the world. Notably, the political use made of Loizos's own work presents a stark illustration of the argument presented here, as will be explained later.

This chapter adds to and modifies the analysis of Loizos, making some further suggestions pertaining to the creation and perseverance of semantic chasms between antagonistic ethnic groups.[2] The unwillingness to engage with others' voices and experiences has been aptly described as (ethnic) "autism" (Ignatieff 1999, 60), while the avoidance to face up to one's own acts of violence and the suffering caused to others has been extensively discussed in Cohen's magisterial book *States of Denial* (2001). This chapter examines the emergence of "autism" and denial among antagonistic ethnic groups from an ethnographic perspective. It explores the interactive social processes involved in the construction and maintenance of hermetically sealed "ethnic truths" and the challenges posed to them. How, in other words, the chasm of the Dead Zone (*Nekri Zoni,* as Greek Cypriots called the division) that separated the two sides absolutely on the ground also appeared to divide the two sides' perspectives, thus disallowing the possibility of common ground.

On Either Side of the Dead Zone: Public Information Offices

> Indifference to objective truth is encouraged by the sealing-off of one part of the world from another.
>
> —Orwell (2000, 308)

The two Public Information Offices (PIO)—one on each side, each bearing the same name and responsibilities—have been allocated the task of disseminating official positions and truths. They have been publishing vast amounts of material, from monthly newspapers to books, brochures, and leaflets.[3] However, it should not be assumed that the political positions expressed have been internally coherent and without inconsistencies, nor have they remained historically stable and unchanging as political goals and regimes have shifted.[4] A full analysis of the content and history of such publications, however promising it appears to be, remains outside the scope of this chapter.[5] Instead, I focus on the basic underlying assumptions guiding the production of such publications after 1974. These publications deal in *evidence.* They display what their creators strive to present as indisputable, crystal-clear, plain-for-all-to-see evidence. Evidence is always evidence *of,* and the question that arises is evidence of what? What are the questions raised? What events is evidence sought for? Conversely, what questions are not raised, what issues are not discussed?

First, evidence was sought for atrocities and violence in any form committed by the other side against one's own community. Instances, photographs, local and foreign reports of atrocities one had suffered were painstakingly collected and distributed but never such evidence concerning the suffering of the other side. Greek Cypriots were primarily interested in evidence of atrocities committed by the Turkish army in 1974. Turkish Cypriots only collected evidence of atrocities committed against them in the 1960s and during 1974. No evidence was ever collected, or seriously considered, on the sufferings inflicted by one's own side against the others—the question was never raised. As a result, evidence of the suffering of the other side emerged only from sources on the other side. Thus, it was regarded as emanating from suspect official sources and was habitually dismissed as propaganda by the other. As for evidence emerging from foreign (non-Cypriot) writers, this was welcomed by the side whose suffering it described as proof "finally coming from impartial independent sources" and readily dismissed as biased or "commissioned" (that is, paid for) by the other side.[6]

After the 1974 division of Cyprus, Greek Cypriots strove for the reunification of the island. In an attempt to historically legitimate this political goal, the "peaceful coexistence thesis" came to be officially endorsed. It claimed a past of brotherly coexistence between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, a past said to "prove" that people could live peacefully together in the future. This led to a strong disinclination to delve into periods of conflict and collect any related evidence. This should also be understood as a counterargument directed against the equally problematic official Turkish Cypriot position: The past was one of pure conflict and animosity, "proving" that the people could never live together and that

separation was the historically dictated outcome. This, in turn, led the Turkish Cypriot authorities to focus on periods of conflict and to amass a large amount of evidence of violence and atrocities committed against them but to collect no evidence of violence committed against Greek Cypriots during or before 1974. The combined result of these antagonistic views was a strong disinclination to talk of the suffering of the other side and violence committed against them. Any such admission was tantamount to treachery: It was supporting the other side's positions and strengthening its propaganda.

The two ethnic groups have, of course, never been homogeneous; significant internal critiques and dissenting voices have always been around. Yet such critics risked having their voices co-opted by the other side in order to point out that "it is not only us who claim these things, people on the other side also make the exact same claims." Evidence in support of one's arguments that came from the other side was presented as ultimate proof, since at the end of the day, so the argument went, we live in a cynical world, one plagued by propaganda, one where even crystal-clear proof such as the one presented by our side has difficulty in shining.

The next section demonstrates how such internal critiques often emerged from the left on both sides. Leftist writings were often republished by the other side's PIO, without of course ever asking the permission of the authors.[7] While such actions may have reinforced self-righteous attitudes on the side that was co-opting and using such critical voices from the other side, the consequences on the side that produced them, and on their authors, also merit consideration. Those whose writings were used by the other side's official publications were habitually accused of having provided the others with "ammunition in their propaganda campaign." They were often branded as traitors, an accusation that rendered them virtual outcasts. The end result of using critical voices from the other side in this way was to blunt their critical edge on their own side, disempowering them as tainted voices of traitors. This made internal critiques much more difficult to openly articulate. These processes led to the emergence of strong tendencies toward self-censorship—a strong prohibition against discussing such issues under the threat of the accusation of treachery.

The manner in which the work of anthropologist Peter Loizos has been used by Turkish Cypriots provides a stark illustration of the points discussed above. Because he is an academic of partly Greek Cypriot descent who grew up in the UK, he could be presented as an impartial (academic) commentator, an outsider (foreigner), or a Greek Cypriot critical of his own side. The largest official Turkish Cypriot Web site featured two of his articles without authorization. The first, published in *Man* (Loizos 1988), discussed the issue of intercommunal killings, using as a case study the

actions and words of a Greek Cypriot right-wing extremist who killed unarmed civilian Turkish Cypriots. The other, based on a 1999 interview in a Greek newspaper, was critical of the actions of EOKA B. Another person whose work was presented in the same section of this Web site ("Published Academic Papers: The Period of 1963–1974"), again without any authorization, was a left-wing Greek Cypriot critical of Greek Cypriot actions during the 1960s.[8]

The Other Dead Zone:
Partial Views, Partial Truths

> The argument that to tell the truth would be "inopportune" or "would play into the hands" of somebody or other is felt to be unanswerable.
>
> —Orwell (2000, 332)

Critical voices willing to discuss the suffering of the other side tended to emerge most explicitly from the left on both sides. If the Dead Zone came to broadly separate Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, another no less significant division was the right-left split within each side.[9] Key in understanding this division was the contest over what constituted the national "imagined community" (Anderson 1983), since this also determined whose violent deaths were to be classified as deaths of enemy/aggressors (who deserved them) or of insiders (with whom one should empathize).[10]

Right-wing parties on both sides identified mostly with the respective "motherlands," their peoples and histories, presenting themselves primarily as Greeks or Turks. While people of the right were thus divided and opposed, the left on both sides expressed mutual solidarity; they were joined by a common discourse on identity as "Cypriots first," as one people that shared a common Cypriot history (see also Peristianis in this volume). This opened up a third space, a common space where empathy could emerge. The two lefts posited Greeks and Turks as outsiders. The combined actions of the two "motherlands" in 1974, namely the coup organized by the Greek junta and its EOKA B extreme right-wing collaborators in Cyprus and the subsequent Turkish military offensive, as well as other outside powers were held responsible for the political conflict in Cyprus. The left on both sides also traced the roots of the conflict in Cyprus to divisive, belligerent actions of right-wing nationalists. These were acts of violence against the other community and, as important, against left-wing dissenters within their own side.[11]

This last point is highly significant. Up until the 1950s, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots had cooperated through left-wing workers' institu-

tions. Even after 1974, left-wing parties on the two sides expressed strong feelings of mutual solidarity. Another important reason for their critical stance was the prevalent feeling among leftists that Greek Cypriot supporters of the left were as much victims of their own right-wing nationalists as Turkish Cypriots were, while analogous feelings prevailed among the Turkish Cypriot left. The two lefts were also joined by the view that the internal victimization of leftists within each community was as important an aspect of a hidden, forgotten, or undisclosed past as the victimization of people of the other community. For example, on the Greek Cypriot side it was mostly in AKEL publications, or publications by AKEL supporters, that one read of Greek Cypriot atrocities against Turkish Cypriots. Such publications strove to demonstrate that right-wing nationalists were the major culprits who divided the people of Cyprus and the island, both through violent acts committed against those of the other community and the implementation of a regime of violence and terror against the left, which was working toward cooperation between the two ethnic groups.[12] On the Greek Cypriot side, these views were also more apparent in the domain of historiography.[13] The standard "History of Cyprus" from an AKEL perspective, for example, includes references to violence against Turkish Cypriots by Greek Cypriot extremists. Significant for the discussion here, the author presents a clear awareness of the risks his approach entails: "Foreseeing the reaction of certain circles, I should underline here that with this work 'I am not offering ammunition to the enemy'" (Graikos 1980, 3, my translation). Among Turkish Cypriots, it was mainly in the domain of folklore studies that a common ground was sought through a discussion regarding shared elements of folk culture (Azgin and Papadakis 1998). Given the almost complete lack of intermarriage and hence of kinship links that transcended ethnic divisions, the political spaces of the left were of paramount significance in creating a space of empathy as well as self-critique.[14]

Between the left and the right, however, there was little common ground for dialogue. Their deep ideological differences were reflected in the organization of social space in Cyprus. Coffee shops in cities and villages were rigidly split into right-wing and left-wing establishments. In general, people chose to read party-aligned newspapers, avoiding those of other parties. No one dared carry the wrong newspaper into the other party's coffee shop. In this way, individual social actors came to be immersed in the ideology and arguments of their own party while becoming highly dismissive of others. The media also came to be highly segregated into right-wing and left-wing television stations or radio channels. Even so, on both sides one clearly noted that the right dominated in mass media and the left had a disproportionately small share.[15] As a result, it was mostly right-wing

views that were aired in the media, ones unwilling to engage in discussions of the suffering of the other side or of violence inflicted within one's own side. Given the tenacity of internal political divisions, the other party's views were commonly treated as propaganda, just as the other side's official views were dismissed on each side of the Dead Zone. This hindered the possibility of the emergence of an open discussion in public social spaces. Such mutually reinforcing processes that create ever-deepening chasms that separate social groups have been powerfully described by Bateson (1973) as processes of "schismogenesis." But the absence of open discussion in the public space does not necessarily entail a total silence among social actors in other settings. People may express an active desire to speak out precisely because of the awareness of silences and prohibitions that guard the boundaries of public discourse. The following section shifts the focus to ethnographic levels of analysis in concrete settings.

Ethnographic Contexts:
The Social Management of Disclosure

Lefkosia (October 1990–December 1991)

I conducted a protracted period of fieldwork from the end of 1990 to the beginning of 1992 with Greek Cypriots that lasted fifteen months in Tahtakallas, an area in Lefkosia (as the Greek Cypriot side of the capital Nicosia will henceforth be called) near the boundary that divides the city. Turkish Cypriots abandoned this area during the outbreak of violence in Christmas 1963. The long duration of this period of fieldwork allowed me to examine in closer detail the social management of disclosure, as I was progressively moving from the status of a relative outsider toward that of an insider.

Initially, I was constantly exposed to stories and events that described how well Greek Cypriots used to live with Turkish Cypriots, echoing the official "peaceful coexistence thesis." Gradually, however, more complex and diverse views emerged, as locals spoke of how other Greek Cypriots (initially said to be outsiders; later some were named as locals) attacked and looted the Turkish Cypriot homes in 1963 and how their own homes too were looted by Greek Cypriots in 1974 when they briefly abandoned the area out of fear. Talk of past coexistence, however, was often disputed by individuals from two political groups for different reasons: men who frequented Orpheas, the communist AKEL-controlled coffee shop, and others who frequented Olympiakos, the right-wing one aligned with DISI (*Dimokratikos Sinagermos;* Democratic Rally). The disputations were presented in specific contexts during the advancement of specific arguments. Leftists often spoke in an accusatory manner of how the clients of Olym-

piakos strongly supported the 1974 coup and how they killed local Turkish Cypriots, forcing them away, in 1963. Disclosures of right-wing violence against local Turkish Cypriots were often recounted in the same breath with accounts of persecution of local leftists by Olympiakos's supporters during the days of the 1974 coup. Olympiakos supporters, by contrast, constantly accused leftists of being unpatriotic traitors, claiming that they never partook in any of the fighting in pursuit of "national causes" as they themselves did (see also Spyrou, this volume). Olympiakos was presented as the local "bastion of Hellenism and resistance [*propyrgeio Ellinismou kai antistasis*]." In such narratives, they pointed out AKEL's condemnation of the EOKA movement back in 1955 and spoke with pride of how in 1963 they alone defended the area from "Turkish aggression": how they bravely fought against the "Turkish mutiny [*Tourkiki antarsia*]," as those events came to be designated in official and popular Greek Cypriot political rhetoric.

Protracted fieldwork can allow the ethnographer to engage with a diversity of voices in multiple contexts, moving beyond the official proclamations, and hence become party to "secrets" not spoken to outsiders. It also provides the opportunity to examine how in the course of specific arguments social agents may strategically employ disclosure in addressing specific audiences. Self-censorship presents a case in point.

Self-censorship, and the local reflexive understanding of its existence, played a prominent role during the course of fieldwork. In relation to issues of violence, it often emerged through statements such as "it is better not to talk about these things." This did not entail a stance of rejection that violence was committed against others, but it did entail one that mobilized a patriotic duty to avoid admission. When an individual would admit to knowledge of an atrocity committed by Greek Cypriots, the description was sometimes accompanied by an admonition such as "but please do not write these things" or a request that the name not be disclosed. Equally persistent, however, were voices, emerging mostly from the left, which, while self-reflectively acknowledging the existence of censorship, precisely for this reason insisted that the ethnographer should make sure s/he wrote these things down, turning them at last into public knowledge, accompanied by a defiant "I will say these [things] even if they call me a traitor."

Yet self-censorship more commonly emerged not as part of an explicit ideological strategy but during the course of ordinary daily events for more mundane reasons. A discussion among leftists in a particular shop regarding "the treacherous historical role of the right" would be interrupted when a client from another party would enter the shop but would continue when someone else entered who the discussants knew would share the same views. Despite the political divisions described in the previous section, social agents were constantly involved in a multiplicity of relationships,

ranging from economic ones to relations of kinship and friendship with others who adhered to opposed parties. In the politically segregated spaces of the coffee shops, hot discussions that were highly accusatory of other Greek Cypriots took place in the absence of the accused. But during other daily encounters, such political discussions were often avoided so as not to endanger other kinds of relationships. Such implicit rules involving fine discriminations of knowing when, to whom, and in which context one should say certain things were part of everyday social practices.

Lefkosha (March 1991)

In Lefkosha, the Turkish Cypriot side of Nicosia, fieldwork took place only for a month, usually in the presence of an official working in the Turkish Cypriot Public Information Office. The primary aim of this research was to engage with Turkish Cypriots who had left Tahtakale (as they called Tahtakallas) in 1963 and then with others from a variety of age groups, places, and political affiliations. Turkish Cypriots from Tahtakale, most of them elders by that point, spoke at length about personal pain, dislocation, and persecution by Greek Cypriots, sometimes naming former neighbors as culprits. It could be reasonably expected that the presence of officials significantly influenced what I was told. It could also be argued that given that over a quarter-century later, this was the first time since 1974 that they found themselves facing a Greek Cypriot interested in their experiences and views, they stressed what they felt Greek Cypriots did not understand or deliberately omitted from the historical record.[16] Many expressed doubts as to whether Greek Cypriots would ever allow me to publish what I had been told or cautioned me about the consequences if I did. The officials in charge of my movements prevented me from speaking to specific individual Turkish Cypriots, all people from the left known to be highly critical of official policies and views.

Istanbul (June–September 1992)

In an effort to engage with other voices among Turkish Cypriots, I later spent three months in Istanbul living with left-wing Turkish Cypriot university students in their twenties. To a large extent, they shared the views Turkish Cypriots had previously expressed regarding the persecution and killings of Turkish Cypriots during the 1960s. But for them other issues were as important. First, they regarded the violence against their community to have been inflicted by Greek Cypriot right-wing extremists rather than by Greek Cypriots in general. Second, they spoke of how some of their families and friends had at times been subjected to violence or intimidation by right-wing Turkish Cypriot extremists. They discussed at length the problems Turkish Cypriots faced after 1974, openly disagreeing with the

official view that 1974 was the solution to all their problems. More concretely, they mentioned many difficulties that had arisen from the presence of the Turkish army and Turkish settlers, issues which were officially taboo and whose discussion was officially deemed as bordering on treachery (see Navaro-Yashin, this volume). They also discussed at length their own family and personal predicaments as persecuted supporters of the left in a society plagued by economic problems, one that denied them access to resources and possibilities for jobs in the public sector.

In their view, theirs was a society whose right-wing officialdom treated them as outright traitors because of their efforts to communicate and empathetically engage with Greek Cypriots. Such efforts, often in the form of bicommunal meetings, were officially designated as expressions of sympathy for the barbaric enemy aggressor (Constantinou and Papadakis 2001). Because of their participation in such activities and their stated desire to live with Greek Cypriots on a reunited island, they had earned the derogatory nickname *rumcu*: those who liked the Rums (Greek Cypriots), those who mingled with Greek Cypriots; in other words, traitors. Instead they preferred to call themselves *barisci,* peace-lovers. Sociospatial demarcations were once again revealing. Whereas I, a Greek Cypriot, was welcomed to live with them for three months, during that period no right-wing Turkish Cypriot or any other Turk visited the flat, nor did we ever go out in the company of either.

Pyla (September 1994–September 1995)

Pyla was a mixed UN-supervised village, the only one located inside the Dead Zone, where I conducted a year's fieldwork. This was a village whose position inside the Dead Zone made villagers feel that they lived in truly precarious conditions, "on top of a powder keg," as a Turkish Cypriot man put it. Pyla often became a source of tension between the two sides, and in times of general tension the village was inevitably affected. Villagers were keen to keep the village at peace and prevent violence from erupting there. To this effect they came to employ various intricate strategies (Papadakis 1997). The highly volatile social environment of Pyla led to other kinds of disclosures and silences.

The Turkish Cypriot official position on Pyla was starkly presented in a publication titled *Pyla: A Village of Unpeaceful Coexistence* (PIO, TC 1997). Its front cover featured a quote by former U.S. Under-Secretary of State George Ball: "The Greek Cypriots do not want a peace keeping force; they want to be left alone to kill Turkish Cypriots." This statement, it should be noted, was made more than thirty years earlier during the 1960s interethnic violence. The pamphlet explained that it was written to correct the false views expressed by "westerners," namely certain EU and UN officials who

had been ostensibly duped by Greek Cypriot propaganda and spoke of life in Pyla in a positive light (PIO, TC 1997, 3). The bulk of the pamphlet did not deal with Pyla per se but with Greek Cypriot atrocities against Turkish Cypriots from 1963 to 1974. The short discussion on Pyla presented various examples of discrimination against local Turkish Cypriots after 1974. Even so, the pamphlet's aim was to present Pyla in the context of historic and continuing Greek Cypriot atrocities and physical aggression against Turkish Cypriots.

If the official Turkish Cypriot presentation of Pyla focused on past atrocities committed elsewhere by Greek Cypriots, locally, Turkish Cypriots showed a disinclination not only to discuss such atrocities elsewhere but even to discuss the case of an alleged atrocity involving local Greek Cypriots that was perpetrated against Turkish Cypriots from other villages. In fact, it was leftist Greek Cypriots who first told me how certain right-wing Greek Cypriot co-villagers were involved in the killing of Turkish Cypriots from other villages during the 1960s. They described how local right-wing extremist Greek Cypriots participated in the holdup of a Turkish Cypriot bus headed for Famagusta; the passengers were killed and buried in a mass grave close by. These accusations often emerged as Greek Cypriot leftists described how they were rounded up and tortured by local Greek Cypriot right-wing coup supporters during 1974.

But Turkish Cypriots were on the whole silent on this issue. Instead, the locally significant story, endlessly repeated to me from the start, expressed gratitude toward the local Greek Cypriot supporters of the coup. This story was recounted to me vividly and in minute detail by Turkish Cypriots of all political persuasions; it described how a Greek Cypriot man heroically deterred right-wing Greek Cypriots who had come from outside to attack the local Turkish Cypriots during 1974. Even though this man was from the extreme right himself and a coup supporter (someone whom they would have ordinarily feared), precisely because of his affiliations and his authority he was able to stop like-minded Greek Cypriots. A left-wing Greek Cypriot would never have stood a chance. The motives of the right-wing Greek Cypriot man were disputed: Some said he did not want harm to come to his Turkish Cypriot co-villagers, others regarded this as a precautionary measure to avoid ensuing retaliations against Greek Cypriots.

When I openly asked about this incident in the later stages of my fieldwork, some left-wing Turkish Cypriots who I had come to know well and who had expressed a strong inclination to help me with my research there still remained very evasive. One year later, when I returned to Pyla, I sat down to discuss my past research with two left-wing Turkish Cypriots and I inquired about this particular issue. This time the response was more straightforward. They said that even though this story was well known

among local Turkish Cypriots, they generally preferred not to talk about it. In fact, one of the two men said that one of his relatives who had lived in another village had been killed in that event. Still, as he put it: "That sad event took place so long ago. It is almost thirty years now. It is no good insisting on these things all the time if we want to live in some kind of peace over here." These words stood in sharp contrast to the official Turkish Cypriot position on Pyla, one built almost exclusively on such events.

Toward an Anthropology of Ethnic Autism

The material produced by the two official Public Information Offices literally screamed with pain. Their aim was to show who truly suffered, who suffered most, and who was to blame for this suffering. Their screams grew louder as they desperately tried to make themselves heard to those across the Dead Zone, who in effect closed their ears because they did not wish to acknowledge the violence perpetrated by their own side and denied the suffering of the other side. At the same time, because both sides broadly shared the view that outsiders had been carried away by the others' propaganda, the screams were also directed at outsiders in an effort to prevail over and drown out the others' cries. Yet what may appear to be ethnic autism on the official level is not necessarily as prevalent at other levels of society, especially those that traditionally interest ethnographers. Anthropologists may be well placed to examine both the "silences" and the social management of disclosure.[17] In the case of mutually antagonistic ethnic groups, one has to look beyond each society in and of itself, focusing instead on their interaction. This analysis should be complemented by an examination of the processes of interaction and contestation among actors variously situated within each society. Close attention to the position one speaks from, to the diverse experiences of actors, and to the different contexts within which disclosures are made can reveal the limits of censorship.

Notes

1. For a suggestive discussion of a similar phenomenon in U.S. history, see Cardozo (1970) on McCarthyism and communist witch hunts. A suggestive discussion regarding the protection and challenge of "sacred national truths" by academics in Greece is provided by Karakasidou (1994).

2. Bryant (2001) identified another significant difference between the political discourses of the two sides. Whereas Turkish Cypriots demanded respect, Greek Cypriots asked for the protection of their (human) rights.

3. A list of the Greek Cypriot PIO publications up to 1992 can be found in PIO, GC (1992). No equivalent list exists for the Turkish Cypriot Public Information Office. The Turkish Cypriot PIO has been publishing a bimonthly newspaper called *Kibris* that provides an excellent source for the examination of its rhetoric and arguments. A comparative study

of the issue of missing persons in Cyprus by Sant Cassia (1998, 1999) includes an interesting discussion of the symbolic iconography of PIO publications of both sides.

4. For example, the books by Worsley and Kitromilides (1979) and Attalides (1977) that included critical comments on Greek nationalism in Cyprus stopped being distributed by the Greek Cypriot PIO after the nationalist DISI government came to power during 1993.

5. For example, as the political context changed after 1974, which led to the emergence among Greek Cypriots of the "peaceful coexistence thesis" regarding past relations with Turkish Cypriots, their representation shifted in official publications from enemies (in the 1960s during the period of interethnic violence) to amicable ex-neighbors and future compatriots. For a general discussion of these shifts in historiography and official publications, see Papadakis (1993, 25–51). For the shifts in PIO, GC publications, compare pre-1974 publications (e.g., PIO, GC 1964a, 1964b, 1964c) with any post-1974 publication that shifts all blame to Turkey as the enemy/aggressor and presents a rosy picture of past coexistence with Turkish Cypriots.

6. A good example is the book by Oberling (1982), an American academic, which focused on Turkish Cypriot suffering and was distributed freely by the Turkish Cypriot PIO.

7. The book by Greek Cypriot author Stavrinides (1977) was an early attempt to create a space for a critical understanding of the 1974 events. It presented a critique of both sides and was published soon after 1974, when because of the recent traumas of the war it was extremely difficult to speak out critically. But since this was a book by a Greek Cypriot author who was also critical of the Greek Cypriot side, it was selectively quoted, republished, and distributed freely by the Turkish Cypriot PIO. This led to the slandering of the author on the Greek Cypriot side and threats to prosecute him. Another telling example is an article published in a radical left-wing Greek Cypriot magazine *Diethnistiki Prosklisi,* which was highly critical of Greek Cypriots and was subsequently extensively used in a book by Egeli (1991, 87–119), a top employee of the Turkish Cypriot PIO; a chapter title reveals his perspective: "Greek Cypriots Beginning to See Cyprus Realities." *Paroikiaki,* a Greek Cypriot newspaper published in London by the Greek Cypriot communist party AKEL, featured an interview during which the interviewee mentioned hearing Greek Cypriot extremists boast of throwing Turkish Cypriot babies up in the air and shooting them. This was republished by the newspaper of the Turkish Cypriot PIO (*Kibris* 1997a). In the same issue of *Kibris* (1997b), a number of quotes taken from left-wing Greek Cypriot sources were used to demonstrate Greek Cypriot bellicosity. The pamphlet published by the Greek Cypriot PIO, *Perishing Cyprus* (PIO, GC 1989), is an example of how Greek Cypriots used a left-wing Turkish Cypriot dissident's writings that described the neglect, theft, and state of disrepair of antiquities by Turkish Cypriots.

8. The Web site under discussion is http://www.trncpresidency.org (last accessed November 2003). It should be noted that the English translation of Loizos's interview (http://www.trncpresidency.org/academic/1963–74/eoka.htm; accessed November 2003) from the original Greek newspaper article (see http://archive.enet.gr/1999/08/13/on-line/keimena/politics/po13.htm; accessed November 2003) contains a number of distortions and omissions, intended to strengthen its impact in accordance with Turkish Cypriot official views. For example, where Loizos spoke of Greek Cypriot policies intended to "humiliate (*exevtelismou*)" Turkish Cypriots, the translator used "eliminate" instead. The Greek Cypriot left-wing writer is Drousiotis, a notorious person who is often attacked on the Greek Cypriot side for his criticism of EOKA (Drousiotis 1998). In the Web site's section on "Books," the person whose work received the highest number of recommendations was Oberling (1982), while one book of Loizos (1975) as well as Stavrinides' book (1977) were also recommended.

9. This is admittedly a rough division that focuses on the largest parties in Cyprus: left-wing AKEL on the Greek Cypriot side as opposed to right-wing DISI and the two largest left-wing parties on the Turkish Cypriot side, CTP (Cumhuriyetci Türk Partisi; Republican Turkish Party) and TKP (Toplumcu Kurtuluş Partisi; Communal Liberation Party), as opposed to right-wing UBP (Ulusal Birlik Partisi; National Unity Party). For a general overview of political parties in Cyprus, see Coufoudakis (1983).

10. See Herzfeld's (1992) discussion on segmentation and the nation-state in Greece, which engages with issues of treachery and unity. One significant difference, however, in the case of Greece is that the definition of the "imagined community" is shared in the examples he discusses, while in the case of Greek Cypriots it is an issue of intense dispute.

11. See Papadakis (1998) on the different views of history and identity between the Greek Cypriot left and right and Papadakis (1993, 52–173) for further discussion that includes Turkish Cypriots. An examination of party-organized commemorations offers the best way to illustrate the differences between right and left regarding the definition of the "imagined community" and its enemies (Papadakis 2003). Right-wing parties on both sides emphasized commemorations of dates and events from the history of the respective "motherland" (rather than events from the history of Cyprus), often events where Greeks had been killed by Turks and vice versa. By contrast, left-wing parties, especially the Greek Cypriot AKEL, organized commemorations of events where Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were killed *together* by right-wing nationalists. The Commemoration for Mishaoulis and Kavazoglu, a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot, both of whom were AKEL members, who were jointly killed in 1964 by Turkish Cypriot right-wing extremists, was paradigmatic in this respect. The Turkish Cypriot left-wing forum, the Movement for Patriotic Unity, recently (2003) began to organize a commemoration for Mishaoulis and Kavazoglu as well. Left-wing parties on both sides also organized commemorations of events during which Cypriots were killed by extremists from the "motherlands." The Turkish Cypriot CTP held a yearly commemoration for left-wing Turkish Cypriot students (Martyrs for Democracy) killed by extremist right-wing groups in Turkey. AKEL annually commemorated the killings of left-wing Greek Cypriots killed by Greeks and EOKA B supporters during the fighting against the 1974 coup (Commemoration for the Resistance Fighters).

12. See the publications of AKEL (1975/1978, 1984). AKEL (1975/1978) describes the events of July–August 1974, highlighting the killings and torture of AKEL members before and during the coup by EOKA B militants and officers of the Greek junta in Cyprus. On killings of AKEL supporters during 1955–1960 by EOKA, the Greek Cypriot anticolonial fighter's association, see the book by AKEL ex-MP Poumpouris (1993). AKEL (1984) outlines the history of the party, including a section on AKEL's role in creating forums for interethnic cooperation (1984, 117–128). Significantly, this section describes various killings of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot AKEL members (including those of Mishaoulis and Kavazoglu). In its discussion of the interethnic conflict of 1963, it presents an accusatory photograph of Nikos Sampson (later appointed as head of the Republic during the short-lived 1974 coupist government) with the caption "From the so-called 'brave acts' of Nikolaos Sampson and his colleagues during the tragic events of Christmas 1963" (1984, 125).

13. The standard history of Cyprus from an AKEL perspective is the two-volume work of Graikos (1980, 1982). In the introduction, he argues for the existence of a Cypriot identity that renders Greek Cypriots different from Greeks (Graikos 1980, 3–5). In the second volume (Graikos 1982), he is very critical of right-wing extremists such as Grivas and Sampson for attacks against Turkish Cypriots, and he points out various murders of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leftists by right-wingers of their own community. See also Kakoullis (1990), another AKEL-aligned author, who extensively discusses Turkish Cypriot suffering during the 1960s.

14. The best example of this in Cyprus can be found in documentaries rather than in books. The documentary *Our Wall* was jointly produced by a Turkish Cypriot and a Greek Cypriot, both left wing. For a more extensive analysis of the two producers' attempt to create an empathetic and critical space, see Papadakis (2000).

15. Herman and Chomsky (1988/1994, 3–4, 14–15) provide some interesting reasons why the working-class movement in the UK became underrepresented in the media: the industrialization of the media, which necessitated enormous capital costs, and the reliance on advertisers, who were generally unsympathetic to left-wing political discourse and ideology, to cover costs. No such in-depth study exists in Cyprus but it could be reasonably expected that similar factors apply.

16. Navaro-Yashin (this volume), a Turkish ethnographer who ten years later conducted protracted fieldwork among Turkish Cypriots under different conditions, recounts how Turkish Cypriots were much more interested in recounting current problems created by their own authorities, immigrants/settlers from Turkey, and the Turkish army than they were in discussing past problems with Greek Cypriots.

17. Two particularly interesting works in this respect, though they deal with different social contexts, are Herzfeld's (1997) study on cultural intimacy and Scott's (1990) discussion of hidden transcripts.

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FOUR

De-ethnicizing the Ethnography of Cyprus

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONFLICT BETWEEN TURKISH CYPRIOTS AND SETTLERS FROM TURKEY

Yael Navaro-Yashin

In much writing on "the Cyprus question," the problem has been constructed as "a conflict between two ethnic groups," which are branded "Turks" and "Greeks" (e.g., Joseph 1990; Volkan and Itzkowitz 1994). The concept and framework of ethnic conflict has been all too central and determinative in scholarship on Cyprus, leaving it insufficiently challenged. Against the framework of "ethnic conflict," so overblown in political and official discourses in Cyprus and widely reproduced in scholarly agendas and settings of the problem, I wish to do something different here. Rather than researching conflict in the conventionally studied fault line between "Turks and Greeks" or between Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot national discourses and ideologies, I wish to study conflicts internal to northern Cyprus, the territory marked apart and repopulated after Turkey's military invasion in 1974 and predominantly reserved for the habitation of people categorized as "Turks." This chapter focuses on the social and political configurations and dynamics which developed in northern Cyprus after 1974, specifically on conflict between people officially registered as "Turks" and assigned "citizenship" in the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus."[1] I focus on what I deliberately call political and social conflict between Turkish Cypriots who were autochthonous on the island and immigrants from Turkey who were invited to settle in northern Cyprus by the "TRNC" regime.

"Turks on Cyprus"

In Turkish nationalist discourses (or officially produced ideology), Turkish Cypriots and citizens of Turkey are represented as sharing a "nationality" and "ethnicity." Until very recent changes in the representations of Turkish Cypriots, in public discourses in Turkey, Turkish Cypriots have been referred to as "our kinsmen" (*soydaşlarımız*), a term which signifies common lineage and blood. Turkey has presented its military intervention in northern Cyprus as an act undertaken to protect "the Turks of Cyprus" who were facing the danger of being exterminated by "Greeks." Members of this community have been named "Turks of Cyprus," "Cyprus Turks," or "Cypriot Turks" (*Kıbrıs Türkü, Kıbrıs Türkleri*) in official Turkish discourses, phrases emphasizing "Turkishness." In this chapter, I use the term "Turkish Cypriot" to refer to indigenous Cypriots of Turkish contemporary identity. The identities of Cypriots have changed and switched in complicated fashions historically, and "Turkish Cypriot" is a relatively new and contingent term for the designation of identity.[2] This is the term commonly used by autochthonous Turkish Cypriots at present for self-identification. The term "Cypriot" (*Kıbrıslı*), without the ethnic reference point, is used even more widely. Identity constructs are employed situationally, of course. In the contemporary period, "Cypriots" signifies distinction from "people of Turkey" (*Turkiyeliler*), as settlers in northern Cyprus are called by Turkish Cypriots. Here, I intend to display the tentativeness, historicity, complexity, and social construction of identities in Cyprus; therefore, all my references to identity are contingent and situated.

In official Turkish discourses, Turkish Cypriots are considered an extension of the people of Turkey, left behind accidentally after the consolidation of national borders at the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, when Cyprus was left in British and southern Anatolia in Turkish hands. In Turkish nationalist discourse, Turkish Cypriots and citizens of Turkey are all "Turks" or "Turkish," seen as part of the same "national" or "ethnic" group, and Turkish Cypriot culture is constructed as a continuation of Anatolia (Anadolu), which is taken to represent the heart of Turkish culture.

The "president" of the "TRNC," Rauf Denktash, has always recounted his background by declaring that he is "a Turk coincidentally born on Cyprus," emphasizing and highlighting his "Turkishness" and rendering his "Cypriotness" almost epiphenomenal or accidental. Denktash has said:

> I am a child of Anatolia. I am Turkish in every way and my roots go back to Central Asia. I am Turkish with my culture, my language, my history, and my whole being. I have a state as well as a motherland. The notions of "Cypriot culture," "Turkish Cypriot," "Greek Cypriot," "a shared Republic" are all nonsense. If they have their

Greece and we have our Turkey, why should we live under the roof of the same Republic? . . . Some individuals are producing fiction about the existence of "Cypriots," "Turkish Cypriots," "Greek Cypriots." There is no such thing as a "Turkish Cypriot." Don't dare to ask us whether we are "Cypriots." We could take this as an insult. Why? Because there is only one thing that is "Cypriot" in Cyprus, and that is the Cypriot donkey.[3]

Denktash pronounced these words in public in 1995, reflecting on Turkish Cypriot folk dancing performances which were emphasizing figures shared with Greek Cypriots. Many Turkish Cypriots felt angry, insulted, and humiliated by his words, and his donkey metaphor is remembered and widely critiqued in popular anecdotes of this public declaration. On another occasion, Denktash said:

There isn't a nationality called the "TRNC" ["KKTC"]. We are the Turks of the TRNC. We are proud of being Turks. The motherland [Turkey] is also our motherland, our nation. We are a part of that [Turkish] nation which has formed a state in Cyprus.[4]

Until the turnover of parliamentary power in December 2003 and the referendum in April 2004, Denktash's words about his identity were the official policy of the "TRNC." Administrative resources have been channeled into eliminating Cypriot and bringing out Turkish cultural elements in northern Cyprus. And claiming "national" and "ethnic" affinity with Turkey (as Turks, tout court) has served the Denktash regime's desire to go farther than partition (*taksim*) and integrate with Turkey.

In publications of the administration in northern Cyprus, the geographical position of the island of Cyprus, about forty miles from Turkey's southern shores versus around 400 miles away from Greece, is interpreted as proof of the connection of Cyprus to Turkey. Certain publications, such as history books for Turkish Cypriot children, recount that Cyprus used to be attached to Anatolia but that due to an accidental geological transformation in ancient times, it broke away from Turkey and became an island.

Turkish Cypriots and People from Turkey

In northern Cyprus in the period when I conducted this research (the late 1990s), one of the existential matters that most preoccupied Turkish Cypriots was their experience of living side by side with immigrants from Turkey who were settled in northern Cyprus through the population policies of Turkey and the "TRNC." Paramount was the expression of a feeling of having been disturbed by settlers from Anatolia.[5]

Before checkpoints at the borders were opened in April 2003, Turkish Cypriots did not significantly speak about or refer to "Greeks" in informal settings. Conflict with "Greek Cypriots" did not preoccupy or worry them as much as their everyday experiences of living with settlers from Turkey who were granted housing (given Greek property), jobs, and citizenship privileges by the administration in return for settling in northern Cyprus. Unless relatively older members of indigenous families were asked to recount their memories of the wars in Cyprus or the time that preceded the wars, everyday conversation before the opening of the checkpoints did not consist of references to "Greeks" as much as it was almost excessively filled with critical stories about "people from Turkey." Indeed, Turkish Cypriots use the term "people of Turkey" (*Turkiyeliler*) to refer to settlers from Turkey or citizens of Turkey in general and call themselves "Cypriots" (*Kıbrıslılar*) in distinction.[6] Turkish Cypriots on the left of the political spectrum who are critical of Turkey's ongoing military and political presence in Cyprus are not the only ones who are uncomfortable with the presence of settlers from Turkey. Turkish Cypriots of all political convictions express similar feelings.

When speaking about the settlers, Turkish Cypriots most often mention space. They associate the arrival of the settlers, as well as their presence, with the radical spatial transformation of the places most familiar to them, with being entrapped and enclosed in a slice of territory, especially after the partition of the island between north and south. The landscape and the capital city (Nicosia) are bisected by barbed wire, Greek Cypriots on one side and Turkish Cypriots on the other.[7] Many Turkish Cypriots have recently moved house, arguing that it is because of the consequences of the settlement of people from Turkey in inner parts of the cities of northern Cyprus. An old locksmith, Hasan Bey, who supported one of the right-wing Turkish nationalist parties (UBP) at the time of my interview, said, "They threw us out of here," referring to people from Turkey now settled within the city walls of the northern part of Nicosia.[8]

Hasan Bey was born and brought up in Nicosia, which, until the conflicts in 1963 and partition in 1974, was not a city carved in half. It was not until a few years ago that Hasan Bey had to move his family out of the inner city walls of Nicosia and into the outskirts of the city. "We are afraid," he said. "If you try and walk about here at night these days, you are sure to get mugged or knifed." Most significant, the locksmith said he was afraid of what he experienced as the rough and violent ways of the settlers. He recounted that when he asked a man from Turkey not to park his car in a spot that would block the window of the key shop, the settler brusquely turned around, as if getting ready to hit him, and said "Do you know who governs this place?" The settler was symbolically associating himself with

Turkey's military regime in the "TRNC." The paradox is that Hasan Bey, too, was a supporter of the Turkish authority in northern Cyprus and in favor of Turkey's ongoing political, economic, and military presence there. He had been a member of the TMT (*Türk Mukavemet Teşkilati*), the Turkish Resistance Organization, which fought its Greek counterpart EOKA during the period characterized as that of "intercommunal conflicts." On the other hand, for the settler man who argued with Hasan Bey, there was a difference between them. He had expressed a consciousness of having (or a willingness to have) more political power than the native Hasan Bey and even power over him, just because he was from Turkey in a zone under Turkey's sovereignty. The settler identified with the Republic of Turkey as a subject. He wore this identification with the Turkish state as a garment in his interactions with Turkish Cypriots in order to assume power in his everyday relations with them. And he wished Turkish Cypriots to be subordinate in this contingent relationship. That it was Hasan Bey, a supporter of the right-wing UBP, who told me this story is significant. When in private and not worried about being officially exposed, Turkish Cypriots of all political affiliations (not just members and supporters of the opposition groups) express discontent with the presence of people from Turkey in Cyprus.

Turkish Cypriots often gloss or confuse the settlers with soldiers from Turkey, failing to differentiate between these social groups in their representations. In relation to soldiers from Turkey, Yılmaz, a Turkish Cypriot and an enthusiastic reader of the opposition's newspaper *Avrupa* (later *Afrika*) said, "We are terrified." "I am afraid especially of the soldiers," said his wife Emel. "I warn my children not to open the door to soldiers when they are alone at home."

There are said to be about 40,000 soldiers from Turkey still in northern Cyprus, though the exact number is not officially revealed. There are so many soldiers that the economy of contemporary northern Cyprus is geared to their needs. The marketplace of the northern part of Nicosia has been transformed into a shopping place for soldiers.[9] "This place is finished," the owner of a shoe shop said, too sad to recount anything more about the former (pre-1974) vitality of the marketplace. Old trades—pharmacy, shoemaking, carpentry—are disappearing or diminishing due to lack of demand, to be taken over by the ever-multiplying shops that now operate as phone booths for soldiers calling home and by soldiers' coffee shops, tea houses, casinos, and brothels.[10]

Rasime Hanim, a 60-year-old Cypriot shop owner who sells old, worn out, or secondhand bags, books, and odds and ends in the Nicosia marketplace, recounted that "one day a Turkish soldier came and asked me why we don't like them."[11] "I replied," she continued, "telling him that I had fed

the Turkish soldier for years during the war." Turkish Cypriots remember being relieved in 1974 when Turkish soldiers landed in Cyprus with planes and parachutes. At the time, they rejoiced over the arrival of soldiers from Turkey because they thought they would save them from being attacked by Greek Cypriot nationalists. However, their relationship with the soldiers turned out to be much longer and more complicated politically than Turkish Cypriots anticipated at the time. Since 1974, the Turkish military has strengthened its authority in the north of the island, taking over much Greek Cypriot as well as Turkish Cypriot property, land, and resources. Certain former Greek Cypriot and mixed villages have been practically transformed into barracks, where markets and residential areas are geared to the needs of soldiers and their families. A very high proportion of land and space in northern Cyprus is designated as a military zone, which means that it is either military barracks, barricades, or an area under total military control, leaving limited space for those categorized as "civilians" to operate freely. One finds military roadblocks at many intersections. Border areas between the north and the south of Cyprus are heavily guarded. Barbed wire and military signs indicate no-access zones. The army has inscribed nationalist slogans and images on hills, slopes, and mountaintops, overtaking and overcrowding views of the landscape from close up and from afar. Inscriptions on the landscape read "Fatherland First,"[12] "Conquer, Shoot, and Take Pride," "Service to the Army Is Our Honor," and "How Happy Is the Person Who Calls Himself a Turk." Soldiers are everywhere, either in person or through their symbols: khaki-colored military cars; red-and-white barrels marking off access zones; guns, rifles, and uniforms; cleanly shaven heads; and the occasional sound of shooting practice in the barracks.[13]

If some Turkish Cypriots do not express fear, they do indicate a certain unease beside Turkish soldiers. One young boy who was eight years old wanted to draw my attention to "what 'Turkish soldiers' do." "One day," Tamer said,

> two "Turkish soldiers" were passing by our garden. They stopped under our orange trees and started to fill their bags with oranges. My father came and asked them why they were picking the fruit without permission. And the soldier said: "Who rescued you? [*Seni kim kurtardı?*]"

The little boy was aware of Turkish soldiers' discourse about the presence of the Turkish army in Cyprus. Soldiers had arrived in Cyprus in 1974 "to rescue their kinsmen from being exterminated by Greeks." And yet Tamer was also conscious of the irony of the situation with this soldier brusquely claiming an entitlement to his father's orange grove. Emel, Tamer's mother,

said that after that event in the orange grove, she warned her husband against arguing with people from Turkey, whether they were soldiers or settlers. "If you argue with them, they can bring you trouble; you can't know what they are capable of doing," she said. There is a representational gloss here, again, between the settlers and the soldiers from Turkey. Yılmaz states that he is careful with people from Turkey in general. He does not defend himself when harassed. He has assumed the position of the political subordinate in their presence. He recounts:

> This place belongs to the soldiers and to people from Turkey. Everything else exists only by chance. There is an extraordinary situation here, a state of emergency. If you were to worry every day about what happens here, you would lose the endurance to live here. If you live here, you have no choice but to accept the situation as it is. We, for example, have submitted ourselves, we have let ourselves be abased [under the presence of settlers and soldiers]. Otherwise they would not let us survive.

This was a description of a survival strategy with a consciousness of relations of power under military laws; an enforced and unwillingly assumed condition of submission. Yılmaz bowed to the authorities, he explained, because he knew that he was the subject of a repressive political regime. He sensed and felt the repression in the no-access zones that surrounded his everyday itinerary, in his relatives' and colleagues' cautious demeanor around him when he dared to be critical of the administration, in the barbed wire everywhere, in the convoys of military trucks passing by. . . . He had nowhere else to go. He had to live in northern Cyprus. So he felt that he had to submit.

Turkish Cypriots specifically complained about the settlers. Elderly Pembe Hanim said:

> The "infidels" were "infidels" [*gavur,* referring to Greek Cypriots in common language], but things were never as bad living with them as they are now living with the *fellahs* [referring to settlers from Turkey].[14] When we had financial difficulties, "the infidel" used to lend us money. If we were sick, he would help, he would call for a doctor. Now, the *fellahs* would not give you anything. On the contrary, they take, they steal from you.

Pembe Hanim's pitting of "Greeks" against "Turks" in her comparison is situated and contingent. She is reflecting on her past experience with Greek Cypriots in comparison with her present experience of living beside people from Turkey. She distinguishes herself markedly from both Greek Cypriots and people from Turkey, using othering terms to refer to each. However, she says that in spite of difference in religion (note her use of the term "infidel"), life was better living side by side with Greek Cypriots than it has been living with people from Turkey who are her co-religionists.

Settler communities from Turkey are not homogeneous; they have a complex composition. Most settlers are in Cyprus because they had experienced difficulties, some social, some economic, some political, in Turkey. When they received promises of jobs, land, and free housing in northern Cyprus after 1974 under Turkey's population policies, they came with hopes of better prospects. Although they were categorized as "Turks" by policymakers, settlers are of diverse backgrounds—Laz (from Turkey's Black Sea region), Kurdish, Arabic, as well as Turkish. However, many settlers will identify as "Turkish" (at least officially) and will speak in favor of Turkey's military presence in Cyprus because it is as a consequence of being categorized as "Turks" that settlers have obtained benefits in the "TRNC." Generally, until the late 1990s, settlers from Turkey (and even those who identify as left wing in Turkey) cast their votes for the right-wing Turkish nationalist parties in northern Cyprus (DP or UBP)[15] and in favor of Turkey's continuing sovereignty in northern Cyprus. The DP and UBP are known to distribute citizenship as well as other favors and benefits to settlers from Turkey in return for votes. Other than the actual settlers, or those who were effectively granted property and citizenship rights by the Turkish Cypriot administration, there are many other categories of immigrants from Turkey in northern Cyprus: some who have arrived for temporary work, others who work under the counter and who are considered "illegal immigrants" under the "TRNC" regime. However, in Turkish Cypriot representations, all immigrants from Turkey are lumped together, as if there were no internal social or cultural differentiation among people arriving in northern Cyprus from Turkey.[16]

Turkish Cypriots express and analyze their distinction from settlers using terms that represent difference and social class (Bourdieu 1984). Turkish Cypriots differentiate themselves from people from Turkey particularly on the grounds of lifestyle. They tell "Turks" apart from "Cypriots" through certain symbolic markers that they have come to associate with "the culture of Turkey." Veiling, or the many fashions of wearing a headscarf, for example, out of habit or faith (unless done in a particular Cypriot way, with the corners of the scarf tied together at the top), is commonly associated with "the culture of Turkey." "Cypriot women generally do not tie their heads," said a young woman, using a common idiom in Turkish for veiling.[17]

"You can tell someone from Turkey through the way she keeps her house," said a Turkish-Cypriot woman, articulating a distinction that Cypriots commonly make of people from Turkey. "For example, a Cypriot would never put a fake or plastic carpet on the floor. Anyway in summer we don't have a habit of using carpets." But, most significantly, Turkish Cypriots tell people from Turkey apart from their gardens. Particularly in the urban areas of Cyprus, gardening, like cooking, is an important com-

ponent of everyday life. Remarkable passion is expressed about trees and flowers and much attention is given to their care. Trees and flowers are so close to the heart that Cypriots are distraught when they notice ill-kept or dried-out gardens. Ibrahim Bey, an old gardener who has lived in Nicosia for the latter part of his life, was annoyed by the way he thought the settlers treated trees. "They do not know of trees," he said:

> We were born in the midst of trees, we grew up with trees. Where people of Turkey come from, there are mountains, there are forests. . . . They know how to hoe, but they cannot tell a flower and a weed apart.

Ibrahim Bey frequently told stories of settlers leaving trees to dry or burning flowers and bushes to create fields. He was commenting that the settlers did not have local knowledge.

In the same vein, Turkish Cypriot narratives about people from Turkey were imbued with symbols of lifestyle, class, and culture. However, the relationship between Turkish Cypriots and people from Turkey is a complex one of power which cannot be explained using classical approaches to social class. Also, this particular social and political relation ought not be confused with the relationship of Germans to worker immigrants from Turkey or with the relationship between Istanbul's middle classes and immigrants to the city from rural parts of Anatolia. In this historical contingency, the relationship between people from Turkey and Turkish Cypriots has to be evaluated in the context of Turkey's political power in northern Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots' attitudes toward the settlers cannot be analyzed in a vacuum by applying universalizing or objectivist concepts of "class" or "migration"; it must be analyzed within the particularities and peculiarity of the political situation in northern Cyprus and the ensuing sociopolitical spectrum. A more careful analysis would seek to study relations between Turkish Cypriots and settlers as complicated and situational points of positionality in the context of a political space governed and controlled by a repressive administration and military power. Although Turkish Cypriots resort to their local cultural capital when speaking about people from Turkey, they do so through a feeling of resentment about Turkey's policies, whose practices are represented in the presence of settlers in northern Cyprus. The relation of power is complex between Turkish Cypriots and settlers. In most domains of social, political, and economic life in northern Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots maintain a standing, for example holding privileged access to jobs as civil servants in most departments of the administration. With their social and kinship networks, Turkish Cypriots are able to manipulate the administration to serve their needs or those of their families. Although Turkish Cypriots are able to play the card of sociocultural capital against the settlers, settlers attempt to assume an affinity with (or patronage from)

the Turkish state and army in Cyprus in order to claim another kind of power over the Turkish Cypriots.[18] Turkish Cypriots express their fear of political subordination under Turkey's sovereignty through their symbolically charged comments about people from Turkey. Settlers, on the other hand, often attempt to overcome their sociocultural humiliation under the Turkish Cypriots by declaring their alliance with Turkey as its citizens and assuming a Turkey-centered nationalist discourse.

Pembe Hanim's relationship with the settlers was characteristic. A native of Paphos (Baf) who lived in a house formerly owned by a Greek Cypriot family in what used to be a cosmopolitan Greek, Armenian, and Turkish Cypriot neighborhood, Pembe Hanim frequently complained about people from Turkey who had become her neighbors. She looked down upon the settlers and used markers of social and cultural distinction to describe her difference from them. Her narrative was full of derogatory remarks about their lifestyle. She, like other Turkish Cypriots, had felt violated by people from Turkey and had heard stories from her neighbors of similar experiences.

> We had lent our house in the back garden to a family from Turkey. After a year, we asked them to leave. One day, I noticed a young man jumping over the fence. He was trying to steal some wood planks. I caught him and held him by his arm so that he would not escape. He in turn clutched my arm over my bracelet. He held me so hard that the bracelet cut through my wrist. When I saw the blood, I panicked and let him go. We immediately informed the police about this. The police came and wrote a report. But then there was nothing. No follow-up, nothing.

Turkish Cypriots recounted experiences like this all the time. Yılmaz and Emel's children told me the story of an old woman from their village who was murdered by Turkish soldiers who broke into her house and stole her belongings. Incidents of violence between people from Turkey and Turkish Cypriots illustrate the social and political differences among them in this complex relation of power. In July 1998, the northern Cyprus newspaper *Kibris* reported the incident of a Turkish Cypriot couple who blew their horn at two settler men who were urinating on the side of the road, only to be traced down through their car's license plate, found at home, and beaten up by the settlers. Another story was recounted of a Turkish Cypriot woman who broke off her affair with a Turkish soldier, after which the soldier raided her house and killed her husband. Ibrahim Bey likewise told the story of an elderly friend who died very soon after marrying a settler woman from Turkey; the woman inherited all his property. Ibrahim Bey was convinced that the woman had married the old man on purpose, knowing that he did not have much longer to live; he had seen other similar cases.

Turkish Cypriots did not find the police in northern Cyprus on their

side in such incidents of conflict with the settlers. They complained that there were no authorities that they could turn to for help on such occasions. At times, Turkish Cypriot authorities, including the Turkish Cypriot police, were themselves at a loss as to how to react to the settlers, so they refrained from intervening in the conflicts. Hence, Pembe Hanim was fearful of, and cautious with, the settlers.

Since 1974, Turkey has had a policy of increasing the "Turkish" population of Cyprus vis-à-vis those categorized as "Greeks." There have also been extensive institutional efforts to assimilate Turkish Cypriots into what is called "the Turkish culture" of Anatolia, policies implemented through various bodies, primarily schools, the media, and the army. One dimension of the context for Turkish Cypriots' othering of the settlers is the minute and enforced Turkeyfication[19] policies of the Denktash administration in northern Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots have a poignant sense that they are being culturally evacuated, though they will express this in different ways, depending on their political party affiliations. Generally, Turkish Cypriots' practical responses to such policies of nationalization have been to either escape and leave (one of the reasons for the sizeable population of Turkish Cypriots in Britain, Australia, and Canada) or to endure, support, submit to, or resist such implementations in northern Cyprus. In response to the inquiries about the migration of Turkish Cypriots out of northern Cyprus, Rauf Denktash has often publicly announced: "One Turk leaves, and another one arrives," expressing indifference to the outmigration of Turkish Cypriots, as though they were simply strategic indices in a politics of population against Greek Cypriots on the island. A large proportion of Turkish Cypriots have actually left Cyprus. Statistics are politically charged in Cyprus and no one is too sure about the population statistics of settlers against Turkish Cypriots because the censuses in northern Cyprus register all "Muslims" as "Turks," regardless of background.[20] But many Turkish Cypriots feel that they have been outnumbered by the settlers. The authorities in Turkey and the "TRNC" prefer settlers over Turkish Cypriots because they are better subjects of the regime. In this context, Turkish Cypriots express feelings that they have been invaded and culturally and physically annihilated. Emin, a young Turkish Cypriot who has seen most of his close friends leave Cyprus to become immigrants in Britain and Canada, said:

> We are "the Last of the Mohicans." They turned us into "Indians." They got rid of a whole culture. At least there are people who still remember the "Indians." But who will remember us?

Because they could not freely make political remarks about Turkey's population and assimilation policies, at least not until the shift in gov-

ernmental power in the "TRNC," Turkish Cypriots have politicized their everyday life. In fact, many Turkish Cypriots who tell critical stories about the settlers do not intend to make clear political statements against Turkish nationalism or Turkey's official policies. Anxious or wary of contradicting official Turkish discourse about settlement, a retired Turkish Cypriot police officer qualified his remarks about the settlers by saying that "it was good that 'people from Turkey' came here; otherwise we would have remained here as a minority amongst the Greeks." But in more private moments the retired officer lamented the administration's policies regarding Turkish Cypriots living abroad. Turkish Cypriots feel, then, that they count less than the settlers from Turkey, in certain circumstances, under the "state" that claims to represent them. But they more rarely make explicit political remarks. It is in more subtle ways, through ordinary discussions about eating, drinking, gardening, and housekeeping, that they produce commentary on their existential situation.

Conclusions

In the discourses of international organizations as well as in much academic scholarship, there are two sides to conflict in Cyprus, "the Turkish side" and "the Greek side." Official discourses in Turkey, Greece, the Republic of Cyprus, and the "TRNC" would also have it as such. The language of ethnic difference is still central to politics in Cyprus. But since partition and the implementation of specific administrative policies in the north (as well as in the south), social and political dynamics in Cyprus have shifted in fundamental ways. "Conflict" now must be analyzed in new and complex ways. Under Turkey's military and political control in northern Cyprus since 1974, Turkish Cypriots and people from Turkey have been put in contingent, complex, and specific relations of power. Turkish Cypriots and settlers from Turkey perceive cultural difference in one another, though they are classified as "kinsmen" or as members of the same "ethnic" or "national group" in the dominant political discourses. The political context of northern Cyprus has generated social and political dynamics of its own.

Although international discourses (including those of international organizations and states and in academic scholarship) construct and imagine "a Turkish side" to what is conventionally called "ethnic conflict in Cyprus," in opposition to "a Greek side," such an essential side does not exist. Those who have been discursively categorized as members of the same "ethnic" or "national group" (i.e., "Turkish") do not perceive or experience themselves as such in the specific relations of power they have developed among themselves under the existing political regime. Those officially categorized as "kinsmen" (*soydaş*), or members of the same "ethnic" or "national group"

(in this case "Turks"), distinguish among one another. Although the categories that dominate nationalist and internationalist discourses on Cyprus do not assign separate group consciousness to people from Turkey and Turkish Cypriots, people living in northern Cyprus have created these categories through their experience and consciousness of social and political difference (which they articulate as "cultural difference"). Their experience with one another—that is, social and political conflict—has pushed them to counter the "national" or "ethnic" straitjackets specific regimes and population policies impose on them, in turn inventing new categories for cultural identity.

This discussion of differential consciousness among those "ethnically" classified as "Turks" sheds light on group consciousnesses that contradict the logic of nationalism and ethnonationalism. The intention is to focus our analytical lenses on *political* as opposed to "ethnic" conflict. There is a conflict to be studied, as is evident in peoples' experiences, but it is not "ethnic" and it is not just between "Turks and Greeks," the rubric that has so dominated imaginaries of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. It is time for the notion of "ethnic conflict," which has dominated both official and scholarly discourses about Cyprus, to be replaced with analytical terms that attend to other social and political dynamics.

Notes

1. The "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" declared itself a "state" under the auspices of the Denktash administration in northern Cyprus in 1983. But the "TRNC" has not been recognized by the international community; its only supporter is its patron, the Republic of Turkey. I use quotation marks to refer to the "TRNC" not only to mark its unrecognized status in international law but also to bring out the liminal position Turkish Cypriots have found themselves in as a result, entrapped between legality and illegality of status and identity. For a study of the use of the quotation marks in international documents on the "TRNC" and the implications of this for Turkish Cypriots, see Navaro-Yashin (2003a).

2. Until the development of nationalism in Cyprus, the term "Turkish Cypriot" did not exist. People identified as "Muslims" or as "Ottomans" (Ateşin 1999). For the development of Turkish Cypriot identity during the colonial period, see Bryant (this volume); for comparable debates on identity among Greek Cypriots, see Peristianis (this volume). It must be mentioned that there is a significant history of conversion in Cyprus from Greek Orthodoxy or Catholicism to Islam and vice versa; thus my emphasis on the contingency,

tentativeness, and social construction of cultural identities. For studies on cosmopolitanism in Cyprus, see Yashin (2000, 2002).

3. Denktash quoted in Belge (2002).

4. Ibid.

5. The research for this chapter was conducted in the late 1990s. This chapter is not a comprehensive study of settlers from Turkey, only a study of Turkish Cypriot perceptions of and representations about people from Turkey. For a thorough study of settlers from Turkey, with new evidence, see Hatay 2005.

6. "Cypriots" do not refer to the settlers as "settlers" or as "immigrants." In fact, there are no specific words for these concepts in colloquial Turkish in Cyprus today. The term that "Cypriots" use in everyday conversations is, as I have mentioned, "people of Turkey." "Cypriots" distinguish between themselves and "people of Turkey" by employing several mechanisms of othering. This distinction cuts through the official claims to "kinship" between Turkish Cypriots and people from Turkey, all of whom are classified as "Turks" by Turkey and the "TRNC." Until the recent turnover of parliament and the opposition's assumption of power under the leadership of Mehmet Ali Talat, Turkish Cypriot officials of the administration in northern Cyprus did not use the term "people of Turkey" when on duty, as it would have countered the integrationist policies of Turkey and the Denktash regime. Instead they employed the term "the motherlanders" (*anavatanlılar*), glossing implications of internal difference among "Turks" with metaphors of "kinship" between "motherland" (*anavatan*) Turkey and "infantland" (*yavruvatan*) "TRNC" and thereby constructing a symbolic parental relationship between people of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots.

7. For studies of Turkish Cypriots' experiences of confinement and space in northern Cyprus, see Navaro-Yashin (2003b) and Navaro-Yashin (2005).

8. Although Turkish Cypriots blame settlement and population policies for their moves out of Nicosia's inner city walls, in fact this move had started to take place even before the arrival of immigrants from Turkey. Nicosia was not "settled," as it were, through specific policies, as was, for example, the Karpaz region. Rather, immigrants from Turkey arrived in Nicosia's inner city after the official settlement policies, for temporary or sometimes unregistered work (Mete Hatay, personal communication).

9. This account refers to the period that preceded the opening of checkpoints at the border in April 2003. Since access has been allowed across the border, the economy of northern Nicosia, and northern Cyprus more generally, has begun to address Greek Cypriot shoppers as well as tourists.

10. Cynthia Enloe (1989) has studied similar features of militarization.

11. Turkish Cypriots use the term "Turkish soldier" (*Türk askeri*) to refer exclusively to soldiers from Turkey and not to Turkish Cypriot soldiers. The latter are called *mucahitler,* a reference to guerilla fighters in the period of intercommunal conflict.

12. A distinction must be made between the term "*vatan*" used in this slogan and the term "*anavatan*" ("motherland"). A better translation of "*vatan,*" as used in nationalist slogans, is "fatherland," a more abstract concept that encompasses both "mother" and "infant" lands.

13. After complaints by Turkish Cypriot civilians, the Turkish army has more recently allowed soldiers to roam without their uniforms when off duty and outside the barracks.

14. The use of the word "*fellah*" in the Turkish vernacular of Cyprus is different from its use in the Turkish vernaculars of Turkey and its meaning in Arabic. In Turkish (of Turkey), "*fellah*" means "farmer," "Egyptian peasant," or "Arab." For this, see for example, the dictionary of the Türk Dil Kurumu (Turkish Language Association 1988, 493). In Arabic, "*fellah*" means "peasant" (see Fahmy 1997). In contrast, in the Turkish vernacular of Cyprus, "*fellah*" is used interchangeably with "*cingane*" to metaphorically refer to "gypsies" or

"dispossessed people" (see the *Dictionary of Words Collected from the Vernacular of Cyprus,* compiled by Hakeri [1981, 27]). The term "*fellah*" in the contemporary Turkish Cypriot vernacular does not include a reference to "Arabs." In fact, many Turkish Cypriots, and especially those from the Famagusta region, claim "Arab" backgrounds and kinship, explicitly referring to their "Arab" (sometimes "Egyptian") ancestors with pride. "*Fellah*" is an othering term that Turkish Cypriots use to specifically refer to settlers from Turkey of a particular lifestyle. For a study of different uses of the Turkish language (or multiple Turkishes) with specific reference to the Turkish Cypriot dialect, see Yashin (2000, 2002).

15. Hatay (2005) has noted that this political profile of the settlers has changed more recently.

16. Under-the-table workers from Turkey work and live in the most difficult conditions and without work permits from the "TRNC." Such workers do not have the "rights" granted to the officially approved settlers in northern Cyprus. When Turkish Cypriots speak of people from Turkey, they refer to illegal workers as well. However, their comments are mainly directed against the settlers who are given political privileges in North Cyprus.

17. Women's veiling has been constructed as the central marker of class and culture (see Gole 1996; Navaro-Yashin 2002). Turkish Cypriots are aware of such discussions in Turkey in a removed manner, mainly through television, but also through their visits to Turkey and their temporary residence there for study and work. However, the associations that Turkish Cypriots make with veiling must be studied in their own context without being confused with cultural politics internal to Turkey. For Turkish Cypriots in the contemporary period, veiling is one marker, among many, of the cultural transformation of Cyprus through Turkey's policies of settlement. Unlike secularists in Turkey who critique Islamists from a position of power (in alliance with the secularist state and the army), Turkish Cypriots refer to veiling from a position of political subordination vis-à-vis the Turkish state.

18. Such attempts by the settlers are not always successful.

19. Here, the distinction "Turkey-fication" from "Turkification" is necessary, because the policies of the administration in northern Cyprus are geared to assimilate the Turkish Cypriot language and culture into that of Turkey. There are official attempts to make more proper "Turks" out of the Turkish Cypriots by teaching the official Turkish language of Turkey in schools and discouraging the use of the Turkish Cypriot dialect, changing place names in Cyprus (not only of Greek Cypriot locations but also of old Turkish Cypriot villages) to names that recall places in Turkey, and introducing "the culture of Turkey" as that of Turkish Cypriots.

20. See Hatay (2005) for a more updated account of population statistics in northern Cyprus.

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FIVE

Cypriot Nationalism,
Dual Identity, and Politics

Nicos Peristianis

In the last few decades there has been a veritable explosion in the study of ethnicity, nationalism, and ethnic/national identity in virtually all fields of the social sciences, a development which obviously relates to the resurgence of these phenomena in the real world. In social anthropology, ethnicity has been a main preoccupation since the late 1960s, but nationalism began attracting attention only from the 1980s onward. One of the main reasons for the relative delay in paying due attention to the nation and nationalism had to do with anthropology's focus on the concrete and on small communities that could be studied with the traditional tools of the trade: participant observation, interviews, and surveys. The national state was considered to be out of scope of the discipline, to be dealt with only as part of the "wider context" impacting on the community under study. Similarly, an "imagined community" such as the nation was considered too vague and national/ethnic identity too esoteric or private to constitute legitimate domains of research. Such phenomena were left to others—historians, political scientists, social psychologists, and sociologists—to handle (Eriksen 1993).

Peter Loizos, a firm believer in a "broader view of social anthropology's scope," was one of the first anthropologists to enter this new terrain.[1] His initial fieldwork in Cyprus (reported in *The Greek Gift*)[2] aimed at studying politics in a local village—not so much as a small-scale isolated community but as an entity with complex interrelationships with the state. His analysis

integrated micro and macro levels of analysis. He subsequently produced a number of papers and books on various aspects of nationalism, interethnic relations, and ethnic conflict in Cyprus, which remain some of the best available analyses on these subjects (Loizos 1972/2001, 1974, 1977, 1981, 1988). In one of these papers (1974), he derided anthropologists who were skeptical of the discipline's ability to cope with phenomena such as those he was considering, insisting that the knowledge acquired through intensive fieldwork on the interaction of small- and large-scale events (in his own case, "the increasing involvement of a village in national politics") was a solid enough base for moving into the study of more complex phenomena, such as nationalism.

Loizos's work focuses almost exclusively on one version of nationalism in Cyprus, the "ethnic" variant. There is little, if any, analysis of the "territorial/civic" type of nationalism which in many other countries proved to be a main contestant for ethnic nationalism. Interestingly enough, his widely acclaimed essay on the topic is titled "The Progress of Greek Nationalism in Cyprus, 1878–1970" (Loizos 1974) and deals only with *enosis* (which he views as "a particular political platform" that promotes the goal of "political union with mainland Greece"), effectively identifying nationalism with *enosis*. The reason for this is simple: Loizos did not believe that there was another type of nationalism among Greek Cypriots, since, as he saw it, *enosis* "excluded other possible nationalisms, for example, a *Cypriot* nationalism which would have sought to unite the island's Greek and Turkish populations" (ibid., 35). Furthermore, as he points out, the prevalence of an ethnic type of nationalism led to the sustenance and cultivation of "hellenic identity," which proved to be a barrier to the development of an overarching identity and "a genuinely Cypriot citizenship" in the newly created Cyprus Republic (Loizos 1976/2001, 79). Yet in recent years the view has been documented (Attalides 1979; Stamatakis 1991; Papadakis 1993; Peristianis 1995; Mavratsas 1998) that a Cypriot or territorial/civic brand of nationalism did develop in Cyprus and, as I try to argue below, it is, in fact, only in the interrelationship of ethnic and civic nationalisms that we can better understand politics and identity formation in Cyprus.

Although the distinction between these two variants of nationalism is well supported elsewhere,[3] it may be useful to briefly sketch the basic differences. Territorial/civic nationalism sees the nation as a political community of citizens (*staatsnation*) that inhabits a given territory and whose members are equal before the law irrespective of ethnicity, religion, class, or other particularistic criteria. An additional feature, which is problematic in the case of Greek Cypriots, whom this chapter focuses on, includes the sharing of a common culture that is responsible for the development of a sense of solidarity through common meanings, values, myths, and symbols.[4]

Ethnic nationalism sees the nation as a cultural community (*kulturnation*) that is "formed on the basis of a pre-existing *ethnie* and ethnic ties" and focuses attention on "the genealogy of its members, however fictive; on popular mobilization of the 'folk'; on native history and customs; and on the vernacular culture" (Smith 1983). Thus, national identity and nationalism are seen to precede the establishment of the state and citizenship to be organically tied to ethnicity.[5]

The Progress of Cypriot Nationalism and Its Contest with Ethnonationalism

Ethnic nationalism among Greek Cypriots focused its primary attention on Greece (hellenocentrism), seeing Greek Cypriots as part of the greater cultural community of the Greek nation (*ethnos*). The *enosis* movement was part of Greek irredentism (the Megali Idea),[6] the prevailing ideology once the Greek state was formed, which entailed the vision of liberating those regarded as "Greeks still under foreign yoke" and bringing them under one political roof (Gellner's congruence of cultural with political borders). Inevitably, the emphasis on the concept of nationhood became associated with an ethnic definition of national identity.

By contrast, territorial/civic nationalism focused primarily on Cyprus (cyprocentrism), emphasizing the elements that unite all Cypriots, regardless of ethnicity, into one people (*laos*). Territory was one obvious element of unity, but there were difficulties with regard to the vision and subsequent reality of the state and its civic institutions, supposedly the main vehicle of unity in this paradigm. The hegemonic discourse within each of the two main ethnic communities on the island has been emphasizing their very different cultures and each group as a part of two separate "mothernations." The forging of a nation-state was beyond imagination, and the compromise in 1960 of a biethnic state was the only remaining alternative, which accounts for the dual loyalties and identities that have developed.

A brief review of the progress of territorial/civic nationalism and its antagonism with ethnic nationalism can facilitate a better appreciation of today's configuration of politico-ideological forces in Cypriot society. A first expression of Cypriot nationalism appeared in the 1920s, introduced by the two newly founded parties of the lower classes: the Rural Party of Cyprus (AKK) and the Communist Party of Cyprus (KKK). The latter, which proved to be the more dynamic and longer-lasting carrier of the new radical ideas, advocated that Greeks and Turks of the island struggle against imperialism together with the aim of achieving independence under a worker-peasant government. It was vehemently opposed to *enosis,* which it considered a ploy of the Orthodox Church and the bourgeoisie to keep

the masses divided and under their control. The KKK's views met with little support: the conservative tendencies of Cypriot society, the attachment of the peasants to religion and the Orthodox Church (rather than the atheistic messages of historical materialism), and the virtual absence of a proletariat in conditions of underdevelopment (in which agriculture was the most prevalent economic sector and industry was in its infancy) rendered its proclamations unrealistic and its power and impact insignificant.[7]

In the 1940s, AKEL succeeded the KKK as a popular front party, unifying a broad spectrum of "progressive" individuals of communist, socialist, social democratic, and even liberal leanings. It staunchly opposed established politicians and colonialism and supported cooperation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but it pursued an ambivalent policy with regard to the goal of *enosis.*[8] Its militant trade union activism, strong support for worker and peasant rights, and cohesive party organization won it a mass following, so much so that the leadership of the Church (*ethnarchy*) and its allies (the bourgeoisie) began to seriously worry. Despite some early victories, its opponents managed eventually to win the upper hand and consolidate their leadership by taking charge of the 1955 struggle against colonialism. AKEL's exclusion from the struggle brought it shame and marginalization in political matters for a long time to come. The allied forces of the right, which were more firmly identified with hellenocentric ideals, emerged from this period triumphant.[9]

This meant that during the first years of independence in 1960, AKEL was quite deferential toward President Makarios, leader of the Church and of the newly founded state.[10] Most Greek Cypriots at this stage considered independence to be only a first stage toward *enosis.* When the realization gradually grew that this was no longer a feasible goal, simmering intraethnic tensions began to escalate. Makarios, who had to worry about intercommunal rivalry, threats from Turkey, and strained relations with Greece, was forced to increasingly distance himself from ethnic nationalist goals, and in 1968 he declared that *enosis,* though still the "ideal" goal, was nevertheless hardly "realizable" (at least under the circumstances of the times), signaling his turn to the more realistic policy of supporting independence.[11]

Henceforth two camps began to crystallize within the Greek Cypriot community. A small minority of "unrepentant enosists," who insisted on immediate union with Greece at whatever cost, and willing or grudging supporters of independence, most of whom maintained hopes for *enosis* at some point in the distant future (or at least used the rhetoric of that hope). AKEL quickly turned into an ardent supporter of the independent state, relieved to see the power of ethnic nationalism dwindling. In fact, the great majority of Greek Cypriots did rally around Makarios, who continued to command more than 95 percent of the votes! They thus became identi-

fied with their leader as Makariakoi or *anexartisiakoi* (pro-Makarios or pro-independence) and their opponents, of the extreme right, as Grivikoi or *enotikoi* (pro-Grivas or pro-*enosis*).[12] Since the first camp was becoming increasingly loyal to the Cypriot state while their opponents' primary loyalty seemed to be with the greater Hellenic nation (or simply Greece), one could discern in these developments a new phase in the progress of territorial/civic nationalism (even though the majority of its adherents still clung to Hellenic ethnic symbols).

In the years right after 1974, Cyprus nationalism gained undisputed prominence in reaction to what was widely perceived to be the "great betrayal" of Greece—that is, the Greek junta's staging of the coup in Cyprus and Greece's subsequent inability to forestall the Turkish invasion.[13] The political right was discredited, and so were hellenocentric ideals, which had all along been more strongly associated with the right. A broad alliance of left and center parties (AKEL, EDEK, DIKO) managed to exclude the large right-wing party (DISI) from power and brand it with the stigma of "traitorship" for many years to come. There was a belated appreciation of the benefits of independence, *enosis* was declared officially dead, and reunification of the island became the new goal to strive for. The only weapon of Greek Cypriots against Turkey's military might was a political one, namely the international recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. Thus the integrity and autonomy of the state acquired immense significance: for the first time after the formation of a Cypriot independent state, an Independence Day was specified and the Cypriot flag was hoisted on government buildings and in official state celebrations. Relations with Turkish Cypriots became equally important (they were now seen to be, after all, citizens of the state, the Republic of Cyprus, who were "led astray" by their own leadership and Turkey), and this found expression in the policy of rapprochement. The Neo-Cypriot Association, formed right after the events of 1974, is a characteristic example of the cyprocentric turn in this period (viz., its emphasis on beginning to "think first as Cypriots and then as Greeks or Turks," the need to promote "love of country, understanding between its communities, [and] the consolidation of a democratic way of life"; Peristianis 1995).

By the late 1980s, however, it had become obvious that a process of reversal had set in and that hellenocentrism was staging a comeback: among other factors, this had to do with the many problems the broad antiright front faced in government and the continuing impasse of the Cyprus Problem, which necessitated renewed relationships with (the now democratic) Greece—seen to be the only defense in the unequal struggle against Turkey, an adversary of much greater military strength. With the ascent of socialist A. Papandreou to power, closer links developed between official Greece and center or left-of-center parties in Cyprus (DIKO and

EDEK). Relations with Greece on all fronts were rejuvenated; only AKEL remained aloof. Parallel to these political processes, the rapid and massive modernization accompanying the "economic miracle" in the south, together with the opening up of society as a result of the globalization process, enhanced feelings of rootlessness within Greek Cypriot society, so that hellenocentrism and its perceived association with age-old roots and values started to gain renewed attraction, no longer as a political goal of union with Greece but as a desire for cultural resistance and rejuvenation. Interestingly enough, the most prominent division of this period was not between left- and right-wing parties, but between a new realignment of so-called soft-liners (*endotikoi*/concessionists) against hard-liners (*aporiptikoi*/rejectionists) around their respective stances with regard to the solution to the Cyprus Problem; to a large extent the former coincided with civic and the latter with ethnic nationalism. In this realignment, AKEL and DISI were considered to be in the soft camp, whereas EDEK and DIKO, the centrist parties, in the hard-line camp. To further refine the picture, it should be pointed that there were similar rifts within each of the parties, primarily perhaps DISI, which managed to turn this internal division into a resource, emphasizing either of its two "faces" according to the purpose at hand. The ascent to power in 1993 of Clerides, founder and longtime leader of DISI (a right-wing party), on a hard-line platform, with the help of DIKO (center) and the tolerance of EDEK (center-left), can be seen as the logical outcome and the merging of all of these trends.

One could thus propose that the political terrain in contemporary Cyprus cannot be comprehended by resorting to the traditional left and right dichotomy as a way to refer to sociopolitical ideologies, practices, and orientations, as if representing positions on an imaginary one-dimensional continuum.[14] A better understanding may be reached by utilizing a second pair of polarities representing loyalty to nation (hellenocentrism/ethnic nationalism) and loyalty to state (cyprocentrism/territorial-civic nationalism). If we depict this as an imaginary vertical axis that intersects the previous horizontal one, we end up with a two-dimensional grid that more accurately represents the field of forces previously analyzed (see fig. 5.1). This two-dimensional grid allows us to demonstrate that political parties and individuals may be characterized by multiple loyalties and identities. AKEL and EDEK, for instance, may both be left-wing parties, but AKEL tends to put more stress on the state than the nation. Thus, we would expect a large majority of AKEL supporters to fall within the third quadrant and only a few in the fourth, and we would expect EDEK to have a smaller number of supporters than AKEL in the third quadrant. We could anticipate that DISI's supporters would be divided (not necessarily equally) between the first and second quadrants, and so on.[15]

Loyalty to Nation
(Ethnic Nationalism)

IV   I

Left   Right

III   II

Loyalty to State
(Civic Nationalism)

FIGURE 5.1.

Nationalism, Political Ideologies,
and Dual Ethnic Identity

So far exposition has concentrated on the analysis of nationalism and political ideologies. I now consider how these abstract ideologies are manifested at the level of individual identifications. But how can one determine the way Cypriots view themselves, the extent to which they identify with the "left" or the "right" political ideology and the extent to which they feel "Cypriot" and/or "Greek"?

William Bloom reminds us that ideologies on their own cannot "evoke identification" in a "psychological vacuum" but must be underpinned by "appropriate attitudes," modes of behavior, and "identity-securing interpretive systems" for dealing with real situations.[16] In other words, people identify with an ideology only if it is seen to adequately interpret experienced reality. Building on these observations, we may propose that the two antagonistic political ideologies and nationalist discourses in Cyprus provide Greek Cypriots with identity-securing interpretive schemes through which they may comprehend the social world, the recent history of Cyprus, and everyday reality. These interpretive schemes are obviously associated with "appropriate attitudes," which we now turn to consider.

The traditional social scientific tool for unraveling attitudes has been the survey method, and the account that follows draws on a specially de-

TABLE 5.1.
National Identity of Greek Cypriots, 2000

Respondent Identifies As:	Percent
Cypriot	47
More Cypriot than Greek	10
Equally Cypriot and Greek	35
More Greek than Cypriot	3
Greek	5

Source: "Understanding Bicommunal Perceptions and Attitudes: A Survey on Political and National Perceptions" (2000).

signed social survey carried out among Greek Cypriots toward the end of 2000.[17] Let me first consider a question that directly aimed to solicit responses about how Greek Cypriots view themselves with regard to their dual identity. The question was: "As regards the issue of collective identity, which of the following best describes how you feel?"[18] The tabulation of the answers to this question (table 5.1) reveals interesting outcomes. A first observation is that a large number of Greek Cypriots acknowledge the "dual" nature of their identity (35 percent say they are equally Cypriot and Greek and another 13 percent feel the two in differing degrees—an overall total of 48 percent).

What is even more interesting to note, however, is that almost half (47 percent) of the Greek Cypriots sampled give priority to their Cypriot identity. From one point of view, the strength of a unitary Cypriot identity comes as a real surprise, considering the hegemonic position of hellenocentric discourse in recent history and the multifarious ways in which Greekness has been underlined all along. Yet from another point of view this might have been expected for a number of reasons: to begin with, the different historical trajectories of Cyprus and Greece have naturally given rise to different social institutions, values, and overall social realities. Of primary importance is the existence of a separate state in Cyprus with its own political, economic, and social institutions; its own international representation; and so on (Attalides 1979). More generally, "indigenous Cypriot institutions" have led to the gradual entrenchment of a Cypriot lifeworld that is responsible for the formation of an "everyday pre-theoretical consciousness" which seems to be the "stronghold of Cyprioteness [*sic*] and Cypriots [*sic*] identity" (Mavratsas 1999). Finally, identifying with Cyprus is more prevalent among the left: the different historical and social

TABLE 5.2.
National Identity by Support of Political Party
among Greek Cypriots, 2000 (by percent)

	AKEL	DISI	DIKO	EDEK	ENOM DIMO[1]	NE.O[2]	OIKOL[3]
Cypriot	69.8	27.9	51.2	35.2	44.4	20.0	
More Cypriot than Greek	11.0	7.9	9.3	9.3	22.2		33.3
As much Cypriot as Greek	17.9	47.9	34.1	53.7	22.2	60.0	66.7
More Greek than Cypriot		7.0	0.8			20.0	
Greek	0.3	9.1	4.7		11.1		

1. Enomenoi Dimokrates (United Democrats)
2. Neoi Orizontes (New Horizons)
3. Oikologoi (Ecologists' [Party])

Source: "Understanding Bicommunal Perceptions and Attitudes: A Survey on Political and National Perceptions" (2000).

experiences described above resulted in the left sharing a different habitus than the right, leading to different classificatory schemes and ultimate values.[19]

The survey outcomes can be scrutinized more closely by correlating identity with political ideology (to the extent that this is evinced in political behavior or party choice). Table 5.2 presents a cross-tabulation of national identity and party affiliation. It is obvious from the results that the party adherents who mostly stress their Cypriot identity are AKEL supporters: a large percentage (70 percent) of the latter view themselves as "Cypriot" and another, smaller, percentage (11 percent) as "more Cypriot than Greek". This result fits the preceding analysis, which accounted for AKEL's history of cyprocentrism.

DISI is considered to be the polar opposite of AKEL and is widely perceived as primarily hellenocentric (ethnic nationalist) in orientation. The survey results demonstrate that indeed, among the larger, more established parties, DISI adherents are the ones who least stress the Cypriot component of their identity (36 percent). Even this percentage, however, is quite high,

considering this is deemed to be the hellenocentric party par excellence.[20] A similarly interesting finding is that the majority of DISI supporters do not go to the other pole or extreme to emphasize their Greekness but stress both components of the Greek Cypriot identity equally. These findings could relate to a number of possibilities. Possibly DISI's supporters represent a wider spectrum of political/ideological views and attitudes than is often assumed; previous historical analysis has indicated the coexistence of a spectrum of ideological currents in this party. It could also be that some of these supporters may feel more Greek than they are willing to admit but choose to stress a more "balanced" identity so as not to be perceived as adherents to an extreme right ideology, which still carries negative connotations (that this does indeed seem to be the case is demonstrated in the last section of my analysis).

DIKO supporters put the primary emphasis on being Cypriot (51 percent) or more Cypriot than Greek (9 percent). These may, again, seem surprisingly high percentages, considering DIKO's public image as a hardliner on national issues and its tenacious emphasis on Greek heritage and the need to work as closely as possible with Greece. Perhaps the pro-Cypriot stance could be traced to the identification of the supporters of this party with Makarios and his later pro-independence policies. Successive leaders of DIKO tried to adhere closely to the policies of Makarios (both S. Kyprianou and T. Papadopoulos were his close associates), posing as his acknowledged heirs. This allowed DIKO, much as Makarios had, to play a balancing role between the left and the right, reaping obvious political benefits (including holding the office of president of the republic three out of six terms after Makarios's death). The party's long association with Makarios and the state must account to a large extent for the strong identification of DIKO's supporters with the Cypriot component of their dual identity. This brings DIKO near to AKEL, with one important difference: AKEL's cyprocentrism more strongly relates to commonalities of the people of Cyprus. Starting from the Marxist thesis of common interests between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot working classes, this expands into the common interests of all working people and finally into the common struggles, hopes, and aspirations of the people writ large. DIKO mostly emphasizes the sanctity of the state, the Cyprus Republic, whose integrity must be preserved at all costs. But since Turkish Cypriots abandoned the bicommunal state in 1963 and the Cyprus Republic has effectively been taken over by Greek Cypriots, DIKO places less emphasis on civic nationalism (equality of citizens in a common state) than on a latent ethnic nationalism (the survival or predominance of a Greek Cypriot–controlled state).

Discourses on National Identity

Useful and interesting as survey results may be, they cannot provide sufficient explanations. That is why the survey methodology attempted to complement quantitative data with in-depth interviews carried out with a subsample of the respondents. The aim of the interviews was to elicit "commonsense" talk or discourses (views, opinions, arguments, narratives) on the topics under investigation and analyze these as social constructs reflecting not only the personal beliefs of the interviewees but also the wider public discourses dominant in Cyprus at the current historical juncture.[21]

One of the benefits of this approach is that it redirects analysis to the more traditional methods and concerns of anthropology. Indeed, the increasing attention to discourse, or language, in the last few decades has "contributed to the breakdown of artificial barriers between the various social science fields,"[22] including those among anthropology, sociology, social psychology, and political science. This shift in emphasis helps move analysis away from considering ethnic/national identity as an underlying essence that must somehow be discovered and attitudes as the privileged pathway that provides access to this hidden reality. Rather, the different responses or attitudes of people are seen as actions in themselves (language is social practice) which try to do or to achieve things (for instance, to argue for or against a particular public discourse).

In what follows, the classificatory scheme I use is that of "ideal types"; that is, the grouping together of views that have internal consistency regarding their meaning. In practice, no speaker ever sticks to absolutely consistent views (so that, for instance, a cyprocentrist may espouse ideas properly identified with ethnic nationalism—much as a right-winger may adopt leftist positions on some matters).

Loyalty to Nation: Hellenocentrists

As expected, ethnic nationalists—hellenocentrists—stress their primary identification with and loyalty to the nation (the identity argument). They are proud of the Greek nation and of being Greeks. They are concerned with diachronic and ontological continuity of the present with the past and of the particular with the universal:

> I feel Greek. I am part [*aneiko,* I belong] of the Greek nation, since our history, heritage and civilization has its roots in ancient Greece (129).[23]

The feeling among hellenocentrists that they are part of the Greek nation has a corresponding impact on their evaluation of their identification as part of the Republic of Cyprus: "I feel more Greek than Cypriot, because

I see no reason to separate out a tree from the wood. Cyprus is Greek." In fact, such comparisons may render Cyprus and Cypriotness a second-best option:

> I feel very proud of being *Greek* Cypriot. Cypriot says nothing. Cyprus has no history of which it could be proud, whereas Greece can be very proud of its struggles. I am very proud as a Greek Cypriot, for many conquerors passed through Cyprus, but Cyprus managed to maintain its Greek identity. (286)

Indeed, this feeling that Cyprus is relatively unworthy in comparison to the glorious past of Greece, which obviously reflects on present-day evaluations, leads some to exclaim that they would "rather be called Greeks" than Cypriots (176).

Another set of arguments stresses the synchronic aspect, the present commonalities of all Greeks who constitute the "imagined community" of the Greek nation:

> Cyprus may be thought of as a part of Greece, in the same way that Crete and Rhodes may have their own local traditions, but they simultaneously partake in the panhellenic heritage which unites all Greek people, including Greek Cypriots. (195; see also 789)

Similarly, other respondents comment that they "feel firstly Greek and then Cypriot," and they suppose this applies for all the inhabitants of Greek islands: "They feel they are [firstly] Greek and then islanders." Or, again, the differences between mainland Greeks and Greek Cypriots are explained analogically through comparing them to the differences between Greek Cypriots who live in the various districts of Cyprus; this argument implies that Cyprus could be seen as a district of, and thus as a part of, Greece.

The corollary to such arguments is the emphasis on vital differentiation with other nations, primarily, of course, the Turks (the difference argument). Turkey is seen to be the complete opposite of Greece, the eternal enemy of the nation: lacking in history (because it is of recent origin, a mix of Asian/Oriental tribes which expanded through conquest and plunder) and thus lacking in civilization (because it is barbarous, violent, and cruel; see Bryant, this volume). Turkey's invasion of Cyprus is seen as a logical expression of its violent and expansionist character or essence. "The most basic cause of the Cyprus Problem is Turkey's expansionism" is a recurring mantra or statement of faith, one that provides clear answers about the goodness and innocence of the collective self and the evilness and guilt of the collective other. Turkey is evil, violent, and expansionist by nature; it has always been like that, and "Greek history bears witness to this, from the fall of Constantinople [Istanbul], to the destruction of Smyrna, and

the invasion of Cyprus." An extreme hellenocentrist carries the argument to its logical conclusion when he claims that the Cyprus Problem cannot be solved through political means, but only through war:

> I am ready myself to fight for my country at whichever time. I even contest [the loss of] Constantinople, Agia Sofia, in the same way as [I contest the loss of] Kerynia and Apostolos Andreas.

Attitudes of hellenocentrists toward Turkish Cypriots vary considerably. Exactly how Turkish and how Cypriot are they? For many, "Turkish Cypriots are more Turkish than Cypriot" because of the education, socialization, or indoctrination they had. This means that in the eventuality of a solution to the Cyprus Problem, "living together may be impossible" (129). History is often quoted as proof of the impossibility of rapprochement and cohabitation (230). This may lead to complete rejection, a wish that they were not there—"I don't like them very much and I would prefer it if they had not existed at all or if we lived completely separated" (288)—or to a milder view of stressing the need to keep distances: "Of course they are people too, I don't hate them, but I would rather, in case we had to live together, that we were neither too close nor too distant from them" (176).

Loyalty to State: Cyprocentrists

As shown above, hellenocentrists' concerns revolve around the glory of the nation and identity with Greece and mainland Greeks. Cyprocentrists' views and opinions are in many ways the complete opposite of these, so that identity arguments become converted into difference arguments. The following are two quite extreme such views that do, however, highlight the vastly different evaluations involved:

> I feel Cypriot, I am Cypriot. Greeks for me are foreigners/strangers [*xenoi*]. They are those who destroyed us. I feel Cypriot, I believe in the independence of my country, I believe we should have our own national anthem and hoist our own flag (604).

> Our national identity as well as our citizenship must be Cypriot. I do not feel Greek. I grew [up] in Cyprus and I am Cypriot. Greece destroyed us. Greeks are crooks, liars and self-interested [*symferontologoi*]. They are not hospitable [*filoxenoi*]. I also want to stress that we should only have a Cypriot flag and must be called Cypriots and not Greek Cypriots (126).

One cannot help but be impressed with the intensity with which such views come across. This must relate to the fact that the speakers are challenging a firmly entrenched discourse: as outlined earlier on, hellenocentrism has been the dominant ideology and interpretive scheme for so long

that it seems invincible. Thus a challenger must fight harder. Furthermore, the challenge must be total; no compromises can be accepted. "Compromise" is the almost universally accepted, more "balanced" official view that stresses that Greek Cypriots are bearers of Greek ethnicity/culture but holders of Cypriot citizenship (see next section for elaboration). The extreme cyprocentrist rebels against this orthodoxy and counterargues that s/he is not a Greek but a Cypriot; s/he "will not bow to Greek symbols" (flag and national anthem) but wants "our own," including the ultimate symbol of one's very name—which must be "Cypriot" and not "Greek Cypriot." What are the reasons for this total rebellion? Rupture, discontinuity, the end of innocence. Greeks are held responsible for the great destruction [*katastrofi*] of 1974. The coup was staged by the Greek junta, which was not subsequently able to forestall the Turkish invasion. The latter amounted to a destruction of biblical proportions: almost 40 percent of the land came under Turkish control, a third of the population was displaced, hundreds of people died and went missing, the economy was torn apart, the state almost collapsed. Thus, many hold Greece responsible for the "great betrayal." Even though real responsibility may lie with a relatively small group of junta members or collaborators, feelings of wrath are generalized to include "all Greeks" and "everything Greek," including all right-wing/hellenocentric Greek Cypriots. This explains why for many Greek Cypriots, such as the respondents quoted above, the "umbilical cord" with "mother Greece" was finally and brutally cut, so that Greeks are seen as "*xenoi,*" "those who destroyed us," "crooks and liars." Another respondent comments: "I don't believe we are brothers with the Greeks. I used to believe that when I was young. Nowadays I've changed my mind" (533).

Let me finally turn to cyprocentric views of the ethnic or national Other—Turkish Cypriots and Turks. As expected, assessments of the former are much more positive. Turkish Cypriots are seen to be "far from cruel and violent," proposed one respondent, who then proceeded to criticize the "social system" that turns Greek Cypriots against Turkish Cypriots. This respondent felt that the "wall that separates us is a false one" and that "we must change attitudes through education and other means" (201).

"Cyprus belongs to all Cypriots," says another, reciting a well-known slogan of cyprocentrists, pointing out that Cypriots of both ethnicities should leave behind whatever separates them to approach each other once more to solve the Cyprus Problem.

Their attitudes toward Turkey are more ambivalent: "I am a Cypriot but I feel [like] a Greek too. . . . Perhaps we 'feel' Greek because of the Turks" (546). "The Cyprus Problem was the result of Turkish expansionism and the attitude of the Americans. . . . We must have good relations with Greece, as it is the only country which supports us" (520).

Thus, the arguments come full circle: Cyprocentrists may not feel strongly Greek and may not want Greece's involvement with Cyprus. They want to have the chance to give it another go with the Turkish Cypriots. But because of Turkey's threat, they fall back on the need for Greece. . . .

Dual Identity and the Balancing of Loyalties

As shown in Table 5.1, the majority of Cypriots (48 percent) give credit to the "dual" nature of their national identity. Here is a "representative" account of what this may mean:

> I feel [that I am] as much Greek as Cypriot. Greek as to ethnicity because we share with Greeks the same language, perceptions, civilization and religion; and Cypriot as regards citizenship, since I was born in Cyprus and I am a citizen of the Cyprus Republic, with all rights and duties that any citizen enjoys. (728)

Obviously a "perfect balance" between the two components of one's identity is not always possible, and many Greek Cypriots would stress one or the other component—but not at the cost of total rejection or at the expense of the remaining one (as in the case of "extreme" cyprocentrists or hellenocentrists). For instance, after opting for the more balanced option ("as much Cypriot as Greek"), many respondents would qualify their choice and/or stress the Cypriot component, giving various justifications for this: One points out that although he feels both Greek and Cypriot, this does not mean he will "support Greece over Cyprus in case of need" (378). Others add that "feeling Greek does not mean support for *enosis*" (12, 14) or "that Greece should get involved in the affairs of Cyprus" (290).

Conversely, many chose the more balanced option but then qualified their selection and/or stressed the Greek component. The justifications, once again, are quite varied: Some start with the admission that Greece is to blame for the destruction of 1974 but then proceed to make the realistic assessment that "she is our only help" (605). Others recognize that they "are Cypriots" but then acknowledge that "Cypriots are more Greek than mainland Greeks"—for various reasons, such as that "our tradition" is more "pure," concluding that it would be a mistake to "abort our Greekness" [*ellinikotita*] (1003).

Placing an equal emphasis on both components of one's identity seems to be seen as of paramount importance in itself, as it indicates a sense of the "golden mean," an avoidance of extremes. Consider the following statement, where the effort to reach a middle position is important with regard to both political ideology and nationality:

> The party I support is DIKO, the center, I am not an extreme or absolute person [*akraios kai apolytos anthropos*]. . . . I feel Greek Cypriot, as much Cypriot as

Greek. As I said, I am not an extreme person, to feel only Cypriot or only Greek. I feel Greek Cypriot because I believe Greece and Cyprus can co-exist and without wanting to contradict myself I'd like to stress that I feel Cypriot and believe in the independence of Cyprus . . . for I live in Cyprus, but I feel Greek as well since I believe that we have common roots, and a common civilization—thus I am both, Greek and Cypriot. (750)

This need to maintain a balance seems to derive from various sources. Papadakis attempts to explain the centripetal forces involved through a structural analysis of what he calls the "dilemma of Greek Cypriot identity."[24] He proposes that Greek Cypriots are faced with a situation in which they need Greece to help them deal with Turkey, but in the process they must try not to alienate Turkish Cypriots, whom they need to convince of their good intentions in accepting a unified state as a solution to the Cyprus Problem. Thus, a dilemma is created: "On the one hand, the dependence on Greece and the belief in the Greek origins and cultural heritage of Greek Cypriots requires the stressing of the 'Greek' part" of their identity. "On the other, the need for rapprochement with the Turkish Cypriots leads to a desire to stress the 'Cypriot' part. . . . That it is not possible to definitely choose one over the other is the source of ambivalence. At the same time one has to choose position on [an imaginary] continuum; choosing any (with the exception of the middle) means that one would lean more towards one side. This makes the ambivalence acquire the form of a dilemma over which side to stress more" (Papadakis 1993, 136).

The diachronic/historical account as well as the synchronic analysis of the current politico-ideological "field of forces" help to complement and put into context Papadakis's situationalist perspective. The picture he paints has obviously not always been that way (for instance, decades ago the Greek component of Greek Cypriot identity would have been stressed more). The present emphasis on balance is the outcome of the fierce ideological contest between hellenocentrism and cyprocentrism that has been waged for a long time. Expressing support for any one side of the battle would mean risking the chance of being identified with extreme positions and being accused of betraying the *ethnos* (antihellenism) or the state (anticypriotism). Many, of course, were ready to accept such a label while the contest was raging, and taking sides was an act of heroism and honor. But nowadays, after the dust from the ideological battles has largely settled, revealing convergence on a number of issues (witnessed, for instance, in the realist/conciliatory attitudes of AKEL and DISI regarding the Cyprus Problem), being moderate has merit. Thus, more "balanced" views and constructing a respectively balanced "dual identity" have gained wide acceptance.

Finally, I will flesh out the synchronic analysis presented earlier to represent the basic dimensions of the tension/dilemma relating to Greek

Cypriot identity. Figure 5.2 shows that the more a social actor identifies with the nation, the closer s/he feels to Greece, which has obvious symbolic and instrumental benefits (e.g., identification with Greece's glorious past and the military security it provides against Turkey). Yet such a move entails moving further away from Turkish Cypriots, which has obvious symbolic and instrumental losses (e.g., undermining the commonalities vital for reuniting Cyprus and the loss of a possible ally in the struggle against Turkey).[25] The opposite applies when the social actor identifies with the state.

Conclusion

There seems to be a number of reasons why Loizos and other social scientists have not acknowledged the existence and impact of territorial/ civic nationalism in Cyprus. For one, before the period of independence, civic nationalism found initial expression in the 1920s through the Marxist internationalism of the feeble KKK. From the 1940s onward, it constituted an underlying current in the discourse of a broader and more powerful left. It started taking root between 1960 and 1974, but during that period it appeared in peculiar guises as a consequence of the paradoxical features of the political and ideological terrain at the time (Markides 1977; Attalides 1979). After the events of 1974, it rose to prominence for a while, acquiring the status of a new hegemonic power, although it was soon challenged again by a transmuted form of ethnic nationalism (neonationalism; see Peristianis 1995). Henceforth it has been a serious contester of ethnic nationalism in an ongoing battle which signifies the inherent tensions in the very constitution of Cyprus's biethnic state with regard to the "dual identity" and "dual loyalties" of Greek Cypriots: on the one hand, their loyalty to the political unit, the state, which carries the prospect of unifying everyone, despite ethnic origin, on the basis of common citizenship rights and obligations; on the other hand, a sense of affiliation with and loyalty to the ethnic community of their origin and the associated heritage of cultural features (language, religion, etc.), which constitute "social/ethnic markers" that set Greek Cypriots apart from the members of other ethnic communities on the island (and, especially, of course, from Turkish Cypriots).[26]

The two variants of nationalism and the associated loyalties/identifications find expression in different symbolic codes which constitute different discourses and ultimately different conceptions of the world. One could propose that the more traditional division of the world on the basis of politico-ideological dichotomies (left/right, reflecting different emphases on moral-political dilemmas, such as justice/freedom and so on) is losing its power and is being replaced, or at best supplemented, by

I	Identity with Nation (Hellenocentrism)	Greek	Close to Greece Far from Turkish Cypriots
II		Greek Cypriot	
III	Identity with State (Cyprocentrism)	Cypriot	Far from Greece Close to Turkish Cypriots

FIGURE 5.2.

these new divisions. Even this new polarity is gradually being attenuated as a result of a process of convergence that is very much like the dilution of the ideological polarity between left and right. Meanwhile, at the level of everyday consciousness, these dichotomies have managed to infiltrate ordinary common sense. Whenever there is an opportunity, such as at a political rally/campaign before election time, opposing concepts, themes, and stereotypes are "awakened, so that old adversaries will face each other in battle once again" (Billig 1991).

Notes

1. The quote comes from Loizos (1974, 39): he here refers approvingly to Lucy Mair, acknowledging her influence in his own work.

2. Loizos (1975).

3. See inter alia, Smith (1983, 1986, 1991); Brubaker (1992); Brown (2000). Other terms used in the literature to describe civic-territorial nationalism include "Western" or "political"; for ethnic nationalism, other terms include "Eastern" or "cultural."

4. This brand of nationalism, which is usually state-led, initially developed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in Western Europe (mainly France and England) and the United States.

5. Nation-led nationalism developed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in continental Europe, from which it spread to the rest of the world.

6. See Pollis (1996).

7. See Leventis (1997).

8. Attalides (1979, 108–116); Katsiaounis (2000). AKEL adopted a pro-*enosis* stand soon after its formation. Yet it linked this to the right of self-determination of Cypriots (because Greek Cypriots were the majority, self-determination would have led to *enosis*). In

1947, AKEL joined negotiations with the British for self-government. Even though it was again implied that this would eventually lead to *enosis,* it mostly demonstrated the left's concern with expanding civic freedoms. After the failure of the negotiations, AKEL reverted to an "e*nosis*-only" policy, if only to defend itself against the right's aggressive attacks for betrayal. To some extent, AKEL's stand with regard to *enosis* was strategic and instrumental in intent (opportunist, its opponents claimed). Though it used terminology from the prevailing ethnic discourse on common descent and the continuity of nation, its parallel emphasis on *enosis* as the democratic right of people to choose their own fate (note that the Atlantic Charter was signed in August 1941, a few months before AKEL's first public declaration in support of *enosis*) made its arguments more modernist than perennialist, to use Smith's important distinction (Smith 1998).

9. Markides (1977, 21–34).

10. Attalides (1979, 108).

11. Ibid., 127–137.

12. See Papadakis (1993). Grivas had been the military leader of the EOKA struggle, while Makarios led the political part of the effort. After independence, Grivas gradually became Makarios's main critic and rival.

13. This account of cyprocentrism's battle with hellenocentrism after 1974 draws on Peristianis (1995, 1999, 2000).

14. The limitations of using a unidimensional left/right ideological axis to explain reality has been noted by many (Kitschelt 1994; Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990; Inglehart 1997; Giddens 1994). Inglehart (1997) proposes the addition of a modernity/postmodernity axis to supplement the unidimensional axis, but his model does not help explain societies such as Cyprus, where postmodernity has hardly set in and where multinational or polyethnic realities make ethnicity/nationalism a more pertinent axis of analysis.

15. For a general account of the tensions created by differential loyalties (to state and/or ethnic community) in modern states, see Smith (1986, 129–152); for an analysis of the specific tensions relating to the Cypriot state, see Peristianis (1995).

16. Bloom (1990, 25–53).

17. The survey "Understanding Bicommunal Perceptions and Attitudes: A Survey on Political and National Perceptions," which I coordinated, was conducted by Intercollege on behalf of the Peace Center (Cyprus) in the summer of 2000 among Greek Cypriots aged eighteen and above. The representative sample of 1,073 individuals was stratified according to district, urban/rural area of residence, age, and gender. It used a "closed" questionnaire delivered to all survey participants and an "open" questionnaire delivered to a subsample of 150 individuals. The survey was sponsored by the UN Office of Project Services.

18. This is a slightly amended version of similar questions asked in surveys investigating "dual identities," such as Scottish, Welsh, Catalonian, and Basque. In these cases, the question refers to how people see themselves in terms of their "nationality," which is considered a good proxy for national identity. In the Cypriot case, the term "collective identity" was used instead, as it was considered to be both more direct and neutral. Furthermore, this avoided using the negatively phrased version—for example, "Scottish, not British"—as it was felt that this would have triggered defensive, ideologically loaded replies. A number of studies in other countries have made a similar choice; see, for example Brown, McCrone, and Lindsay (1996).

19. Mavratsas (1999); Attalides (1979); Bourdieu (1977).

20. Papadakis (1993); Stamatakis (1991).

21. Billig (1991).

22. Wood and Kroger (2000).

23. Parenthesized numbers are identification numbers of those who participated in in-depth interviews for the survey "Understanding Bicommunal Perceptions and Attitudes."

24. Papadakis (1993).

25. Again, this diagrammatic presentation draws upon and elaborates on Papadakis's work (1993).

26. The initial weakness and obscurity of Cypriot nationalism, the particular guises under which it appeared, and its belated ascendance after 1974—by which time Loizos's focus of attention had already shifted away from nationalism, may explain this conspicuous absence in his analyses.

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SIX

Children Constructing Ethnic Identities in Cyprus

Spyros Spyrou

Greek Cypriot children live in a divided society where identities are highly politicized and where being a particular kind of person implies a particular sense of political being. This chapter on the ideological becoming of children centers on two children, Stalo and Marinos,[1] and their political and ethnic lives as they unfold at a particular point in time in their particular local contexts. I met them in 1996 while conducting fieldwork in Cyprus for my doctoral dissertation. In a more general vein, the chapter addresses children's agency in the world; about how they, as children, construct their ethnic identities in an active rather than passive manner as fully competent members of society. Put another way, it is about the processes of ethnic socialization and cultural production and reproduction as these take place in contexts where real, unique, individual children live and act in a world which largely constrains but does not determine their political becoming.

The intersection between childhood and ethnic identity construction remains largely unexplored. We still know very little about the processes by which children come to acquire a sense of collective identity, construct a sense of "self" and "other," and participate in a world where issues of identity are of paramount importance. Though some work has been done in psychology, the studies that situate children's identity construction in specific cultural and social contexts and examine their reciprocal impact are few and scattered (e.g., Hatcher and Troyna 1993; James 1993). Similarly,

the intersection between childhood and nationalism is only now beginning to be addressed (e.g., Cullingford 2000; Gullestad 1997; Hengst 1997; Holloway and Valentine 2000; Koester 1997; Okely 1997), though for the last three decades ethnic identity and nationalism have been at the forefront of anthropological discussion (e.g., Gellner 1983; Bryant, this volume). Moreover, studying identity construction among children in divided societies such as Cyprus remains in its infancy, though some studies have paved the way (e.g., Bryne 1997; Burman and Reynolds 1990; Coles 1986; Davey 1987; Elbedour, Bastien, and Center 1997; Spyrou 1999). Understanding how identities are shaped in the early years of life can illuminate the process by which culture and ideology become meaningful and persuasive or fail to do so. The potential for ethnic identity and nationalism to result in violent conflict has further intensified the need to study such phenomena and try to understand how identities emerge, are sustained, and sometimes become destructive elements in interethnic contexts such as Cyprus (see Papadakis, this volume).

Children have been largely ignored by anthropology, a discipline which prides itself in studying people (Caputo 1995). The view that children are incomplete adults and therefore in a temporary stage which they will eventually grow out of has prevailed in much of the discipline's history. This view shaped the research issues and questions anthropologists sought to investigate in relation to children. To the extent that it became of interest, childhood was used only to illustrate the importance of culture in a child's upbringing. Cultural stability and continuity were assumed rather than problematized, and the more or less successful acquisition of cultural roles by children was taken for granted.

What is noticeably absent in the earlier work on childhood, whether produced by anthropologists, sociologists, or psychologists, is a concern with children as children. Human agency is almost entirely absent; even where the cultural context is taken seriously, children are seen as being at its mercy. In recent decades, and especially since the 1970s, the study of childhood has taken a new direction that follows the larger critiques and debates in the social sciences. An important critical work was published in 1990 by Allison James and Alan Prout, *Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood,* which took upon itself the task of theoretically rethinking children and childhood. James and Prout, in their introduction and their chapter for the volume (1990a, 3–5, 8–9; 1990b), argued persuasively that children are not passive members of society but actively construct their own social worlds and participate in them; therefore, there is a need for researchers to explore children's lives from the children's own perspectives and not simply from the perspectives of adults. Methodologically, they argued for situated, contextualized, ethnographic studies of children that would reveal their day-to-day experiences.

Several researchers have taken up the call for a more close and contextually sensitive study of children. From these studies we learn a great deal about what children do, what values they adhere to, what attitudes, opinions, and thoughts they have—in short, about the experience of childhood from children's own perspectives (James 1993; Hutchby and Moran-Ellis 1998; Mayall 1994, 1996; Morton 1996; Skinner and Holland 1996). The concern with children's agency and ability to impact their worlds has brought a realization of, and a concern about, the structural limitations placed upon children's lives, from the institutional constraints they encounter at school or in the family to the discourses that circumscribe their lives and actions in significant ways.

This chapter attempts to illustrate the utility and significance of focusing on children and childhood as categories of analysis in anthropological research. It also attempts to illustrate the importance of focusing on children's daily lives and perspectives, which can in turn inform us about the larger social and cultural processes which impact life. Ethnography is a powerful tool for exploring the dynamics of life, of culture and of society more generally, and of identity construction in particular. It can shed light on the role of agents or contexts of socialization in ways that other methodological approaches might not be able to.

Studying Ethnic Socialization

Drawing on the empirical evidence from a study on ethnic identity construction among Greek Cypriot elementary school children, I illustrate in this chapter the complexity and diversity of children's lives and the utility of an anthropology of childhood which takes children as its primary focus. The study, which was carried out from July 1996 to July 1997 among Greek Cypriot elementary school children aged nine to twelve, was ethnographic in nature and was situated in two communities and their respective schools (Spyrou 1999).[2] The urban community is adjacent to the buffer zone in the old part of Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus, while the rural community is situated in the Pitsillia region, a mountainous area about fifty kilometers from Nicosia. The main aim of the study was to situate identity construction in the specific contexts in which it takes place. The school emerged as a major site for ethnic socialization, but other significant arenas of ethnic socialization such as the home, the playground, and the religious instruction school (*katichitikon*) were also studied. The data come from my interviews with children, parents, teachers, and community leaders; observation and participant observation; sorting and ranking (of ethnic groups, countries, national flags); photography; and video recordings and the children's drawings, essays, and interpretations of pictures and poems. My daily routine involved participating in school activities such as attending classes, national

celebrations, and demonstrations and joining the children on school trips. In the afternoons, I spent considerable time observing and participating in children's play and other activities. Though I never had the illusion of being seen by children as a child myself (i.e., "going native"), I sought to become an integral part of their daily lives as much as possible (see Lewis and Lindsay 2000).

The study of children's identities has been hindered as much from the limiting assumptions of adult researchers, who have rarely acknowledged children as capable of having political lives and being able to talk about them (e.g., Coles 1986; Stephens 1995), as from a general lack of concern with childhood research per se. The process of socialization, and of identity construction in particular, is a complex one. Paying attention to the lives of unique individuals as they are socially positioned in particular cultural contexts can highlight this process. Identities, including collective identities, become meaningful and powerful because they find fertile ground in the experiences of individuals (Cohen 1996). It is in the dynamic, dialectic relationship between individual particularity and cultural reality that we may understand how identities are formed and reformed through time. To illustrate some of the complexities of children's lives and portray children as full and competent social actors who are able to reflect upon their worlds and actively participate in them, I turn to an account of two children, Stalo and Marinos, paying particular attention to their ethnic socialization.

In choosing two individual children, my aim is not to suggest that they are each representative of their respective communities (though, as I argue, they construct their identities, to some extent, based on local discourses); rather, my aim is to illustrate how the individual (with all his or her particularities, life circumstances, and social positions) intersects with the local cultural context to construct a sense of self. The two children I focus on are exemplary cases which provide insights into the processes of situated identity construction; they illustrate how children themselves are implicated in the production and reproduction of the factual and ideological messages they receive from school as well as from sources outside of school such as their parents and their peer group. Similarly, by choosing to focus my description and analysis on a rural girl's identity and an urban boy's identity, my aim is not to reify the female/rural versus male/urban stereotype (of which I am fully aware). Space limitations prevent me from offering a more elaborate account of internal variability in each community, which certainly exists and is important to acknowledge.

Stalo: A Rural Childhood

In 1996, when I began my fieldwork for this project, Stalo was eleven years old and lived in the village of Paramithi, the rural community I

studied. She was the third of five children in her family and attended the sixth grade of the village elementary school. Both her parents—her father, a construction worker, and her mother, a housewife who worked in the family's fields—were born and raised in the village. Several members of her extended family, including all her grandparents, still lived in the village as well.

In at least one particular way, Stalo's daily life did not differ much from that of her counterparts in urban areas: She went to school every day. However, her school was significantly smaller than many of the urban schools. As a district school, it accommodated the needs of three villages and had a total of eighteen students; moreover, it had only two teachers.

As a result of the school's size, Stalo's principal teacher was responsible for teaching her all subjects with the exception of art. Also, a smaller school meant that the two teachers were not able to organize as many activities to teach about national anniversaries and celebrations—for example, 28 October (the anniversary of Greece's entry into World War II) or 25 March (the anniversary of the 1821 Greek war of independence against the Ottomans)—which can be particularly influential in informing a young person's sense of collective identity. Nor were there many opportunities to visit museums or national monuments.

However, school was not all. Once a week Stalo also attended *katichitiko* (i.e., religious instruction) lessons with a few other children from her elementary school. *Katichitiko* lessons can inform a child's sense of identity, since religion and nationalism are intimately connected in many of the stories told to children about Greek Orthodox saints and martyrs. Though the priest who conducted the lessons often told the children stories that linked Orthodoxy with the struggles of the Greek nation, it is doubtful whether Stalo or any of the other children retained much; they constantly interrupted the priest during the lessons and played with each other. I observed this behavior on all of the occasions when I had a chance to observe such lessons. From what both the children and the priest told me, this was typical.

In my conversations with Stalo, I was able to get a sense of her political evolution, her understanding of history, and the multiple influences on her identity. When asked what political party she herself supported, Stalo stated that she supported none in particular but pointed to her parents, who were both supporters of the AKEL party, a left-wing political party in the Republic of Cyprus. In a village where most residents were supporting DISI, a right-wing party, Stalo's parents were in this sense one of the few exceptions.

Though Stalo was exposed to a great deal of information about the struggles and the history of the nation, the Turks, and the current situation

in Cyprus, her sense of identity was very much rooted in the anticolonial war of the EOKA period, 1955–1959.[3] For her and the rest of the children at her school, this was an important historical event, perhaps ultimately more important than the Turkish invasion of 1974. Her identity, despite the fact that she came from a left-wing family,[4] was very much rooted in her knowledge of what happened during the EOKA period. When in the context of a group discussion I asked the children to tell me what they knew about EOKA, Stalo was the first to jump in to tell me what the acronym EOKA stands for ("National Organization of Cypriot Fighters"); then she proceeded to tell me that "very many people from our village were [members] of the EOKA organization." The power of collective memory in the village—mostly communicated to her through the stories of her grandparents and other adults—gave her a sense of pride about the national whole that found meaning in EOKA. In that sense, she was not unlike most of the other children of her village, whose national identities were also anchored in their knowledge and understanding of EOKA and the participation of their village and region in the anticolonial war of 1955–1959.

Not that Stalo was not concerned about the Turks and the situation in Cyprus, for she was. But her understanding of these issues was again filtered through the popular religious beliefs that she was exposed to by her parents and grandparents at the village. This is what Stalo told me in an interview when our conversation turned to Cyprus, the Turks, and the future:

> Our grandfathers told us that they read in books, in some leaflets that were given to them at the village, that there will be a war between Turkey and Cyprus and they will occupy us for 24, either 24 years, 24 seconds, 24 minutes, 24 years, it is written that the war will last for 24, and everybody says 24 hours, and afterwards when the war is over in Cyprus, before it is over, a blonde nation will come to liberate us, and everybody is saying it is Russia . . . and then the war will end up in Constantinople, and all the Turks will leave and go to Constantinople to save it and we, the Cypriots, will run to save our Cyprus. The war in Constantinople will go on for three days and nights and when it is over all the Turks will be killed and there will be a few left and they will all be baptized Cypriots and they will be Christians and all the countries will run to take a piece of Turkey.

Many of the rural children recounted to me some version of the prophecy quoted above, which most of them had learned about from their grandparents, parents, or other relatives or from reading books which circulate around the village.[5] Stalo's interpretation of the prophecy is a common one: Essentially, Cyprus will be occupied by Turkey for twenty-four years (although the unit of time sometimes varies) but eventually a blonde nation (most probably Russia) will enter into war with Turkey and free Cyprus from Turkish occupation. This prophecy gained popularity in

1997; the twenty-four-year mark since the Turkish invasion of 1974 was approaching (i.e., in 1998) and the prevailing political climate involved Cyprus's planned purchase of ground-to-air missiles (S-300s) from Russia and Turkey's military threats against their deployment in Cyprus.[6]

Stalo's life may not seem extraordinary, but her experience of growing up in a rural village and attending a small district school with few opportunities for formal ethnic socialization (e.g., visiting museums, participating in national celebrations, etc.) but having a rich oral history passed on to her from her parents and grandparents in the form of stories about the nation or religious prophesies shaped her particular identity. Her identity contrasts in some ways with the identity of the boy Marinos. This highlights the process by which identities are constructed in particular social contexts.

Marinos: Growing Up Near the Buffer Zone

In 1996, Marinos was twelve years old and attended the sixth grade of the urban school I studied. He was born in Nicosia and lived near the buffer zone. He was the youngest child in a family of six but was the only one who lived with his mother. It is not clear from what he and his mother told me what their family situation was. From what they volunteered, it seems that his mother was married and perhaps separated or divorced. Marinos was the offspring of a relationship his mother had with a man from Greece who Marinos himself never got to know, as he left them soon after he was born. In the absence of a father in the house, Marinos developed a more prominent role in the family in comparison to other children of his age. He was well informed about the family's financial situation and exhibited a breadth of knowledge about politics and the history of Cyprus. As he told me, he regularly watched the news on television and read books about history and politics on his own because he liked to know what was going on.

Marinos's school, though not very big, was significantly larger (eighty-five students and ten teachers) than the small rural school Stalo attended. It was situated in the center of the island's capital city. The larger size of the school allowed teachers to organize events around national or religious celebrations with a clearly ethnic content. Marinos had several teachers who taught him different subjects: one for history, another for geography, and another for religion. As compared to Stalo, Marinos was therefore exposed to a much more diverse set of ideological knowledge stemming from each of his teachers' own ideological predispositions. Also, because of the school's proximity to the buffer zone, there were plenty of classroom opportunities to discuss issues related to the island's political situation, while the area where the school was situated—in the old part of Nicosia—provided many occasions to visit museums, galleries, and various historical monuments that could inform his sense of identity in particular ways.

Marinos's living context—next to the buffer zone—also provided many opportunities for ethnic socialization. Thus, in his neighborhood, he joined other children in playing "war."[7] "War games" are games for children involving two competing teams (which sometimes have names such as "Cyprus" and "Turkey" or "Greece" and "Turkey") that pretend to fight a war against each other (see Spyrou 1999). In an elaborate reenactment of the Derinia events[8] by the children, for example, the two opposing teams were the Greek Cypriot demonstrators and the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot counterdemonstrators; there were also groups representing the police, UN peacekeepers, and nurses. Through these games, which the children themselves had created, Marinos and the other children engaged in peer learning (Frones 1995; Corsaro and Rizzo 1988),[9] and their identities were shaped by their collective knowledge and imagination. On one occasion, the children altered the outcome of the Derinia events they were reenacting and had the Greek Cypriot demonstrator, Tasos Isaak, saved by other Greek Cypriot demonstrators instead of being killed, which was his actual fate in Derinia (Spyrou 2001, 182).

Marinos's identity was largely informed by his knowledge of politics and his understanding of history. Here is how he described his family's political loyalties:

> At election times some wanted to vote for AKEL, others for DIKO[10] *and things like that, and they shouted; one would say "you are going to vote for the traitors"; the other would say "you are going to vote for the criminals, the coupists."*[11]

Though his mother was an AKEL supporter (as she herself told me), Marinos seemed, at least initially, highly critical of all political parties:

> I believe that no party can liberate Cyprus because all say "We will solve the Cyprus problem and I promise you peace and things." Out of all those who said this thing, no one kept his promise. That's what I believe. That nobody is worth anything.

As he explained in another conversation, he feels that all political parties are to blame to some extent for the prevailing state of affairs.

If he had to choose, however, his preference would be *Eleftheri Dimokrates.*[12] As he explained:

> If I could vote the only party which I believe in, [it] would be the party of Giorgos Vassiliou, *Eleftheri Dimokrates,* because when he was president things were much better. In spite of what the adults say [I would not vote for] AKEL, DISI. . . . I would vote for either *Eleftheri Dimokrates* or nothing.

In our conversations it became clear that Marinos had opinions about

issues, about politics, and about the island's history and he wanted to let me know what they were. For instance, Marinos was critical of the EOKA war, though he recognized that those who fought in it were heroes. As he said:

> I learn that yes they fought about Cyprus but what did they achieve? Did they manage to free it? Or to enslave it?

He also told me about his ideas regarding the 1974 coup: that it was not really Turkey's fault but it was those who organized the coup that are to blame, for otherwise Turkey would not have invaded Cyprus. Similarly, he expressed his frustration about the Turkish invasion because, as he said, "We were not prepared."

Marinos's attitudes toward the Turks were very negative. He expressed his anger at what the Turks do today in the occupied territories, especially the destruction of Orthodox churches. He described the Turks as devious and proceeded to tell me all about incidents when Greek Cypriot solders were murdered by Turks while guarding the Green Line. He was particularly upset about the Derinia events which had taken place a few weeks earlier. He described the behavior of the Turks in relation to the events as "inhuman." Incidentally, his mother told me on another occasion that while he was watching the violent events live on television and after Tassos Isaak was killed, he broke into tears and kept hitting his hand on the table in anger and frustration. When he grows up, he explained, he would like to join the military to fight the Turks so he can visit the occupied territories which he so far has never been able to visit. Marinos here is almost instinctively drawing on the kind of antagonistic, nationalistic "logic" Loizos (1988) describes as "collectivist, generalizing, and non-specific" in his analysis of intercommunal killing in Cyprus. For Marinos, the enemy is another nation—the Turks—who bear collective responsibility for Cyprus's occupation, not specific individuals with whom he has a problem. Like the Palestinian children Hart (2002, 38) studied in a refugee camp in Jordan, Marinos thinks of himself as an "agent of redemption" for the lost homeland which the previous generations failed to recapture.

However, when our conversation turned to Turkish Cypriots, Marinos was quite confused. Not unlike Stalo, who thought Turkish Cypriots were "our own people, but they are being held by the Turks" (i.e., Greek Cypriots who are prisoners of war), Marinos also reinterpreted the category "Turkish Cypriots" in a way that made sense to him and which fit into his lack of more precise knowledge. When I asked him what the difference is between Turkish Cypriots and Turks, he said: "The difference is that their mother or father was Greek. Isn't it? Is it like that?" And then he added: "Either this or they were born in Turkey and now they live in Cyprus. Either of the two" (see Spyrou 2001).

Children Constructing Their Own Identities

These brief descriptions of the two children's lives are meant to illustrate some of the complexity involved in understanding children, a kind of complexity not unlike that which characterizes the lives of adults. The identities of these two children are impacted in unique ways as a result of their particular circumstances and the fact that they are growing up in Cyprus during this specific historical period, the post-1974 period, with their country partly occupied and actively pursuing membership in the European Union.

These two children are neither typical nor representative of all Greek Cypriot children. There is much that they share with other children but also much that they do not share. At one level, they are exposed to common social discourses (e.g., the discourse surrounding the Turkish invasion of 1974). At another level, their experiences differ significantly and their identities develop in distinctive ways—their gender and family background; their personal interests, likes, and dislikes; their living contexts; the schools they attend and the teachers they have all affect them in unique and particular ways.

The two children's school experiences provide us with interesting insights into how education may be implicated in identity construction. In official educational policy, the school is the social space where children are expected to develop a strong sense of national identity. This is where the state hopes children will learn about the nation's history, will look with reverence to the past, and will eventually become loyal members of the national whole. Indeed, in the classrooms of both schools, children were instructed more often than not on how to think about their identities. They were told that they are above all Greeks, heirs of a noble past, living in a half-occupied homeland which waits for them to liberate it. Moreover, they were told that the Turks, the nation's enemy, are as barbaric as ever and have no redeeming qualities.[13] What the teachers say, especially about the nation's history, is to be absorbed, accepted, and not questioned. To this day, teachers play an authoritative role and the "facts" that they present the students with are rarely debated. Because teachers minimize the opportunities for free dialogue, especially when it comes to "unquestioned truths" (e.g., the Greek nation's moral superiority in relation to other nations, especially enemy nations such as Turkey), students are discouraged from interacting with knowledge and bringing their own knowledge and perspectives into the lesson.

This is not to say that there were no other messages that children received at school. Teachers came from a variety of ideological backgrounds and did, on occasion, present children with alternative messages, some of

which challenged the "official" classroom views. Furthermore, children did not absorb messages without reinterpreting them; children constructed and reworked meanings in ways that made sense to them. Moreover, I have seen children on a number of occasions resisting—sometimes subtly, sometimes more directly—what the teacher said by bringing, for example, alternative knowledge into the classroom (e.g., knowledge from parents, grandparents, the mass media, or their own experiences) and by drawing on alternative (nonnationalistic) discourses which contradicted the official nationalistic discourse of the curriculum. Yet, despite this apparent multivocality and despite children's reinterpretations of and occasional resistance to messages, nationalistic messages were still the dominant ones and the ones children often used to express their identities (Spyrou 2000; see also Luykx 1999).

The school Marinos attended contributed a great deal to his ideological learning about the Turks and the situation in Cyprus, an issue which greatly preoccupied him. This is where he learned in a systematic manner where he, as a Greek, came from, what it means to be a Greek, and what that entails for his future. Because he had several teachers, one for each course, and was going to a school situated next to the buffer zone, questions of identity were commonly raised and discussed in his classes. In that way, the school contributed decisively in giving content to his identity and rooting it in the larger framework of the nation's history as well as in the particularities of the island's division.

Stalo's ethnic socialization in the small, rural, district school she attended was different in many respects. Because she was primarily exposed to one teacher's style of teaching, views, and ideological inclinations, her principal teacher played a key role in her educational life and her ethnic socialization in particular. Moreover, because few events were organized at her school on the occasion of national celebrations, she did not have the opportunity to be exposed to the more official and structured aspects of ethnic socialization to which Marinos was exposed. Similarly, as a result of the lack of opportunities to visit museums, monuments, and other sites at the village which are implicated in identity construction, her ethnic socialization as a student was largely circumscribed.

As the two examples from above show, children have agency and play a role both in the reproduction of cultural and ideological meanings and the production of new ones. Where children help reproduce cultural meanings (e.g., Marinos's stereotypes of the Turks), they do so in an active way by engaging with knowledge and experience and ultimately justifying their particular understandings. To the extent that their school knowledge helps them reproduce cultural ideologies, children draw on such knowledge to construct their worlds meaningfully (Hatcher and Troyna 1993). In other words, children make sense—more precisely cultural sense—in an active

way, not by passively internalizing what is out there. More important, they contribute to cultural production; that is, the production of new meanings and understandings by combining and recombining what they know and imagine in ways that make sense to them (see Willis 1990). Thus, through their participation in war games, the urban children used their collective knowledge and imagination to reenact the Derinia events in a way that made sense to them. That they took liberties and produced their own version of the events—largely resembling what actually happened but also to some extent reinventing what happened—is significant, for it highlights the power of the imagination in childhood. In that sense, children's identities are never fully controlled by adults or society at large. They are influenced and shaped but never fully determined.

Rather than being at the mercy of dominant discourses, children have the ability to access critical or alternative discourses, and on occasion they do so (e.g., Marinos's views of EOKA). Instead of simply accepting the clear and unambiguous message he had heard many times at school (i.e., that the EOKA war was a necessary and noble war fought for the ideals of the nation), Marinos questioned its necessity by drawing on one of the more critical discourses of the left which sees the EOKA war as unnecessary or perhaps inappropriate at the time and that the organization's policies were problematic (i.e., that its members were exclusively Greek Cypriot, thus excluding Turkish Cypriots).[14]

Moreover, children's ability to resist, reinterpret, and rework that which is given to them (e.g., Marinos's preference for a party other than the one his mother supported and his, as well as Stalo's, reinterpretation of the meaning of "Turkish Cypriot") are indicative of their agency and the creative potential of their imaginations (however disturbing such realizations might be at another level; i.e., the realization that Greek Cypriot children do not have a clear idea of who Turkish Cypriots are; Spyrou 2001). Similarly, the absence of adult supervision in much of children's afternoon play in the neighborhoods allowed them to construct and express their identities in other ways, drawing on a variety of discourses which sometimes included nationalistic discourse but was not limited to it. For instance, in many of the skits and plays they staged, the children of the urban community drew heavily on their more local Cypriot tradition and their immediate experiences and lived history than on the nationalistic discourse learned at school (e.g., they used the Greek Cypriot dialect in their dialogues and stereotypically Cypriot character names in their skits and chose themes from traditional rural Cypriot life or the 1974 war).

My observation of *katichitikon* lessons[15] clearly revealed that the teaching of culture or ideology is not to be equated with the learning of culture or ideology. Stalo participated in that particular context, but very limited learning took place; the "noise" that existed obstructed the message and

any possible learning that might have resulted from it. The misbehavior of the children at the *katichitikon* may be seen as subtle strategies of resistance, much like the resistance strategies of Malaysian peasants described by James Scott (1985). These strategies (e.g., creating noise and disturbance during a lesson) have nothing in common with the more coordinated and planned resistance that is characteristic of organized groups with an agenda for change. Rather, they operate below the surface, in the ordinary flow of things, and aim to "sabotage," however minimally, the authority which resides in those who exercise power over the powerless. In the *katichitikon* context, the children used these subversive strategies to challenge the authority of the priest in the same way they used such strategies to challenge the authority of the teacher in the classroom. The aim was to avoid direct confrontation while frustrating the official agendas. The children engaged in this form of resistance because they knew that they had some power, though it was admittedly limited. Luykx (1999, 221), observing Bolivian students' strategies of resistance in the classroom, explains:

> Certainly these tactics allowed students to expend less time and effort to enjoy a greater degree of freedom than they would have otherwise. Added to this was the less tangible but no less significant gratification that comes from controlling one's own meanings and actions, at least in some limited, "offstage" domain. (Luykx 1999, 219)

And again:

> Students become bored with the production of knowledge they deem irrelevant to their interests and join together to appropriate a margin of class time to their own purposes. (Luykx 1999, 221)

By locating social action in specific contexts, we can begin to understand how ideologies are consumed: how they are accepted and reproduced, on the one hand, and how they are resisted and reinterpreted, on the other.

The children's growing up, their ideological becoming, their sense of who they are—in short, their identities—are not easily accounted for by socialization models which seek to determine which agents are doing what to them. The relationship between the children and their social worlds is a complex one; it is not a one-way process whereby the agent impacts the child in this or that way but is rather a reciprocal relationship where power differences are played out and meanings are constantly being negotiated (see James and Prout 1990a; James, Jenks, and Prout 1998; Solberg 1990). It is the dynamic play between the particular and the shared which gives rise to their identities, which are culturally recognizable yet uniquely shaped (Holland, Skinner, Lachicotte, and Cain 1998).

Take for instance Stalo's preoccupation with EOKA despite her family's

left-wing loyalties. Both her parents mentioned to me that it was not un-common for them to talk to Stalo and the rest of their children about politics, especially when they all watched television at night. On many occasions, Stalo and her other siblings asked questions about politics and the parents explained or commented. The parents' political influence was evident in Stalo. For instance, she knew quite a bit about the 1974 coup; she was well aware of the historical details surrounding the coup because her parents told her several personal stories about it. This was expected and comes as no surprise; as members of the left wing, her parents see the right wing as primarily responsible for the organization and execution of the coup. But her parents had not in any way tried to question the le-gitimacy of EOKA, as other left-wingers might have done.[16] As members of the village community, they also shared this history and honored it; what might have been downplayed by other supporters of AKEL was not an issue for them—they could be left wing and still strongly support the anticolonial war. Similarly, their concern and preoccupation with religion and religious prophecies in particular could coexist in harmony with their political identity, again in contradistinction to the more critical position of AKEL (as a communist party) toward religion and prophecies that are very nationalistic. In a conversation we had, Stalo mentioned that "at home they only talk about AKEL, that it is the best and they support it." When I asked her what she felt about that, she refrained from taking a strong position of loyalty by saying "They [i.e., parties] are all good." Stalo, as a child and at that stage in her life, did not strive for ideological consistency but had a more complex political identity than might be suggested by more direct causal explanations of identity construction. In other words, her identity was clearly impacted by her parents' political loyalties but not in a way that one could easily predict, for they themselves were not faithful repro-ducers of left-wing ideology. Such findings suggest the utility of looking more closely at the individual level and questioning simplistic models of socialization which rule out ideological contradictions and tensions (Billig et al. 1988).

Similarly, by contextualizing our studies of childhood we learn a great deal about the impact of the local on the national. National identities can become meaningful and powerful because they find correspondences with local actors' experiences and sense of belonging. In his work with Kalymnians, Sutton (1998) illustrates this point by showing how they use familiar principles and practices to interpret the present and establish historical continuity with the past. To the extent that they help reproduce nationalism, it is because they make sense of it through their own local and familiar cultural ways. Ultimately, through this process, the local feeds the national and the national anchors itself in the local.

Stalo's sense of national identity was rooted in the EOKA anticolonial war, an influence of her particular local environment, and (to a lesser extent) in the national educational system she participated in. Stalo's understanding of the political situation in Cyprus was filtered through her knowledge of popular religious beliefs in her locality. Her experience of growing up in that particular village and being exposed to particular stories and narratives had contributed to her particular ideological formation. It is interesting to note here that the stories Stalo heard and recounted are not unlike the grand narratives of nationalist historiography. Such stories or prophecies like the one she recounted to me are structurally similar to the nationalist historical narratives she learned about at school. They also aim to teach right from wrong, to separate "us" from "them," to distinguish good from evil. Moreover, they provide an authoritative message which, however speculative (as in the case of the prophecy Stalo recounted to me), are clearly beyond criticism, for they come with the full force of tradition and are fully backed by the sacred word. For Stalo and the other children from the village who told me about similar prophecies, these narratives provided a more interesting and perhaps ultimately more persuasive account of their history and sense of identity. The magical qualities of these narratives and their explicit and often gruesome content allowed the children to construct the imagined community by drawing on the familiar and the trusted, on that which was informed by their situated lives at the village, and less so on the indirect and the abstract which came from the official nationalist narratives they learned at school. To the extent that the two narratives were similar, they helped reinforce the children's sense of national identity.

In a similar way, the preoccupation of the children who live near the buffer zone with Turks and war can be better understood when one focuses on the role of the local in shaping the national. Children such as Marinos who live near the buffer zone confront all the symbols of the island's division on a daily basis. They see the Greek and Turkish flags, the guard posts and soldiers from both sides, and the UN peacekeepers; they hear the *hotza* (the Muslim imam) preach through loudspeakers; they feel the fear of living so close to the buffer zone (especially in times of political crises); and they participate in numerous demonstrations and other events that take place on the Green Line. Their sense of national identity is as much rooted in their everyday experiences as in the more academic and indirect knowledge about history and the nation they learn at school.

Much has been said about imagined communities (Anderson 1983/ 1991) and their authority in people's lives, but the processes by which such communities come to take hold in ordinary individuals' imaginations are still not well understood (see Cohen 1996). This chapter has tried to

explore children's identities by focusing on them as social actors in the early years of a lifelong process of identity construction as it takes place in particular social, cultural, and historical contexts. Given that we still know little about children's lives and less about their identities, the anthropological approach, and ethnography in particular, can be a very fruitful way to explore the day-to-day dynamics of growing up. More important, they help us appreciate a much-neglected and marginalized social category—children—whose identities are much more complex and rich than most of us, as adults, ever allow ourselves to acknowledge.

Notes

1. To protect the anonymity of all those mentioned in this article, all individual and place names have been changed.

2. After the fieldwork for this study was carried out, significant changes took place which are important to keep in mind. Since April 2003, opening of the checkpoints and partial removal of restrictions to freedom of movement has brought the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities into contact with each other after almost thirty years of separation. Similarly, the full accession of Cyprus into the European Union on May 1, 2004, and the process of "Europeanization" that the Greek Cypriot community has undergone in the last few years are also impacting in significant ways notions of identity among the Greek Cypriot population.

3. EOKA was an organization of Greek Cypriot guerilla fighters that aimed to overthrow the British and unite the island with Greece.

4. The left wing, and AKEL in particular, has been critical of the EOKA war against the British mainly because it considered it to be unnecessary at a time when decolonization on a global scale would have resulted in the departure of the British from Cyprus and because of the involvement of General Grivas (an anticommunist who played a key role in the Greek civil war against the communists) in the leadership of the organization.

5. Some of these prophecies come from the writings of Greek Orthodox saints such as Saint Methodios and Saint Kosmas Etolos.

6. Hart (2002) in the Palestinian context and Coles (1986) in the Northern Irish context have reported this interesting merging of religion and nationalism in children's identities.

7. I observed that the rural children did not play "war games"; my interviews with the children corroborated this.

8. The "Derinia events" refer to the violence that broke out in the summer of 1996 on the buffer zone near the Derinia area in the southeast of Cyprus. A demonstration by Greek Cypriot and foreign motorcyclists for the right of free movement on the island was counteracted by Turkish and Turkish Cypriot counterdemonstrators. The violence that erupted resulted in the murder of two Greek Cypriots, Tasos Isaak and Solomos Solomou.

9. Lanclos (2003, 143) also identified this kind of peer learning in folklore and especially in joke-telling in the everyday lives of Catholic and Protestant children in Belfast.

10. DIKO is the center party.

11. AKEL is sometimes criticized by the right wing for being unpatriotic because it takes a critical stance toward Greek nationalism. The right wing, on the other hand, is often criticized by the left wing for playing a role in the 1974 coup and the attempts to overthrow Makarios, the president of Cyprus at the time.

12. *Eleftheri Dimokrates* (Free Democrats), later renamed *Enomeni Dimokrates* (United Democrats), is the political party formed by George Vassiliou (former president of the Republic of Cyprus).

13. Avdela (1997) and others (see Frangoudaki and Dragona 1997) have identified a similar role for education in constructing the nationalist imagination in Greece.

14. See Papadakis (1998) for a discussion of the nature of contested and competing discourses and identities in Cyprus.

15. The students of the urban school did not attend *katichitikon* lessons during the year of my fieldwork because the school could not find a suitable and willing instructor to conduct the lessons.

16. The left wing makes a negative association between EOKA (more precisely the terrorist organization EOKA B, a later development of the original EOKA) and the 1974 coup.

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SEVEN

"Contested Natures"

AN ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT IN CYPRUS

Gisela Welz

In the winter of 1968–1969, farmers demonstrated in Nicosia. Buses had carried men from five villages in the area of Morphou in the northwest of the island to the capital. There they marched to the presidential palace to protest the government's delay in constructing a dam that would provide irrigation for the cash crops their communities were growing. The villagers were competing with the inhabitants of nearby Morphou town for access to water. The town did not want the dam to be constructed because it would detract from the irrigation of its own fields and plantations. The villagers saw the state's reluctance in going ahead with the dam as evidence that government officials were bowing to the pressures of the local elite of Morphou, who were known to be well connected to political circles in the capital. In his political ethnography of a Cypriot village, Peter Loizos (1975) gave a vivid account of this event. More than thirty years later, what Loizos calls the "organizational tactics villagers employ to extract benefits from the political and administrative sectors of the wider society" (Loizos 1975, 289) are still very much in evidence.

A recent example may serve as an illustration. An airplane rather than buses took representatives from another group of villages, this time from the Paphos district, to Brussels in April 2001. Community leaders attended the so-called Green Week, a series of meetings under the auspices of the European Commission that was organized by one of the leading transna-

tional environmental organizations, World Wide Fund for Nature. The fact that the villagers attended this event did not mean that they had suddenly become spokespersons for environmentalist issues. Quite the contrary: not unlike the Argaki villagers that Peter Loizos accompanied on their protest march in Nicosia in the late 1960s, they believed they had unfairly been denied resources that were theirs by right and that fault for this laid with a conspiracy mounted against them by their competitors in other communities with the help of certain personages in high places.

The resource in question this time around was not irrigation water: These landowners from villages in the Paphos district demanded that prohibitions against tourism development in their area be lifted. They wanted to participate in and profit financially from the tourism boom that their neighbors in coastal communities of the region have already been enjoying for some years. However, their own villages are located inland in the close vicinity of the Akamas Peninsula. Akamas, a brush-covered area of about 230 square kilometers on the western coast of the island in the Paphos district, has so far been largely untouched by development. It contains a number of sensitive coastal ecosystems as well as important habitats of rare and endangered species, some of which are endemic to the island, and it has been proposed that the peninsula become a national park. Against the backdrop of the conflicting concerns of environmental preservation and economic development, the future of the region and the question of which land uses should be allowed or prohibited have been hotly debated for many years, not just in the national but also in the international arena. Environmental NGOs who are operating on a global scale have Akamas on their agenda; some years ago, Greenpeace presented the issue in transnational fora and staged protests locally, and the European Commission has exerted considerable pressure on successive governments of the Republic of Cyprus to prohibit tourism development in the Akamas and to create a national park there instead.

The transnational dimension of the struggle over the future of this piece of land infuses what superficially may appear to be a conflict between local landowners and state authorities with a special dynamic. Of course, one might say that there were transnational aspects in the 1960s fight of Argaki and its neighboring villages for irrigation water as well, for the owners of citrus plantations were intent on maintaining and expanding production for an internationalizing market, hastening along the integration of post-independence Cyprus into the world economy. Yet there is a different quality today about the transnational dimension of conflicts labeled "environmental." In their 1998 book from which the title of this chapter is borrowed, *Contested Natures,* sociologists Phil Macnaghten and John Urry pointed out that in a globalizing world, the protection and pres-

ervation of the natural environment has emerged as a transnational issue as "nature becomes less intertwined with each individual national society . . . and is much more interdependent with global relations" (Macnaghten and Urry 1998, 31). This certainly holds true for Cyprus. Management of the environmental resources of the country today is monitored closely by international organizations, especially within the framework of the country's 2004 accession to the European Union (EU). Globalism has become an idiom in which assertions of local interest must be expressed and negotiated, requiring all local actors—both conservationists and pro-development interests—to extend their reach beyond the region and the state, as is evident in the villagers' excursion to Brussels.[1]

The Akamas case offers the opportunity to explore what anthropology can contribute to an understanding of such conflicts and to engage with recent discussions within anthropology on how to address environmentalism as a cultural meaning system in itself. A struggle such as this one provides an ideal opportunity to ask how nature is constituted in a particular locale or conflict and inquire into what counts as "the environment" in any given political negotiation, corporate strategy, research initiative, livelihood trajectory, or policy program. How are new "environments" created within these "projects"? Research following this agenda "contrasts the knowledge-making practices of conservationists, social activists, and local resource users as these issues are played out in varied local arenas" (Tsing 2001, 5). Not just indigenous groups and rural populations but environmental bureaucracies, national and transnational NGOs, and scientific research institutions then come within the purview of anthropologists. The Akamas case elucidates the way in which competing sets of moralities inform the actions and stances of the social actors involved and how their conflicting representations of the environment enlist local and translocal knowledge.

Inventing Akamas:
Transformations, Inertia, Reconfigurations

Akamas, with its rugged coastline and secluded beaches, is a landscape of spectacular natural beauty. For many decades, the peninsula and the adjoining region of the Paphos district were considered a backward and somewhat uncivilized area of little importance. It came into the spotlight of public attention in the late 1980s, however, when it emerged as one of the few stretches of coastline of the Republic of Cyprus to escape the impact of the tourism development that took off in the aftermath of the 1974 invasion (see Ioannides 1992; Ioannides and Apostolopoulos 1999). The Paphos district has recently experienced a massive expansion of tourism infrastructure. Today, the increasing pressure on Akamas comes mainly from

the south, where the urban sprawl of Paphos extends northward and hotel complexes and so-called villa developments spring up in rapid succession along the coast and in its hinterland, and from the communities that line Chrysochou Bay to the east of Akamas. These, although they are latecomers to tourism development, appear particularly eager to transform the area into a replica of other mass tourism destinations on the Mediterranean's northern shores.

The fact that Akamas remained virtually untouched by development while all around it the tourism economy has been booming since the 1980s is in itself the consequence of a transnational relationship. The fact that Akamas has retained its "natural" condition which today merits protection is related to the colonial history of Cyprus. The terms of the treaty that granted Cyprus its independence in 1960 gave the British army the right to conduct military exercises on parts of the peninsula, which for this reason could be used only for grazing and remained uninhabited west and north of the villages of Inia, Drousia, Arodhes, and Neo Chorio, even though the peninsula shows many traces of settlement and land use in earlier centuries. During the 1980s, the first attempts were made by preservation-minded actors in government to place the natural environment of the peninsula under conservation. They were successful in establishing a reserve area on the western coast, where the nesting beaches of two endangered species of marine turtles are located. The more-far-reaching goal of prohibiting development in the entire area, however, was not achieved. Increasingly vocal environmentalist groups that had formed to protect the natural landscape and its biodiversity were stalled by pro-development interests. Some investors had started acquiring attractive stretches of coastal land and entered into a coalition with local landowners in the villages, who also nurtured hopes of entering the tourism economy or selling their land at high prices.

In the early 1990s, actors pushing for nature conservation, both within the government and in NGOs, sought international funding and political backing from European agencies. The Laona Project, a five-year project to plan for sustainable development and agrotourism in the area, received the first EU funding of its kind in Cyprus (Beck and Welz 1997; Amato 2001). In addition, in 1995, the World Bank's Mediterranean Environmental Technical Assistance Program completed a study on the Akamas region. It proposed a management plan for the area that included establishment of a national park that would include the entire peninsula, sustainable development alternatives to mass tourism, and conventional development options to the adjoining local communities within the framework of a zoned biosphere reserve area.[2] Local community elites, however, came out against the plan. They did not want to be restricted to options of soft agro- or ecotourism, as they felt that they would be left behind in the race for

material prosperity that most of their compatriots had had an earlier start in. Village leaders publicly stated that they feared "that the plan condemns the region and its inhabitants to perpetual poverty."[3]

However, the management plan was never implemented in its proposed form. A number of Cypriot investors, for whom Akamas was a prime piece of real estate that they intended to transform into expensive hotels and club-type resorts that promise high financial returns, also opposed it. The British army ceased military exercises in the area in 1999, giving in to the protests of environmentalists and nationalist pressure groups that had for many years viewed the continuation of the postcolonial military presence in the area as an insult to the sovereignty of the country. Because exercises were stopped before any decision on the establishment of a national park was taken, the cessation of military activity to some extent played into the hands of pro-development interests. In March 2000, the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cyprus decided to take steps toward opening the peninsula for large-scale tourism development. While it placed the local communities under restrictions, this decision privileged the interests of an industrialist who planned to construct a large tourism resort on the as-yet-untouched north coast of Akamas on Chrysochou Bay; subsequently, further concessions to him and other powerful economic actors engaged in investing in the area became public knowledge. For the Cypriot public, this came as no surprise, considering that some years before, in 1996, a building permit had been granted to erect a luxury hotel on an as-yet-undeveloped stretch of the northeastern coast of the Akamas Peninsula.[4] The hotel started operating in 1998, but in the course of the ensuing scandal, the owner of the hotel chain involved lost his political position as a cabinet member in the government. Technically speaking, the hotel site was located within a zone that allowed for building activity, even though it was an area under consideration for inclusion in a future national park. Prior to the construction of the hotel, there was hardly any tourism infrastructure or other buildings in the area, and the district authorities had turned down similar requests for permits from other landowners in the past. That a powerful political officeholder was granted an exception caused considerable outrage in the Cypriot public. Additional fury was generated when the hotel owner sidestepped the restriction imposed on him by the building permit. Much of the public debate in Cyprus and the protest activities of transnational environmental organizations centered on the accusation that this official had exploited political power for personal gain. Yet in the context of the threats against the ecological integrity of Akamas, the inordinate attention given to this particular case somewhat detracts from the detrimental effects of numerous small-scale developments which since the late 1990s have spread throughout the area, perilously close to the

protected state-owned forest land that still awaits declaration as a national park. More and more so-called villa developments are dotting the hillsides that the 1995 World Bank plan intended to include in a future Akamas nature reserve, and tourism complexes are springing up next to the ecologically sensitive beaches.

After the government's decision to allow tourism development on Akamas in March 2000, Cypriot environmentalists turned to transnational agencies even more forcefully than before. They asked the European Commission and the Council of Europe to increase their pressure on the Cyprus government to reverse its stance and safeguard the preservation of this area that they consider to be of incomparable ecological and aesthetic value. Eventually, in the summer of 2002, the government presented a revised set of management guidelines for the Akamas region to the public that appears to offer some measure of compromise. It falls dramatically short of placing the entire region under protection, as had been strongly recommended internationally. Instead, a much smaller area of the peninsula proper will be declared a national park. Yet while it allows for tourism development in selected sites, it curtails the plans of both villagers and large-scale investors to build hotels on the as-yet-unspoiled coastline of the peninsula.[5] Not surprisingly, the villagers immediately protested this decision. The last chapter in the long saga of the struggle over the future of Akamas has not been written yet, and the antagonistic positions of the actors involved have become too entrenched by now to expect any simple solution. Whether the prohibitions against coastal development and the degradation of the peninsula itself will be effective in the future only the implementation process of the 2002 guidelines will show. In the spring of 2004, the government had not yet taken any definite steps toward converting the guidelines into a management plan.

Scientific Knowledge and the Politics of Expertise

Anthropologists increasingly inquire into how environmental problems are discovered and acknowledged by the public and political decision-makers. Obviously, an environmental crisis does not automatically trigger public concern, but environmental issues are "as much or more a matter of social construction and politics of knowledge production" as they are "a straightforward reflection of biophysical reality" (Hannigan 1995, 39). Environmental problems must be constructed as legitimate claims and contested against competing readings of reality. Only when this is achieved can they be translated into political decision-making.

The social construction of environmental issues rests not only on moral assumptions but also on scientific knowledge. Environmental problems

must be "discovered" and "diagnosed" by scientists before they can acquire any sense of being real or serious. At the core of the EU's demands for the protection of Akamas is the claim that the peninsula is indispensable for the maintenance of the biodiversity of the entire Eastern Mediterranean. This claim places Akamas within a geographical context that extends far beyond the island of Cyprus. At the same time, those who make the claim draw on bioscientific knowledge that is decidedly not local in origin. Indeed, in order to be able to assess the ecological significance of Akamas, comparative data from other parts of the Eastern Mediterranean have to be considered, and the anticipation that tourism development will irreversibly destroy the habitats of endangered species and threaten the integrity of coastal ecosystems rests on observations and scientific findings in other parts of the world. The environmentalists' struggle for the conservation of the natural environment of Akamas, thus, is in itself evidence of the global diffusion of bioscientific practices.

Since the 1980s, biological studies and surveys have both paved the way for and accompanied the attempts to place the Akamas Peninsula under protection. Some were conducted independently by international scholars following their own research agendas, others were commissioned by agencies of the government.[6] In the ongoing struggle over the future of Akamas, local environmentalist actors have again and again attempted to enlist the authority that goes with scientific knowledge to bolster their claims about the need to create a national park in the area. The aforementioned World Bank plan is the most prominent attempt along these lines. Because it was produced by agencies outside of Cyprus—funded by the EU under the auspices of the World Bank and conducted in part by French experts—environmentalists hoped that the international reputation of the actors involved, their independence from local interests, and the scientific soundness attributed to their work would give the cause of protecting Akamas more clout in the political arena than previous statements from experts.

This did not work out as expected. Not only did government agencies delay the publication of the results of the World Bank plan, but the pro-development opponents of a national park attempted to play the same game of enlisting expert knowledge by flying in a team of counterexperts from abroad, who did not warn against but indeed recommended tourism on Akamas in a widely publicized press conference.[7] German social theorist Ulrich Beck (1992) has written extensively about how the sciences are losing their monopoly on truth in the late modern period; how scientific knowledge appears unreliable, notoriously unstable, and contingent; and how competing claims can be made with equal authority. This means that when expertise is used in the political area, opposing positions can each be

bolstered by the authority of science. In the case under discussion, however, it is somewhat doubtful whether the specialists called on by the investors to denounce the pro-conservation World Bank plan qualify as counterexperts in the sense that Ulrich Beck defines them.

All of the early bioscientific reports on the ecological and environmental significance of Akamas attempted to translate the results of their research into a discourse that would emotionally appeal to the lay public; they claimed that Akamas is "pure," "virgin," and "unspoiled"; emphasized the "richness," "diversity," "originality," and rarity of its fauna and flora; and highlighted how vulnerable individual species and the entire ecosystem are to human incursions.[8] These discursive tropes spelled out a moral imperative: to preserve the environmental integrity of Akamas and to conserve its "precious" ecology that needs protection.

Whose Akamas Is It Anyway?
Property Relations and Transnational Connections

One thing that stands out in the Akamas conflict is that local residents are opposed to the objectives of environmental protection. The communities in the area have also largely supported other nonlocal business interests engaged in developing the area for the tourism economy. Environmentalists and pro-development interests are entrenched in their opposition to each other, but at the same time, both are competing for government support and, in doing so, enlist and expand existing patronage networks. Government itself, because it is infused with semi-clientelistic structures, is not a monolithic actor but rather a collection of contradictory and sometimes antagonistic positions, especially if we keep in mind that while most of the early initiatives to secure protection for the landscape and natural habitats of Akamas originated from within the government, developers could also count on support from government actors. Obviously, this is not the type of conflict anthropologists have typically portrayed all over the Mediterranean, a conflict between powerless and marginalized local communities on the one hand and a distant, hostile, or simply indifferent state on the other hand. The conflict at hand is much more complex. To whom does Akamas belong? Beyond the large expanse of state-owned forest, Akamas is a patchwork of private properties, with many smaller pieces belonging to individual landowners living in the adjoining villages. Sizeable portions of Turkish Cypriot land are also administered by the government. Some considerably larger areas are owned by investors and by the Church, which has become successfully involved in the hotel business and other large tourism enterprises in other areas of the Paphos district.

The transnational connections of the issue add a new dimension to

the question of property relations. Increasingly, Akamas constitutes a focal point for the monitoring activities of supranational organizations. Most prominent is the European Commission. European institutions subscribe to the notion that halting the loss of biological diversity is a global task to be promoted and enforced by transnational institutions. With its March 2000 decision, the Cyprus government found itself at odds with the agenda of environmental protection the EU imposed on candidate countries before accession; to wait to implement this agenda until after Cyprus joined the EU obviously would have left a wide-open window of opportunity for projects and investments detrimental to the environment. In the process of aligning Cyprus with the environmental chapter of the *acquis communautaire,* which was provisionally closed in July 2001, the European Commission made its objectives clear, referring specifically to the Akamas issue, and asserted that "the situation will need to be monitored in the interim period to ensure that Cyprus complies with the spirit of the legislation."[9] It is only after the date of accession, however, that governments are held responsible for compliance with the *acquis* to the letter.

The role the EU has assumed vis-à-vis Akamas reflects changes in the way environmental problems are now tackled internationally, indicating the emergence of the globalization of environmental governance (Clark 2000). The EU views Akamas as a unique natural area that has been bequeathed to the community of all Europeans. For the European Commission, this requires putting the common good of Europeans above the particular interests of national governments or other stakeholders—including individual landowners. At the same time, the EU is holding the national government responsible for adequately safeguarding this legacy. It is the "conventions of property which regulate our access to resources and differentiate the natural world in relation to this access" (Tsing 2001, 7). We are witnessing here some interesting transformations—one might even say, inversions—of the type of property relations typical for capitalist societies. When environmental protection enters the picture, the right of property owners to unfettered use of their land is often curtailed in specific ways. The land uses are being restricted to those that are not harmful to the environment and its biodiversity. Such restrictions call to the fore one aspect of the Western convention of property—that ownership entails duties as well as rights and that these duties are for the good of the whole. In addition, environmental policies often extend a type of symbolic ownership to categories of social actors who hold no title to the land. They have never bought or inherited the land, but they are charged with protecting it. This is the concept of "stewardship" that has emerged alongside the globally influential discourse of "sustainability" (Johnston 2001), of safeguarding and renewing resources to ensure the livelihood of both the environment and future generations of humankind.

European agencies have come to regard any ecologically valuable piece of land that is located within a EU member state as the symbolic property of all Europeans. In 1992, member states approved the Habitats Directive to promote the protection of the "European natural heritage." The implementation of the directive has resulted in the establishment of Natura 2000, a Europe-wide network of protected sites. Land in designated Natura 2000 sites remains privately owned, but land uses, especially development, are monitored, evaluated, and, if they threaten the survival of protected species and the integrity of ecosystems, prohibited. The EU funds the implementation of sustainable development measures in such protected areas under the auspices of a number of programs.[10] After identifying potential sites for inclusion during the run-up period to accession, the Cyprus government submitted its list of zones to be protected as Natura 2000 sites in 2004. While the early scientific reports of the 1980s and 1990s on the ecological value of Akamas have yet to engage an emotional vocabulary that will speak to popular sentiments in a way that will enhance their political effectiveness, the advent of EU regulation has given environmentalism politically effective tools based on bioscientific knowledge. These take the form of standard selection criteria that are applied across Europe and are outlined in reference lists of habitat types and species. Predictably, in Cyprus, the public announcement of proposed protection zones created an uproar in many of the affected communities, spreading the type of conflict generated by the Akamas controversy to other regions of the country as well. Government officials at meetings with village representatives were threatened with physical violence and were told that the protection of the designated zones could not be enforced without the consent of the local communities: "It only takes one match for the entire area to be up in smoke."[11]

Akamas and the Environmental Patrimony of Cyprus

In the Akamas area, local community elites and investors pushing for tourism development can count on their arguments enjoying widespread support in Greek Cypriot society. Since Akamas is such an important part of the environmental patrimony of Cyprus, populist discourses argue, every Cypriot should be able to enjoy its natural beauty and historical sites, and since the military exercises of the British army have ceased, the area should be made accessible by roads and other infrastructure. In the 1990s, some of the big-time investors had already successfully appropriated this populist stance, profiling themselves as stewards of the traditional village communities and the treasure that Akamas represents for the Hellenic heritage of the whole of Greek Cypriot society.[12] This line of argument accuses environmentalists of wanting to deny the population what is rightfully theirs by imposing restrictions on land use.

In this lengthy conflict, the smaller, locally based landowners have for the most part entered into a coalition with outside investors. Even though it is doubtful whether this actually works to their own best interest, the decision of villagers to support the big businessmen and industrialists makes sense against the backdrop of their hopes for getting at least a small share of profits from tourism as soon as restrictions are lifted. Perhaps more important, an underpinning of clientelistic relationships cements the coalition. Some of the investors plausibly present themselves as "local boys who made it" and demonstratively claim close personal and family connections with the area. Also, both local elites and outside investors subscribe to the same cultural values of aggressive economic competition. They act within the framework of a shared moral economy which says that social actors are to be taken seriously only when they are promoting or defending their self-interest (which is often intimately related to family interests such as property rights) in their actions. This socially constructed legitimacy is exactly what even prominent Cypriot environmentalists are lacking; they have no local family background and no business concerns in the area. Their motives are neither recognizably self-interested nor do they have stakes in the local world that are recognized as culturally legitimate. Rather, their concerns are nonlocal or even antilocal and refer to abstract systems—such as bioscience and the environmentalist paradigm of sustainable development—rather than to concrete social worlds. In the mudslinging that has characterized some of the media coverage of the conflict, environmentalists often end up being symbolically stigmatized as traitors to the national patrimony, as agents of the former colonial rulers, as spies of competitors in business, or simply as lunatics (Baga 2001, 2002). It is not surprising, then, that Cypriot environmentalist groups that are locally based but recruit their members from the educated urban middle class have not managed to position themselves as legitimate stewards of the imperiled habitats and ecosystems of Akamas.

To the local population in villages adjoining the peninsula proper, Akamas is unprofitable land which will gain significance only when it can be transformed into a resource for securing and increasing the status and material prosperity of their families. For them, viewing Akamas as an area of high environmental value which is unparalleled not only in Cyprus but in the entire Mediterranean is at best an alien concept. It is something that urbanites and foreigners have invented that is far removed from how they themselves regard the area. Vassos Argyrou (1997) has commented on how the discourse of environmentalism in Cyprus is perceived by large parts of the population, especially the residents of rural areas and the working classes, to be an extension of the symbolic domination of the former colonialist and the indigenous bourgeois elites and rejected outright. However, a recent study in mountain communities in the Paphos district by environ-

mental sociologist Marina Michaelidou (Michaelidou and Decker 2003) claims that while rural populations value primarily the tangible benefits the land provides in terms of subsistence, they also appreciate its aesthetic significance and share some idea of its ecological value.

Anthropologists have often seen it as their task to make visible the interests and perspectives of local communities and to represent the cultural knowledge of indigenous groups that have been bypassed or marginalized and exploited in the modernization process. When addressing issues of the environment, many anthropologists tend to assume that local populations are the social actors most interested in averting ecological damage and identify them as the legitimate stewards of the environment. A growing number of ethnographies has addressed local populations as victims of environmental degradation and pollution. Anthropological studies of many non-Western societies have highlighted local resistance against logging or mining companies, plantation owners, and governments that implement large-scale dam projects (Milton 1993; Escobar 1995; Brosius 1999; Herzfeld 2001). The underlying assumption of these studies is that local populations are natural allies of environmentalism and that resource management based on their cultural traditions will safeguard the ecological integrity of an area. The Akamas controversy complicates such admittedly simplistic allocations of legitimacy and authority in environmental conflicts. To this day, the local population in the villages and communities adjoining Akamas continues to be extremely vigilant when they see their economic interests threatened by the political process of negotiating a solution for Akamas.

Yet as anthropologists we should be careful not to oversimplify the issue by concluding that local populations single-mindedly pursue one goal, namely material gain. Economic anthropologists caution us against trying to separate "pure" cultural values from "materialistic" economic motives. Against the backdrop of an ethnography of a comparable conflict on a Greek island, social anthropologist Dimitrios Theodossopoulos (2002) argues that beyond the potential economic value that land acquires once it becomes drawn into the dynamic of the tourism boom, cultural values that are closely connected to notions of the integrity and well-being of the family continue to be attached to property. This attitude toward the land and its uses is connected with "how individuals ally with other individuals to form corporate social entities such as the rural household rather than the mere calculation of material gain or loss" (Theodossopoulos 1997, 264). This is what must be taken into account in order to make the implementation of the most recent government decision on Akamas work, which to a large degree rests on the offer of compensation—both monetary compensation and the substitution of alternative pieces of land in exchange for land where building activity will be prohibited from now on.

Tradition and the Ethics of Environmentalism

Occasionally, in the struggles over the future of Akamas, local actors have referred to the preservation of cultural traditions in order to demand that restrictions on building activity beyond the confines of the villages proper be lifted. In this, the so-called dowry house, a building erected by the parents of the bride that constitutes an element of property transfer in the relationship between families established by marriage, has loomed large as an argument. Because available land for construction within the villages is limited and growing prosperity has increased the pressure on parents to provide ever-larger and more prestigious dowry houses, which may never actually be lived in by the young family but could just as well be used for tourism business, it would be easy to infer that the argument of tradition is used here to cleverly mask more modern objectives. As Michael Herzfeld recently pointed out, "Local populations may claim that their cultural heritage entitles them to activities on which environmentalists—for reasons often no less embedded in a particular set of cultural values—would resolutely frown, and the ethics of environmentalism clash with the ethics of cultural self-determination" (Herzfeld 2001, 186). Yet Herzfeld cautions us against an uncritical cultural relativism that claims that "anything goes" as long as it is embedded in a cultural meaning system. Some of the requirements that allow the biological world to function cannot be constructed out of existence, nor can any type of dealing with the environment be considered legitimate as long as it appears to be justified by a cultural order. Do we need to go along with a local community elite that claims that building four-star hotels is the "articulate expression of a well-established cultural tradition" (Theodossopoulos 1997, 265)? I should think not.

Ultimately, because of the uniqueness of Akamas, the individual owners of land in this area find themselves under pressure to adopt a position of ecological stewardship that radically contradicts the objectives they pursue. The increased efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus Problem and, in a paradoxical way, the failure to reunite the island on the eve of the Republic's accession to the EU in May 2004, have provided a new setting for the Akamas conflict and, indeed, renewed urgency about its resolution. Increasingly, the north of the island has come within the purview of both the tourism industry and the environmental concerns of the EU and other transnational actors. The tourism sector in the south of the island imagines itself under threat of increased competition by the north as the EU fosters the integration of the north into the transnational economic arena in the aftermath of the April 2004 referendum. If the north becomes an internationally accessible tourism destination, the tourism industry in the south will be even less tolerant than before of restrictions posed on its expansion

by environmental policies. At the same time, the coastal areas of the north of the island that are largely undeveloped run the risk of being destroyed in the course of rapid incorporation into an expanding tourism sector. Yet it is also conceivable that the implementation of EU environmental protection policies will gain a foothold in this relatively undeveloped part of the island.[13]

Conclusion

From an anthropological point of view, what sets the actors and agencies involved in the Akamas controversy apart from each other is not merely conflicting interests but, in an important way, how they perceive and conceptualize this piece of land—the meanings through which they construct, even invent, Akamas in a variety of ways: as a profitably exploitable piece of real estate, as a landscape of great aesthetic appeal, as useless brush land requiring irrigation to become agriculturally productive, or as an area of important habitats of rare and endangered species—to name but a few examples. These competing constructions of Akamas inform and guide the agendas of the various actors and agencies locked in a struggle for the future of the area. From what I have described, it is obvious that for each category of actors, Akamas carries a meaning that is incompatible with meanings constructed by others. In an important way, actors do not speak of the same thing when they say "environment" or "nature." British sociologists Phil Macnaghten and John Urry argue "that there is no singular 'nature' as such, only a diversity of contested natures; and . . . each such nature is constituted through a variety of socio-cultural processes from which such natures cannot be plausibly separated" (1998, 1).

The Akamas controversy constitutes an excellent opportunity to explore what Peter Loizos once called the "relation between private and public interests, between local and national community, between actions and forms, between long- and short-term advantages, between precise calculation and uncertainty" (Loizos 1975, 301). In the ongoing struggle over the future of Akamas, local community elites have emerged as the most visible and vocal actors opposing environmental concerns. In doing so, they have to some extent allowed themselves to become pawns in a game that is much larger than the desire for prosperity for their families and communities. Studies from other tourism destination areas show that once large-scale economic interests enter the scene, the local population will inevitably lose out in the long run. They may be able to sell land at inflated prices, but more often than not, they do not profit from the creation of new employment opportunities (Mowforth and Munt 1998).

The ethics of environmentalism have produced a "moral economy

of responsibility" (Herzfeld 2001, 186) toward the environment which brands those who obviously do not comply with this economy as immoral. It is conceivable that as "big business" and "big government" come to an understanding, the local communities will end up being scapegoated as "backward and greedy peasants." As anthropologists, we will have to be particularly attentive to the inequalities of power and the mechanisms of what Argyrou calls symbolic domination that are at play in such a conflict (see Argyrou 1996; this volume). Ultimately, the conflict underlying the Akamas issue is one between the standards imposed by "the West," embodied in the ecological rationality of the EU, and the political elites of Cyprus, who represent a society on the margins of Europe that is engaged in a struggle to be acknowledged as modern and European.

Notes

1. The material presented in this chapter stems from a series of interviews completed in 1999 in the context of a research project carried out with graduate and postgraduate students of cultural anthropology (see Welz and Ilyes 2001). Fieldwork was conducted during a three-month stay in 2000 and in a number of additional visits in 2001–2003. Interviews focused on the strategies, rhetoric, and underlying meaning systems that inform the practices of institutional actors in this prominent environmental conflict, within the government as well as in politics, the media, and nongovernmental organizations. Local tourism entrepreneurs and other stakeholders in the Akamas area were interviewed. In addition to interview materials, a wide range of documents and media reports were included. My research interest in environmental issues grew out of an earlier ethnographic concern with the economic strategies of small entrepreneurs in tourism in the Paphos district (see Welz 1999).

2. The plan is popularly known as "The World Bank Plan," even though the World Bank is only one of the sponsors of METAP and the funds for conducting this study were provided by the EU. See METAP, World Bank, UNDP, and CEC 1995.

3. *Cyprus Weekly,* May 26–June 1, 1995.

4. See also Council of Europe, "Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitat: Conservation of the Akamas Peninsula in Cyprus, Specific File Report of an On-The-Spot Appraisal Undertaken for the Council of Europe," February 21, 2002, T-PVS/Files (2002), 1.

5. For an in-depth assessment of the July 2002 decision of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cyprus entitled "Management of the Akamas Peninsula," see Council of Europe, "Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitat: Conservation of the Akamas Peninsula in Cyprus, Specific File Reports by the Cyprus Conservation Foundation and the Friends of Akamas," September 10, 2002, T-PVS/Files (2002), 10. New documentation produced for the 2004 meeting of the Standing Committee of the Berne Convention showed that the process for converting the management guidelines into an actual management plan had not made any progress.

6. Since the completion of the World Bank plan, a number of scientific surveys and fact-finding missions have been conducted by national and international teams of experts working for EU agencies; for instance, those implementing the Fauna-Flora-Habitat Directive of the EU. Also, bodies commissioned with monitoring the Europe-wide treaties on

nature protection such as the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats have Akamas on their agenda. As a result, the Council of Europe's standing committee on this particular treaty—which was ratified by Cyprus—opened a file against Cyprus for noncompliance that had very detailed recommendations for the conservation of Akamas. See Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, Standing Committee: Recommendation No. 63 (adopted on 5 December 1997) on the conservation of Akamas peninsula, Cyprus, and, in particular, of the nesting beaches of *Caretta caretta* and *Chelonia mydas.*

7. In Cyprus, environmental organizations claimed that the so-called PEACE expert team was "a front of the pro-development lobby" (*Cyprus Mail,* September 5, 1995). The investors have since continued to try to utilize the social authority of scientific practice by founding an Institute for the Sustainable Development of Akamas.

8. See an example of an earlier report integrating previous biological surveys in Demetropoulos, Leontiades, and Pissarides 1986.

9. The environmental chapter was closed by the negotiators from Cyprus and the commission in a meeting on July 27, 2001, in Brussels. The quotation is from the Regular Report from the Commission on Cyprus's Progress towards Accession, European Commission, November 8, 2000.

10. The full text of the Habitats Directive is available online at http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/nature/nature_conservation/eu_nature_legislation/habitats_directive/index_en.htm. See further information on the types of funding available at www.natura2000benefits.org/ireland/finan.htm.

11. See *Cyprus Mail,* May 12, 2004. Michaelidou and Decker (2003) warn of strong local opposition to the implementation of the Natura 2000 network if community interests are not sufficiently incorporated into the conservation framework.

12. This culturalist discourse is most skillfully orchestrated by one of the landowners, who in 1997 published a full-page article in the island's only daily English-language paper titled "Why I Want to Develop My Land on the Akamas." Baga 2001 offers an excellent interpretation of the symbolic strategies at work here.

13. Here, as infrastructural modernization had been largely suspended during the past thirty years, a number of environmental issues had remained unattended to; for instance, the problem of toxic waste pollution in the area of abandoned mines in the west of the Turkish Cypriot territories. However, the protection of two endangered species of marine turtles has been recognized as important by the authorities in the north for some time. In recent years, the bicommunal cooperation between environmentalist NGOs and special projects for the designation of habitats and ecosystems for protection measures has been fostered by the UN Office of Project Services and other agencies, creating a foundation for the implementation of EU policies in the future. The list of proposed Natura 2000 sites submitted by the government of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU also includes some sites in the north of the island which were designated on the basis of historical data.

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EIGHT

Gardens and the Nature of
Rootedness in Cyprus

Anne Jepson

The idea of a garden, as anyone who has and tends one will tell you, is supremely personal. It is an act of creation and intimate involvement. It is brought into existence as a cultural artifact through the imagination and practical work. It is an assault on nature. It is also a rendition of "nature." It functions as a liminal place, mediating between what we experience as the cultural—the cultured, the understood—and "nature"—the "wild," or what is outside our immediate private reference. I begin with the assumption that gardens are complex matters or entities, that they are more than mere neutral décor, functional growing areas, or abstract miniature landscapes.

Borders

An island is an easily imaginable whole; it is not arbitrary.[1] While I have the two-dimensional map of my own country imprinted on my consciousness, as many of us do, a relatively small island has a particular presence, and not only on a map. An island's boundary—where it meets the sea—is nonnegotiable. I would argue that this "presence" affects the consciousness of those who live on it.

A few years ago, I carried out fieldwork on another island, the Isle of Skye off the west coast of Scotland. Admittedly, it is smaller than Cyprus, but I was struck how the physicality of the island was the reference point

for the people there rather than the nation it was associated with. Cyprus is by no means a similar case, but at a crude level I wished to investigate this phenomenon, of a sensual awareness of physical boundaries that informs a particular sense of attachment that is perhaps peculiar to islands.

To render the situation of Cyprus more complex than the obvious corruption of its political division, any discussion must consider the question of identity, wary as we must be of the term (Handler 1994, 27–40). Are the islanders Cypriots, Greeks, and Turks or are they Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots? Or are they one of a number of other "labeled" minorities? The answer, of course, depends on who you ask. Essentializing is not constructive, but it is in the nature of conservative politics on the island (as elsewhere) to do so. In any place where divisions are made along presumed ethnic lines, perceived difference can only become fetishized. Seremetakis specifies some of the particularities of Greek identity in her essay "In Search of the Barbarians":

> Greek identity these days is nationally and internationally played out, defined, and sought after at the borders. Questions are debated in the public culture: who are the Greeks, and who are Greece's minorities? Where are Greeks themselves a minority? Where do the boundaries of the Greek diaspora in Eastern and Western Europe and the United States begin and end? Where do we draw Greece's boundaries in land, sea, air, and time? (1998, 169–170)

It is, of course, arguable that almost any identity could be substituted here. What is germane in the case of Cyprus is that the physical area is where polarized Greek and Turkish politics are played out; such a region is often metaphysical, but historical circumstance has made Cyprus the actual fulcrum between the two. However, the island enjoys little or no power in holding such a position. Cyprus is the proverbial backyard of both countries. As I will go on to argue, however, backyards, or gardens, can be quietly transformative and can act as the areas of mediation between neighbors or friends or, at another level, between nature and culture as two distinctly perceived realms.

In almost any area of Cyprus, one is aware of its edges, its physical boundaries. I am intrigued with how the political and arbitrary disruption of the physical integrity of a sensually experienced whole might be made manifest in the quotidian practice of gardening and growing things. The work on Skye led me to conclude that the direct and sensual interaction with the soil, the immediate stuff of a place, as well as an immediate sense of physical integrity are the most elemental rooting practices; that a garden can be a key to attachment. However, this assumes gardens to be somewhat static, an integral part of the whole that constitutes a bounded home. But I now suspect that it is the practice of gardening as much as the

garden itself that should be considered. I think that such practice can be a form of low-key memory work. It is a close-range, sensual, and supremely personal endeavor: The wider world is largely excluded by the boundaries of a garden. But the manipulation of the soil connects one by its ubiquity to other known places. The self, especially in terms of memory and nostalgia, can be expressed and articulated in a very understated way. But not necessarily, of course—the meaning of a garden need not be made explicit or explained. One can create copies of former gardens that look and smell the same. Practice and material can be faithfully replicated from one place to another through gardening, but the sensual associations might never be articulated so that anyone else would notice.

Talking Sense: The Scents of Memory

There is a clear distinction between memory and nostalgia and a politics is associated with both, although nostalgia in this instance is, at least in part, a particular product of the politics of memory. Herzfeld's formulation of "structural nostalgia" is pertinent here. He talks about structural knowledge being the "collective representation of an Edenic order—a time before time—in which the balanced perfection of social relations has not yet suffered the decay that affects everything human" (1997, 109). The flow of the process of nostalgia, which is gently restated by each generation—the "laments about moral decay" (1997, 111)—is not the narrative most apparent in Cyprus. There, the political construction of memory (see Papadakis 1993, 139–154) interrupts this gentle flow with the continually reiterated imagery of, and reference to, that construction's corruption by the events of 1974. That said, nostalgia and its etymology makes it, paradoxically in terms of Herzfeld's definition of structural nostalgia, the most apt expression of that "Edenic order." I do not want to dwell here on the politics of memory and nostalgia; instead, I use the formulation put forward by Seremetakis in *The Senses Still.* She dissects the word "nostalgia" into its Greek roots: *nostos* ("return") and *alghos* ("pain" or "ache"). She says that it "evokes the sensory dimension of memory in exile and estrangement" (1994, 4). She compares it with the English meaning of the word, which she says "freezes the past in such a manner as to preclude it from any capacity for social transformation in the present. . . . The Greek etymology evokes the transformative impact of the past as unreconciled historical experience" (ibid.). She goes on to explore how memory and the senses are intertwined and how the latter are inextricable from the former:

> Memory is the horizon of sensory experiences, storing and restoring the experience of each sensory dimension in another, as well as dispersing and finding sensory records outside the body in a surround of entangling objects and places. (1994, 9)

The practice of gardening, with its strong sensory involvement, fits well with this definition of memory and is distinct from memory evoked by the politics on the island. Nor does Herzfeld's notion of "structural nostalgia" fit with the sensual memories associated with gardening. Gardens, as miniature Edens, are politically unfettered elements of an order that is not verbally articulated.

The garden is a transient feature of any property that is not so obviously built, not so noticeable, and therefore not apparently significant. It is an area traversed by visitors on their way into or away from the house. However, growing spaces and gardens have a cyclical nature not only in terms of the seasons but also in terms of kinship and ownership; plots are inherited, divided, abandoned, reinstated, redesigned, and replanted. The paradox of the garden is that far from being rendered a "nonplace" by its transience and attributes, it becomes entwined intimately with the social through the organic and the cyclical. The territory might therefore be deemed central. With this in mind, I want to consider some of the significance of soil, the medium of a garden.

Soil, which is the basis for growing and is apparently natural, is also the basis of territory and a potent symbol of the homeland. It appeals to a primordial sense of belonging and attachment, or rootedness. Soil can be seen as the fixed, unchanging, and symbolic baseline of life that has lived and died on any particular patch of it. But this belies a more complex relationship between the so-called natural and the cultural, between permanence, transition, and transience. Soil is moveable: I have heard of refugees attempting to leave their homes with plants in pots of soil that were confiscated by the Turkish authorities. The person who recounted this did not know why they were doing so. Could it be that such artifacts are seen as much more than merely pots of soil; that in taking soil and plants from a place one is taking territory? More banally, soil can be eroded and washed away, but it is also created through cultivation and microbial activity. Gardens, as particular and ambiguous patches of territory, lie at the fulcrum of that complexity between the natural and the cultural; they are powerful and potent precisely because of their ambiguous location. The practice and action involved in creating a garden is, if you like, a moveable connection to actual places and the realm of unpoliticized memory and nostalgia.

The Absence of Gardens

Cyprus is not a country renowned for its gardens. By that, I mean gardens that tourists might be directed toward or gardens established as part of a national heritage. There is no apparent tradition. However, let us not allow apparent absence to put us off. Instead let us suspect that the

lack of a specific discourse provides an interesting if shady corner for the subject within the anthropology of Cyprus. Cyprus is still a significantly agricultural country where there is a growing interest in gardens and a gradual proliferation of the suburban garden as well as a long-standing and embedded relationship with plants and cultivation.

In Cyprus I came to see that horticulture was alive and well in many guises and excitingly diverse, with its private gardens, civic landscaping, commercial enterprises, and small-scale market gardens. In the village where I stayed I found traditional private enclosed yards—places for work, entertaining, and leisure—and their complement: the fields around the village. These were also places for work, recreation to a degree, socializing, and local conflict.

In Cyprus I encountered a crisis with regard to identifying my "field sites." The place where we lived as a family for a year was a small village in the northwest of Paphos district, on the edge of an area theoretically designated as a national park, the Akamas (cf. Welz, this volume). It was approximately thirty kilometers from Paphos and ten kilometers from Polis on the north coast. Although I had anticipated problems in defining and recognizing what constitutes a garden, I feared that I would not find the neat front and back gardens of the British suburban landscape I was so used to. I found the fields to be more like the British idea of an allotment—a productive area located away from the house. Vegetables were grown there not on a commercial scale but for the use of the household, and the surplus was distributed locally or sold at Paphos market. My British suburban garden, an integrated whole of vegetable and aesthetic production, did exist, though: an outward show of status and of order within. All new villas are built with a garden, an area for display to the outside world. These villas, bright and white, are familiar in much of the Mediterranean, and they stand out. They are a stark statement of new wealth. Some make obscure or stylized gestures toward a Hellenic past with grandiose columns and archways or to a "traditional" past with balconies, wooden shutters, and pan-tiled or flat roofs. They seem quite brash, something of an overstatement, a creation of a hyperreality. They are a denial of the history that created the conditions under which such villas could be built. I will return to these gardens later.

Gardens are classified by many factors. They arise from particular local, national, and international histories. One type is the garden in the older villages, the "traditional" villages; these include the enclosed yard around the house and/or the fields around the village. There are the gardens around the bright white villas, in or close to the towns, that belong to the children of those who live in the villages. A third type is the gardens of the British expatriates, which are found on vast new estates of retirement properties

that are loosely associated with an existing village. Expatriates also take on older village properties and renovate them in the "traditional" style, but the result is often an incongruous fusion of suburban with obsolete Cypriot "folk" artifacts. Landfills are scavenged for old baskets, tools, furniture, donkey saddles—whatever will add to the rustic ambience. A fourth type is the gardens around the properties that formerly belonged to Turks but have now been taken over as holiday properties by Greek Cypriots who live in the urban centers. And finally, there are the gardens of the refugees who have been rehoused.

I do not intend to deal in detail here with all aspects of these types of gardens, but I wish to use ethnographic material to draw out some of the interesting features, particularly regarding the themes related to the unarticulated work of memory through gardening practice.

Re-rooting

I was particularly interested in and intrigued by gardens in areas where there has been dramatic rupture, such as the refugee housing that went up outside Nicosia after 1974. The housing on the estates is flimsy; it was never intended to be permanent and is perhaps never allowed to be thought of as such. My decision to visit these estates was met with quizzical and doubtful responses. The general impression was that they would not be the places to find things growing, that there was more concrete in them than anything else, and that they were areas of serious social problems. I was expecting the hard and familiar evidence of this—a general lack of care for anything outside the houses, vandalism, graffiti, litter, and so forth.

This is far from what greeted me. The tiny plots were in proportion with the tiny houses. Each was fenced but was open to the road or car park behind and to all the neighbors. These refugee properties were on public display. The miniature gardens were invariably well tended and full and strikingly similar. In them one found samplers of village gardens and yards—diminutive renditions. Certain elements were common. Lemon trees were a central feature, and judging by their size, they were among the first things planted. There were vines, flowers, and herbs, and tiny token patches of vegetables such as broad beans, peppers, tomatoes, aubergines, and potatoes. There was not room for more than a few plants, certainly not enough to supply a family for any length of time, yet there was no question but that these gardeners would grow what they had grown at their home in the north. The history was very quickly evoked with these families, as were the attendant emotions—the grief and loss was still very raw, twenty-five years on. Talking about the plants and their provenance took residents I spoke to straight back to their former homes, where they had grown the

same things. Of course, back there and then, everything grew better and in greater abundance. As in the village, growing and garden work were, on the whole, a cooperative effort between husbands and wives, but the women took a greater interest in flower cultivation. The people I spoke to here were in their sixties, so in 1974 they would have been in their twenties and thirties. They mourned the loss of their fields, speaking in nostalgic terms about their land. Inherent in their descriptions was a comparison with the featureless, bleak, and soulless estate they now found themselves on. But I could not see the bleakness. What I saw was a passion to grow, to fill all the available space with green living plants, fresh food to eat, and flowers.

Mr. and Mrs. Makris were originally from Karavas, near Kyrenia. They had left a large farm in 1974 with only the clothes they were wearing. A sister and her husband had been shot by the invading Turkish army. Mr. and Mrs. Makris had owned extensive orchards of citrus, olives, and carob, and they had had three donkeys and oxen for plowing. They first went to the mountains and then to another area of Nicosia before settling in Anthoupoli. They did not own their current house and never could. Nor could they pass it on; after thirty years, they were defined, like all refugees in Cyprus, as "temporary residents." They are now elderly, but they work together in their small garden, helped by their son, who works in a nursery in the next village. Their other children, like many other refugees and economic migrants in the 1950s and 1960s, went to Africa. The impression I got from those who had returned or still had family in Africa was that most had become very successful. Mr. and Mrs. Makris have two large lemon trees that they planted as soon as they moved in, a large dessert grape vine, and olive trees at the back and front of the house. They harvest the olives and take them to the olive oil factory. When I was there, their garden was slowly encroaching on the communal parking area at the back where Mrs. Makris grew chrysanthemums and had many pots with carnations and the ornamental form of *kolokasi*. The front garden was packed with lilies, geraniums, carnations, campanula, and an exotic plant that I could not identify that they had grown in Karavas. They also grew broad beans, tomatoes, courgettes, cucumbers, and peppers in tiny plots. As we talked we were joined by their neighbors, who were curious about the visitor. Despite one of the neighbors saying that it had been a mistake not to keep people from communities in the north together when they were rehoused (which was done in some villages), there was clearly a close community feeling to the estate. Mrs. Makris—Christella—said that her neighbor was like a daughter to her, that they are very close. The gardens were divided only by low walls, and these were used chiefly for displaying more pots of flowers. Everyone on the estate looked after their gardens, she said. Mrs. Makris is known for her fine beadwork, crocheting, and tatting, and she

uses designs from Kyrenia, often based on flowers, to make decorations and gifts for local weddings. Before I left, an elderly stooping neighbor, also from Karavas, came in to sit and do her handiwork with Christella. Practices and current relationships connect them to one another, to their past, and to the particular plants and trees that moved with them or were replicated.

It was clear that the trees had been planted soon after the refugees arrived. What paradoxical urge was there in a situation where they expected that their stay in this flimsy barren estate would be brief that made them plant something, such as the lemon trees, that would not produce a decent crop of fruit for several years? Gardens are not allowed in refugee camps because they apparently signify a more permanent settlement. This is an irony; it is far easier to bulldoze or flatten a garden than it is to dismantle and dispose of a house or shelter, however makeshift. The growing of plants and/or food clearly represents something that fixes people to a particular spot. In the highly charged environment of a refugee camp, gardens are seen as dangerous because they introduce political ambiguity to a situation that relies for many reasons on being temporary. There is too much vested in these camps not becoming homes. Interestingly, I often heard the refugee estates in Cyprus still referred to as camps. These "camps" are not dangerous because the inhabitants are refugees in their own country. Their former homes, so close in geographical terms, must be thought of as politically close also. The "nostalgia," in the Greek sense, must be perpetually rekindled. But their gardens show that disaffection is not the response, as one might expect, and that the urge of these refugees is to re-root themselves.

It is easy to grow things in Cyprus, and given the agricultural background of many of the refugees it is not remarkable that they used whatever space was available as garden. I came upon one elderly woman, a neighbor of Mr. and Mrs. Makris, on a patch of municipal flowerbed she had appropriated; she was tending young olive trees that she had recently planted. She had marked her little territory with a precarious wall of pebbles. According to Christella, nobody minded—nobody owned any of their land or property anyway. Other areas amid the paving slabs between the massive new church and the housing looked forlorn, with just a few thin neglected shrubs. Their condition spoke of their pointlessness, even of a poor selection of plant material. Christella's neighbor saw space to grow something in and simply used it.

In the village where I lived for the duration of my fieldwork, I witnessed a careless abandon to the sowing and cultivation of crops, not the ordered, neurotic rows I had been trained to create that had specified widths, depths, and distances according to the crop. Nevertheless, in an interview, one refu-

gee in her thirties demonstrated the urge to garden as an intrinsic need that was necessary for her health and well-being. She said that when something in the garden was failing, she herself felt unwell. This was a refugee who had eventually settled in a Turkish Cypriot property near Paphos. It had taken her and her husband, also a refugee, twelve years to decide to work on the house, to invest the money and the necessary part of themselves that would make a clear statement that this was their home. This reluctance must be put in the context of Greek Cypriots taking over former Turkish Cypriot houses and not having the title deeds to those properties; they live in these houses on the understanding that they still belong to the Turkish Cypriot owners, who can claim them back in the event of a political settlement to the Cyprus Problem. Nevertheless, this woman had started in the garden as soon as they moved into the house. She had designed, planted, and extended haphazardly, allowing the garden to evolve, and was always looking for ways to enlarge it. She resented the fact that an extension to the workshops needed for the family business might encroach on her garden. In what ways, I wonder, does this interaction with earth/soil and plant fulfill a need? How is it that such an involvement is necessary for such deeply felt well-being? She stated in strong terms that gardening was an essential part of her. This was also true for Mr. and Mrs. Makris and their neighbors and my neighbors in the village, as evidenced by their own gardening. There was no apparent outward reference to others' gardens, no social competition in the impulse, just a need to grow. Could it perhaps, and paradoxically, also be that the very provisional, transient, cyclical nature of the garden draws them to this work? The investment with the provisional, the cyclical, and the transient is (ironically) less political than the investment in the concrete, more heavily symbolic markers of home, namely the house. The lives of refugees are suffused with the politics of "going home," of a reality they have not been able to grasp for nearly thirty years. The garden literally and metaphorically fills the space and achieves some sort of deeply personal reconciliation.

I had assumed that a connection and interaction with the earth, the soil of a place, was the most fundamental rooting practice, that the garden would be the key to attachment. I suspect now, however, that the garden and gardening practices fulfill some other, less overt function. They can incorporate nostalgia. They entail practical involvement. Thus they can externalize memory and concretize it. One can have exact replicas of the various plants that are familiar, that smell the same, that are cuttings—clones—that will produce fruit that will taste the same as those that grew back home. This is not possible, at least in the short term, with houses or communities. I was told of a vine which grew beautiful grapes for a family in Morphou, which is in the occupied north. Prior to 1974, on a visit to Morphou, some cousins from Larnaca had asked for a cutting. After 1974,

the family was forced from Morphou and were able to take nothing with them. They asked for a cutting of the vine that was now growing well in Larnaca. The person who told me the story, another family member, also has a piece growing at his home in Nicosia. In a very prosaic way, plants connect people and places, emphasizing genealogies and social relation. In addition, they can provide a means of acting out memory. Memory can be inscribed anew on the symbolically permanent: the soil, which, as already stated, is, in fact, a very fluid layer. One refugee spoke at length of the garden she knew as a child. She had no memories of the house—she was seven in 1974—but she said:

> I remember to the last stone of the garden. I had an area that was completely my own where I grew flowers, onions, small things that I was given by my father or others. My sister remembers the house, but I have no memory of it at all.

At some level, she connected back to that childhood garden through the one she is cultivating now. I visited another, older woman who showed me photographs of her former home, a large modern house that was surrounded by an open garden. Her home now, close to Larnaca, which is also large and modern, was likewise surrounded by a garden, in which she had reproduced exactly her favorite features and beds from her former home. In a garden, practice and sensual experience and involvement are carried in the memory and can be reenacted with tangible results. Material objects are never a necessary part of this process. This sounds like a contradiction; plants and soil are, of course, material. But I emphasize that it is the process, one of sensual evocation and not necessarily an absolute and faithful reproduction, that simultaneously nourishes "nostalgia" and connections backward in time and creates continuity in the present. The smell of the plants, the feel of the soil, and the practice itself are all the same as ever, and the creation of a new garden can be seen as a force for continuity that subsumes rupture and, in essence, transcends bounded territoriality. The making of a garden is an apolitical, sensual act. Through a garden, elements of nostalgia and memory—embedded rather than politically evoked, connect with a sensual recognition of the organic baseline that soil and plants provide. Soil and plants can also move across the more fixed geology beneath. Mr. and Mrs. Makris had gone to the mountains and brought their soil back in a car because the soil on the newly built estate was very poor. Many other people talked of bringing in soil to their gardens and enriching it with manure. Soil is manmade: created, improved, mixed, and moved.

Loizos does not dwell on attachment to land explicitly in *The Heart Grown Bitter,* but in describing the immediate aftermath of the 1974 invasion on Argaki refugees, he observed "people carrying out small actions which looked like metaphors."

An Argaki woman, dwelling in a half-ruined mud-brick house, only a few miles from her own village, was sun-drying citrus seeds on a sack . . . "to plant later." Since she had no land were the seeds a talisman, to take her home again? . . . Tomas had a seedling lemon tree in a one-gallon oil tin. . . . It had been left there by the previous owner. . . . It would have been a pity to let it die. (1981, 184)

There was no explanation offered by the refugees in the immediate traumatic aftermath when the future was so uncertain. Perhaps there was a recognition that the seedlings articulated the means of regeneration, of potential reattachment through planting trees; they put down roots, which must be tended where they are planted and will produce food.

Bardenstein considers trees in the context of Palestinian and Israeli collective memory. She states that trees are "loaded and hypersaturated cultural symbols" for both groups and that "discontinuity or absence of an immediate and experienced 'people-land' bond is at the core of the construction of both Palestinian and Israeli collective memory" (1999, 148). She tells a story of a far more self-conscious series of "acts of memory" than was evident in Cyprus, particularly in the case of the Israelis. She describes a poem written by a Palestinian that resonates with the story of the vine from Larnaca. The story is about her father and a fig tree and of how they were constantly reactivated as "sites of memory" wherever he went and in stories he told his daughter (1999, 151). They became a metonym for Palestine:

Through the power of the fig-tree fragment to evoke the sensations and associations of homeland, the father is able to experience Texas as a new incarnation of home, as if all has been restored to the natural order, as if Palestine was no longer absent. (152)

It is surprising that the elements of territory, namely trees, soil, and plants, cannot be pinned down and demarcated easily. The paradox is clear; soil is one of the key symbols of the homeland, the basis of a country, the vessel for its dead. But here it is, in different places, helping in the re-creation of home. The key is that it is fluid, moveable, the layer over that which is rock-solid; but it has the impression of solidity and its depth is unknown. In one sense, soil, geology, and topography are unified and contiguous This makes soil a potentially powerful symbol of permanence. But in reality, it shifts, it can be moved around, it can be layered up, dug up in order to bury pipes, people, buildings, even, and is, in fact, perpetually created anew by the action of weather and erosion and the acts of cultivation and manuring, for example. Trees and plants are the more readily mobilized complement of the soil, the more obvious metaphor for human experience.

There is a conflux between the past and the present and between underlying geology and surface layers. When refugees looked up and away from the ground now about them, the politically inaccessible north was visible

across the Mesaoria Plain. The refugees' small gardens with their familiar plants exaggerated the limit of their existence compared with 1974. By 2004, the situation was slightly different. In 2001 and 2002, at the time of the research, the north was totally inaccessible, but in 2004, although the north was accessible, circumstances made it impossible for refugees to return home. They have an uninterrupted view of the way back to their former homes. I cannot imagine the frustration and sadness of not being allowed to reconcile their sensual experience—the visible unity of the land, their involvement with their gardens here and in their memory, for example—with the arbitrary political barrier that confounds that sensual awareness and experience. Their gardens are, I feel, an attempt at a reconciliation. It is as if the arbitrary boundary completely frustrates the need for movement, making not the home the crucial factor, but the movement itself.

The language of gardening is implicit rather than explicit. Boundary-making and building are, in contrast, overtly political acts. Houses, and buildings in general, cannot connect with a past home in quite the same way that plants and soil can: The investment in the house is more definite, more overtly political, and, I would argue, more self-conscious and less personal than the quieter, more easily eradicable but deeply sustaining involvement with soil and plants. In the houses I entered there were many photographs of the family's previous life in the north—pictures of the village church, the house, the oxen the family had used, family members who had been killed or remained "missing." In one home, a small model of the family house in the north sat in the living room. For the teenage daughter, who had never visited the north, this model was a powerful and constant reminder of her denied inheritance, and its presence invoked anger and underlined for her the need for resolution. She was prepared for that resolution to be violent if that was the only means by which family property could be regained. These artifacts and static representations or frozen moments are somewhat crude in comparison to the elements of a garden and the gardening practice I encountered. Because they are static, in the sense that they directly record past experience, their meaning is inescapable. The memories associated with them more closely invoke the feelings that were present at the time and there is little possibility for transformation of that experience in the present.

Garden Ornaments

I want to turn now to more apparently ephemeral facets of horticulture. There was a seemingly different side to horticultural practice in Cyprus, and what follows is something of a counterpoint to what I have focused on so far. Some gardens there speak of a different form of rupture and movement,

namely social mobility and a self-conscious distancing from the "home" of childhood and of the village. This material will appear to run counter to the themes I have introduced; here I will focus on how gardens and flowers can be signifiers of excess, class, and ephemeral redundancy. These gardens deny the reproduction of personal and sensual memory. In them, I found examples of commodification of memory through the creation of gardens or aspects of gardens. I want to discuss the newer, overstated urban or sub-urban villas and the presence of flowers as disposable bourgeois products.

Bourdieu argues that "distinction," or "natural refinement," is merely about the maintenance of a relational gap in social space (see Bourdieu 1984). Class distance is sustained by ensuring that the markers of economic and cultural capital from one class to another are kept distinct. An example of this might be someone who is bourgeois, or confident about their class position, starting a collection of kitsch from the 1950s or 1960s as compared with someone who had bought it at the time, believing it to be truly tasteful. Attitudes about what is "tasteful" shift, and those who possess the greater cultural capital (and not necessarily the most economic capital) make the selections. The attitudes of those with "taste" lead the way toward and away from markers of "good taste." As more of the population takes up markers of distinction in fashion, art, leisure activities, and even profession, they become devalued and the elite adopt new markers.

The gardens of the new villas are located in a very different cultural space from the refugees' gardens in the estate, and they demand attention. They are part of the architecture and physical structure of the villas. They can be found in Nicosia, in the suburbs of Limassol perhaps, or, increasingly, on the outskirts of villages of any region. These villas were frequently decried, and the stereotyped owners derided, by intellectuals and expatriates, especially those who have taken over, or "rescued," the older grand houses that were in the narrow abandoned streets in the old parts of the cities. These people, confident of their class position, sought out "tasteful" pieces of furniture and/or antiques and restored the properties carefully to retain the original character. I was told how architects and builders in the era before concrete and reinforcing rods used skills that are now lost or redundant, applying them to such details as how to maximize the flow of air through the house to keep it cool in summer. These people with "taste" and "discernment" are, and perceive themselves to be, very removed from the owners of the new white villas who want air-conditioning and like the versatility of concrete. The relational gap is maintained via the discourse of "traditional" versus "modern," artisan versus builder, indigenous versus alien. In Nicosia particularly, preservation is being addressed at a municipal level, and whole areas are being renovated and refurbished, a process intended to encourage "good taste."

The new villas are brash markers of difference, not simply between the rich and poor but between the first generation of the wealthy, the upwardly mobile (who still remember life in the village as children) and the nouveau riche and those who live in the older properties, who demonstrate cultural distance from residents of the new villas who have rapidly accrued economic capital. These villas have an urgency about them—the memories of little social capital and little economic wealth are very close to the surface. This urgency results in the overstatement that is the villa itself. Many of these gardens conform to the northern European norm of a lawn with water features and statuary. The lawns are at their most stark in the summer, when all other greenery on the island has burned off. The garden is not located within a private enclosed yard but is clearly linked with the strident expressiveness of the house. To feed, or rather furnish, these gardens, the equivalent of a supermarket or furniture shop is necessary, and there has been an upsurge in the presence of garden centers in Cyprus. They are either attached to supermarkets or have evolved out of florists' businesses and flower shops. The garden center differs from the plant nursery in that it deals exclusively with a finished, packaged product rather than the growing and propagation of the plants. Both the villas and the garden center industry that has grown up to supply them foster a degree of alienation from the organic and the cyclical.

One refugee, a woman now living near Larnaca, spoke about her interest in gardening as a defined activity. She has memories of getting ideas from women's magazines and television in the 1960s and 1970s. In these media, gardens became commodified and the aesthetics of the garden were made an explicit project. The garden became an enhancement of the house: its outward mantle. People with a new house on a new plot have a blank canvas, one that is perhaps far removed from their childhood home. The number of such people has risen dramatically as migration from the countryside has become more common over the past few decades.

Such individuals have total power, apparently, to create a completely new existence. It is no longer necessary for them to grow food; it is more convenient simply to buy it, so the garden has to fulfill another function or functions. One of these, I would suggest, is that of bourgeois display, of a garden made solely for leisure and pleasure: a semi-public forum for the disclosure of disposable income and aesthetic taste.

Cut flowers are another and perhaps more extreme indicator of bourgeois excess and taste. Flower shops are an example of the denial of the solely useful, and cut flowers have been in demand for many years. An excess and redundancy associated with the evanescence of cut flowers outdoes the excesses of art, which is usually permanent. Similarly, a purely ornamental garden speaks of excess and redundancy that replaces a certain and perhaps

personalized configuration of the past. The memory of the need to grow food can be erased by covering the soil with lawn and shrubs and flowers. Children can play rather than be required to help with the cultivation. They demonstrate and are emblematic of a bourgeois existence.

Garden centers emerged from flower shops, of which there are many. I was puzzled at the number; I had been given the impression that ground used for growing flowers was wasted ground. One British expatriate was admonished by a Cypriot neighbor for planting flowers in the yard around her village house. She rationalized the criticism in a somewhat patronizing way by remarking that her neighbor had a very recent memory of poverty that apparently required that all available land be used for food. The British woman's rather ethnocentric assumption was that Cypriots saw flowers as a bourgeois indulgence of the affluent. The predominance of flower shops is still somewhat mystifying in a country with a climate that means that fresh cut flowers have a very short lifespan.

Flowers in houses were very evident everywhere, not so much as vases of fresh flowers but as plastic flowers that served as decorative motifs on walls and tablecloths. They appear to be an essential feature of sitting-room décor for many women. Some of the women I interviewed gave replies that assumed that flowers in some form were necessary decoration. I was told:

> Plastic flowers don't die, they don't make a mess, and when they get dirty and dusty we can wash them.

Flowers in general were associated with cleanliness, giving them, perhaps, moral overtones. One respondent remarked, "Everyone grew flowers there, it was a very tidy and clean village." Plastic flowers are such a different product from the real thing, which does not last long. This to me is part of the attraction of fresh flowers—they are a treat, they fill a room with fragrance which brings part of the garden indoors. The plastic flowers were approached with pragmatism, but there was no question that they should exist. They stand perhaps as a permanent marker for the ephemeral, a small emblem of bourgeois excess and exuberance that is paradoxically purged of all the excess and exuberance of what flowers stand for.

In a related way, the new villas with their instantly installed gardens are a bold statement of presence, but there is such an aura of consumer durability, of a garden being delivered and subject to changing fashion, that despite their boldness, they ironically speak less of permanence and occupy more of an interstitial space. They are a transitional object, more a symbol of upward mobility than of having arrived somewhere. These houses and their gardens seem to have nothing whatsoever to do with memory, and I would go so far as to say that they are anti-memory. They seem to defy

nostalgia and be dislocated from the past. Most of the younger people I met were quite resistant to returning to the village, where their family was from, but they visited on occasion when duty insisted. To them, the villages signified backwardness, even social primitivism, and "were full of the old people"—their parents or grandparents. The younger generation wanted to escape from that backwardness. One man, our landlady's son, an energetic businessman living in Limassol, cited with disgust and humor the outside toilet as the epitome of the life he had gotten away from. I observed wryly later how the expatriate British conservationist couple living in the village were very proud of the composting toilet they had installed; it was a feat of technological expertise that was based on sound modern principles of sustainability. It seems that the past is always bound up with and evident in the present, even, it would seem, in the apparently uncontroversial domain of toilets.

Conclusion: Leaving the Garden Gate Open

In these examples of gardens, I have attempted to suggest ways in which the practice and expression of gardening signifies a facet of the process of memory. In some ways, gardening represents a dual interaction between the material and the metaphysical, between self-conscious and embedded practices. Gardening is a means of temporary, erasable inscription. Inscription implies deliberation, cultural marking. But there is the underlying awareness that gardens can quietly return to a state of nature where the inscription is lost. Gardens do not have the political presence of the built environment, yet they are tied indelibly with the idea and territory of home.

I have also suggested that the soil represents the implied permanence of all that underlies the notion of home. Soil serves as a vessel for the dead of a nation and as something conjoined with underlying geology (and therefore with history). Its fluidity, in symbolic and literal terms, is present in the quieter work of nostalgia and memory in the tentative reestablishment of roots, in the creation of a replica of a past that is nonetheless recognized, or rather practiced, as something that is both new and connected with the past through identical sensual experience. Plants can be easily replicated, and they bring sensual as well as nostalgic memory. Propagation relies on provenance, and the parallels between kinship and the networks that pass on plants, cuttings, and seed give plants a cultural and personal genealogy. Plants have been cloned for centuries. Replicating plants denotes social replication and social reproduction on two levels. Commercially grown flowers and plastic flowers for display represent an economic, perhaps alienated, production that is related to the social production of "taste."

The more intimate social acts of friends and neighbors breaking off bits of plants to give to one another when visiting stand at the opposite end of this spectrum.

Finally, I have talked about the "new" garden, the garden that is anti-memory, that seeks to deny historical attachment through soil. I have introduced the contradictions implicit in this form of garden and the use of plants as ephemera, markers of excess and redundancy, and have implied that plants and gardens can re-root people quite differently in a burgeoning bourgeois space. One resulting contradiction is that such houses and gardens speak very loudly of territoriality in one sense, but not in an embedded sense that links one personally and sensually with historical places, kin, friends, neighbors, and nostalgic connections, as is the case with the gardens of the refugees I spoke to. Personal connections subsume that territoriality.

I am aware that throughout this chapter, I have created a finely delineated path for gardens, veering close to an essentialization of nature and even, by extension, a conception of territoriality that at times might seem to threaten my project. I have guarded against this by discussing the unique position that gardens and gardening practice can assume through the media of the senses and the memory. My personal stance as a gardener comes from a naturalistic perspective (see Descola 1996) that is fraught with internalized dichotomies which cannot be universalized. So while my instinct wants to see the urge to garden as a primordial need to connect with the objective world at its most basic level—that of the soil and what grows in it—I do not intend to imply that any other sublinguistic urge is a prima facie given. I maintain that because the sensual nature of gardening is sublinguistic and its power is implicit, it manages to circumvent dualistic language and motivation.

The second form of gardening that I have described is couched stridently, and therefore apparently perhaps too simply, in the context of class distinction. This form of practice demonstrates an alternative mode of expression for the garden and flowers that combines an erasure of memory with a more straightforward technologizing and naturalizing motivation. It is an expression of emplacement, of social presence in an often urban environment where building proliferates and extinguishes a concept of territory associated with landscapes and rural vistas. These gardens are unmistakably property, but they are more than that because they are also a denial of an association with the land that was historically essential for survival and sustenance, an economic necessity.

Whatever its manifestation, however, any garden is sensually experienced—at the simplest level of plucking off a flower to smell its scent, for example—and, more pragmatically, in the construction of its boundaries.

The meanings contained within those boundaries are supremely personal, although they clearly have a social presence that is powerful and potent through their understatement, their ambiguity, and their absence of overt articulation. Such power is underpinned by the very fluidity of the elements that make up any garden.

Notes

1. This chapter is based on fieldwork done in Cyprus between 1999 and 2001, at a time when there was minimal communication between the north and south of the island (and what communication there was was hostile). In April 2003 the regulations pertaining to movement between north and south were relaxed, allowing Cypriots to visit their former homes on either side of the Green Line.

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NINE

Researching Society and Culture in Cyprus

DISPLACEMENTS, HYBRIDITIES, AND DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORKS

Floya Anthias

Introduction: Researching Cypriot Society

When I first began the study of Cypriot society, I came to it as a sociologist with an interest in inequalities and otherness. The central plank in the literature I began to consider was the ethnic and national issue in Cyprus. It examined the historical, economic, and political underpinnings of nationalism in order to show its international dimensions. In much of this work, the local context, the imaginings and relations of the people themselves, was constructed as an effect of these "outside" interests and there was a tendency to see Cypriots as stooges and pawns rather than as political actors. Although there is clearly a place for an international relations approach to what is commonly known as the "Cyprus Problem," the day-to-day processes involved in the scenarios many of these writers set up were absent. They saw ideologies as monolithic and overdetermined and did not discuss the contradictions which open up potential for change.

The growth of anthropological research on Cyprus in the last decade by Cypriot and other scholars internationally has moved the focus away from the dominance of the national issue to discussion of the reconfiguration of Cypriot society as a whole in relation to global and local social and cultural contexts. Work has been undertaken on a rich array of facets of Cypriot society, connecting these substantively to broader theoretical and

political issues worldwide. Issues of representation and recognition and narratives of identity and otherness have been important developments in this literature.

It has now become recognized that postcoloniality is an important context for Cyprus. This recognition does not only mean that the history of colonial domination (by Britain most recently) is responsible for the tragedy of contemporary Cyprus, through the Zurich Agreement and its fatal aftermath, which extended colonialism from one country to three by legitimizing the military presence of the so-called guarantors, Britain, Turkey, and Greece. Nor does it only mean that colonialism has left its mark on the infrastructure of Cypriot society. Postcoloniality extends beyond these facets and signifies the positioning of Cyprus ambivalently between the "West" and the "East," combining within its borders the White hegemonic Christian and the Muslim other. And yet because of its colonial context and centuries of being on the margins—as the colonized, as the "small," as that which is to be contained—its location in relation to the hegemonic West is once again ambivalent. Its place on a map of the world testifies to this: nearer Turkey than Greece, the majority culturally and linguistically Greek, classified in the category of the Middle East in cheap international telephone tariffs! And yet, of course, Cyprus has joined the European Union and has rejected the most recent version of the Annan Plan, which proposed a formula for reuniting the island on the basis of a bizonal federal system. This rejection in a referendum in April 2004 indicates that Greek Cypriots particularly (and of course largely through the discourse and positions of their political leaders) are concerned about the ways in which Turkey's role is legitimated further on the island through the maintenance of some Turkish military presence, albeit a reduced one, and the failure to allow all refugees to have the right to return to their home. It does not, however, mean that Greek Cypriots do not wish to find a bizonal and federal solution through which these issues of concern, and a number of others, can be resolved.

There is no doubt that the ongoing national conflict and Turkish and Greek nationalisms have served to underplay the importance of the context of postcoloniality in Cyprus society. Such postcolonial frames leave subject positionalities where identity politics is overstressed as a compensatory mechanism for the uncertainties and fissures in society. Cypriots are ambivalent about their value, and this is both produced and reflected in imaginings about belonging to the Greek or the Turkish nation. The concept "Cypriot" is divested of value in and of itself; it is an apology for not being complete, and a form of self-hatred and denial is sometimes witnessed. Mimicry of those who are seen as more modern, as more worthy or Western, as more advanced is found in the attitude toward language in

particular, at both the official and everyday levels. A friend's son was told at school that the word *sintichano* (an ancient Greek word meaning "converse") was not a Greek word and was asked to check it in the dictionary. Words such as *ximarismenos* ("dirty person") and *kotzakari* ("old woman") are used but with a recognition that they might not be as valued as much as *leromenos* and *gria* (the "proper" Greek words for "dirty person" and "old woman"). This is an example where the self emerges as the "other" of itself. And yet, in constructions of selfhood and belonging, identifying, inferiorizing, and apportioning blame to the "other" as a form of scapegoating play a significant role. In recognizing the self in the other this process becomes undermined and the possibility of dialogue emerges. Here, the experience of "otherness within" of Cypriots may be able to play some role in overcoming the fixities of belonging constructed by ethnic frameworks of the self. In this sense also, discourses of interculturality may play an important role as long as they are not simplistically conceptualized.

The focus of this chapter is on the issues of displacements and hybridities, a generally neglected area in research on Cyprus. While refugees have been looked at from a number of viewpoints, particularly in the important work of Peter Loizos (1981), there has been little attempt to think through the importance of Cyprus as a translocational space; that is, one where interculturality, movement, and flow have been important aspects of social reality. Drawing upon narratives of interculturality is important here. However, such narratives need to avoid the oversimplified type that says: "Once upon a time we lived together happily when we were left to our own devices, but it was outsiders that created ethnic divisions." A more nuanced sense of commonalities, differences, and the dynamic nature of connections and disconnections to place and time need to be addressed. However, there are insurmountable difficulties for scholars and ideologues who wish to pursue such a line. Sometimes these difficulties relate to "the political realities in Cyprus," where political projects related to the Cyprus Problem and how that problem can be resolved form the point of view of each supposedly monolithically constructed national side of the Greek/Turkish divide. This is not just a question of prohibition; it is one where strategic considerations about what can be talked about, how Cyprus should be represented, and how issues of recognition (in the broad sense) can be used to block, exclude, and marginalize those discourses and potential research problematics that have the potential to uncover the intricacies of interculturality as a continuing framework. Notions of origins, blood, heritage, and culture (read as an inherited or genetic effect) disable the possibility of transcending the fixities of belonging that are constructed within nationalist or ethnic discourses and practice.

This chapter does not seek to provide a substantive account of the historical manifestations of interculturality in Cyprus; it is a theoretical

intervention that discusses how such a framework might or might not yield the potential for new imaginings in Cyprus. I will consider the dialogical potential of developments in approaches to displacements and hybridity. For it is in the concept of dialogue and the shifts in position that become possible through this process that the potential for revealing the fluidity of boundaries and their social rather than natural construction exists. Such a process can encourage notions of a self which is multiple, not just in terms of an accretion of different identities but in terms of an identity that can encompass otherness, both internal and external. In such a model, the self and the other are no longer experienced as eternal binaries but are aspects of each other. From this point of view, I will address the whole issue of "translocational" positionings in order to further develop the foci on "hybridity" and transnationalism that have become increasingly important in academic debates (see Anthias 2002). These are not merely academic issues; they also signify ways of representing the social frame in political (albeit inexplicit) terms. The focus on existing and new hybridities has the potential to displace the certainties and fundamentalisms of fixed locations that lie at the heart of ethnic chauvinism. Cyprus's entry into Europe does not necessarily do this because of the constructions of the European and "the other" that still lie at the heart of the European transnational project.

Displacements and Boundaries of Belonging: Translocational Imaginings and Issues of Hybridity

Displacement has created the most powerful image for the modern world in arguments about transnationalism and globalization. Displacement, however, cannot be seen in any unitary way or as a single process. Moreover, the notion itself already presupposes its opposite, which can be thought of as being "in place." Being in "place," however, is never an empirically given or static relation and is open to local and particular imaginings and representations which have political as well as emotional resonances. This is compounded in Cyprus by a number of characteristics. Forced population movements from 1963 (especially in 1974) produced internal flows and disruptions involving displaced persons, their memories, their hybridities. Movements of people from Anatolia and other parts of Turkey to the north have been induced in order to change the demographic balance and have had significant effects on constructing new forms of belonging and otherness. Diasporic movements have brought forth the imaginings of those who left as young people and some who returned when old as well as the migrants from Cyprus (who live in the United Kingdom, the United States, or Australia, for example) who return every year as "tourists" build homes, and feel dissatisfied with the Cypriot mentality. The otherness of these returnees is constructed as both "one of us" and as "an outsider,"

particularly when they return to their villages and try to relate to the locals. They may be seen as outsiders in the local community. Property ownership has grown among retirees from Western and Northern European countries who wish to settle in Cyprus and construct it as a "painfully beautiful island" (as a letter to the English-language daily newspaper *Cyprus Mail* memorably put it). Transnational migration to Cyprus, particularly by women from the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Eastern Europe, has created a migrant workforce. Domestic workers, many of them illegal, live and work in people's homes in the south. They are constructed both as members of the household and as alien subjects: The roles of media and political and state representations in these constructions are important, as are local constructions within families, neighborhoods, and communities. Female migrants who are employed in the Cypriot sex industry also constitute a special category of "otherness." The growth of mass tourism in destinations such as Ayia Napa has led to an increase in nightlife-oriented infrastructures and the spread of Western styles of working-class youth culture. Also, the exodus from rural Cyprus has proletarianized urban spaces both in terms of migration of laborers to towns and in terms of refugees who have fled to towns, where they become constructed as victims of displacement and at times are pathologized.

This short survey points to some important gaps in the literature on Cyprus. After interrogating the notion of hybridity, I will focus first on the intercultural narratives of diasporic young Cypriots and raise some issues relating to Cyprus as a space that includes these young people very centrally through connections with the spaces of their parents and the returnees. Then I will look at the reconfigurations immanent in the phenomenon of migration to Cyprus, focusing particularly on domestic maids.

Hybridity and the Translocational

Hybridity is a term that has been seen as characterizing the "modern condition," particularly within postmodern discourse; it has been a central term in poststructuralist cultural theory and in some variants of globalization theory. However, the story we tell ourselves that we are all becoming global, hybrid, and diasporic can only be told by those who occupy, as Robert Young (1996, 4) so persuasively argues, a space of "new stability and self-assurance." In Cyprus, the desire to be modern and therefore open to transformations of the self is bounded by our location in the border between being Greek Cypriot and being Turkish Cypriot and the construction of our selves as opposite poles of each other. This may be one reason why ideas of hybridity have been neglected and indeed frowned upon in Cypriot society. To what extent can the growing importance of global cultural and other spheres be applied to the Cypriot context?

"Hybridity" is used in different ways and constitutes for each contemporary writer a way of challenging existing paradigms of "identity" (see Anthias 2001). For example, Stuart Hall suggests that hybridity is particularly linked to the idea of "new ethnicities" (Hall 1988), which attempts to provide an approach to ethnic culture that is not static or essentialized. Paul Gilroy (1993), on the other hand, uses Du Bois's notion of double consciousness to denote the hybrid and diasporic condition. Homi Bhabha (1994), too, sees the transgression of national or ethnic borders as the key to the condition of hybridity; a double perspective becomes possible and signals the migrant artist/poet/intellectual as the voice that speaks from two places at once and inhabits neither. This is the space of liminality, of "no place," of the buffer zone, of "no man's land." Bhabha sees hybrids as cultural brokers. It is clear that this role does not develop through a simple process of accretion and that it is never complete; it is full of discontinuities and ruptures.

Hybridity, therefore, refers to issues of *cultural* syncretism or interpenetration and its transformative as well as transgressive potential. However, given the range of different meanings that can be legitimately attached to the notion of "culture," it is important to be clear about how the term is used. Various writers use the term in different ways (e.g., see Bhabha 1994; Gilroy 1993; Hall 1990). However, the meanings and uses of the elements of culture as well as the particular combination of these elements point us in the direction of rejecting the view that cultural artifacts or practices have singular or fixed meanings. Such hybridities cannot be judged as either transgressive or progressive without paying attention to their deployment (e.g., see Hebdige 1979/1995, who argues that new youth styles relating to music are co-optive). Migration and diasporization can produce the opposite of hybridity: a ghettoization and enclavization, a living in a "time warp," a mythologizing of tradition (Shukla 1997). Hall, following Robins (1991), acknowledges that this may be the alternative adaptation to that of translation (where new more transgressive forms emerge). In addition, the political projects of the Irish, the Jews, and the Greeks, among others, evidence a concern with homeland and its national project, or what Anderson (1995) calls long-distance nationalism.

Despite these provisos, however, the acknowledgment of identity formation (see Anthias 2002) is an important counterposition to the fixed notions of identity and ethnicity that characterize both academic writing and political action on these issues.

Narratives of Belonging:
Young Greek Cypriots in Britain

I will now look at the narratives produced in my study of young Greek Cypriots to explore the formation of hybrid, or translocational, positions and

identities (see also Anthias 2002).[1] In Britain, Greek Cypriot ethnicity has a history of breaks and discontinuities. The continuing salience of the ethnic category "Greek Cypriot" does not mean the continuation of a pre-given set of cultural identifications. The category is also impacted upon by the provision and organization of ethnicity which provides a space for the enactment and re-enactment of familiar ethnic symbols and practices. In Haringey in North London, for example, the Cypriot Community Center was opened in the early 1980s by Haringey Council for the Cypriot community to use. Many social services local offices have Cypriot social workers and there is a strong awareness by the local council of Cypriots that they constitute a pressure group. Cypriot grocery stores and supermarkets serve traditional Cypriot food and staples and now have a wide-ranging clientele for Greek and Turkish food, both of which are increasing in popularity. Cypriot factories usually employ Greek Cypriots and some Turkish Cypriots, and Greek and Cypriot banks serve Cypriot customers. Doctors, dentists, driving schools, butchers, and furniture shops will all serve an ethnic clientele, both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot. Haringey, particularly the Wood Green area, constitutes an ecological center of the Greek Cypriot community, and ethnic concentration and association are instrumental in perpetuating the ethnic category.

Stories of spatial movement and location/dislocation of different kinds appear in the narratives of young Cypriots in Britain. These are not always more important than other types of dislocation native youngsters experience, but they form a particularly meaningful part of the construction of the familial narrative; they are stories that are perpetually recycled within the family and by the collectivity as a whole in its social reproduction and its cultural practices. In the construction of narratives of location/dislocation, moreover, local meanings and categorizations are in play, not just national ones. Administrative arrangements affect these narratives and produce categorizations and identity claims. These categorizations are just some of the components of the spatial habitat of young Cypriot migrants. Others may be less visible but just as powerful, such as the normalized ethnic category "English."

The narratives of these young people often use the concept "belonging" to distance the self from what he or she is not rather than a clear affirmation of what he or she is. Terms such as "them and us" abound, as does the concept "how things are done differently": Relatedness and comparison are important elements in the narratives. Being British is defined in legalistic terms rather than as an emotional identification.

Members of the study's population saw their families as a strong system of support that they contrasted positively with a notion of Englishness that did not include a strong supportive family system. The Cypriot family proved useful for finding work and providing financial help. Over half of those interviewed were hoping to or had found a job because they were Cypriot; that is,

through someone they knew who was also Cypriot. However, many also felt the disadvantages of being Cypriot, which demonstrates the importance of constructions of otherness and the fact that Cypriots lack mainstream social capital. Their parents did not take an interest in schoolwork, they spent many hours working, and they did not speak English (a source of embarrassment to their children). All of the girls spoke about the restrictions on their movements and social life.

One-quarter of the people interviewed thought that a major difference between Cypriot and English culture was the sexual behavior of Cypriot women (who should not have more than one partner). The men saw a strong difference between English and Cypriot women. Many said it was acceptable for the former to have many sexual partners but not the latter, indicating a clear preservation of traditional gender values on this issue. The women were more likely to reject this value but restrained their sexuality (or were careful to conduct their sexual activities in secret) for fear of the culture of gossip and public disapproval. Most youngsters kept their sex lives separate from home and did not bring girlfriends or boyfriends home. Bringing a lot of girlfriends home was seen as disrespectful to parents. There was a strong notion of public and private worlds. For example, many young males saw young Cypriot girls as "cheap" and "loose" if they were "hanging around Wood Green." Only about one-sixth of the girls were open to casual sex relationships, and another one-quarter thought sex should accompany love and a serious commitment.

Most youngsters liked Western pop music and all listened to Greek music, although when they heard Greek music, it was usually because their parents had chosen to listen to it. Some Greek pop artists were popular, however; Anna Vissi, for example, whose music combines traditional Greek and Western pop (that is, her music is hybrid). A few wanted to publicly display that they were Cypriot—for example, boys like to play Greek music loudly in cars—particularly when they got together. Few knew anything about Cypriot literature and art. This was sometimes seen as a problem that related to the values of the community, which did not promote these, even within the "community" schools (where religion and customs are prominent—e.g., dance and rituals—but not literature or poetry).

Some survey participants distrusted English people, and the more educated youngsters thought that racism was endemic in the ways they were treated and related to as "outsiders." Those who were bullied at school tended to see the behavior as related to their foreignness (even though a few said that that might not necessarily be the reason). About one-tenth said their parents had instilled in them a distrust of "*xenoi*" (foreigners of any kind, including the English). They constantly referred to the fact that non-Cypriots made fun of their names and called them racist names. At times they reported

these events with some annoyance but also with a positive and dismissive attitude; they might say that such experiences "make you more resilient," or "it's only a game."

When they mixed with different ethnic groups, these were more likely to be other "minority" groups at school than English pupils. Most felt that there was better communication among "your own" (in other words, they placed themselves in the categories of "Cypriot" and "foreigner") and felt that they could relate better to other "foreigners." Many related changes over time: As they got older, they felt more comfortable around Cypriots even if at school they had wider friendship groups. This was particularly the case for those who attended university or had a job outside the Cypriot community. An exception is one-quarter who are mainly girls. About one-fifth of those interviewed said they mixed with Cypriots more because they did not feel that they could pass as English and felt uncomfortable. They wanted an education for the higher income they could earn as a result rather than because they felt that education was a good in itself. Young men aspired to self-employment even if they had attended university. Girls did not share these entrepreneurial dreams. Young women saw themselves as less strong than first-generation migrant women: They tended to be more financially dependent on their partners if they were married.

Quotations from the interviews allow us to explore the different ways these young Cypriots categorize themselves.

> Akis: I was called Stavros a lot: Is that racism? No, it's just a joke. I used to call the English *kochino-kole* (red bottom) but they didn't understand and that was fun. I don't feel Black; I'm European. Greeks don't get a lot of racism, not like the Blacks do or the Indians, about 2 percent, which is tiny, but they get a lot of stick. Being a Cypriot might be a plus, because employers have to employ a certain number of minorities.

Here it is interesting that Akis uses the terms "Greek" and "Cypriot" interchangeably (although this never happens when the narrative is in Greek; see Anthias 1992). In terms of his relation to Cypriotness, he later said:

> I don't know really, doing different things to what English people do, going to church, going to weddings, it's difficult to say, difficult to describe. You're Cypriot; that's what you are. You can't really say why its different, 'cos that's what you are.
> (What does it mean to you?) Nothing really, it just means you're Cypriot.

Akis defined his relation in terms of difference: as a matter of fact on the one hand and as doing different things on the other. He also had difficulty finding specific elements of being "Cypriot."

Andrew: When I was young the whole estate was White, so you used to get into fights and trouble there (we were about eight years old but with boys who were about twelve). Living on an estate you get to learn to fight. When we moved (to Tooting), the school was Black. I used to stay out of fights between Blacks and Whites. I used to say "I'm a foreigner, what are you going to do with me?" Most of them were nice because we owned a fish shop. At secondary school in Selhurst I had two best friends, one is half Jamaican and half Indian and the other is English. I used to listen to a lot of hip-hop so I used to mix with the Blacks.

The cultural identification here is different from the sense of belonging; his cultural preferences are similar to those of Black youth, but this does not mean that he sees himself as the same as them. Cultural mixing can produce synthetic identifications or new mixed identifications, and it is important for hybridity theorists to differentiate between the two. Later Andrew talked about his relationship with Cyprus and Cypriotness:

It makes me proud, my motherland is Cyprus because that is where my parents grew up but my fatherland is England; England is where I grew up. England is like the father, but Cyprus is the mother because it is where you want to go back, it is secure. I would fight for Cyprus, don't get me wrong, I am very proud to be Cypriot.

Here we see a very located sense of Cypriotness that is related to the importance of the family, the behavioral characteristics of Cypriots (Andrew used the word "Greek" when he spoke English rather than "Cypriot," which is the term he used when he spoke Greek), a strong sense of community, and the fact that Cyprus is located in the Mediterranean. Andrew's narrative of identification is about location spatially and socially, one that is embedded in a lifestyle.

Mario: All I know is when we are in England, we are not classified as English, and when we are in Cyprus, we are not classified as Cypriot, they call you Charlie. In my school they are not racist, me and my Black friend, I call him a rubber-lipped nigger, and he will call me a flabby bubble. . . . Most people in my school are Black anyway.

Here there is a strong sense of being categorized by others as not belonging to either group. Mario's narrative also illustrates that the racist language can have a range of meanings, depending on who is using it. In some contexts, this language is not received as racist. It is also important to note that some of the racist labels come from Cyprus, where British-born Cypriots are labeled as Charlies.

Christine: When I was younger, I was told: "We only beat up Greeks and Pakis." We are White and European enough for people to claim they are not being racist to us

because how could you possibly be racist to Europeans. Therefore people are getting away with saying things to Greek Cypriots which they would never get away with saying to Jews who are basically of fairer skin and bluer eyes than we are. In broader anti-racist formats, it is difficult to fight for your specific rights when the slogan is "Black and White unite" and not "Greek Cypriot and White" unite.

Christine's statement shows a nuanced understanding of racism and how some groups might react to it. English people use the "Europeanness" of Cypriots to legitimize how they treat them, since who could possibly think behavior toward Cypriots could be interpreted as racist? The last sentence raises the perceived problem when the White/Black dichotomy is used to fight exclusion.

> Yianna: I am Greek Cypriot, obviously my nationality is British but deep down I know I am Greek Cypriot. At least I can say I come from a beautiful island, gorgeous place, love it there. All my family as well. I think Greek Cypriot people are far more . . . generous, more giving, they are more close. When you have more family, you feel more loved, it is nice, [you] know more people. I suppose if you do something that everyone will frown upon, everyone will know about it.

Here, Yianna is using the idiom of "identity" to distance herself from an Englishness that has no defining characteristic, and she also notes the beauty of the island. Again, the closeness of the family is very important. The "difference" is exoticized here: It becomes a good thing in itself despite the negative "gossiping" that she refers to.

> Maro: I used to go around with mainly Greeks at school and we got lots of comments about being bubble and squeak. . . . I used to ignore it. I knew I was in an English school, English passport, English birth certificate, everything, so it was just that my background was Greek basically. . . . I love our traditions, your family, your mum and dad are always there, whereas the English people their family don't give a damn you are on your own. Definitely the Asians and Blacks at school got a lot more racism.

In this narrative, there are a number of statements about intercultural friendship preferences (using the category "Greek" rather than "Cypriot") and name-calling that is defined as racism. Maro articulates difference in relation to a conception of different family relations, reasserting the value of the Cypriot family. He also articulates difference vis-à-vis the racism experienced by Blacks and Asians.

In the narration of these youngsters, we can identify some common themes which denote shared experiences articulated in a variety of ways in the interviews. One of the striking characteristics of the material collected is the extent to which the interviewees experienced various forms of racism,

particularly name-calling and other forms of "othering." Moreover, while it is commonly thought that young people from minority groups are "between two cultures" or able to produce hybridities, most of the Cypriot youngsters experienced the sense that their location was somewhere in between White and Black, although the cultural ingredients they used could be depicted as hybrid. These narratives draw on the collective stories and understandings about ethnicity and "race" in Britain which work with fixed binary notions. They were too White and European to be Black, but they were too "foreign" to be White. On the other hand, their narratives are always situational; they are always about things that happened to them, about what was said to them, about their relationships with others rather than about their sense of identity. Overall, a strong sense of difference was the most notable theme in the narratives in relation to "belongingness" references. This was generally not accompanied by a strong sense of identity if one defines "identity" as a coherent notion of who one is and where one belongs. The sense of difference was expressed more in terms of differentiating oneself from what one was not, which was less ambivalently presented. Also there was rather a discontinuous moving backward and forward between categories such as White, European, Greek, and Cypriot which functioned more as explanations for the experiences they had or as descriptions of a lifestyle (such as a life that is shaped by strong family bonds) rather than as forms of proclaimed identity. The majority felt "other" in both England and Cyprus, however. They tended to see Cypriot as something they couldn't avoid being and English as something they could never be accepted as: These were just facts.

Gendered Migration in Cyprus and Belongings

Another important aspect of displacements and hybridities in Cyprus comes from the example of migration to Cyprus. In the 1990s, Cyprus became a country that receives migrants from the Third World and Eastern Europe. Like much of southern Europe, Cyprus has experienced a feminization of migration (Anthias 2000). More and more Cypriot women have been incorporated into the labor force, and the gendered division of labor continues within the Cypriot economy and within the home. Migrant women are therefore important in terms of the changing configuration of gender relations for Cypriot women's incorporation into the labor market. Cypriot women are more likely to be employed full time, unlike many married women workers in western Europe (Crompton 1997), but state agencies do not provide care and services for families. Relationships are changing with elderly parents, who can no longer be looked after by their married daughters. Some of these elderly people require a full-time nurse at home. Not enough local women are going into nursing and care work, and immigrant labor costs less.

In addition, many women feel more comfortable about employing foreign maids rather than indigenous ones (also cited in Phizacklea and Anderson 1997). All of these factors mean that women are more likely to hire Filipino and Sri Lankan maids and nannies.

As more and more Greek Cypriot women enter the labor force (see House, Kyriakidou, and Stylianou 1989) some aspects of patriarchal control will be modified, but no great transformation of gender relations has accompanied women's economic participation, although this issue has yet to be fully assessed through empirical research. What has not been modified is the continuation of women's responsibility for household and child care, particularly since the employment of maids has put the transformation of social roles within the family on the back burner.

Following the pattern found in the rest of southern Europe, women generally enter Cyprus as maids for middle-class professional families or as "artists" and "musicians," euphemisms for the sex industry which in Cyprus caters largely to the indigenous population, although tourists also hire sex workers. Migration related to sex work has been very profitable for those who exploit the workers and is an integral part of tourism in many countries in southern Europe. In Cyprus, sex workers come particularly from Southeast Asian countries, such as Thailand, and from Eastern Europe. These women enter the country within the framework of a legal status as "artistes." In their countries of origin, they are recruited either as cabaret dancers or quite openly as prostitutes. Even though the status of "artiste" is legal, its heavy restrictions create conditions that make the women heavily dependent on their employers. Those sex workers who overstay the permitted period, send a female relative in their place, change employers, or enter on tourist visa and operate illegally are particularly vulnerable to exploitation.

There is little regulation of the terms of employment for many of these women. There is some evidence that domestic maids, who come largely from the Philippines and Sri Lanka, for example, are super-exploited (e.g., see Anthias 2000). They are also a status symbol: In one prestigious new development in Nicosia, twenty-four out of twenty-six families had a foreign maid. And this phenomenon is not confined to families where the women work; women who prefer leisure to doing their own child care and domestic work may also employ an immigrant maid. In addition, more and more women within the lower middle classes are hiring maids as part of a materialist status symbol. Filipino maids bring the highest degree of status to a family because it is believed that they are cleaner, more deferential, and more sensitive to privacy needs. Many Filipino women immigrants are highly educated; some of them have degrees and were teachers or accountants in the Philippines. The issue of racialization is relevant here; they

are regarded as less of an "other" than Sri Lankans, largely because they are Christian. Many of these women provide services not just for the family that employs them but also for the employer's elderly parents; they may be given tasks of cleaning parental homes and looking after sick relatives as well as looking after the children of brothers and sisters. A barter in maids is not unknown, and a particularly pleasing maid may be passed on to other relatives or friends. Also, the sisters and mothers of maids may be brought in either concurrently or sequentially, and sometimes a mother may replace her daughter within a particular family. Many of them are not treated as part of the family, and they eat their meals separately. They often share a bedroom with the employer's children and are not allowed boyfriends. They may be used for the dirtiest work and have little protection.

It is not surprising that women—whether they are migrants or not—play a central role as biological reproducers of the nation, given the importance of ideas of "blood" and "common origin" in the construction of ethnic and national collectivities. State policies are geared to women as biological re-producers. Women also reproduce the nation culturally, and as such, they can be seen as targets and agents of national acculturation. The education of women, then, becomes a key dimension of producing loyal citizens. In some cases there have been highly publicized attempts to assimilate women into the dominant culture; for example, France's notorious prohibition on wearing headscarves in school (Silverman 1992). Deniz Kandiyioti (1989), on the other hand, shows how the modernization project in Turkey used the emancipation of women as a strategic tool at both political and cultural levels. She argues that because the domestic sphere represents the continuation of tradition, it becomes the subject of state discourses under situations of politi-cal change (Kandiyoti 1991).

Modesty and motherhood are key elements of women's symbolic rep-resentation of the nation, as in the French Patria and the symbol of Cyprus as a martyred mother mourning her loss (Anthias 1989). In Nicaragua, the revolution was symbolized by a woman carrying a baby in one hand and a gun in the other (Charles and Hintjens 1998, 4). Conversely, those women who are perceived to be outside the national collectivity, unable to reproduce or symbolize it, may face particular forms of racism and exclusion.

In Cyprus, as is the case for other societies, women may be seen as the direct transmitters of the "cultural stuff" of ethnicity because they are responsible for the day-to-day domestic and family life and for child-rear-ing. Among other cultural values, women transmit the "work ethic," sexual mores, notions of what it means to be "good" Greek Cypriots or "patriots," and nationalist consciousness. The twinned concept of mother and nation is important here, as is the concept of "mother of fighting men" (see Anthias and Yuval Davis 1989).

Women are definers of the boundaries of ethnicity (Anthias and Yuval Davis 1989). Women's bodies have much to do with the legal definition of citizenship; only particular women can reproduce citizens within the "national boundary" (see WING 1985; Anthias and Yuval Davis 1989; Anthias 1989); in Cyprus, only women who are married to men of Cypriot origin can produce citizens. However, another aspect of the definition of the boundary of ethnicity involves conceptions about desirable sexual or gender behavior. In this case, women's bodies are involved in the processes of reproducing a group. For women, one of the ways of being a good "ethnic" subject involves behaving in ethnically appropriate ways by conforming to the principle of sexual purity. For men, this means maintaining control over women. In migrant groups that consist of males only, ethnic culture tends to decline sharply (Anthias 1992). Among Cypriot migrants in Britain, for example, women are seen as the bearers, keepers, and symbolic signifiers of ethnic identity and constitute one of the most important boundary markers between English and Cypriot ethnicity (Anthias 1992).

In many Western societies, migrants are feared because they bring foreign cultural and moral elements, particularly if they are Muslims or Asians. This is the case in Cyprus, where one finds many reports in the press that Cypriot culture is in danger of being undermined by foreign undesirable influences. While maids are employed mainly for the physical work they do—cooking, cleaning, and child care, the fear that these women will import foreign culture is evident in public discourses (Trimikliniotis 1999). There are different discourses around the employment of foreign maids however, and tourism is also feared as a threat to national culture (see Ayres 1999). The concern with the national heritage found in public discourse is closely linked with the dominance of the national problem in public life for both the immediate past and the present in Cyprus.

New migration to Cyprus creates tension with the prominence of ideas about "national identity" in the public discourse about the Cyprus Problem. In other words, economic interests legitimize foreign workers but nationalist discourse sees them as undesirable. This also relates to how globalization and Europeanization figure in Cypriot political discourse; Cypriots increasingly see themselves as European now that Cyprus has joined the European Union. This will be particularly important in the context of the aftermath of the referendum in late April 2004, in which Greek Cypriots voted against accepting the Annan Plan and have subsequently suffered much retribution from the European Union and particularly Britain. The United States has joined in this. Entry into the European Union has required harmonization policies around some of the issues raised by migration and a reformulation of Cyprus as a nation that contains multiple ethnicities and new forms of European citizenship (see Kostakopoulou 1999). Cyprus faces the challenge

of an increasingly ethnically and culturally diverse society, over and above the ethnic divisions between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.

Conclusion: Displacements and Dialogical Positions

In this chapter I have discussed two aspects of the ongoing hybridity and translocationality in Cyprus. The first case related to the diasporic experience of young Cypriots and illustrated the ambivalence and contextual nature of ethnic identifications: These resonate in Cypriot society and the way it receives these youngsters. The second aspect related to the movement of new populations into Cyprus, particularly women, and the effects this demographic change is having on the restructuring of Cypriot society. I would like to highlight the potential in these developments, particularly their dialogical potential. Dialogue is an essential element in the process of using interculturality to overcome fixities of location. But simply bringing together different cultural groups does not guarantee dialogue, especially when these groups have different interests regarding representation and recognition (as is the case in Cyprus) and the use of economic and cultural resources. And dialogue cannot be guaranteed by a formula that suggests that an individual can be rooted in one set of cultural idioms and respect and acknowledge the other when asymmetric power relations exist. Creating the conditions for an individual to use their "voice" or to speak from a different "place" or even to be acknowledged and heard is not enough. It is essential to make that individual's voice effective. It is not simply a matter of asking under what conditions allegiances or alliances can be forged: The very notion of allegiance already presupposes investments in the difference across which allegiances are to be made. The notion of hybridities assumes that difference has been overcome, or at least that difference no longer exists between people but within them and is therefore validated when it is discovered between them as well. This suggests that the fight against constructions of difference and identity that exclude and devalorize requires a concerted effort to eliminate social practices that construct identities and differences in naturalized, collectivized, and binary ways and in terms of hierarchical otherness, unequal allocation of resources, and modes of inferiorization (see Anthias 1998). This requires engagement at a political level around the following targets:

Naturalization: a denaturalization of difference and identity by showing how they are located historically and as social constructs

Collective attributions: a recognition of differences within individuals in terms of the interaction between ways in which they are constructed and the ways in which they construct themselves situ-

ationally and contextually; a refusal to construct people or selves in terms of singular identities

Hierarchical cultures: the development of legal and other state mechanisms which embody the principle of multiculturality where it does not conflict with the basic ethical principle of personal autonomy as a basic human right

Mechanisms of accountability within institutional frameworks: scrutiny of procedures in terms of outcomes, intentions, and rules so that outcomes that are sexist or that create inequalities with regard to ethnicity and class are brought to light, even if that outcome was not the intention, and redressed through corrective and sustainable procedures such as positive action frameworks

These practices and processes are particularly important in the new political realities of Cyprus, where there has been some negative fallout from the negotiations and ultimate rejection of the Annan Plan and the Cyprus Problem continues, albeit in a changed and unpredictable form. There is a danger here of the resurgence of chauvinist nationalism, particularly if Greek Cypriots become perturbed by what they see as an unjust undervaluing of their plight as the result of increasing concessions to Turkish Cypriot demands for incorporation into the international community. All of these perspectives have been recently voiced in Cyprus.

Note

1. Survey research was conducted between 1994 and 1998 in two London boroughs (Haringey and Croyden) with four groups of British-born young people, aged 16 to 30, whose backgrounds were Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot, Bangladeshi, and Pakistani. An equal number of males and females were interviewed. They were chosen using opportunity sampling on the basis of gender, age, educational background, and place of residence for semi-structured narrative interviews. Fifty Greek Cypriot participants were included in these interviews.

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Recognition and Emotion

EXHUMATIONS OF MISSING PERSONS IN CYPRUS

Paul Sant Cassia

Introduction

In his short story "Conversation with Mother," Italian playwright Luigi Pirandello returns to Agrigento following his mother's death. In an imaginary conversation with his mother, she tells him that she feels sorry for him. He assumes this is because of his pain at losing her. She says no. She feels sorrow for him because when she was alive he also existed, as a representation for her. We exist "in other people" as much as "in ourselves." Now that she is dead, her representation of him has been erased, and his personhood is diminished through that loss. When people dear to us die, we lose not just them but our existence in them, which "made" us individuals, with our social identities that were in their (temporary) safekeeping. Although we can get over the loss of loved ones, because we live in others their death diminishes our "identity" in a fundamental and nonrecuperative way that we do not normally perceive.

Pirandello alerts us that more may be involved in death and mourning than rituals, emotion, transgressions of the social order, and gender identities. He suggests a link that can help transcend the Durkheimian opposition between the individual and the collective. In this chapter I discuss the attempts by one widow of a missing person in Cyprus to recover the remains of her loved ones and give him a proper burial. My aims are threefold. First, I show that although the issue of missing persons in Cyprus

is highly politicized, relatives have different and conflicting needs than the agendas of the nation-state. Their attempts to recover what was lost are not merely a necessary reaction to simulation on the part of their political representatives; they are essential for psychic stability. Second, I show that mourning is more than ritual or emotion and that it encompasses fundamental cognitive, existential, and identity changes, along the lines hinted at by Pirandello. Finally, I suggest that we should be cautious about either genderizing emotion or viewing it as a resistant margin (e.g., Seremetakis 1991). Rather, I suggest that every political order requires its own specific representations of suffering. Emotion and suffering therefore both subverts and sustains the social order.

A Brief History of the Issue

Between 1963 and 1974, over 2,000 persons, both Greek and Turkish Cypriot, disappeared in Cyprus. They disappeared in the course of hostilities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and during the 1974 coup backed by Greece and the subsequent invasion by Turkey. Responsibility for the disappearances appears to be straightforward in some cases, more murky in others. Only one body (that of a Cypriot U.S. citizen) has been recovered officially from Turkish-held areas. There are major differences in the ways that Greek and Turkish Cypriots regard their missing persons. Whereas Turkish Cypriots regard their missing as *kayipler* (as disappeared/ dead/lost), Greek Cypriots regard their missing as having suffered an unknown fate—*agnoumenoi*—as not-(yet)-recovered, as living prisoners at best or, at worst, as concealed bodies requiring proper and suitable burials. They believe that such persons, which number some 1,400 cannot be presumed to be dead unless their bodies are recovered and their cause of death judicially ascertained. Until then, these persons have been scripted by the state as legally constituted characters. Their salaries are still being paid into bank accounts; their children receive special scholarships, government posts, and so forth; and their wives have to go through lengthy, complex, and demeaning procedures to remarry. Few have done so. Greek Cypriots fear that because many of these persons were captured alive by the invading Turkish army, they were killed by the former or handed to Turkish Cypriot irregulars to dispose of. There is some evidence for this. Turkey claims that it returned all the persons its army captured during the invasion and refuses to get involved. Turkish Cypriots maintain that Greeks killed these men during the coup that provided the pretext for the Turkish invasion or during the hostilities attendant upon the invasion. There is also evidence for this, but the majority of the missing seem to have disappeared behind Turkish lines.

Turkish Cypriots also claim that 803 of their civilians disappeared between 1963 and 1974. For Turkish Cypriots, the problem of the missing began in 1963, the first year of intercommunal troubles in the Republic of Cyprus. Encouraged by their leaders, who want to distance their communities from Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots perceive their missing as dead. For the Turkish Cypriot leadership, the missing are proof that Turkish and Greek Cypriots cannot live together. Thus, while for the Turkish Cypriot leadership it is important that their missing be considered dead, for Greek Cypriots it is important that they might still be alive or at least that the issue is closed only when the causes of their death are established and the bodies returned to their relatives. By contrast, for Turkish Cypriots the issue of the missing is a closed chapter, an example of their oppression by Greek Cypriots in the Republic of Cyprus, a state of affairs that the Turkish "Peace Operation" ended. Thus, Turkish Cypriots appear to want the matter closed in its present manifestation but want to keep the memory and memorials of their oppression alive. In contrast, Greek Cypriots want to maintain the issue as open in a present continuous tense as an issue that is very much alive and that can be closed only when the missing are finally returned and their bodies laid to rest.

In recent years, various accounts of the coup and invasion period have emerged that have challenged official versions of events. In 1995, an investigative reporter published a number of revelations which profoundly shook the political establishment. In a series of reports in the weekly news periodical *Selides,* Andreas Paraskos wrote that some of the Greek Cypriot missing were buried in three collective graves at Lakatameia cemetery (on the Greek Cypriot side of the capital city of Nicosia) but were still on the list of the missing.

The articles highlighted gaps between the official representation of events and people's experiences. It also helped force a split that had long been lurking between the government and the Pan-Cyprian Committee for the Relatives of the Missing (CRMP). Although it appeared that there was witness testimony from 1975 indicating that some individuals were dead, the government apparently did nothing about these reports, and the names of individuals mentioned in this testimony remained on the list of the missing. In this chapter, I am primarily concerned with relatives of this group.

Exhumations

On July 31, 1997, the leaders of the two communities, Clerides and Denktash, agreed to provide each other immediately and simultaneously all information at their disposal on the location of graves of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot missing persons. For a brief period, it appeared that

the issue was about to be resolved. However, the Turkish Cypriot leadership backtracked and stalemate ensued once again. A few months later, two Greek Cypriot women, Androulla Palma and Maroulla Shamishi, made a daring attempt to exhume their husbands from Lakatameia cemetery, which contained some collective tombs. They went secretly to the cemetery with pickaxes and broke into some collective tombs. When apprehended, they said they wanted their husbands back as they had been lied to by authorities. Their attempt made national headlines and rattled Greek Cypriot authorities. The women were arrested and released.[1]

In 1999, the Republic of Cyprus unilaterally decided to begin exhuming and identifying the remains located in graves in the area under its control. Given the deadlock, this was a courageous move. A bicommunal institution, the Institute of Neurology and Genetics, had been established in 1991 which could provide the necessary scientific backup.[2] DNA testing started in 1995, and soon after that, the collection of blood samples from relatives. The Turkish Cypriot leadership prevented Turkish Cypriot relatives from donating samples.

I now examine the case of Androulla Palma, who, together with Maroulla Shamishi, attempted to get into the tombs at Lakatameia.

Androulla lives alone in her dowry home in Peristerona. Her living room is a shrine to her husband and her efforts to discover his fate. All the photographs on her wall show her participating in public demonstrations. These are photographs of active kinship. Androulla has commissioned a painting of herself holding her two young daughters, one of whom is clutching a small photograph of their disappeared father. It adorns her *saloni.* It is based on a photograph taken from life. I realize that this is a family representation of an absence, an attempt to have an idealized united family in a painting that could never be captured by a photograph. People commemorate absences and turn them into presences—like the shoes and the shirts that will never be filled by a warm body or the place left empty at supper. Although these are family photographs, they are ideal representations just the same—of being together. They indicate that her husband, Hambis, is not forgotten, that she is holding up her children to commemorate him. In that respect, she is acting out an idealized gender role. It is almost as if we need a *representation* of patriarchy, rather than its enactment, to create a space and a role for her to fulfill. I get the impression that the role she is enacting is as much that of a daughter who must bury her brother as it is of a wife who needs to find her husband's body. Indeed, as I hope to show, during the process of exhumations and reburial, something more was involved than the attempts by a wife/widow to find her dead husband and lay him to rest. It was a reassertion of obligation and the obligation of reassertion.

Here is her story:

"My husband Haralambos Palma from Livadia [Larnaca] was captured together with Andrea Palma his cousin. Six years ago I read the papers, and I learnt how my husband had been captured. Until then I didn't know anything, nor did they tell me anything." Until then, she still believed that her husband was missing. "The government said that the witnesses appeared six years ago—but they had given their statements way back in 1975," she said. Androulla's husband's name was among the 126 names the government did not present to the UN committee charged with investigating the disappearances, a clear indication that the government felt that there was sufficient proof that he was dead.

"According to my witnesses my husband was lost on 17 August (1974) during the second invasion." Here she used the word for "lost"—*hathike*—(not "killed" [*skotothike*] or "was killed" [*ton eskotosan*] or "died" [*pethane*]). "Six bodies were loaded onto a truck. My husband was wearing military uniform. Denktash said that my husband died in the coup. This is not true and I want you to write this down."

In July 1999, the government commissioned a team from the renowned group Physicians for Peace, led by the well-known forensic anthropologist Bill Hagland, to conduct the exhumations and identifications. Androulla was disturbed and in a highly suspicious mood. "As soon as they started digging I went with Maroulla and Popi (her daughter) and spread yellow flowers on the graves. They didn't allow me to do so." She was bitter and angry that soldiers had stopped her. As with most of her interactions with government, the cemetery became a place of contestation when Androulla attempted to personalize and symbolize her grief.

Androulla is unsure about the purpose of the exhumations. In her handbag she always carries a lock of hair taken from her mother-in-law before she died to assist with genetic identification. Her daughter Popi, a bright, recently married young woman who never knew her father, is also present.

Androulla and her group spend a few days clinging to the edge of the cemetery while the exhumations proceeded. The scene resembles an archaeological dig. After several days of careful measuring, an American archaeologist walks over on one of the last days and says that she is about to start the digging. She has found a body under the soil and is about to begin the delicate process of retrieving it. Popi, who has a file on her father with her, begins talking fluently in English. She reels off details—what operations he had had, the fact that his dental records were not retained, his shoe size, and his height. Her father's tangibility and existence is there in the file, a proof that he existed, that he is not an *agnoumenos,* a person of unknown fate, a disappeared. He is more real to her than many fathers would be to their children through their memory. When Popi and her sister married, they each took items of their father's clothing to their new homes. These are memento mori, except that instead of *commemorating*

his existence, they are kept to *prove* that he existed, was alive, and that he should be reclaimed, given an identity, and buried properly with a name rather than in some collective anonymous grave. To every detail Popi gives, the archaeologist replies "OK." But how could the archaeologist tell Androulla that a particular skeleton is her husband? Surely the whole point is to identify the bones through DNA testing. Androulla and her daughter seem convinced that the body is her husband's. They walk up to the edge of the pit overlooking the collective grave and return.

Over those few days, Androulla moved from pent-up anticipations of certainty that official accounts would be proven wrong generated by a faith in the revelatory power of "scientific" investigation (the term *epistimoni-ki*—scientific—has a certain legitimacy in Greek that is absent in English) and a disbelief in the authorities' version of the past to a state where her immediate, unarticulated, taken-for-granted world was slowly dissolving. This new state nudged her to come to terms with the fact that her husband was dead. She began moving away from her epistemological certainties of disbelief in official versions of reality to grasp more existential realizations. She reached this in two ways. First, as I show below, there were certain slips, differences in language use between her and others, that slowly implanted the realization that she had to adopt a different way of imagining and talking about her husband. This included learning about, and accepting, other accounts, other memories of what had happened. Until then, her husband had retained an existential validity and tangibility for her as an *agnoumenos* which specifically prevented her from navigating through his last hours and thus giving shape to his death. There was no aftermath; there was just a closed door that she could not enter. Indeed, by maintaining him as an *agnoumenos,* which was as much a decision on her part as his inclusion on that list by the authorities was, she excluded herself from knowledge.

Her often-stated desire for "full transparency" (*pliri diafaneia*) kept her in a domain of unknowing, for it did not address her husband's last days. That clarity would be ushered in through the senses. In effect, by going over and listening to other witness accounts of the collective burials, Androulla was guided by the markers they set down, especially the senses, to give imaginary shape to what had happened and thus render it more real and possible to experience. The restitution of the senses through others' accounts was for her a substitute for experience and it restored her imagination through specific shapes and forms. It enabled her to enter the territory of the past which she had been barred from surveying.[3]

By going over the events through reading newspaper accounts and questioning witnesses from the vicinity, Androulla moved from an unwritten chronicle to a relatable history. She was slowly being exposed to and given, and was making for herself, a story. Through sharing or being exposed to

how others experienced the events of August 1974, and through her senses, she began to move from considering her husband not just a question mark about which the authorities refused to give answers but a knowable entity. By being exposed to what had happened to her husband in terms of what she assumed to be his burial (for there was as yet no evidence that any of the remains exhumed were those of her husband), she had a history, an account she could imagine and thus give shape to what occurred. At the same time, this sharing suggested that scientific certainty is not transcendent, self-evident, immediate, unambiguous, and authoritative.

During the exhumations it was clear that Androulla still considered her husband to be still with her, still present, certainly not dead. She humanized him. She used the word *myrizan* (smelled) to describe the corpses when talking about the reasons why the bodies were buried hurriedly. This was certainly the case: "We buried them without a proper *kideia* (mortuary ceremony)," said the priest Papas Andreas Christoforou. "We only performed the *trisageio* [lit., the sign of the cross]. There were some 190 dead and we couldn't do more than this because of the unrelenting bad smell (*aperanti disodia*)" (as reported in *Phileleftheros,* 3 June 1999). The term *aperanti disodia* is a literary one. Androulla, by contrast, used the word *myrizan*—from *myrodia,* which could also suggest smelling good, even perfume (although the term "aroma" covers this). The term can be applied to smells that occur in the natural world, such as the smells of flowers. The woman at the house next to the cemetery to whom she spoke used an even more unambiguous term: *vromisan* (they stank)—a term used for cesspits, filth, and matter that is fundamentally out of place. The term refers to human sources and human putrefaction. Something that is *vromizei* needs to be concealed, kept away from light and air, buried. It is a polluting smell. Clearly, what the neighbor meant was that for non-kin, such bodies were mere corpses that required immediate burial. By contrast, when Androulla said "*myrizan, oi kaimenoi*" ("they smelled bad, the poor ones"; literally, "the burned ones"), she spoke of her husband not as a polluting putrefying corpse to be hidden but as someone still recognizable, belonging to the world of the living, such as a hunter returning home (as depicted in his photograph) who had now become the hunted (see Seremetakis 1991 for a further discussion of *kaimenos*). The person(s) referred to are objects of pity and compassion that require cleansing and washing, not objects of horror deriving from pollution. They still belong to the world of the living. Thus, her husband required cleansing, his body needed to be prepared for the proper burial he had never received. There was, of course, no body to be retrieved, merely bones. Nevertheless, Androulla had to conceive of him as *freshly* dead to give him the burial he had never received, to mourn him in a way she had never been permitted.

The above lends credence to the psychological *necessity,* even precondition, of rituals to express emotions (contra Rosaldo 1984). But rituals also require social frameworks. Androulla's efforts were an attempt not just to "repatriate" Hambis as a national subject in the face of official indifference but also to retrieve a husband toward whom she had ultimate obligations of care. He had died the classical "bad death"—according to witnesses, as a result of beating (*vasana*) by Turkish soldiers after being captured. The term *vasana* (terrible suffering) is also used to describe the suffering undergone by Christian martyrs. He was in *xeniteia* (a state of being away from kith and kin). According to Seremetakis, *xeniteia* "encompasses the condition of estrangement, the outside, the movement from the inside to the outside, as well as contact and exchange between foreign domains, objects, agents. . . . *Xeniteia* is reversible and situationally-contingent" (1991, 85). By retrieving him from a double *xeniteia* as a nameless fallen and retrieving him existentially (existence before essence), she was attempting to realize the bonds of kinship and care in the face of statist imperatives that these men were in effect lost and therefore could not be buried properly.

It is not too fanciful to suggest that women such as Androulla thus assume the symbolic role of an Antigone who fights to bury her brother (husband) against the wishes of the State/Elders/Creon because he was implicated in a shameful betrayal and civil war that require a sacrificial scapegoat to uphold the integrity of the city-state or the nation. Clearly Androulla did not see her situation in such conscious terms. Modeling herself on a classical heroine was far from her mind. But her defiance, even her harshness and her pride, are features that a careful reader of the play would recognize as not too distinct from the character presented to us by Sophokles.

Burial

On my return to Cyprus in September 2000, I learned that the bones of Androulla's husband (Haralambos) had been identified. Her daughter said that her mother was getting better every day, but when I spoke to her, she sounded subdued. She had had an operation and was leaner and her skin was darker. Her eyes were tired. It was as if she was bracing herself for a final encounter with what she had to do. In particular she concentrated on the role of the authorities, and she now had an opportunity to have her say.

She repeated a number of times the phrase "I lost my life [on this issue; *echasa tin zoi mou*]." Androulla went to Phaneromeni Church to pay the priest to read her husband's name out as a *mnimosino* (memorial service). This was a clear indication that she considered him dead. This was the first time she had done so. She later learned that his mothers' *mnimosino* fell

on the same day. "Very strange [*periergo*]," she said, but left the discussion empty, although she seemed to be toying with the idea that this was fated.

She noted that it was the family's decision whether or not to accept a government representative at the funeral. "I said that my husband fought for his country, Greek and Turk." Because of Androulla's high profile, media attention was intense and the authorities tried to impose a news blackout over the *translatio* (movement of bones to a final resting place). But Cyprus is a small place and news travels, so the press and television channels were present. Androulla was of two minds about whether she wanted the authorities to attend. In the end, she relented. Her condition oscillated on different levels and she often talked about her dreams. Her major struggle and reality was defined by, and in contrast to, the bureaucracy. Given her high profile and her irrepressibility, the authorities were concerned that she would use the opportunity to make some highly embarrassing statements to the media. She quite justifiably believed that the authorities were withholding information from her but that she had managed to ferret it out. "I have my own sources and blood speaks," she said.

"The politicians shouldn't talk [at the funeral]," she said. Popi, her daughter, was planning to do so. This day would be hers and hers alone. She wanted, in the apt phrase of Seremetakis (1992), to have the last word. "All the family will be there"; they planned to receive his body, keep him at home and then have a *kideia* the next day. "I am preparing to receive my husband as he is. Nobody understood our tragedy and us. I am proud that I found him and that he will be a hero for his country." Another theme she was proud of was that in her original transgressive action of breaking into the tombs at Lakatameia cemetery, she had forced the authorities to do something.

The day after I spoke to her, Androulla seemed very distressed. "*Archisan ta provlimata* [The problems have begun]," she said. She wanted Defense Minister Socratis Hasikos to be present, whereas government people wanted politicians to make the oration. They told her that there were many missing and that it would not be fair to invite him to speak at this ceremony. She replied that her husband had lost his life for his *patrida,* his country, and therefore it was only right that the head of the army speak. Two days later the government had accepted her request for Hasikos to attend and give a speech. The box with the remains was collected from the laboratory, draped with a Greek flag, blessed by a triad of priests, and transported by military cortege to Androulla's home. There it remained for the night and the wake.

> "God gave me much strength [*dynami*]. When they told me about the death of my husband, that night I had a dream." She did not mean the identification but

used the word for death—*pethane.* This was the first time she used the most neutral word for death, indicating that until then he had been somehow still alive for her. "I saw my *pethera* [mother-in-law] and next to her was my own mother. My *pethera* said to me 'Come and sit next to us' and made a sign. And I was glad. But I was also afraid that there would be news from this side of the family. Then the telephone rang. That day I went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I wasn't happy. Something was eating me inside. My daughter sent Haglund [the head of Physicians for Peace] a fax. That other night I had another dream. They opened my mother's tomb, to bury someone. I asked the man digging: Has my mother dissolved [*elyose*]? He showed me a bone and told me that this was all that was left. They were about to phone me up. I was warned of this in the dream. Haglund phoned up my daughter and told us that they had found our father [here she used "*o pateras mas*"]. We said it was right to see the bones—for us to believe, for us to fully understand it [*yia na pistepsoume, yia na katalavoume*]. Until then I knew and yet I didn't know [that he was dead]. We wanted photographs and had to photograph secretly. We wanted photographs to show that it is ended." She also wanted me to videotape the ceremony. To her it was deeply important: "It is good to have a video—for the children."

In her excellent book on death and divination in Mani, Greece, Seremetakis (1991) outlines how women are progressively drawn into the presence of death through rituals that range from divination (dreams) to "screaming the dead" (*klama*). These are of course "normal" deaths. In Androulla's case, however, this process occurred through engagement with bureaucratic procedures. Nevertheless, the process of intuiting death appears in the "normal" sequence, through dreams. According to Seremetakis, "A central static sign of the warning dream is the appearance of the dead. . . . The return of the dead codifies a future displacement of the life situation of the dreamer and/or significant others. The dead can also signify by biological shared substance, that is, the kinship affiliation of the dead indicates the general direction of the dream's message" (58). Dreams of imminent death are signified by 1) defamiliarization; 2) inversion; 3) shared substance; and 4) static signs of negativity (ibid.). Androulla's dream featured a "return of the dead": her mother and mother-in-law. The "dissolving" of the body and the bone are critical indexes of defamiliarization. At the same time there was an inversal: She referred to her husband as a "father." This may be partly due to the collective linguistic "we," a word that grouped herself with her daughters. Yet something distinctive seemed to be taking place. Throughout the late afternoon till the next day, the coffin lay in her *saloni* for the wake (*agrypnia*). The house was filled with relatives and close friends. Women would come in crying, and she would call out "*ela Christoulla mou* [come, my Christoulla], come and see him." The weeping woman would come over, kiss her on the cheek, and then move to another part of the room. The women sat around a table on which the box contain-

ing the bones had been laid. The Greek flag was draped over the box and a framed photograph rested on top of it. Emotion ebbed and flowed. At times people talked silently and normally. At others, an event might trigger collective crying. When the box containing Hambis's retrieved personal belongings was opened, there was a scramble and Androulla shouted "Let them see! So that they can see how governments lie and how people are betrayed!" The dead man's sister cried out: "To think that all these years he was buried close by without our knowing, his father wailing alone in his fields for his lost son!" Seremetakis categorizes the woman who sings her pain as the *korifea*: "The *moiroloyistres* and *korifea* institute the fundamental dynamics of lament performance and of mourning in general. . . . The *korifea* is the soloist in pain and the *moiroloyistres* are the chorus; their responses to the *korifea* validate her pain with their own pain" (ibid., 99). "The acoustics of death embodied in 'screaming' and lamenting and [the] presence or 'appearance' (*fanerosi*) of kin construct the 'good death.' The silent death is the asocial 'bad death' without kin support. Silence here connotes the absence of witness. 'Screaming the dead' counters the isolation of death. It separates the mourner from residual social contexts yet registers her entry into a social relation with the dead and the rest of the mourners" (ibid., 101). Androulla, who was highly distraught, addressed her husband many times, often not in full sentences but in phrases when collective emotions were high. When she uttered these words, her voice became deeper and intense: "*Den se kavalava Hambi* ("Hambi, I didn't recognize you"—meaning "I wasn't able to hear you speaking to me when you asked me to find you"). "Hambi, what have you done? . . . Hambi, I had to come and find you. . . . I took the *kouspo* [shovel]. . . . That's what they told me, Hambi." It was almost as if she were addressing him and that she was predestined to find him: "*Eipa sou na kalypso ton topo pou etafis, ton topo pou se evalan mana mou*" ("I told you that I would find the place where you were buried, the [wrong] place they had put you, my dear.") . . . "*Chryse mou, nomizeis enna polemisis?*" ("My dear, so you think you are about to go into battle?")

The wake was important for Androulla not just as a way to channel her emotions but also as a vindication of her struggle. She had been labeled as slightly crazy for having broken into the tombs and was aware that this act required much courage. She had acknowledged to me that such actions were macabre (*makavrio*), but she believed she had to do it. It was also an opportunity to present her own account of her struggle to others. During the wake, she also recounted to visitors a logical, sequential, more episodic account of how she had realized that her husband was actually buried in the Greek side, in contrast to her utterances above, when she was "possessed" (a word used very easily in anthropology). In this case, she presented matters

as if she had been predestined to find him. Yet the two strands of knowledge united literally in an epiphany of disclosure. She repeatedly said "The truth was made manifest [*efanike e alitheia*]." This is what she recounted:

> In 1981 there was a secret agreement whereby they exhumed bodies from Tymvos military cemetery and cleaned them and sent them to Greece. Why did they take them to Greece? Eh, they will tell us. I don't know. [This was a secret agreement whereby some bones were "identified" by Greek Cypriot authorities as belonging to mainland Greek army officers and sent to their families. It then transpired that they were the wrong bones, and they had had to be prized away from their Greek relatives, much to the embarrassment of Greek Cypriot authorities. It also transpired that the bones couldn't be identified because they had been cleaned with the wrong chemicals.] . . . In 1981, I was informed of this and I went to the Committee (of relatives of missing persons) and they told me that he wasn't in that group and [that] they [had] exhumed all of them and [taken] them to Tymvos, and [that] he wasn't there. It was from this time that I got angry [*synhistika ego*], and you know, I was gutted [*teleiosa*], and I wrote requesting to be informed of all the names. They phoned me up five years ago. I didn't know that the *osteofylakeia* [sacred place where the bones are retained after exhumation] was a *koinotafion* [common tomb where bones are reburied after exhumation]. But they didn't collect the bones from one place. They got a leg from one place, a head from another. At the end they phoned me twenty-one years later to say that my husband was dead, and I asked where? They didn't say. I went to Lakatameia and when I saw there were some tombstones with "Unknown Soldier" on the tombstones, I got alarmed, and I had to take pills for three and a half years, and then I had to do this. . . . It was from other witnesses that I discovered the truth. . . . Government people didn't believe that I would do this, saying, "slowly, slowly," but we had been waiting all these years. . . . I didn't know which grave was his, only generally as there were many men there. . . . I had dreams: on the day they notified me by letter that my husband had been identified and on the day they informed me to go and collect the body. In it I recognized him from his skull [*kranio*]. There were other women who were weaker than I was and they locked themselves up in their homes all these years. But I won [*ime nikitis*].

The women gathered around her were like the chorus in an ancient Greek play. They expressed collective feelings, social sentiments. Often people would say: "But can you understand what it means to die and for your loved ones not to know? This is the biggest sin." The similarity to Aeschelian ancient theatre is more than superficial. As in theatre, the action took place off stage and was recounted. The gathered women were the chorus, and there were two main characters present: Androulla and the corpse/remains of her husband. The men stayed outside.

Androulla had a son who suffered from cerebral palsy and died at the age of twelve. Her brother, Kyriakos, who lives next to her, went to the

cemetery to gather the bones of her son, next to whom her husband would be buried. On the Saturday morning Androulla said she wanted to see her son. She took eau de cologne to sprinkle on her son's bones, which Kyriakos had gathered in a blanket onto which he had placed the son's skull. She went first to his grave and told him, crying as a *moiroloyio* (lament), "We have found your father. Tonight you will sleep with him next to you." She then went to her mother's grave and addressed her: "Mother, I have found my husband, Hambis." She was very agitated. Her friend Maroulla was worried: "I thought she would faint, and then what will I do? Fortunately, the *colognia* revived her." "I will sleep with Hambis tonight," Androulla said, hugging his coffin. The shovels used to bury him were the same ones she used at her attempted exhumations, she said.

The memorial service at the church, *praesente cadavere,* was a major event attended by the media, ministers, the Bishop of Morphou, officials, and representatives of the Committee of the Relatives of the Missing. The speeches reinforced the tendency to turn the missing into heroes, something that Androulla and many other relatives seemed pleased with. This process also occurred in Argentina (Robben 2000). Christian symbolism was predominant in the speeches. No officials came to her home after the funeral to take refreshments during the *parigoria* [post-funeral gathering]. According to Androulla, they did not come "because they are tired of the whole business and they came to the church only to see the reaction of the family."

Androulla's observation was astute. Tensions between political widows and authorities over burials are not new. They underlie Sophokles' *Antigone* and, in more contemporary times, South Africa. For the latter, Ramphele has noted: "The political widow becomes a valuable resource for the political organization to which her husband and/or herself were affiliated. She embodies the social memory that has to be cultivated and kept alive to further the goals of the struggle. . . . [But] she also becomes the embodiment of the brutality of the state which leaves women like her in a vulnerable liminal state" (1997, 110). The authorities were apprehensive about Androulla's potential for independent action and the danger (from their point of view) that she might overstep her passive role as political widow and condemn them. Initially she wanted to exclude them, but she relented. Her insistence that the defense minister attend confirmed her husband's heroic status. Ramphele suggests that "the public role of the political widow derives from her relationship with her husband; she is not seen as a widow but as someone standing in for a fallen man. . . . Her agency is not completely eliminated but constrained" (112). This may apply to post-apartheid South Africa and indeed to many Cypriot widows on both sides but is perhaps too uncompromising in its positing an ideal of uncon-

strained political agency—a romantic view of Antigone. The messiness of social life rarely permits such gestures. What was important for Androulla was the recognition by the authorities that her link with her husband was more compelling than the scandalous ways they had used him as a missing person. In short, she was a political widow *before* his identification and exhumation. His reburial returned him to her, much like Phocion's widow who gathered his ashes from beyond the city's walls. Clearly the authorities attempted to derive political capital out of the public ceremony, but their presence there suited her purposes. Political sponsorship did not assuage her resentment or indeed constrain her possibilities for future action. It may even have strengthened her position. Nor was the charade lost on the public or on the officials present.[4]

Conclusion

In her book on death and divination in Greece, Seremetakis (1991) laid bare how death defamiliarizes the social order. Death separates men and women. By "screaming the dead" (the *klama*), women reconfigure the social order, managing violence through language and sound which is both the "performance" and self-embodiment of pain (*ponos*). Death provides women with an eruptive opportunity to *other themselves* through a violently emotive engagement with, and *pothos* for, their dead that men fear to enter. Seremetakis considers the *moiroloyio* and the *klama* to be expressions of the ethics of care, which have been incrementally encroached upon by the historical rationalization of death (163).

We can view matters somewhat differently, less in terms of the progressive "rationalization" of emotions, attractive (and indubitably partly correct) as this thesis may be. Highly emotively charged situations (such as the loss of loved ones) are by their very "nature" resistant to "rationalization," and they often provide a performative space for those likely to be particularly constrained by such forces to comment on them. In this chapter I have shown that during the process of exhumations and reburial something more was involved than the attempts of a wife/widow to find her dead husband and lay him to rest. It was a reassertion of obligation and the obligation of reassertion. In situations of extreme stress, kinship reasserts itself not through the enactment of roles but rather through *the enactment and embodiment of sentiment.* Sentiments are not restricted to, and by, roles. Rather, individuals embody their sentiments as a means to find themselves and define their roles in their own way.

Contemporary anthropological theory finds it difficult to grapple with these notions. Our understanding of kinship is embedded in our treatment of roles—as brother, mother, wife, father, and so forth. But there is a sense

in which emotion transcends these terms and has to be treated as a sui generis phenomenon, redefining what we normally understand by these terms. In Greek, one could use the term *diki mas/dikos mas* (our man, our person) to denote an ascriptive role beyond kinship terms. "Our man/woman" applies to strict kinship and affinity, patronage, political party membership, even ethnicity. It is the opposite of *xenos.* Yet although the term is useful, in Androulla's case, the sense of recapture, of the emotion she expressed and the way she spoke of her husband, transcended a "simple" matter of the recovery of a husband. She recovered something more than that. Here a detour to the classical Greek notion of *philia* may be useful. In discussing Greek tragedy, Simon Goldhill (1986) notes that the notion of *philos* (and, relatedly, *ekthros*) cannot be glossed as friend (and enemy). *Philos/philia* is the language of obligation between one's own, between husband and wife, brother and sister. *Philia* is an obligation to be obliging, versus an equal obligation to be disobliging, with one's *ekhthroi* [enemies]. Sophokles' Antigone treats the sentiment of *philia* toward her brother as higher than the rules of the city that holds him to be an *ekthros:* "I am not of a nature to share in hatred (*ekhth-*) but to share in love (*phil-*)." Modern Greek does not carry that notion. Indeed, when a woman refers to her *philos,* she refers to a lover (often a secret one). But I am suggesting that it is precisely this categorically transgressive use of *philos* that could give us an insight into the notion that her husband was her *philos* in both the modern Greek sense of lover and in the classical Greek sense of an obligation that binds both husband and wife *and* brother and sister. Androulla's struggle against the authorities in wanting Hambis identified not as an *agnoumeno* but as her husband, not as an anonymous person buried secretly beyond the city's walls but as someone with an identity who should be buried *within* the city (i.e., the moral community), was in effect a struggle for recognition of a living, binding, personal, relationship, of her obligation, of her *philia,* rather than an imposed, civic, depersonalized, linkage to her husband as a political widow. Her struggle to maintain that bond with Hambis can be seen metaphorically as a bond with a *philos*; that is, a secret, not socially recognized bond with an individual, one that rejects the state-imposed role of a passive Penelope. She rejected the waiting or mourning role of a wife/widow and pursued the action of frequenting Hambis's materiality after his politically imposed "disappearance," or non-materiality. Through her attempt to exhume him, she "materialized" (*pragmatevthike*), literally made real/true, her husband. In this sense, until he was positively identified, he could be seen in the modern Greek sense as her *philos,* as someone with whom she maintained a rapport on an ongoing emotive level that was not recognized by society. I am of course talking metaphorically here, but it is through the use of symbols and hidden levels of meaning that we can

understand the subtlety of her utterances and conflicting emotions during the exhumation and reburial process. In another sense, her rapport with her husband can be seen in the classical Greek sense of *philos,* as a term in moral discussion or judgment. I am not referring here to the notion of "friend" but as someone to whom she had a overriding obligation (perhaps *dikos mou*). As Goldhill notes, not only is *philos* "one of the commonest adjectives applied to Homeric poems to words for 'spouse'" (1986, 82), but it also marks the "bonds and agreements of a social interaction" (ibid.). It is not too fanciful to suggest that because she had not had a material or physical relationship with her husband for some twenty-six years, he had become something like a brother, or even a father, someone whose bond one inherits. She did indeed make the slip of referring to him as "*o pateras mas*" (our father), and when she was apprehended by the police during her desperate exhumation, she cried out: "Is there not any *mother* who doesn't want to find her *son*?" I am struggling here to try to fit complex sentiments and representations in extraordinary situations into categories and roles (husband, wife, brother, etc.) that *produce* normality. Terms such as "husband" and "wife" do not fully work in such situations. It is because of the situation's phenomenological extraordinariness that we must move beyond the normal embedded meanings of terms. Significantly, she addressed him only as *o antras mou,* my husband—that is, as a socially restricted role—when talking to officials in public. At home during the wake and at the cemetery, she always referred to him, and addressed him by, his name, Hambis. Nor could she refer during the wake to any of his characteristics as a husband. He had long ceased to materially disclose himself to her as a person. It was not his identity as an interacting recently departed husband that was recalled, for they had only been married for a short time. She did not have a bank of images to draw upon. Instead, she drew incessantly upon his last days: "And you thought you would go off to fight, dear Hambi!" By contrast, it was his siblings who could recall him as he was prior to his marriage, as an individual with unique personal characteristics. The re-presentation of missing persons is also a struggle against the missing enemies of memory.

One could describe the process of Androulla's recapture of her husband as a *process of recognition.* It is recognition that gives the process its extraordinary dramatic potency. The various scenes at the cemetery during the exhumations and at the wake could be called "recognition scenes," similar to those found in classical tragedy. Recognition is a process of legitimation. Antigone recognizes Polynices and throws earth over him. Androulla recognizes her husband and wants him buried properly. As Goldhill noted: "These [recognition] scenes—regarded by Aristotle as one of the two most powerful types of scene in tragic plots—dramatize not just the moment of

a sentimental rediscovery of a family member, but also the reaffirmation of the legitimacy or obligations of a particular tie" (1986, 85). The *klama* and *moiroloyi* Seremetakis discusses can also be viewed as variations of recognition scenes. Clearly, the death of loved ones is an emotional event. But I prefer to view the *klama* in terms of an *attempted recovery of loss.* The advantages of this perspective are twofold. It encompasses the recovery of material remains of individuals who represented the aspirations of national communities that Verdery (1999) discusses with respect to Eastern Europe. And it locates emotion in an attempted (ultimately doomed) recovery of loss rather than in the loss itself. The *klama,* as a scene of recognition, is thus both pain at loss and a defiance of death's violent erasure of social ties through "the screaming." Pain as mourning requires a participatory audience not just for those experiencing the loss but for society itself. *Re-cognition* as the quintessential mise-en-scène sets in motion the attempted *recovery of loss.* And recognition is triadic: it requires the recognizer, the recognized, and the recognized-to—a witness, an audience.

I make these points because recognition, as in Androulla's case, can take place a long time after the actual loss itself. Admittedly this is a rare case, but it demonstrates, even if in extremis, that it was the recognition as a mise-en-scène (bringing together the recognizer, the recognized, and the recognized-to) that provided the only meaningful context for that intense eruption of emotions. Seremetakis makes an important observation that enables us to tease out the paradox: "Burial interrupts visual contact with the dead. Exhumation restores that contact which is described as the 'first facing' of the dead. This can be a moment of shock, loss, and extreme grief for the exhumer who finds the dead 'unrecognizable.' Exhumation then constitutes a re-encounter with the dead in a new and alien form" (1999, 187–188).

Re-cognizing the "unrecognizable." This seems to me precisely the "moment of shock" because it substantiates and reconfigures not just a change in relationship with the lost/mourned person but a change in the mourner's relationship with herself. Mourning is not just expressive; it is also transformative. It was precisely because the burial/ritual process here was the *reverse* of normal burials that this type of recognition took place. The normal burial-exhumation-recognition process as outlined by Danforth (1982), when women talk or sing to the exhumed bones, is one of both recognition and untying the bonds between kin. Here, by contrast, the following process occurred: Androulla's desperate first "exhumation" to draw attention to her unrecognized tie—scientific exhumation—her "intuitive precognition" of his bones—scientific validation—the *klama* as a *social* recognition of her link to Hambis, and his *re*burial. It was thus important for her to "recognize" the bones, to make them hers. She was "pre-

destined" to find her husband, and her finding of him was a reaffirmation of the bond between them. Victor Turner long ago identified the dramatic moment that exposes the various forces that affect the social structure. I suggest that some insights from classical tragedy can be effective tools in prizing open the complexities of this particular set of dramatic moments. This can help us recognize Aristotle's views on tragedy as anthropologically significant when approaching the phenomenon of social suffering. Tragedy is not a condition. It is the working out of the actions of individuals as they affect others, guided by certain ideas and beliefs. "Suffering is an action. It is the outcome of a series of preceding acts. Indeed this plot-centered view holds the promise of cognitive clarifications that may lead to the possibility of personal and social change" (Morris 1997, 37). The characters discussed here progressively achieved some cognitive clarifications through pursuing cultural patterns of action more likely to result in "closure." It would be hubris to identify this Western vocabulary of suffering with a return to the situation *ex post ante.* Events etch indelible traces on the lives of individuals. Women like Androulla and Maroulla used the cultural resources available to them against the authorities that sought to use them for state purposes—not to achieve closure but to recover their dignity through discharging their gender-informed obligations. Contra Ramphele (1997), I would argue that their gender identity as constrained widows enabled them to claim agency. Gender *is* constraint, but those constraints are part of the cracked edifice of society. The Hegelian ideal of a genderless "full citizenship" may actually *disempower* individuals. The major threat to the recognition of the widows' suffering does not come from their current political exploitation by authorities on both sides of the Green Line. There is increasing awareness of this exploitation in Cyprus (Drousiotis 2000). It is rather that the national politicization of the issue on both sides conceals an even more fundamental reality, which is the state's need for dead bodies to be appropriated—in short, the *political order requires representations of suffering,* and this particular political formation requires ethnic representations of suffering.[5] The major threat to the recognition of suffering always comes from the concealment of agency.

If I am right that every political order requires its own specific representations of suffering, we should not be surprised if suffering is redefined in Cyprus, moving from the ethnic to the medical. Should a political solution to the island's division be found, suffering may be *depoliticized through medicalization.* Androulla's conceptualization of her suffering was certainly medical in part, but this is what one could call a "traditional" mode of seeking assistance. Globalization and modernization, to which the professional classes aspire in Cyprus, can homogenize the symptoms and vocabulary of suffering to take advantage of the Promethean gifts of modern therapeutic

regimes imported from overseas that see suffering in terms of psychological trauma. These may be profoundly unsuited to people's original experiences in the sense that they do not address the causes of their suffering, but they create new subjects (and thus new citizens) for modern political and medical orders. In the interests of "national reconciliation," we should not be surprised if medicalization—turning suffering people into patients—offers an "economical solution" that overrides recognition of political agency. This has happened elsewhere, but at a cost. Kleinman and Kleinman note the implications: "Increasingly those complicated stories, based on real events, yet reduced to a cultural image of *victimization* (a postmodern hallmark), are used by health professionals to rewrite social experience in medical terms" (1997, 10). As often occurs, this process may be wrought out of the compromised silences of those who have to bear this silencing.

Notes

1. For a discussion on this and related issues, see Sant Cassia 1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2001.

2. It was established to conduct research on genetic disorders.

3. For a discussion on the use of the senses, see Seremetakis 1991.

4. For a discussion of public secrets and power, see Taussig 1999.

5. See Verdery 1999.

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ELEVEN

Postscript

REFLECTIONS ON AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF CYPRUS

Vassos Argyrou

I

Anthropology is an impossible discipline. It is burdened with a power it does not want but a power nonetheless from which it cannot liberate itself. It knows what its aim is—above all to demonstrate that we are all, "us" and "them," essentially and fundamentally the same—but every time it aims, which is always, it always already misses the target and badly bruises itself. Anthropology is an impossible discipline because it cannot discipline itself. Its practitioners are caught up in the modernist ontological double bind, the vicious circle of being subjects and objects at the same time, both creators of the world and creatures in it. Hence, although they meticulously and painstakingly construct the world as One, at the very same instant they deconstruct it. They do so by the very act of construction, which imperceptibly but inevitably produces Two—the constructor and the construct, the creator and the creature—which are by definition locked in an asymmetrical relationship. Anthropology is an impossible discipline, in short, because it cannot avoid being what it must never be; namely, ethnocentric.

What, then, is there to say about "an anthropology of Cyprus" except that it itself is an impossible task? In one sense, of course, this is precisely what one must say. But, to begin with, anthropology will not go away because it cannot be itself. Although it exists as a shadow of itself, it will no doubt continue the uphill struggle to become its true self. And this is not only or even mainly because of a whole host of practical, professional,

and institutional reasons. The most fundamental reasons are ontological. Anthropologists must continue the struggle to maintain a unified image of the world because an inherently divided world, a world in which inequality is an intrinsic part of reality—for anthropologists, a racist and ethnocentric world in particular—is ethically absurd and meaningless. They must continue the struggle to convince others and, above all, themselves of the essential goodness and innocence of the world, of its common humanity and human purity, because they are driven by an implacable desire for an ethically meaningful world—a will to meaning.[1]

If anthropology is here to stay, then, perhaps there are ways and means of making it less blatantly ethnocentric and more palatable. To be sure, so-called postmodern anthropologists (e.g., Clifford and Marcus 1986) have suggested various reflexive and dialogic methods for the discipline as a whole. My concern in this chapter however, is not with anthropology writ large but with the prospect of an anthropology of Cyprus. My exploration revolves around and is constrained by this theme.

In a certain fundamental sense, an anthropology of Cyprus is impossible. This is anthropology understood as the discourse of Western anthropologists on Cypriot society and culture. Yet this is not the only way to understand either anthropology or Cyprus, and to think otherwise is to fall into the trap of ethnocentrism once again, the ethnocentrism which assumes without saying so that the only "natives" of anthropology are to be located outside the West and the only practitioners of the discipline inside. An anthropology of Cyprus could very well be the anthropological study of the West itself from the perspective of a dominated and marginalized culture. There is, of course, always the danger of repeating the various blunders of anthropology, chief among them the essentialization and reification of what is, after all, a plurality of cultures. For is not the notion of the West the flip side of the notion of the Other? No doubt it could be. Yet what I have in mind is not a unified culture or a group of cultures, and certainly not something to be located exclusively in Western societies. Rather, I am referring to ideas (and hence also practices), the dominant ideas that originate in Western societies and circulate around the world as serious and legitimate statements. Which is not to say that they circulate necessarily in the same way or for the same reasons and purposes. Nor is it to say that because they circulate, they are necessarily endorsed. An anthropology of Cyprus would make such hegemonic ideas its object of study. What it might look like and what its ultimate aim could be is the second concern of this essay.

II

An anthropology of Cyprus in the first sense—as a Western discourse on Cypriot society—must begin with the inescapable fact of colonialism.

I am not referring here only or even mainly to the historical experience of British colonial rule but also, and more important, to the colonization of the local consciousness that began long before the arrival of the British and continues to reproduce itself today, long after their departure. We should not forget that the British were received in Cyprus as representatives of civilization, as liberators from Turkish "backwardness" and "barbarism," as a nation that could understand and sympathize with the Greek Cypriot desire to become part of Greece. For it was the British, after all, and no doubt the Germans also, who produced the myth of Greece as the cradle of civilization. And we should not forget either that even though Greek Cypriots subsequently came to view the "liberators" as oppressors and fought a bitter "liberation struggle" against them, this was never an anti-European or even anti-British struggle but a struggle to be recognized as personas in the myth that Europeans had themselves created. Cypriots still long to be part of that myth. Whether they will be recognized as personas of equal standing in the European myth now that they have formally joined the European Union remains to be seen.

The kind of colonialism that I have in mind, then, does not so much refer to direct political domination or direct economic exploitation as it does to the more subtle and for all purposes far more effective domination at the symbolic level—the taking control of signs by making culturally visible what had been invisible and therefore transforming ways of thinking, imagining, desiring, and making dependent entire ways of being (see Bryant, this volume). The distinction is critical because the latter form of domination is not reducible to the former. Cyprus came under direct British colonial rule—a fact that should not be underestimated—but its predicament of being dependent on Europe for the meaning of the world is shared by societies that have never been colonies in the formal sense— Greece and Turkey are two examples that come readily to mind.

An anthropology of Cyprus must begin with the fact of colonialism because the colonization of native consciousness provides the context in which contemporary realities can be better understood and appreciated. More to the point, such a context could go some way toward discouraging the more blatant forms of ethnocentrism: first, because it makes it more difficult to turn local culture into nature; and second, because it highlights the direct links between the local culture and the anthropologist's culture and therefore throws into relief the complicity of the latter (which is not to say that the former is in any way innocent). Indeed, to understand Cyprus is to understand how European hegemony works in the margins of Europe. There are innumerable examples of how this hegemony operates in everyday life, but here I shall illustrate the point with two relatively recent ones. The first connects the two sides of the divide—Greek and Turkish Cypri-

ots—in a paradoxical, ironic, and multilayered manifestation of European symbolic power. The second, equally ironic and paradoxical, concerns a confrontation between Greek Cypriots and their former colonial masters.

The first case has to do with a well-known Turkish Cypriot journalist, Sener Levent, who has been very critical and vociferous in his critique of the Turkish Cypriot regime and the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus—in fact, he is one of the few Turkish Cypriots to use the term "occupation" for what Turkish propaganda calls "peace operation." Levent has been equally vociferous about the need for a speedy solution to the Cyprus Problem: reunification of the island and peaceful coexistence between the two communities under the umbrella of the European Union. His views made him quite unpopular with the Turkish Cypriot regime and the Turkish army, which tried to silence him with threats of various kinds. Ultimately, the authorities took more drastic measures: they closed down his newspaper, *Avrupa* (Europe), and confiscated its property. Levent's response was to found a new paper, which he decided to call *Afrika,* and continue his trenchant critique. In the summer of 2002, he and one of his colleagues were arrested, taken to court, and sentenced to several months in prison for espionage. The Greek Cypriot side reacted instantly. Greek Cypriot journalists demanded their immediate release and reported the incident to the European Union of Journalists, the International Press Association, and other such international organizations. The Cypriot government itself protested to the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the United Nations. In October 2002, under mounting international pressure, the Turkish Cypriot regime relented and set Levent and his colleague free.

The second example is an environmental story. It began a few years ago with Greek Cypriot environmentalists protesting against the British army's use of the Akamas Peninsula in western Cyprus, an ecologically sensitive area (see Welz, this volume), for military exercises. The British argued that their right to exercise in Akamas was guaranteed by the agreement that gave Cyprus its independence and the British two sovereign bases on the island. The confrontation continued and escalated until the government negotiated a compromise: The British exercises would move to a new location that was not ecologically sensitive. A second round of confrontations began soon after when the British announced that they were planning to construct a giant antenna near the salt lake of Akrotiri, which is located on one of the two British bases in Cyprus. The environmentalists argued that the radiation would be harmful to the local population and that construction work was certain to damage another ecologically sensitive area. The British agreed to commission studies on both issues; these studies, not surprisingly perhaps, concluded that the radiation posed no health hazards to people and that the fauna and flora to be affected could be moved safely to

a nearby area. In the summer of 2002, having completed the removal of the various species of plants and animals, the British began construction work. The environmentalists tried to disrupt them, clashed several times with the police, and denounced the British as "neocolonialists." No compromise was reached in this case. The British completed construction work and began operating the antenna and the Cypriot environmentalists continue to denounce them in the same manner, albeit not as vociferously.

Let us explore the paradoxes and ironies, twists and turns of European hegemony in these stories. First, Sener Levent's choice of names for his two newspapers. As I have argued elsewhere (Argyrou 1996), Europe is what most Cypriots—certainly most Greeks Cypriots—want their country to be. This, of course, does not preclude rhetorical stances that might indicate otherwise, depending on the context and the stakes involved. However, the high stakes, which are not so much economic as political and cultural, lie West, and this is where Cypriots are primarily facing. The best proof of this is not, as one might think, that they are now members of the European Union but rather the offense they take at the slightest insinuation that they might not be truly and fully European.[2] In this context, Levent's choice of the name *Avrupa* (Europe) for his first newspaper should not come as a surprise. But neither should the choice of name for the second newspaper. A "civilized" Europe does not stand alone; it stands in opposition to its "uncivilized Others." What better way then to protest against the conditions in the occupied north than to name one's newspaper *Afrika*? Has not Africa always epitomized Otherness in the European imagination? There is, of course, bitter irony in all this. In a paradoxical gesture of both self-empowerment and self-victimization, Levent resorted to the very Eurocentric ideology that the British used to legitimize their colonial rule in Cyprus and Greek Cypriots in turn used to justify to themselves their dominant position vis-à-vis Turkish Cypriots. What is perhaps even more indicative of the extent of European hegemony in Cyprus is the fact that the Greek Cypriot journalists and politicians who rallied around Levent and criticized the violation of his human rights have never considered or, at any rate, have never stated publicly that the form of his protest was itself a blatant violation, even if symbolic, of other people's rights. How could they have done? Whenever anyone in Cyprus wants to criticize anything, the term for it is *tritokosmiko,* "third-world-like."

There is a lesson to be learned in the second story too. There is no doubt that in their confrontation with the British, the Greek Cypriot environmentalists could claim the moral high ground. They fought to protect the local people's well-being and save an ecologically sensitive area from destruction. The British concern, on the other hand, was the construction of an antenna to be used for gathering military intelligence from the wider geographical

area, primarily, one suspects, the Arab world, especially Iraq. The former, then, sought to preserve life, the latter to (potentially) destroy it. There is no doubt either that the environmentalists were further empowered by presenting Cypriots as victims of British neocolonialism—a small nation still fighting for its independence forty-two years after it had formally won it. But there is a paradoxical twist in this claim that throws into relief the environmentalists' complicity in their own domination and undercuts their short-term empowerment. "Neocolonialism" works in mysterious ways or, at any rate, in ways the Greek Cypriot environmentalists do not seem to recognize. Over and above its more blatant manifestations—the use of force and the threat of force—it colonizes the local consciousness, and this form of colonization is far more effective and insidious than the former. By disregarding the environmentalists' wishes, the British may have acted as "neocolonialists," but what is one to say about the environmentalists themselves? We do not know, for instance, what the British thought and said about them in private, but we do know what Cypriots themselves often say in such situations: "Come, grandfather, I'll show you [where] your vineyards [are]." For is it not the case that environmental discourses, sensitivities, and practices came to Cyprus from, ironically, Britain itself, Europe, and, more broadly, the West? To take the simplest and most ob-vious example, where does the practice of chaining oneself to trees and fences come from if not Greenpeace activism? One could say, then, that if the British behaved as neocolonialists in their militaristic pursuits, Greek Cypriot environmentalists revealed themselves as neocolonial subjects that would have no reason to provoke the British to act as neocolonialists in their own environmentalist pursuits.

One is tempted to contrast the "Cypriotized" Geenpeace activism with indigenous forms of protest, such as the *chipko,* or tree-hugging, practice in northern India, but tree-hugging was not an "environmental" protest until it was discovered by Western environmentalists and was promoted as such. At any rate, the point here is not to accuse Greek Cypriot environmentalists of "imitating" their Western counterparts if by imitation one understands pretension. There is no choice here, nor, indeed, any consciousness of choice. Having adopted the language of environmentalism, Cypriot envi-ronmentalists must use its signs, not only to make sense to others but also, and more important, to make sense to themselves. Rather than "imitation," then, it is perhaps better to speak of "indigenization," provided that the meaning of this misused term is clear. I take it to be the hegemonic process by which global culture is turned into local nature (cf. Appadurai 1990). But it is not my aim here to suggest that there is an authentic local cul-ture in which "alienated" Cypriots should re-immerse themselves in order to become once again their "true" selves. Beyond the obvious dangers of

transforming this culture into another local nature, we should bear in mind that traditions are always invented to oppose modernities and hence are from the very beginning tied to and limited by the hegemonic. Finally, my aim is not to suggest that there is a position outside the hegemonic from which to speak about and deal with it. We are all trapped in it—whether we are tied to it positively in identification, negatively in resistance, or, as is so often the case in practice, in both of these ways at once.

Yet it is also the case that there are different ways of being caught up in a game. The most common is to take the game seriously and play for the stakes involved. Another is to play the game in order to put an end to it. Although it is impossible to ignore the hegemonic, it may be possible to deal with it in ways that undermine those conditions responsible for identifying with it or resisting it, which is another form of recognition. Which brings me to the question of an anthropology of Cyprus in the second sense discussed above.

III

As I have already suggested, an anthropology of Cyprus in the second sense cannot be a mere reversal of Western anthropology—the study of Western societies and cultures by non-Western anthropologists. The fundamental problematic of Western anthropology has been to demonstrate the unity of the world. The problematic of an anthropology of Cyprus can only be the painstaking examination of the forces that generated the need for such universalisms and, ultimately, their debunking. A more promising line of inquiry in this respect would be the study of dominant ideas and systems of ideas that originate in Western societies, assume a life of their own, and colonize the rest of the world. Two broad research areas suggest themselves: first, investigation of the historical and ontological bases of these ideas; and second, investigation of the circulation of these ideas and their impact on the rest of the world. I shall begin with the second, leaving the first and perhaps more ambitious program for later.

The circulation of Western ideas around the world means that the West cannot be solely located in Western societies. Nor, for that matter, can it be located only in the confrontation between the West and its Others as, for example, in the reflective and fully articulated resistance to these ideas by means of invented traditions—Gandhi's (1910/1963) vision of India comes readily to mind here, a vision which, by his own admission, was mediated by the European Orientalists of the nineteenth century and Henry Maine's depiction of the ancient Indian village; and so does, in fact, the Neo-Orthodox discourse in Greece and Cyprus which reproduces the romanticism of, among others, Hamann, Herder, Mauss, and Heidegger.[3]

The West must also be located in non-Western societies themselves, in the internal struggles among different local groups—social classes, men and women, the generations, ethnic communities—for identity and power. This is where the West is reproduced outside the West as a matter of course, roughly along the axis of tradition and modernity. An anthropology of Cyprus would need to expose this silent reproduction, both the indigenization of the global and the invention of the local, as one of the primary ways in which the non-West enacts and reproduces the symbolic violence of Western hegemony.

An equally significant aspect of circulation that requires thorough investigation is the impact that shifts in hegemonic ideas have on the periphery. Such an investigation would throw into relief the predicament of being dependent on others for the meaning of the world—the surprises, paradoxes, and dilemmas to be faced and dealt with. I shall provide two brief examples here to illustrate the point.

As I have already suggested, and as Herzfeld has thoroughly demonstrated in his work on Greece, modern Greek identity is constructed around the Eurocentric ideology of the eighteenth century that depicts ancient Greece as the cradle of European civilization. Yet this ideology is unstable. Over the last few decades, the perception that Europeans have of themselves has begun to shift, no doubt partly under the influence of liberal America and its vision of the world, itself a reflection of the particularities of American society. This is not to say that Europe no longer traces its origins in ancient Greece. It is to say rather that this tracing has lost much of its critical edge. In a world where allegedly there are no centers and no peripheries but only "cultural flows," the question of origins is no longer raised with the same urgency—at least not by those who, secure at the center, can afford to imagine the world as a "multicultural" universe. This privileged group at the center does not include Greeks or Greek Cypriots. Having indigenized the Eurocentric ideology and having little else with which to compete in the global arena for national prestige, they cling to the cradle-of-the-West myth with tenacity. Hence, when in the early 1990s one of the former Yugoslav republics claimed the name Macedonia for itself, Greeks went up in arms—and Greek Cypriots rallied behind them with equal fervor. The "Skopians," the Greeks argued, were falsifying history and usurping Greek cultural heritage. Macedonia was Greek and had been Greek long before Alexander the Great. Europeans and Americans were puzzled and disturbed by the Greek reaction; they could not understand the Greek anger over the use of a mere name. Greeks, in turn, were puzzled and disturbed by the Western response itself. What *they* could not understand was why Europeans and Americans could not understand *them.* In the end, the Western powers found a compromise: Macedonia was to

be known as the "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," or FYROM for short. Macedonia was to remain trapped in a past that it does not want and Greece in a past that it cannot do without. The incident cast a dark shadow over anthropology as well. Having carried out intensive fieldwork in Macedonia, Greece, and other parts of the world, anthropologists provided a comprehensive explanation for the Greek reaction. It reflected, they argued, the claim that the highly centralized Greek state is authoritarian.

Now I turn to the second example of shifts in hegemonic ideas and their impact on the non-West. For a long time, certainly from the early nineteenth century onward, one of the hallmarks of civilization was "man's" mastery of nature. And the reverse: An untamed nature was the mark of the lower stages of civilization—savagery and barbarism. With the collapse of empires and the ascendancy of American power after the Second World War, the terminology of cultural distinction changed but power relations remained firmly entrenched. Mastery of nature was now the characteristic of the "developed" nations of the world (rather than the civilized), while the rest, which may have had a different view of themselves and their physical surroundings, were now presented as "underdeveloped" and "traditional" (rather than "primitive" or "savage"). As late as the early 1960s, the "underdeveloped" were encouraged to take a "leap across the centuries" (United Nations 1963) to master nature at an accelerated pace through the use of Western science and technology. Yet those who took the leap soon discovered that there was no place to land. By the 1980s, nature was no longer an object to be mastered. It had become a fragile domain of life to be protected from human pollution and defilement. As a result of this radical shift in the hegemonic, the "underdeveloped" of the world found themselves caught up in an intractable double bind, a set of conflicting values not of their own making. On the one hand, poverty is cultural pollution—for it is indicative of the ignorance of backwardness; on the other, environmental pollution is cultural poverty—since it is indicative of the ignorance (and arrogance) of "man," the modernist subjectivity for which nature is an object to be mastered.

The other research area that opens up for an anthropology of Cyprus is the critical investigation of the historical and ontological bases of hegemonic ideas. Since the aim can be none other than the disenchantment and demythologization of the hegemonic, this sort of intellectual labor inevitably aligns itself with deconstructive attempts within Western societies themselves. Hence, the close connections between postcolonial and poststructuralist theory. Yet this can only be a strategic and temporary alliance. The West cannot decenter itself by itself; it can only be decentered. Every attempt to decenter it from within inadvertently but inevitably fixes it more securely at the center. The history of anthropology bears witness to

this monumental failure and the intractable paradox that underlies it. And so does the history of the various poststructuralisms of the last few decades. Through such internal "deconstructions," the West emerges as the locus of pure reflexivity, enlightened self-criticism, liberalism, cultural tolerance, and understanding, a domain that claims through denial the cultural and intellectual high ground. In short, it emerges as the recentered center of the world. It is critical therefore, that the deconstructors are themselves deconstructed, even if one has to use their tools and insights.

In my view, the most important of these insights, which comes down to us, through poststructuralism, from the work of such thinkers as Nietzsche and Heidegger, is that although "man"—the modern Western subject—is a being without foundations, he makes himself the foundation of all beings. This paradox has been primarily discussed in epistemological terms, and although this is hardly unimportant, it is by no means the whole story. "Man" has made himself not merely the only guarantor of knowledge but also the only source of significance and value. He makes the world meaningful, but there is nothing in the world that can guarantee that his meaning-giving function has any meaning. This is to say, among other things, that "man" must exorcise the distressing realization that if his life has any purpose at all, it is only because he invented it for himself. Nihilism, then, the problem of meaning, as Max Weber phrased it, and not unreliable knowledge seems to be the most fundamental problem of this "man." It is no accident, for instance, that in the first part of his most famous book, *The Will to Power,* Nietzsche (1901/1967, 7) refers to nihilism as the "uncanniest of all guests." But nor is it an accident that after developing a "critique of the highest values hitherto," he turns in the last part of the book to propose "principles of a new evaluation"; that is, spells to exorcise the uncanny guest. "Man" can critique all values, but when he is finished, he must find other values to put in their place.

If the West is driven not so much by a will to power or knowledge as by a will to meaning, any non-Western deconstructive effort, such as an anthropology of Cyprus, must question the ontological basis of what circulates around the world as the truth—including those truths that make it a point to demonstrate that there is no such thing as the truth. One must ask, for example, What is the purpose of demonstrating the epistemological limits of anthropology? Why should one strive to make present the impossibility of presence (and hence blatantly contradict oneself in the process)? How is one to understand anthropology's attempt to demonstrate the unity of humanity and the more recent environmentalist attempt to convince us of the unity between humanity *and* nature? The ultimate aim of raising questions of this sort should be to maintain the ontological contradiction in which "man" is caught up in the foreground and in full visibility,

to grant the uncanny guest permanent hospitality, to drive the system to where its internal logic is taking it. This may go some way toward making what this "man" says irrelevant and inconsequential both to him and, more important, to those who have been listening attentively for more than two centuries now.

Notes

1. For detailed discussion of these issues, see Argyrou (2002a).

2. I refer to some examples in Argyrou (2002b). For similar examples in Greece, see Herzfeld (1987).

3. For a comparison of the discourse of Yiannaras, the main Neo-Orthodox intellectual, and Mauss and Heidegger, see Argyrou (2002b).

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